LOGAN COUNTY, KENTUCKY, BY LOGAN FISCAL COURT; SHAKERTOWN REVISITED, INC.; CENTER BAPTIST CHURCH; THE FATHERS OF MERCY; R.V. WOODWARD; JOE E. WOODWARD v. APEX ENVIRONMENTAL, LLC.
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AUGUST 26, 2005; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001859-MR
NO. 2003-CA-001891-MR
NO. 2003-CA-001941-MR
LOGAN COUNTY, KENTUCKY, BY
LOGAN FISCAL COURT; SHAKERTOWN
REVISITED, INC.; CENTER BAPTIST
CHURCH; THE FATHERS OF MERCY;
R.V. WOODWARD; JOE E. WOODWARD
v.
APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES
APPEALS AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM LOGAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TYLER L. GILL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00350
APEX ENVIRONMENTAL, LLC.
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
AND:
NO. 2004-CA-000099-MR
NO. 2004-CA-000189-MR
APEX ENVIRONMENTAL, LLC
v.
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM L. GRAHAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-00368
SHAKERTOWN REVISITED, INC.;
CENTER BAPTIST CHURCH; THE
FATHERS OF MERCY; R.V. WOODWARD;
JOE E. WOODWARD
APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS
AND
NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION CABINET
APPELLEE
OPINION AFFIRMING IN NO. 2003-CA-001891-MR,
NO. 2003-CA-001941-MR, AND NO. 2003-CA-001859-MR;
REVERSING AND REMANDING IN NO. 2004-CA-000099-MR; AND
AFFIRMING IN NO. 2004-CA-000189-MR
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: HENRY AND VANMETER, JUDGES; MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE. 1
MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE:
These five appeals concern the legality
of a “waste transfer station” placed into operation by Apex
Environmental, LLC (Apex) in the Logan County community of South
Union under a “registered permit-by-rule” issued by the Natural
Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet, Division of
Waste Management (Cabinet) pursuant to 401 KAR 47:110.
The
Logan Circuit Court entered an order upholding the legality of
the facility.
Logan County, by and through Logan County Fiscal
Court, appealed the decision (Case NO. 2003-CA-001859-MR).
Facility opponents Shakertown Revisited, Inc.; Center Baptist
Church; The Fathers of Mercy; R.V. Woodward; and Joe E. Woodward
1
Senior Judge John D. Miller sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
- 2 -
also appealed (Case No. 2003-CA-001891-MR).
Apex cross-appealed
the decision (Case No. 2003-CA-001941-MR).
Concurrent with the Logan Circuit Court proceedings,
opponents of the transfer station filed a petition with the
Office of Administrative Hearings seeking revocation of the
permit.
The Administrative Hearing Officer issued a
recommendation that the permit be held invalid because the
public notice published by Apex contained an improper address;
did not list the actual owner of the subject property at the
time the notice was published; and because Apex had not filed
its LLC organizational papers with the Secretary of State at the
time the notice was published.
The Secretary of the Cabinet
rejected the Hearing Officer’s recommendation and upheld the
permit.
On appeal, the Franklin Circuit Court reversed the
Secretary’s decision and held the permit invalid because of
improper public notice.
Apex appealed that decision (Case 2004-
CA-000099-MR) and the opponents of the transfer station filed a
protective cross-appeal (Case No. 2004-CA-000189-MR).
Apex is a limited liability company owned and operated
by Edward T. Hanks and his wife, Joy Beth Hanks.
On March 12,
2002, pursuant to 401 KAR 47:110(5), Apex ran a public notice
advertisement in the Russellville newspaper The News-Democrat &
Leader to the effect that it intended to submit an application
to the Cabinet for a registered permit-by-rule transfer station.
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The advertisement stated that the proposed facility would be
located at “32E Bowling Green Road, South Union, Kentucky,
42283.”
According to an affidavit filed by Edward T. Hanks, he
had been advised by the former owner of the property and the
South Union Postmistress that this was the correct address for
the property upon which the facility would be located.
However,
according to affidavits filed by the Director of the Logan
County Emergency Operations, Miguel Santiago, and the Magistrate
for the District, Wyatt W. Ezell, the correct address of the
property is 21 Pleasant View Road, Auburn, Kentucky, 42206.
On March 29, 2002, Apex filed an application with the
Cabinet for the transfer station permit.
The application
identified the location of the proposed facility as 32E Bowling
Green Road, South Union.
Pursuant to 401 KAR 47:110, the permit
became effective on April 8, 2002, five business days after the
Cabinet received the application, because it was not denied
during that time (the opponents of the facility refer to the
permit as having become effective on April 5, 2002).
In
opposition to the validity of the permit, in addition to the
incorrect address, Apex’s opponents note that the company did
not file its Articles of Organization as a limited liability
company with the Secretary of State, and thus did not come into
existence, until April 5, 2002.
275.020; KRS 271B.2-030(1).
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)
They also note that the property
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upon which the property was to be located was not conveyed to
the Hanks until April 5, 2002, and that the deed was not
recorded in the Logan County Court Clerk’s office until May 10,
2002.
According to Apex, it began operations on April 8,
2002, immediately following the issuance of the permit.
Opponents of the facility allege that operations did not
commence until late June or early July 2002.
In any event, in
May 2002, substantial public opposition to the transfer facility
developed.
On June 21, 2002, the Logan Fiscal Court passed an
ordinance (Ordinance 02.830-6) which would require all solid
waste facilities located within Logan County, including the type
of facility developed by Apex, to obtain a license from the
county.
By its own terms, however, the ordinance does not apply
to facilities operating prior to its enactment.
On October 8,
2002, Ordinance 02.830-6 was amended to set minimum site and
construction requirements for the operation of solid waste
facilities such as the Apex transfer station.
The Apex facility
would not qualify for a permit under the amendment because it
would violate minimum highway and property-line setback
requirements.
A 1995 ordinance (Ordinance 95.830-5) requires a
county license for facilities engaged in “recovered waste and
recycling operations.”
However, though their permit authorizes
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such activities, it is undisputed that the Apex facility does
not intend to participate in recovered waste and recycling
activities, and that the 1995 ordinance does not apply.
It appears that following the enactment of the 2002
ordinance, Logan County informed Apex that it was subject to its
provisions, but that Apex took the position that it was
grandfathered-in because it was operating its facility prior to
the effective date of the ordinance.
On September 3, 2003,
Logan County, by and through Logan Fiscal Court, filed a
Complaint in Logan Circuit Court seeking a declaratory judgment
and injunctive relief against Apex (Logan Circuit Court Case 02CI-00350).
The complaint sought a judgment determining that
Apex was subject to Ordinances 02.830-6 and 95.830-5; a
determination that Apex was in violation of the licensing
requirements prescribed under the ordinances; and requested an
injunction preventing Apex from operating its transfer facility
in violation of the ordinances.
In its answer, Apex denied the allegations contained
in the complaint.
Apex also filed a counterclaim for damages,
alleging selective enforcement of the Logan County Ordinances
against Apex in violation of the Commerce Clause 2 of the United
States Constitution.
2
U.S. Const. Art. 1 § 8.
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On October 11, 2002, Shakertown Revisited, Inc.;
Center Baptist Church; The Fathers of Mercy; R.V. Woodward; and
Joe E. Woodward (Intervening Plaintiffs) filed a motion to
intervene in the proceeding pursuant to Ky. R. Civ. P. (CR)
24.01.
On November 13, 2002, the trial court entered an order
granting the Intervening Plaintiffs’ motion to intervene and
permitting the filing of their Intervening Complaint.
The
Intervening Complaint likewise alleged that the ordinances cited
by Logan County in its Complaint were applicable and that Apex
was operating the facility in violation thereof.
The
Intervening Complaint also alleged claims to the effect that
Apex’s permit was invalid because the March 12, 2002, public
notice published by Apex was deficient on the basis the notice
contained the wrong address for the facility, and because Apex
was not a legal entity at the time of the publication of the
notice and at the time it filed its application with the
Cabinet.
On October 21, 2002, Logan County filed its First
Amended Complaint wherein it added an additional claim that Apex
was operating its transfer station illegally on the basis of
Logan County Ordinance 86-830.1.
Logan County asserted that
this ordinance required the obtaining of a franchise or permit
issued by Logan County to operate a waste facility such as the
Apex transfer station.
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The parties eventually filed motions for summary
judgment.
On March 26, 2003, the trial court entered an order
granting Apex partial summary judgment. 3
The order determined
that the 1995 ordinance was not applicable because Apex did not
propose to recycle or process “recovered wastes” (i.e. recycled
wastes) at the facility, and that the 1986 ordinance was
unenforceable on the basis that the ordinance did not contain
objective criteria for the issuance of a franchise or permit by
the county, and was thus in violation of Section 2 of the
Kentucky Constitution (which prohibits the exercise of arbitrary
power).
The order denied summary judgment with respect to the
applicability of the 2002 ordinance because there was a genuine
issue of material fact regarding whether the grandfather clause
of the ordinance applied.
On June 5, 2003, a bench trial was conducted.
On
August 5, 2003, the trial court entered its Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment.
The order incorporated the
trial court’s previous determinations that the 1986 ordinance
and 1995 ordinance were inapplicable for the reasons stated in
the trial court’s order of March 26, 2003.
The order also
determined that Apex had commenced its transfer station
operations prior to the effective date of the ordinance.
3
Though the order is captioned “Order Denying Motions for Summary Judgment,”
the order, in fact, granted Apex summary judgment on the issues of whether
the 1986 and 1995 ordinances were applicable.
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Further, the trial court held that the 2002 ordinance was not
enforceable against Apex under the principles of the “vested
rights doctrine” and “equitable estoppel.”
In summary, the
trial court held that none of the three ordinances cited by the
opponents of the facility was applicable, and that the South
Union transfer station was operating legally.
Logan County (Case NO. 2003-CA-001859-MR) and the
Intervening Plaintiffs (Case No. 2003-CA-001891-MR) subsequently
filed their notices of appeal from the trial court’s decision.
Apex filed a cross-appeal (Case No. 2003-CA-001941-MR)
challenging the trial court’s dismissal of its claim for damages
based upon Logan County’s alleged selective enforcement of the
waste treatment ordinances.
As events were unfolding in Logan County, in the
meantime, on May 30, 2002, Shakertown Revisited, Inc.; Center
Baptist Church; The Fathers of Mercy; R.V. Woodward; and Joe E.
Woodward filed a petition with the Office of Administrative
Hearings to revoke the transfer station permit issued to Apex by
the Cabinet (DWM-25793-037).
The petition alleged that the
issuance of the permit was void because, among other things, the
public notice was deficient because it listed the incorrect
address for the facility, and because Apex did not file its
Articles of Organization papers with the Secretary of State
until April 5, 2002, whereas it had published its public notice
- 9 -
and filed its application for a permit prior to that date.
Cabinet and Apex were named as Respondents.
The
The matter was
assigned to Hearing Officer Janet C. Thompson.
On September 6, 2002, the Hearing Officer entered her
Report and Recommended Order.
The Hearing Officer determined,
among other things, that because Apex had given the improper
location of the facility in its March 12, 2002, public notice,
that the permit issued by the Cabinet to Apex was invalid.
The
Cabinet and Apex filed exceptions to the Hearing Officer’s
recommendation with the Secretary of the Cabinet.
In its
exceptions, the Cabinet argued that the Cabinet had acted within
its discretion in interpreting the public notice statute as
having been met by the notice published by Apex.
On December 11, 2002, the Cabinet Secretary entered an
order rejecting the Report and Recommendation of the Hearing
Officer and adopting the exceptions filed by the Cabinet; thus
upholding the permit issued to Apex.
On March 12, 2003, the
Cabinet Secretary entered an order making his December 11, 2002,
order final and appealable.
Shakertown Revisited, Inc.; Center Baptist Church; The
Fathers of Mercy; R.V. Woodward; and Joe E. Woodward
subsequently appealed the Cabinet Secretary’s decision to
Franklin Circuit Court pursuant to KRS 224.10-470 (Franklin
Circuit Court Case 03-CI-00368).
The Cabinet was named as the
- 10 -
Respondent in the Franklin Circuit Court appeal.
Apex was
granted leave to intervene as an Intervening Respondent.
Following the submission of briefs by the parties, on
December 18, 2003, the Franklin Circuit Court entered an Opinion
and Order reversing the Secretary of the Cabinet’s order on the
basis that Apex had failed to give proper notice when it
included the wrong address for the facility in its public
notice.
The circuit court’s decision had the effect of
invalidating the permit.
On January 13, 2004, Apex filed its notice of appeal
(Case 2004-CA-000099-MR) and on January 26, 2004, Shakertown
Revisited, Inc.; Center Baptist Church; The Fathers of Mercy;
R.V. Woodward; and Joe E. Woodward filed their notice of crossappeal for the purpose of preserving issues not addressed by the
Franklin Circuit Court (Case 2004-CA-000189-MR).
LOGAN CIRCUIT COURT APPEALS AND CROSS-APPEAL
APPEALS 2003-CA-001891-MR AND 2003-CA-001941-MR
We first address the direct appeals filed by Logan
County and the Intervening Plaintiffs, Shakertown Revisited,
Inc.; Center Baptist Church; The Fathers of Mercy; R.V.
Woodward; and Joe E. Woodward.
These parties, who are allied in
their opposition to the South Union transfer station, filed a
joint brief.
- 11 -
We begin our discussion by noting that this case was
tried by the circuit court sitting without a jury.
It is before
this Court upon the trial court's findings of fact and
conclusions of law and upon the record made in the trial court.
Accordingly, appellate review of the trial court's findings of
fact is governed by the rule that such findings shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous.
643 S.W.2d 261 (Ky. 1982).
CR 52.01;
Largent v. Largent,
The trial court's application of
law, is of course, reviewed de novo.
Monin v. Monin, 156 S.W.3d
309 (Ky.App. 2004)
First, Logan County and the Intervening Plaintiffs
contend that Logan County Ordinance 86-830.1 was applicable to
Apex and required Apex to be issued a permit by Logan County
Fiscal Court prior to conducting transfer station operations in
Logan County.
Ordinance 86-830.1 is captioned “An Ordinance relating
to the disposal of solid waste in Logan County, establishing an
approved disposal site, and prohibiting unlawful disposal of
solid waste.”
Section 3 of the ordinance is captioned
“Prohibited Practices” and states, in relevant part, as follows:
It shall be prohibited for any person
to . . . (5) own or operate a dump except
under permit from the Cabinet for Natural
Resources and Environmental Protection; (6)
engage in the business of collecting,
transporting, processing or disposing of
solid waste within the County without as
- 12 -
(sic) franchise or permit for the conduct of
such business.
In its March 26, 2003, order the trial court
determined that the 1986 ordinance was not applicable to Apex on
the basis that it violated Section 2 of the Kentucky
Constitution in that the ordinance failed to include objective
standards for granting a permit and thereby conferred unfettered
discretion to the governing body in deciding whether to issue a
permit.
We agree.
Section 2 of the Constitution provides that
“[a]bsolute and arbitrary power over the lives, liberty and
property of freemen exists nowhere in a republic, not even in
the largest majority.”
“The rule is well established that
municipal ordinances, placing restrictions upon lawful conduct
or the lawful use of property, must, in order to be valid,
specify the rules and conditions to be observed in such conduct
or business; and must admit of the exercise of the privilege of
all citizens alike who will comply with such rules and
conditions; and must not admit of the exercise, or of an
opportunity for the exercise, of any arbitrary discrimination by
the municipal authorities between citizens who will so comply.”
City of Monticello v. Bates, 169 Ky. 258, 183 S.W. 555, 558 (Ky.
1916); see also Turner v. Peters, 327 S.W.2d 958 (Ky. 1959);
- 13 -
Motor Vehicle Commission v. The Hertz Corporation, 767 S.W.2d 1,
3 (Ky.App. 1989).
Ordinance No. 86-830.1 does not state where a party
desiring to engage in the activities listed in Section 6 of the
ordinance is to obtain a permit (we note that Apex had “a
permit” issued by the Cabinet, and in that respect had complied
with the ordinance) or who is to issue it; nor does it set forth
any guidelines, requirements, criteria, or objective standards
for the issuance or denial of a permit.
Moreover, the ordinance
fails to specify the rules and conditions to be observed by a
party seeking to obtain a permit.
It essentially opens the way
for arbitrary discrimination by the municipal authorities
between citizens who apply for a permit.
We, for that reason,
agree with the trial court that the ordinance violates Section 2
of the Kentucky Constitution and may not be applied against
Apex.
Logan County and the Intervening Plaintiffs also
allege that Apex does not have standing to challenge the
validity of the 1986 ordinance because it had failed to first
apply for, and then be denied, a permit under the ordinance.
We
disagree.
It is true that an individual is not allowed to bring
a challenge to a law unless he is allegedly being injured by the
law.
Yeoman v. Com., Health Policy Bd., 983 S.W.2d 459, 473
- 14 -
(Ky. 1998).
However, in order to support an action, a party
need only have a present and substantial interest in the matter
in litigation.
Winn v. First Bank of Irvington, 581 S.W.2d 21,
23 (Ky.App. 1978) (citing 59 Am.Jur.2d, Parties, § 28).
That is
to say, a party must have a real, direct, present and
substantial right or interest in the subject matter of the
controversy.
Id.
(citing 67 C.J.S. Parties § 6 (1950 ed.).
We
are of the opinion that Apex met this requirement.
Moreover, Apex did not unilaterally seek to challenge
the 1986 ordinance as a plaintiff.
Rather, the challenge was
interposed as a defense in an action brought by Logan County
seeking to impose the County’s interpretation of the ordinance
upon Apex’s transfer station business.
Under the interpretation
sought by Logan County, Apex would not be able to operate its
transfer operations without the approval of the County, and, as
previously noted, the County, an avowed opponent of the
facility, would have unfettered discretion in choosing whether
to issue the permit.
We are compelled to conclude that Apex had standing to
challenge the ordinance in the lawsuit filed against it by Logan
County.
Next, Logan County and the Intervening Plaintiffs
contend that Apex is subject to Logan County Ordinance 02.830-6
because it was not operating the transfer station prior to June
- 15 -
25, 2002, the effective date of the ordinance, and hence is not
grandfathered-in under the grandfather clause of the ordinance.
The 2002 ordinance provides that a party may not
operate a solid waste management or facility in Logan or County
until the owner/operator, site, and facility have been approved
by the Logan County Fiscal Court and a license issued pursuant
to the ordinance.
The second reading of the ordinance occurred
on June 21, 2002, and became effective upon its publication on
June 25, 2002.
The ordinance was amended effective October 8,
2002, to provide for various prohibitions, including highway and
property line set-backs, relating to transfer stations.
Under
the ordinance, as amended, Apex could not operate its transfer
station at the South Union site.
Section G of the ordinance contains a grandfather
clause which states, in relevant part, as follows: “The
provisions of this Ordinance shall not apply to any solid waste
management facility actually operating in the county on [the]
date of ENACTMENT of this Ordinance . . . .”
The appellants
contend that Apex was either not in operation prior to the
effective date of the ordinance or was operating illegally
because it had not complied with the 1986 Ordinance.
The trial court determined that the 2002 Ordinance was
not applicable to Apex on the alternative bases of the vested
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rights doctrine and equitable estoppel. 4
However, as the
appellants have not challenged the trial court’s determinations
with regard to the vested rights doctrine and equitable
estoppel, we will not discuss those issues.
Further, as already
noted, the 1986 ordinance is violative of Section 2 of the
Kentucky Constitution, so we need only discuss whether Apex was
in actual operation prior to the effective date of the 2002
ordinance.
In its August 5, 2003, Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Judgment, the trial court made the following findings
of fact concerning whether the Apex South Union facility was
actually in operation prior to June 5, 2002:
Much of the testimony presented at the trial
of this matter concerned whether garbage or
waste oil was treated at the site prior to
passage of the ordinance. . . . [T]he Court
finds that some garbage and waste oil were
treated at the site in June of 2002 and
before the effective date of the ordinance.
Some testimony was produced on behalf of
Plaintiffs that it appeared from the
standpoint of outside observers that few if
any waste treatment operations were
conducted in June of 2002. Apex produced
evidence that on June 4, 2002 sixteen 55gallon drums of “oily water and dirt, waste
oil” were delivered to the site. The
contents of these drums were processed by
mixing with sawdust and disposed of by
delivery to the Triple M Land Farm in
Simpson County, Kentucky on June 21, 2002.
Some proof was also produced that 4 tons of
4
See City of Berea v. Wren, 818 S.W.2d (Ky. App. 1991) for a discussion of
these doctrines.
- 17 -
garbage (known in the trade as “MSW” or
“municipal solid waste”) was received at the
location on June 7, June 10 and June 24,
2002. During early and mid-June the Apex
premises was inspected numerous times by the
Division of Waste Management which generated
some evidence supporting the claim that some
waste treatment operations were taking
place. No construction or demolition debris
was processed at the site prior to enactment
of the ordinance.
As previously noted, this case was tried by the
circuit court sitting without a jury.
We accordingly may not
set aside its findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. CR
52.01;
Largent v. Largent, supra.
Findings of fact are not
clearly erroneous if supported by substantial evidence.
See
Black Motor Company v. Greene, 385 S.W.2d 954 (Ky. 1964).
The
test for substantiality of evidence is whether when taken alone,
or in the light of all the evidence, it has sufficient probative
value to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable men.
Kentucky State Racing Commission v. Fuller, 481 S.W.2d 298, 308
(Ky. 1972).
While the opponents of the facility presented evidence
to the effect that they had monitored the facility and it did
not appear that the facility was ever actually in operation
prior to June 25, 2002, the trial court accepted the conflicting
evidence and testimony of Apex that operations had been
conducted at the facility prior to the effective date of the
statute.
There was substantial evidence in the record, in the
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form of testimony and documentary evidence, to support the trial
court’s finding that operations had commenced prior to the
effective date of the ordinance.
The grandfather clause of the
2002 ordinance provides only that a facility be “actually
operating” to obtain benefit under the clause.
The trial
court’s findings on the issue intimate that this standard was
met.
This finding is not clearly erroneous, Apex is
grandfathered-in under Section G of the 1986 ordinance, and the
2002 ordinance does not apply to its transfer station
operations.
CROSS-APPEAL 2003-CA-001859-MR
In its cross-appeal, Apex contends that the case
should be remanded for additional proceedings concerning its
claims for constitutional violations arising from Logan County’s
alleged selective enforcement of the 1986 and 2002 Logan County
ordinances.
In denying Apex’s claim for damages as a result of the
actions by the County in this matter the trial court stated that
“[t]he Counterclaim is barred by sovereign immunity.”
Kentucky counties are cloaked with sovereign immunity.
Monroe County v. Rouse, 274 S.W.2d 477, 478 (Ky. 1955).
This
immunity flows from the Commonwealth's inherent immunity by
virtue of a Kentucky county's status as an arm or political
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subdivision of the Commonwealth.
Id.
And unlike municipal
immunity, county immunity is not a creation of the courts and
can only be waived by the General Assembly. Id.; see also
Cullinan v. Jefferson County, 418 S.W.2d 407, 409 (Ky. 1967),
overruled on other grounds by Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510,
527 (Ky. 2001);
Haney v. City of Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738, 742
(Ky. 1965); Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government v.
Smolcic, 142 S.W.3d 128 (Ky. 2004).
Apex cites us to no evidence demonstrating that either
the General Assembly or Logan County waived sovereign immunity
with respect to the cause of action asserted in its
counterclaim.
The trial court properly concluded that Apex’s
counterclaim was barred by sovereign immunity.
FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL
APPEAL 2004-CA-000099-MR
We begin our discussion of the Franklin Circuit Court
appeal by resummarizing the proceedings below.
On May 30, 2002,
The Petitioners Shakertown Revisited, Inc.; Center Baptist
Church; The Fathers of Mercy; R.V. Woodward; and Joe E. Woodward 5
filed a petition with the Office of Administrative Hearings to
revoke the transfer station permit issued to Apex by the
5
The Intervening Plaintiffs in the Logan Circuit Court proceedings were the
Petitioners in the Franklin Circuit Court proceedings. While we referred to
these parties as the “Intervening Plaintiffs” in our discussion of the Logan
Circuit Court appeals, we refer to these parties as the “Petitioners” in our
discussion of the Franklin Circuit Court appeals.
- 20 -
Cabinet.
The issues in the case were eventually narrowed to
whether Apex’s March 12, 2002, public notice of the transfer
station was adequate.
The Hearing Officer determined that in its March 12,
2002, public notice Apex had given the improper location of the
facility; that the actual property owner was not listed in the
notice; and that the organizational papers for Apex had not been
filed with the Secretary of State at the time the public notice
was published.
The Hearing Officer determined that, as a
result, the notice was fatally defective and that the permit
issued by the Cabinet to Apex was invalid.
The Cabinet and Apex
filed exceptions to the Hearing Officer’s recommendation with
the Secretary of the Cabinet.
On December 11, 2002, the Cabinet Secretary entered an
order rejecting the Report and Recommendation of the Hearing
Officer, accepting the exceptions filed by the Cabinet, and
determining that the public notice was adequate.
The Cabinet
Secretary’s decision was made final by his order of March 12,
2003.
The Franklin Circuit Court reversed the decision of
the Cabinet Secretary on the basis that Apex had failed to give
proper notice when it included the wrong address for the
facility in its public notice.
The circuit court’s decision had
the effect of invalidating the permit.
- 21 -
Apex contends that the Franklin Circuit Court
erroneously reversed the Cabinet Secretary for various reasons,
to wit: the circuit court applied the wrong standard of review
of the Secretary’s decision; the circuit court erred by
reinterpreting and expanding 401 KAR 47:110(5) to require the
emergency response address to be placed in the public notice for
registered permits by rule in violation of KRS 13A.130; the
Administrative Agency’s decision was not given proper deference
pursuant to Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984).
(1984); the circuit court erroneously applied KRS 13B.150 in
reversing the Cabinet’s decision; the Secretary’s decision was
supported by substantial evidence; and that the circuit case
improperly relied upon Durbin v. Wood, 369 S.W.2d 125 (Ky.
1963).
The basic scope of judicial review of an
administrative decision is limited to a determination of whether
the agency's action was arbitrary.
S.W.2d 233 (Ky. 1964).
Bobinchuck v. Levitch, 380
If an administrative agency's findings
of fact are supported by substantial evidence of probative value
they must be accepted as binding and it must then be determined
whether or not the agency has applied the correct rule of law to
the facts so found.
Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n v.
Landmark Community Newspapers of Kentucky, Inc., 91 S.W.3d 575
- 22 -
(Ky. 2002).
The Court of Appeals is authorized to review issues
of law involving an administrative agency decision on a de novo
basis.
Aubrey v. Office of Attorney General, 994 S.W.2d 516
(Ky. App. 1998).
At the risk of redundancy, we observe: if an agency
decision is supported by substantial evidence, the "reviewing
court must then determine whether the agency applied the correct
rule of law to its factual findings."
Commonwealth, Department
of Education v. Commonwealth, 798 S.W.2d 464, 467 (Ky.App.
1990), citing H & S Hardware v. Cecil, 655 S.W.2d 38, 40
(Ky.App. 1983).
See also KRS 18A.100(5)(d).
"If the court
finds the correct rule of law was applied to facts supported by
substantial evidence, the final order of the agency must be
affirmed."
Id., citing Brown Hotel Company v. Edwards, 365
S.W.2d 299, 302 (Ky. 1963); Bowling v. Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection Cabinet, 891 S.W.2d 406,410 (Ky.App.
1994).
As a general matter the courts give great deference to
an agency interpretation of its own regulations and the statutes
underlying them.
Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Com., Revenue
Cabinet, 689 S.W.2d 14, 20 (Ky. 1985).
On March 12, 2002, pursuant to 401 KAR 47:110(5), Apex
ran a public notice advertisement in the Russellville newspaper,
The News-Democrat & Leader, to the effect that it intended to
submit an application with the Cabinet for a registered permit-
- 23 -
by-rule transfer station.
The advertisement stated that the
proposed facility would be located at “32E Bowling Green Road,
South Union, Kentucky, 42283.”
As previously noted, conflicting
evidence identified the correct address as 21 Pleasant View
Road, Auburn, Kentucky, 42206.
It appears uncontested that the current proper address
for the property upon which the facility is located is the
Auburn address.
It further appears that the former proper
address was the South Union Address.
The precise evolution of
the address is unclear from the record, but it appears that the
change was related to the construction of a new stretch of
Highway U.S. 80/68 in the South Union area.
It also appears
uncontested that the facility is physically located in the
unincorporated area known as South Union, and is not located in
Auburn, which is an incorporated municipality located
approximately four miles from South Union.
401 KAR 47:110(5) provides as follows:
The owner or operator shall publish a notice
two (2) weeks prior to submission of the
registration in a daily or weekly newspaper
of general circulation where the proposed
facility is located. Public notices shall
be of a size to include not less than two
(2) column widths for advertising and shall
be in a display format. The public notice
shall contain the following:
(a) Name and address of the owner or
operator;
(b) The type of facility;
- 24 -
(c) A brief description of the business to
be conducted; and
(d) Name and address of the facility.
“An elementary and fundamental requirement of due
process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is
notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and
afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”
Bingham v. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection
Cabinet, Com. of Ky., 761 S.W.2d 627, 629 (Ky.App. 1988)
(quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company, 339
U.S. 306, 14, 70 S.Ct. 652, 657, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950)).
The Cabinet Secretary determined that the listing of
the South Union address in the public notice was proper notice.
We believe that this Agency determination must be deferred to
under the circumstances in this case.
The facility was to be
located in the small, unincorporated area known as South Union.
The Agency reasonably concluded that the listing of this address
was sufficient to place the public on notice of the location of
the proposed transfer station such that the public could
exercise its right of protest.
On the other hand, Auburn is
located some four miles from South Union.
Hence, comparatively
speaking, as noted by the Cabinet and adopted by the Secretary,
the South Union address gave a more precise description of the
location of the facility than would the Auburn address.
- 25 -
As
such, the Agency gave a reasonable interpretation to the address
requirement contained in 401 KAR 47:110(5).
Accordingly, we
must defer to the agency.
We further note that there is no evidence of bad faith
on the part of Apex in listing the South Union address.
In
using the South Union address in the public notice, Apex relied
upon information provided by the former owner of the property
and the Postmistress of South Union.
As we must defer to the
agency on this matter, we reverse the determination of the
Franklin Circuit Court that the public notice was invalid for
listing the incorrect address in the public notice
CROSS-APPEAL 2004-CA-000189-MR
In their protective cross-appeal, Shakertown
Revisited, Inc.; Center Baptist Church; The Fathers of Mercy;
R.V. Woodward; and Joe E. Woodward, argue that an applicant for
a permit-by-rule is required to be in existence at the time
notice is published pursuant to 401 KAR 47:110(5) or at the time
an application is filed.
The public notice was published on
March 12, 2002, whereas Apex did not file its organizational
papers with the Secretary of Statue until April 5, 2002.
401 KAR 47:110(5) requires that the public notice
contain the “Name and address of the owner Operator.”
12, 2002, notice gave the name and address as “Apex
- 26 -
The March
Environmental – 32E Bowling Green Road, South Union, Kentucky,
42283.”
As already discussed, the purpose of the notice was to
provide the public with information reasonably calculated to
give notice of the material facts concerning the transfer
facility.
Apex was to be the owner and operator of the
facility, and that is the information contained in the notice.
The public was not prejudiced by the fact that Apex did not file
its actual organizational papers with the Secretary of State
until some three weeks following the publication of the notice.
The Agency’s determination that it was proper for Apex to have
published its notice and filed its application for a permit
prior to filing its organizational papers with the Secretary of
State was reasonable, and we will not disturb its interpretation
of its own regulation.
The Petitioners also argue that the identification of
an incorrect owner of property on which the facility is to be
located in the public notice and application affects the
adequacy of the notice and application.
Apex ran the notice on
March 12, 2002, and did not close on the property until April 5,
2002.
401 KAR 47:110(5) does not require that the owner of the
property be listed in the public notice.
Accordingly, this
argument is unpersuasive.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Logan
Circuit Court is affirmed.
- 27 -
The judgment of the Franklin Circuit Court is reversed
and remanded for entry of a judgment consistent with this
opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR SHAKERTOWN
REVISITED, INC.; CENTER
BAPTIST CHURCH; THE FATHERS OF
MERCY; R.V. WOODWARD; JOE E.
WOODWARD; AND LOGAN COUNTY IN
CASE NOS. 2003-CA-0011891-MR,
2003-CA-001941, AND 2003-CA001859-MR:
BRIEFS FOR APEX ENVIRONMENTAL,
LLC:
Lanna Martin Kilgore
Bowling Green, Kentucky
George E. Strickler
Amanda F. Lisenby
Bowling Green, Kentucky
Thomas A. Noe, III
Russellville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR SHAKERTOWN
REVISITED, INC.; CENTER
BAPTIST CHURCH; THE FATHERS OF
MERCY; R.V. WOODWARD; AND JOE
E. WOODWARD IN CASE NOS. 2004CA-000099-MR AND 2004-CA000189:
George E. Strickler
Amanda F. Lisenby
Bowling Green, Kentucky
- 28 -
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