RALPH FRANKLIN, JR. v. BOBBIE HOLSCLAW, JEFFERSON COUNTY CLERK'S OFFICE, DENISE HARPER ANGEL, JEFFERSON COUNTY PROPERTY VALUATION ADMINISTRATION, J. ROBBINS, ROBERT HENDERSON, AND ROGER WILSON
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RENDERED: July 15, 2005; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001929-MR
RALPH FRANKLIN, JR.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LISABETH HUGHES ABRAMSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-000759
BOBBIE HOLSCLAW, JEFFERSON COUNTY
CLERK'S OFFICE, DENISE HARPER ANGEL,
JEFFERSON COUNTY PROPERTY VALUATION
ADMINISTRATION,1 J. ROBBINS, ROBERT
HENDERSON, AND ROGER WILSON
APPELLEES
OPINION AND ORDER
DISMISSING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, JOHNSON, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Ralph Franklin, Jr., pro se, has appealed from
an order of the Jefferson Circuit Court entered on July 10,
2003, which denied Franklin’s motion for summary judgment,
granted Bobbie Holsclaw’s motion for summary judgment, and
dismissed the complaint with respect to the Jefferson County
1
Apparently, Franklin is referring to the Jefferson County Property Valuation
Administrator.
Property Valuation Administrator.
Having concluded that the
order appealed from is not a final and appealable judgment
whereby this Court lacks jurisdiction to decide the issues
presented, we dismiss this appeal.
The relevant facts to this appeal were stated by the
trial court in its July 10, 2003 order, as follows:
On or about December 11, 2002, [Franklin],
an inmate in the Green River Correctional
Complex, mailed to the Jefferson County Clerk’s
Office a document entitled “Request To Inspect
Public Records Re KRS Ch. 61.” In this form,
[Franklin] requested that the Clerk “send [him]
the name and zip code of the address commonly
known as 14502 Pauly Gap, Louisville, Ky.” A
similar written request was made by [Franklin]
to the Jefferson County Property Valuation
Administrator (“PVA”) on January 3, 2003,
seeking a “copy of valuation report on the
property commonly known as 14502 Pauly Gap
Louisville, Jefferson County, Ky [sic] (township
commonly known as Valley Station) or at a
minimum, the name(s) of the property owners.”
[Franklin] alleges that as of January 8,
2003, he had received no response to his initial
request from the Jefferson County Clerk (the
“Clerk”). Because of this, he filed his
Complaint herein seeking relief in the form of
an order requiring the Clerk to provide the
requested information to [him], as well as
monetary damages. Subsequent to the filing of
the Complaint, on a form letter dated January
13, 2003, the Clerk responded to [Franklin’s]
request with a handwritten notation stating that
“[y]ou need to contact an attorney in order to
get this information.” By another letter also
dated January 13, 2003, the PVA responded to
[Franklin’s] January 3 request stating that
“14502 Pauley Gap Rd. is not located in
Jefferson Co., my map shows it located in
Bullitt County.”
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On January 20, 2003, [Franklin] appealed to
the Kentucky Attorney General the Clerk’s
failure to provide the requested information.
Shortly thereafter, on January 31, 2003, the
Clerk responded to the appeal by stating that
[Franklin] provided an incorrect street name and
address number in his request. Further, the
Clerk pointed out that its records are “set up
to locate deeds and other documents by deed book
and page number,” and that [Franklin] did not
provide any such information. Nonetheless, the
Clerk contacted the PVA in an attempt to assist
[Franklin], but was told that the address in
question could not be found. On this same date,
the Clerk sent a separate letter to [Franklin]
outlining these efforts and findings.
On April 7, 2003, the Attorney General’s
Office issued its Open Records Decision, No. 03ORD-067, regarding [Franklin’s] appeal (“Open
Records Decision”). In sum, while the Attorney
General found the Clerk’s January 13 response
stating that [Franklin] needed an attorney
“procedurally deficient,” he concluded that all
other aspects of the response were materially
correct. [Franklin] has now appealed the
Attorney General’s decision to [the Jefferson
Circuit] Court.
On April 30, 2003, [Franklin] filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment on the ground that
the Clerk failed to timely respond to his open
records request. He further refers to that part
of the Attorney General’s decision referencing
the “procedurally deficient” response as support
for his motion.
On May 21, 2003, the Clerk filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment relying on the Attorney
General’s decision and the pleadings. On May
27, 2003, the PVA filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the ground that it fully complied with
[Franklin’s] request, and even sent out an
inspector to the area of the county described by
[Franklin] to search out the address. According
to the PVA, the inspector found that it was
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“located as part of another lot which was filed
under another taxing lot, with another address.
It was part of a larger parcel of several
acres.”
Plaintiff acknowledges that the relief
originally sought in this action “would not be
possible . . . for the requested address.” He
concedes that there is no address of 14502 Pauly
Gap and now seeks production of a deed to “14300
Pauleys Gap, Louisville, Ky,” an address
apparently uncovered as a result of the
Defendants’ efforts on Plaintiff’s behalf.
The trial court entered an order on July 10, 2003,
denying Franklin’s motion for summary judgment, granting
Holsclaw’s motion for summary judgment and the PVA’s motion to
dismiss.
Franklin then filed a motion on July 21, 2003,
requesting the trial court to alter, amend, or vacate its
earlier decision.
The circuit court denied the motion in an
order entered August 15, 2003, and this appeal followed.
Prior to briefs being filed in this appeal, the
appellees filed a motion to dismiss arguing that this Court
lacked jurisdiction because the July 10, 2003, order was not
final and appealable.
In an order entered October 8, 2004, a
motion panel of this Court denied the appellees’s motion to
dismiss, but noted that “this ruling is without prejudice to a
reconsideration of the matter addressed in appellees’s motion by
the merits panel, at the panel’s discretion.”2
2
After reviewing
Knott v. Crown Colony Farm, Inc., 865 S.W.2d 326 (Ky. 1993) (noting that a
decision made by a Court of Appeals motion panel is not binding on the merits
panel).
-4-
the record, we agree with the appellees’s argument and dismiss
this appeal.
Pursuant to CR3 Rule 54.02(1), an order that does not
address all of the claims in an action is interlocutory in
nature:
When more than one claim for relief is
presented in an action, whether as a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim,
or when multiple parties are involved, the court
may grant a final judgment upon one or more but
less than all of the claims or parties only upon
a determination that there is no just reason for
delay. The judgment shall recite such
determination and shall recite that the judgment
is final. In the absence of such recital, any
order or other form of decision, however
designated, which adjudicates less than all the
claims or the rights and liabilities of less
than all the parties shall not terminate the
action as to any of the claims or parties, and
the order or other form of decision is
interlocutory and subject to revision at any
time before the entry of judgment adjudicating
all the claims and the rights and liabilities of
all the parties.
The trial court in its July 10, 2003, order stated
with regard to the Jefferson County Clerk’s Office as follows:
The Clerk’s Motion for Summary Judgment was
filed only on behalf of Bobbie Holsclaw. While
the ruling in this Opinion would seem to apply
with equal effect as to those employees of the
Clerk’s office named in Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint, as the Motion was not made on their
behalf they cannot be awarded summary judgment at
this time.
Likewise, with regard to the PVA’s office, the circuit
3
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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court stated:
As with the Clerk, the PVA’s Motion to
Dismiss was made only on behalf of the Property
Valuation Administrator. The reasoning in this
Opinion would seem to apply with equal force to
the PVA employees named in the Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint, but since the Motion to
Dismiss was not made on their behalf, summary
judgment cannot be granted for them at this time.
Thus, Holsclaw and the PVA were the only two
defendants who received final disposition of the claims against
them.
Since there has not been a final disposition regarding
the claims against the additional defendants named in the
complaint, the July 10, 2003, order is interlocutory.
For an interlocutory order to be treated as a final
and appealable order, “the trial court is required to determine
‘that there is no just reason for delay,’ and the judgment must
recite this determination and also recite that the judgment is
final.
CR 54.02(1).
The omission of one of these requirements
is fatal” [citation omitted].4
Since the July 10, 2003, order
did not include the CR 54.02(1) finality language, this appeal
is from an order which is not appealable and this Court lacks
jurisdiction of this matter.
Having concluded that the trial court’s order entered
on July 10, 2003, is not final and appealable and this Court
lacks jurisdiction, the appeal is hereby ordered dismissed.
4
Hale v. Deaton, 528 S.W.2d 719, 722 (Ky. 1975) (citing Commonwealth, Dept.
of Highways v. General Refractories Corp., 453 S.W.2d 531 (Ky. 1969)).
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ALL CONCUR.
ENTERED:
July 15, 2005___
_/s/ Rick A. Johnson_____
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Ralph Franklin, Jr., Pro Se
Central City, Kentucky
David A. Sexton
Assistant County Attorney
Louisville, Kentucky
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