GERALD E. DELONG v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
OCTOBER 14, 2005; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001896-MR
GERALD E. DELONG
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PHILLIP R. PATTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CR-00210
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING IN PART, VACATING IN PART
AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, BUCKINGHAM, AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Gerald E. Delong has appealed from the judgment
of conviction and sentence entered by the Barren Circuit Court
on August 8, 2003, following his conditional plea of guilty to
the charge of possession of drug paraphernalia, first offense. 1
Having concluded that the extensive search of Delong’s motel
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.500.
room and automobile could not be supported by the police’s
subsequent learning of Delong’s probationary status following
his arrest, or by exigent circumstances, we reverse in part.
Having further concluded that the initial sweep of the motel
room was a constitutional warrantless safety search under
exigent circumstances, we vacate in part and remand this matter
for additional findings as to which items were in plain view
during the sweep.
The testimony at the suppression hearing revealed that
on April 29, 2002, Detective Terry Harris of the Barren County
Sheriff’s Department responded to a report from the Four Seasons
Inn that there was a strong chemical odor emanating from one of
the rooms on the third floor. 2
Det. Harris proceeded to the
third floor, accompanied by the front desk clerk and the
housekeeper.
Det. Harris testified that once he reached the
landing on the third floor he smelled an odor, which he
described as an “ammonia smell”--typical of the process of
manufacturing methamphetamine. 3
For their protection, Det.
Harris instructed the front desk clerk and the housekeeper to go
2
There was no evidence as to the time Det. Harris received this call. The
registration card from the Four Seasons Inn indicates that the only rented
room on the third floor, room 301, was registered to Jerry Delong.
3
During the suppression hearing, Det. Harris testified that he was unsure if
the smell was that of anhydrous ammonia.
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back downstairs and to evacuate the other guests staying on the
third floor. 4
At approximately 9:02 a.m., Det. Harris knocked on the
door of room 301 and identified himself as a law enforcement
officer.
He then advised the individual to open the door;
however, a male answered and refused to open the door, stating
that he was sleeping.
Det. Harris again knocked and instructed
the individual to open the door; this time the individual
responded that he needed to dress.
Det. Harris continued to
insist that the individual open the door, but the occupant
continued to stall stating that he was unsure that Det. Harris
was actually a police officer. 5
Det. Harris testified that while
he was standing outside the door of room 301, he heard the
individual moving about the room in a “frantic” manner, and that
he heard the toilet flush five times.
Det. Harris told the
individual that if he did not open the door, he would be placed
under arrest for disorderly conduct and for resisting arrest.
Since the occupant continued to refuse Det. Harris entry, Det.
Harris informed him that he was under arrest for disorderly
conduct.
4
The clerk informed Det. Harris that room 301 was the only room occupied on
the third floor.
5
Det. Harris was dressed in plain clothes; however, when the individual
stated his doubt as to whether Det. Harris was a police officer, Det. Harris
held his badge up to the peephole in the door for the individual to see.
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At approximately 9:17 a.m., Barren County Sheriff’s
Deputy Chris Eaton arrived at the Inn to aid Det. Harris.
When
Deputy Eaton appeared at the door of room 301, dressed in his
uniform, the occupant opened the door and allowed the officers
to enter.
The individual inside the room was identified as
Gerald E. Delong, and Det. Harris placed him under arrest for
disorderly conduct 6 and resisting arrest, 7 handcuffed him, and
recited his Miranda 8 warnings. 9
Det. Harris then performed a
protective sweep of the room to determine if there was anyone
else inside the room and to insure the officers’ safety. 10
After Delong was placed under arrest, he informed the officers
that he was currently on probation in Warren County. 11
Det. Harris left the Inn at approximately 10:40 a.m.,
and promptly contacted Officer Julie Atkins, a probation and
parole officer in Barren County.
At the request of Det. Harris,
Officer Atkins contacted the Warren County probation office and
6
KRS 525.060.
7
KRS 520.090.
8
Miranda v. Arizona, 396 U.S. 868, 90 S.Ct. 140, 24 L.Ed.2d 122 (1969).
9
Det. Harris testified at the suppression hearing that he advised Delong of
his Miranda warnings. However, Delong claimed in his motion to suppress,
filed on July 23, 2003, that “[t]he officer discovered that the Defendant was
on probation by questioning him without Miranda warning following Defendant’s
arrest.”
10
Det. Harris described the condition of the room as “one huge mess.”
Amanda Cline was also present in the room and apparently she was charged with
some drug-related offenses.
11
The legality of Delong’s arrest is not relevant to our review.
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discovered that Delong’s probation officer had been unable to
locate him.
Det. Harris returned to the Inn at approximately
noon, and Officer Atkins arrived shortly thereafter. 12
Relying
upon the fact that Delong was currently on probation, Det.
Harris, Officer Atkins, Deputy Eaton, and Deputy Stephen Clark
conducted an extensive search of Delong’s room and vehicle. 13
During the search, the officers discovered various drug
paraphernalia 14 and a variety of items used in the manufacture of
methamphetamine. 15
On May 14, 2002, a Barren County grand jury indicted
Delong for manufacturing methamphetamine, 16 possession of drug
paraphernalia second offense, 17 disorderly conduct, resisting
arrest, and persistent felony offender in the first degree (PFO
12
Officer Atkins stated that she did not smell a chemical odor and there was
very little contraband in plain view inside the room.
13
Officer Atkins stated that the search was performed based on the fact that
Delong had “standard conditions of probation.” However, she conceded that
she did not request a copy of Delong’s terms of probation and did not know
the exact terms and conditions of his probation.
14
The various paraphernalia discovered in the room and in the vehicle
included: a broken glass tube with residue, one clear glass tube with
residue, three different syringes in a plastic bag, electric scales with
white residue, and a cosmetic mirror with residue.
15
The items discovered in the search of the room and the vehicle used to
facilitate the manufacture of methamphetamine included plastic tubing, four
pressurized tanks, one propane tank, a large metal tub with residue and burn
marks, one small clear plastic funnel, and 25 feet of standard airline
tubing.
16
KRS 218A.1432, a Class B felony.
17
KRS 218A.500, a Class D felony.
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I). 18
On July 23, 2003, Delong filed a motion to suppress “any
and all evidence obtained as the result of an illegal seizure of
the defendant, post-arrest statements taken from the Defendant
without Miranda warnings, search of his privately rented suite
and his vehicle, as well as any and all other items, information
and additional statements resulting therefrom.”
A suppression
hearing was held on July 28, 2003, at which Officer Atkins and
Det. Harris testified. 19
In an order entered on August 6, 2003,
the trial court denied Delong’s motion to suppress the evidence
seized from his hotel room and from his vehicle, relying on the
fact that Delong was on probation at the time the search was
conducted and had signed “a complete waiver” of his Fourth
Amendment rights.
The trial court specifically noted that it
did “not reach the other issues presented by the Defendant and
the Commonwealth.
The Defendant’s Fourth Amendment claims can
be decided on the waiver issue alone, without a decision
regarding the existence of exigent circumstances or reasonable
suspicion on the part of the probation officer.”
On August 8, 2003, Delong entered a conditional guilty
plea 20 to the amended charge of possession of drug paraphernalia
18
KRS 532.080(3).
19
The record is incomplete as the entire suppression hearing was not
recorded.
20
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 8.09.
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first offense. 21
Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court
sentenced Delong to jail to serve 12 months “concurrent[ly] with
felony sentence being served for Warren County.”
This appeal
followed.
Delong raises three arguments in his brief: (1) there
was not reasonable suspicion that he had “drugs in his
possession”; (2) there was not probable cause to support his
arrest for disorderly conduct; and (3) his written waiver
consenting to be searched did not validate the search.
In its
brief, the Commonwealth responds to the sole issue relied upon
by the trial court, i.e., the written waiver.
Our standard of review in reviewing a trial court’s
decision on a motion to suppress evidence is well-established.
We must “first determine whether the trial court’s findings of
fact are supported by substantial evidence.
they are conclusive. 22
21
If they are, then
Based on those findings of fact, we must
KRS 218A.050, a Class A misdemeanor.
follows:
The other charges were disposed of as
Count 1:
Manufacturing Methamphetamine, KRS 218A.1432
dismissed due to Kotila v. Commonwealth, 114
S.W.3d 226 (Ky. 2003) and date of effect of KRS
218A.1437 (Meth Precursers)
Count 2:
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia 2nd, KRS 218A.500
amended to Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, 1st
offense (Prior paraphernalia charge had been
merged with possession of marijuana)
Counts 3&4: Disorderly Conduct, KRS 525.060 and Resisting
Arrest KRS 520.090 dismissed per plea negotiations
Count 5:
Persistent Felony Offender I, KRS 532.080 dismissed as a
matter of law.
22
RCr 9.78.
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then conduct a de novo review of the trial court’s application
of the law to those facts to determine whether its decision is
correct as a matter of law.” 23
In Ornelas v. United States, 24 the
Supreme Court of the United States “recognized that police may
draw inferences of illegal activity from facts that may appear
innocent to a lay person and that a reviewing court should give
due weight to the assessment by the trial court of the
credibility of the officer and the reasonableness of the
inferences.” 25
In addressing the question of Delong’s waiver, we find
persuasive People v. Sanders, 26 where the police responded to a
report that a fight was taking place in a nearby apartment
building.
Upon arrival, the officers heard a man and a woman
yelling at one another inside the apartment.
One of the
officers on the scene knocked on the door and ordered the
occupants to open the door.
After a short delay, the woman
opened the door and the officers arrested both occupants of the
room.
One of the officers then conducted a protective sweep of
the apartment to make sure no one else was inside the apartment.
23
Commonwealth v. Neal, 84 S.W.3d 920, 923 (Ky.App. 2002) (citing Adcock v.
Commonwealth, 967 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Ky. 1998); and Commonwealth v. Opell, 3 S.W.3d
747, 751 (Ky.App. 1999)).
24
517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911, 920 (1996).
25
Commonwealth v. Whitmore, 92 S.W.3d 76, 79 (Ky. 2002).
26
73 P.3d 496 (Cal. 2003).
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Inside one of the open bedroom closets, in plain view, the
officer saw plastic bags with cocaine knotted in the corners.
After completing the sweep of the apartment, the officer
contacted the police department and learned that the male
occupant was currently on parole and was subject to a search
condition.
The officer then requested additional assistance
from the police department, including a police dog, and
conducted an extensive search of the apartment based on the
conditions of parole.
The Court held that the protective sweep
of the apartment was unlawful and was not justified as a parole
search because the officers were unaware at the time of the
search that the male occupant was on parole.
The Court stated:
[P]olice cannot justify an otherwise
unlawful search of a residence because,
unbeknownst to the police, a resident of the
dwelling was on parole and subject to a
search condition. . . . [T]his result flows
from the rule that whether a search is
reasonable must be determined based upon the
circumstances known to the officer when the
search is conducted and is consistent with
the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule
– to deter police misconduct.
In the case before us, the terms and scope of Delong’s
waiver of Fourth Amendment rights was not learned until after
the extensive search had been completed.
Thus, we must reverse
the Barren Circuit Court’s order denying Delong’s motion to
suppress to the extent of the full search of the motel room and
Delong’s vehicle.
We will now address the question of exigent
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circumstances and the extent to which the protective sweep was
constitutionally proper. 27
A well-established exception to the search warrant
requirement authorizes a police officer without a warrant to
enter a residence in order to address an exigent circumstance,
such as the threat of imminent injury or the imminent
destruction of evidence. 28
However, when exigent circumstances
provide sufficient grounds for a limited warrantless safety
search, that safety search must be limited to only the
intervention that is reasonably necessary to address the
exigency. 29
Thus, “a warrantless search must be ‘strictly
circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its
initiation[,]’” 30 and exigent circumstances do not allow an
officer to disregard the warrant requirement. 31
27
Since we are reviewing the facts in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth and since the trial court’s ultimate determination of exigent
circumstances is reviewed de novo (see United States v. Cooper, 168 F.3d 336,
339 (8th Cir. 1999)) there is no need to remand this legal issue for a
determination by the trial court.
28
Commonwealth v. McManus, 107 S.W.3d 175, 177 (Ky. 2003) (citing Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1382, 63 L.Ed.2d 639, 653
(1980)). See also Hughes v. Commonwealth, 87 S.W.3d 850, 852 (Ky. 2002).
29
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2413-414, 57 L.Ed.2d
290 (1978) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d
889, 908 (1968)). See also Strange v. City of Tuscaloosa, 652 So.2d 773, 776
(Ala.Crim.App. 1994).
30
Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393. See also Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 105
S.Ct. 409, 83 L.Ed.2d 246 (1984).
31
Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393.
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As Det. Harris testified, it is generally known that
the chemicals and chemical reactions involved in manufacturing
methamphetamine, including ammonia, create significant health
and safety risks. 32
Thus, the trial court’s finding that these
risks are serious enough to justify immediate police
intervention is supported by substantial evidence and not
clearly erroneous. 33
While the trial court did not make a legal
determination as to whether the strong smell of ammonia and
Delong’s evasive behavior gave the police reasonable grounds to
suspect the manufacturing of methamphetamine had occurred, or
was occurring on the premises, we conclude as a matter of law
that there was probable cause to justify a search warrant.
Further, while the trial court did not address the extent to
which exigent circumstances would have supported the search in
order to prevent the destruction of evidence and for the safety
of the officers, we hold that under the facts most favorable to
the Commonwealth the evidence supported a warrantless search
only to the extent of the initial protective sweep and the
32
United States v. Walsh, 299 F.3d 729, 734 (8th Cir. 2002) (stating that
“[t]he potential hazards of methamphetamine manufacture are well documented,
and numerous cases have upheld limited warrantless searches by police
officers who had probable cause to believe they had uncovered an on-going
methamphetamine manufacturing operation”).
33
Kleinholz v. United States, 339 F.3d 674, 677-78 (8th Cir. 2003). See also
United States v. Wilson, 865 F.2d 215, 217 (9th Cir. 1989); People v. Duncan,
720 P.2d 2, 5 (Cal. 1986); and State v. Chapman, 813 P.2d 557, 560-61
(Or.App. 1991).
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extensive search was not proper under exigent circumstances and
required a warrant.
In summary, the evidence supported the police
officers’ initial entry into the motel room and their securing
of the premises for safety reasons and to prevent the
destruction of evidence.
However, once Delong was removed from
the room and the premises were secured, any additional search of
the motel room without a search warrant was unconstitutional.
The officers’ safety search of Delong’s motel room should have
been limited only to removing people from the area, to observing
items in plain view, and to securing any item in plain view that
constituted a present danger. 34
To the extent the officers
conducted a warrantless search for evidence throughout the motel
room and Delong’s vehicle, the searches were unconstitutional.
However, we are limited in addressing this issue
because the trial court failed to make essential, specific
factual findings.
Thus, we must vacate this portion of the
trial court’s order and remand this matter for additional
findings.
The trial court should make specific findings as to
which items, if any, were in plain view during the initial
safety search, and thus, lawfully seized under exigent
circumstances.
However, any evidence that was not in plain view
during the safety search must be suppressed; and upon the
34
Kleinholz, 339 F.3d at 674.
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suppression of any evidence, Delong shall be allowed to withdraw
his guilty plea, if that is his desire.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Barren Circuit Court
is reversed in part and vacated in part, and this matter is
remanded for additional findings consistent with this Opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Dennis M. Stutsman
Samuel N. Potter
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Dennis W. Shepherd
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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