TAMMY BURTON V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
JANUARY 28, 2005; 2:00 p.m.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001076-MR
TAMMY BURTON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FULTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM L. SHADOAN, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 02-CR-00040
V.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART,
VACATING IN PART,
AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, BUCKINGHAM, AND MINTON, JUDGES.
MINTON, JUDGE:
Tammy Burton entered a guilty plea in Fulton
Circuit Court to one count of theft by deception under $300.00.1
She appeals from the trial court’s judgment sentencing her to
twelve months’ imprisonment, probated for two years, and
ordering her to pay $15,217.51 in restitution.
She asserts that
the trial court erred by denying her a meaningful opportunity to
challenge the victim’s allegations of financial damages and then
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 514.040.
refusing to let her withdraw her guilty plea.
She further
claims that she was entitled to have a jury set her restitution.
Finally, she asserts that the trial court lacked the authority
to order restitution greater than or equal to $300.00.
As a matter of statutory law, Burton was not entitled
to have a jury determine her restitution.
Setting her
restitution was a matter within the discretion of the trial
court.
But we hold that the trial court did abuse its
discretion by denying Burton a meaningful opportunity to
controvert the allegations concerning the victim’s monetary
damages.
It further erred by setting her restitution at
$15,217.51 because there is not substantial evidence in the
record supporting the fact that the victim suffered $15,217.51
in monetary damages.
We find no abuse of discretion in the
trial court’s refusal to let Burton withdraw her guilty plea.
So we vacate only that portion of Burton’s sentence that deals
with her restitution order and remand for additional proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
THE RESTITUTION ORDER
Burton was indicted for theft by deception over
$300.002 and unlawful transaction with a minor in the second
2
KRS 514.040
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degree,3 both Class D felonies,4 for stealing groceries from
E.W. James and Sons Supermarket through a practice known in the
grocery business as “sweethearting.”
Sweethearting occurs when
a cashier, without authorization, charges certain customers less
than full price for items or gives those customers items for
free.
Burton, her sister, Ashley Burton (Ashley), and an
acquaintance, Nikki Noonan, were all accused of stealing from
E.W. James in this manner on multiple occasions between March
2001 and October 2001 with the assistance of F.C., a minor who
worked as a cashier.
Burton and Noonan were tried together in a
jury trial that ended in a mistrial when the jury failed to
agree upon a verdict regarding either defendant.
After the mistrial, Burton entered into a plea
agreement.
The Commonwealth amended the theft charge to theft
by deception under $300.00 and dropped the charge of seconddegree unlawful transaction with a minor.
The Commonwealth also
promised to recommend a twelve-month sentence, probated for two
years.
The plea agreement was silent on the matter of
restitution.
And Burton does not assert that the Commonwealth
promised her anything with regard to visitation.
entered a guilty plea to the amended charge.
Burton then
Restitution was
never mentioned during her plea colloquy, which was otherwise
3
KRS 530.065.
4
See KRS 514.040(8), KRS 530.065(2).
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adequate.
Restitution also was not mentioned in her presentence
investigation report (PSI).
When the issue of restitution came up during the
sentencing hearing, Burton’s counsel advised the trial court
that a representative of E.W. James had told Burton that she
only needed to pay $71.00 in restitution, which she had paid.
The trial court expressed skepticism that this $71.00 was
payment in full, recalling testimony from the abortive trial
that E.W. James lost around $15,000.00 due to the sweethearting.
The victim’s advocate could neither confirm nor deny whether
this $71.00 payment was payment in full.
The Commonwealth
requested that Burton be ordered to pay $15,217.51, the total
losses that E.W. James claimed at the abortive trial.
The
Commonwealth noted that Ashley and Noonan, who had already
entered guilty pleas, each were sentenced to pay restitution in
that amount.
No evidence concerning E.W. James’s monetary
losses was presented at the sentencing hearing.
After the dispute over restitution arose, Burton
repeatedly requested a restitution hearing or an opportunity to
controvert the evidence of E.W. James’s losses but her requests
were denied.
Her request to withdraw her guilty plea was
similarly denied.
She was sentenced to twelve months, probated
for two years, and ordered to pay $15,217.51 in restitution.
But the trial court informed her that if she could convince
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probation and parole that this amount of restitution exceeded
the actual damages that E.W. James suffered, then probation and
parole could amend her restitution order accordingly.
Burton
then filed this timely appeal.
RECORD ON APPEAL
As a preliminary matter, we must address two issues
concerning the record on appeal.
Much of the Commonwealth’s
brief is premised on the belief that the record before this
Court is incomplete because the videotape of the trial of Burton
and Noonan is missing.
This is incorrect.
The videotape of the
trial is included in the record on appeal.
Also, both parties’ briefs rely on supplemental
material that was filed with the trial court after the judgment
and sentence on plea of guilty was entered on April 24, 2003.
Burton refers to an email, dated April 26, 2003, from Carl
Bowman, Security Coordinator at E.W. James, to her counsel,
which purports to support her claim that her $71.00 payment to
E.W. James is to be considered payment in full.
The
Commonwealth counters with a letter from Bowman, dated April 29,
2003, to the Commonwealth’s Attorney, stating that this email
was a mistake and reasserting that Burton, Ashley, Noonan, and
F.C. stole $15,217.51 in groceries.
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Both parties have missed the “fundamental rule of
appellate practice that after a final judgment has been rendered
in the circuit court no additions to the record can be made of
matters which were not before the trial court when the judgment
was rendered.”5
Appellate review must be conducted on the record
as it was presented to the trial court.6
Therefore, we may not
consider either the April 26, 2003, email or the April 29, 2003,
letter in deciding this appeal.
NO DENIAL OF RIGHT TO HAVE RESTITUTION SET BY JURY
Burton asserts that she was entitled to a have a jury
determine her restitution amount, citing the provisions of
KRS 431.200.
We disagree with that assertion.
In Kentucky,
restitution is “a system designed to restore property or the
value thereof to the victim” rather than an additional
punishment.7
probation.8
It is required as part of a sentence granting
The appropriate statute governing restitution
imposed at the time of sentencing is KRS 532.032 (and the
statutes incorporated therein, including KRS 532.033 and
KRS 533.030), the “generally applicable criminal restitution
5
Fortney v. Elliott’s Adm’r,
6
Id.
7
Commonwealth v. Bailey, 721 S.W.2d 706, 707 (Ky. 1986).
8
See KRS 532.032(3).
273 S.W.2d 51, 52 (Ky. 1954).
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statute.”9
This is in contrast to KRS 431.200, an older statute
that establishes an alternative procedure for post-sentencing
restitution orders.10
KRS 533.030(3) states, in relevant part, as follows:
When imposing a sentence of probation . . .
in a case where a victim of a crime has
suffered monetary damage as a result of the
crime due to his property having been
converted, stolen, or unlawfully obtained,
. . . the court shall order the defendant to
make restitution in addition to any other
penalty provided for the commission of the
offense. . . . Restitution shall be ordered
in the full amount of the damages, unless
the damages exceed one hundred thousand
dollars ($100,000) or twice the amount of
the gain from the commission of the offense,
whichever is greater, in which case the
higher of these two (2) amounts shall be
awarded.
Within these statutory guidelines, establishing the amount of
restitution is left to the discretion of the trial court.11
9
Fields v. Commonwealth, 123 S.W.3d 914, 916 (Ky.App. 2003).
10
Id.
11
Hearn v. Commonwealth, 80 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Ky. 2002). See
KRS 532.033, which states, in relevant part, as follows:
When a judge orders restitution, the judge shall:
(1)
Order the restitution to be paid to a specific
person or organization through the circuit clerk,
who shall disburse the moneys as ordered by the
court;
(2)
Be responsible for overseeing the collection of
restitution;
(3)
Set the amount of restitution to be paid;
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This
discretion is constrained by the dictates of due process, but
less is required to satisfy due process at sentencing than
during the guilt phase of a trial.12
Specific procedures such as
discovery, cross-examination of adverse witnesses, and factfinding by a jury are not constitutionally required at
sentencing.13
Consistent with this, KRS 532.032 calls for
“ordinary sentencing procedures as the foundation for
restitutionary sentences.”14
This is in contrast to the jury
procedure used to set the amount of restitution in postsentencing restitution orders under KRS 431.200.15
Burton’s restitution was imposed as part of sentencing
and in conjunction with probation.
According to Fields, the
ordinary sentencing procedures of KRS 532.032 apply to such
situations, rather than the jury procedures of KRS 431.200,
which are reserved for post-sentencing restitution proceedings.16
Thus, Burton’s claim that she was entitled to have her
restitution set by a jury is without merit.
(4)
Set the amount and frequency of each restitution
payment or require the payment to be made in a lump
sum.
12
Fields, 123 S.W.3d at 917.
13
Id.
14
Id. at 916.
15
Id.
16
Id.
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DENIAL OF MEANINGFUL OPPORTUNITY TO CONTROVERT EVIDENCE
Burton asserts that she was denied a meaningful
opportunity to controvert the evidence against her concerning
restitution.
Both KRS 532.050 and RCr17 11.02 require that a
defendant be given notice of a PSI report’s factual contents and
be “afforded a meaningful opportunity to controvert the evidence
against him at his sentencing hearing.”18
But it is left to the
discretion of the trial court to determine which procedures are
required to provide the defendant in a particular case with this
meaningful opportunity to controvert the evidence.19
Specifically, a defendant must be given a meaningful opportunity
to controvert factual allegations concerning a victim’s monetary
damages.20
Often, a defendant is first placed on notice of a
victim’s specific claim of monetary damages in the PSI report.21
A defendant has sufficient opportunity to controvert evidence
concerning restitution if the PSI report gives the defendant
notice of the property claimed to have been lost or damaged, as
17
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
18
Commonwealth v. Jeffries, Ky., 95 S.W.3d 60, 62 (Ky. 2002).
19
Id. at 63.
20
Fields, 123 S.W.3d at 917-18.
21
Id. at 918.
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well as notice of the method employed to value the property.
22
The defendant then must be permitted to challenge the assertions
in the PSI in a meaningful way, as by being permitted to
introduce countervailing evidence.23
Fields presents a situation in which a defendant was
denied the opportunity to controvert evidence against him
concerning restitution.
The defendant was ordered to pay
$140,000.00 in restitution after entering a guilty plea to
burglary and receiving stolen property charges related to the
theft of tools and merchandise from an auto parts store.24
The
total claim was far greater than he had expected and included
claims by individual employees of the store, some for thousands
of dollars, which had never been mentioned before.25
This list
of the alleged losses, which was not provided until shortly
before his sentencing,26 specifically identified only one of the
many allegedly stolen or damaged items.27
The defendant never
received notice of the method used to value the items.28
22
Id. at 917.
23
Id. at 917-18.
24
Id. at 915.
25
Id. at 916.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 917.
28
Id.
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Despite
these problems, the trial court denied the defendant’s request
to cross-examine the claimant employees.29
A panel of this Court held that the trial court’s
refusal to permit the defendant to cross-examine the restitution
claimants was probably not an abuse of discretion since crossexamination is not constitutionally mandated at the sentencing
phase.30
But the trial court’s failure to give the defendant
“adequate notice of the claims against him and any opportunity
to controvert them plainly was an abuse of discretion.”31
These
failures rendered the sentencing hearing, with its foregone
conclusion on the issue of restitution, a sham.32
Like the defendant in the Fields case, Burton was not
given a meaningful opportunity to controvert the evidence
against her concerning restitution.
No notice of the specific
monetary damages was given in her PSI.
Even if the evidence
produced at her abortive trial put Burton on notice regarding
the total amount of monetary damages claimed by E.W. James,
Burton was hampered in her ability to challenge these losses
because, as is discussed below, the supermarket never fully
explained at trial how it reached this figure of $15,217.51.
29
Id. at 916.
30
Id. at 917.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 917-18.
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The fact that the victim’s advocate could neither confirm nor
deny that Burton had made restitution in full with her $71.00
payment should have informed the trial court that this
$15,217.51 figure asserted by E.W. James might not be accurate.
By stating that probation and parole could fix any error in the
amount of restitution ordered, the trial court itself signaled
uncertainty about the total monetary loss suffered by E.W.
James.
Nevertheless, the trial court denied Burton any
meaningful opportunity to controvert the factual allegations
concerning E.W. James’s monetary damages, which formed the sole
basis of the trial court’s restitution order.
This denial was
an abuse of discretion.
WITHDRAWAL OF GUILTY PLEA
Having concluded that the trial court’s failure to
permit Burton a meaningful opportunity to controvert the
evidence against her concerning restitution was an abuse of
discretion, we must consider the appropriate remedy.
In Fields,
that portion of the judgment ordering restitution was vacated;
and the case was remanded for further proceedings.33
But the
possibility of permitting the defendant to withdraw his guilty
plea apparently was not raised in Fields, unlike the instant
case.
33
So we must determine whether Burton should have been
Id. at 918.
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permitted to withdraw her guilty plea or should now be permitted
to do so as a remedy for the trial court’s failure to provide
her with a meaningful opportunity to controvert the evidence
against her concerning restitution.
When a criminal defendant pleads guilty, RCr 8.10
requires the trial court receiving the guilty plea to determine
on the record whether the defendant is voluntarily pleading
guilty,34 as determined from the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the plea.35
The trial court is in the best position
to determine the totality of the circumstances surrounding a
guilty plea.36
A criminal defendant who has pleaded guilty may
move the trial court to withdraw the guilty plea under RCr 8.10.
If the plea was involuntary, the motion to withdraw it must be
granted.37
But if it was voluntary, the trial court may, within
its discretion, either grant or deny the motion.38
A trial court
abuses its discretion when it renders a decision that is
34
Bronk v. Commonwealth, 58 S.W.3d 482, 486 (Ky. 2001).
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Rodriguez v. Commonwealth, 87 S.W.3d 8, 10 (Ky. 2002).
38
Id.
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arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by legal
principles.39
In the instant case, Burton has never claimed that her
plea was entered involuntarily.
She has not even asserted that
if she had known that she was going to be ordered to pay
$15,217.51, she would not have entered the guilty plea.
Even
with the disputed restitution order, Burton received a favorable
sentence as a result of the plea agreement.
She was facing a
maximum of ten years’ imprisonment but received a twelve-month
sentence, probated for two years.
Under these circumstances, it
clearly was within the trial court’s discretion to deny her
motion to withdraw her guilty plea.
While permitting a
defendant to withdraw a guilty plea theoretically might be an
appropriate remedy for errors in imposing restitution, it is not
warranted in the instant case.
Instead, we vacate only that
portion of the judgment ordering restitution and remand for
further proceedings to determine the appropriate amount of
restitution.
RESTITUTION EXCEEDING FINANCIAL UPPER LIMIT OF CRIME
Burton asserts that the trial court could order
restitution only in an amount less than $300.00, regardless of
the amount of monetary damages suffered by E.W. James as a
39
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Ky.
2000).
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result of her criminal actions, because she entered a guilty
plea only to one count of theft by deception under $300.00.
We
question whether this issue was preserved at the trial court
level.
But because this case is being remanded for further
proceedings concerning restitution, it is in the interest of
judicial economy to address this issue regardless of
preservation as it is likely to arise again.40
As noted, KRS 533.030(3) provides for restitution “in
the full amount of the damages.”
This provision has been
interpreted as demonstrating the legislative intent of insuring
that crime victims suffering monetary damages are fully
compensated for their losses.41
Whether a defendant who has
entered into a negotiated plea agreement may be ordered to pay
restitution in an amount greater than the financial upper limit
of the crime to which she is pleading guilty is a question of
first impression in Kentucky.
The Kentucky Supreme Court has held that as part of a
plea agreement a criminal defendant may waive rights provided by
statute and accept sentences that would otherwise be unlawful.
40
Cf., Springer v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 439, 446 (Ky. 1999)
(holding that challenge to admissibility of confession that was not
raised at trial was, nevertheless, ripe for determination on appeal
where remand for new trial was ordered on other grounds).
41
Hearn, 80 S.W.3d at 436.
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In Myers v. Commonwealth,42 the Supreme Court held that a
defendant could waive the maximum aggregate sentence restriction
imposed by KRS 532.110(1)(c) in exchange for the benefit of
earlier eligibility for parole.43
Likewise, in Commonwealth v.
Griffin,44 the Supreme Court held that a defendant could waive
the five-year limitation on a sentence of probation to avoid
revocation of probation and imprisonment.45
In both instances,
the fact that the criminal defendant received something valuable
in exchange demonstrated the voluntariness of the waiver.46
As a Texas court observed, permitting restitution in
excess of the upper financial limit of the theft charge to which
a defendant pleads guilty serves the dual goals of facilitating
and promoting plea bargain agreements and of ensuring that crime
victims are fully compensated.47
A blanket rule prohibiting a
42
42 S.W.3d 594 (Ky. 2001).
43
Id. at 596-98.
44
942 S.W.2d 289 (Ky. 1997).
45
Id. at 291.
46
Commonwealth v. Townsend, 87 S.W.3d 12, 15 (Ky. 2002).
47
Campbell v. Texas, 5 S.W.3d 693, 700 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (en
banc) (upholding restitution order of $100,000.00 despite fact that
defendant entered a guilty plea to theft by deception of property
valued more than $20,000.00 but less than $100,000.00). Other cases
similarly holding that a defendant who pleads guilty as a result of
a plea agreement may be ordered to pay restitution in excess of the
financial upper limit of the charge to which he entered a guilty
plea are as follows: Maine v. LaCasce, 512 A.2d 312 (Me. 1986)
(upholding restitution order of $12,000.00, originally $36,000.00,
for defendant who plead guilty to theft of property over $500.00 but
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defendant from paying restitution greater than the upper dollar
limit of the criminal charge to which the defendant pleads
guilty would have the ultimate effect of limiting plea
bargaining in multi-count indictments, which would have a
detrimental effect on a defendant’s ability to limit penal
liability.48
This rationale is persuasive given Kentucky’s
legislative intent that restitution is meant, at least in part,
to fully compensate crime victims for monetary damages49 and the
Kentucky court’s recognition of the established judicial
practice of plea bargaining.50
under $1,000.00 where defendant received a substantial reduction in
her potential penal liability as a result of a plea bargain); Nix v.
Arkansas, 54 Ark.App. 302, 303-304, 925 S.W.2d 802, 803-804
(Ark.Ct.App. 1996) (en banc) (holding that defendant who entered a
plea of guilty as a result of a plea agreement to theft of property
over $200.00 but less than $2,500.00 could be ordered to pay
$19,500.00 in restitution where sufficient evidence supported that
the victim lost property valued at the higher figure); Wisconsin v.
Huntington, 132 Wis.2d 25, 26-28, 390 N.W.2d 74, 75-76 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1986) (upholding restitution order of $4,800.00 despite fact
that defendant entered guilty plea only to one count of theft of
property having a value not exceeding $2,500.00); and Fee v. Alaska,
656 P.2d 1202, 1205 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (holding that a
defendant who pled guilty to criminal mischief in the third degree,
which involves intentionally inflicting between $50.00 and $500.00
of property damage to the property of another, could be ordered to
pay $871.20 in restitution).
48
LaCasce, 512 A.2d at 316.
49
Hearn, 80 S.W.3d at 436.
50
See Kennedy, 962 S.W.2d at 882 (noting that plea bargaining helps
“expedite the disposition of heavy criminal dockets” and, in proper
cases, serves both the interests of the Commonwealth and a criminal
defendant by offering “a negotiated, certain sentence,” rather than
the risk and unpredictability of trial).
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This issue is interrelated with joint and several
liability.
No published case in Kentucky appears to address
whether liability for restitution is joint and several.
However, KRS 533.030(3) states that “[w]here there is more than
one (1) defendant or more than one (1) victim, restitution may
be apportioned.”
The statute uses the permissive “may.”
To say
that restitution may be apportioned among multiple defendants
necessarily implies that apportionment is not mandatory.
Joint
and several liability is also consistent with the restitution
statutes’ legislative intent of ensuring that crime victims are
fully compensated for their monetary losses because it increases
the pool of available funds.
Based upon the plain meaning of the KRS 533.030(3) and
the fact that imposing joint and several liability promotes the
legislative intent of restitution, we hold that multiple
defendants may be held jointly and severally liable for
restitution.
Yet, this statutory scheme of permitting joint and
several liability would be frustrated if a defendant were able
to escape joint and several liability merely by pleading guilty
to a lesser charge that has a fixed-dollar upper limit less than
the victim’s total monetary damages.
The evidence offered at trial concerning the monetary
damages of E.W. James consisted largely of computer copies of
twenty-seven cash register transactions conducted by F.C.
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The
Commonwealth presented evidence linking Burton, at most, to only
ten of these transactions showing unpaid-for merchandise
totaling $706.77.51
Therefore, although the trial court did not
explicitly state this point, by sentencing Burton to pay
restitution for the total amount allegedly lost by E.W. James
through the sweethearting scheme, it was imposing joint and
several liability upon her.
Given that it was in the trial
court’s discretion to do so, it would be inconsistent to say
that Burton’s favorable plea bargain removed this discretion.
Perversely, if her liability were restricted to the financial
upper limits of the crime for which she was sentenced, which is
less than $300.00, Burton could not even be liable for
restitution to pay the full amount in groceries that the
Commonwealth’s trial proof showed she stole personally.
We find
such a restriction inconsistent with Kentucky’s restitution
statutory scheme.
And it would be detrimental to the
established practice of plea bargaining, ultimately harming
defendants such as Burton who seek to minimize their penal
51
The $706.77 figure is the Court’s own calculation, based on all the
cash register receipts identified by the Commonwealth at trial as
ones Burton potentially was involved in. Burton actually admitted
to participating in only one transaction, which she paid for by
personal check. The Commonwealth presented testimony at trial
linking her to all ten of the twenty-seven transactions that did not
involve the use of an Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) card, a
debit card used to access food stamp benefits. This Court takes no
position as to how many sweethearting transactions Burton was
actually involved in. As described below in Footnote 63, there were
some obvious arithmetical errors in the calculations based on these
receipts which were presented to the trial court.
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liability.
Moreover, even if there were otherwise a prohibition
against sentencing Burton to pay restitution greater than the
financial upper limit of the crime for which she is being
sentenced, Burton waived this prohibition.
The record shows
that, in exchange for her guilty plea, Burton received a
favorable sentencing recommendation which the trial court
adopted.
She went from facing a possible ten years of
imprisonment to receiving twelve months, probated for two years.
This quid pro quo is sufficient to show a valid waiver of any
right otherwise prohibiting Burton from being sentenced to pay
restitution greater than $299.99.52
INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT RESTITUION ORDER
Burton did not specifically question the sufficiency
of the evidence to support the trial court’s restitution order.
But we find that the order is not supported by substantial
evidence.
Because this issue is likely to arise again on
remand, we address it in the interest of judicial economy.
As noted, the trial court’s discretion to set the
amount of restitution to be paid is not without limits.
Due
process at sentencing requires that “sentences not be imposed on
the basis of material misinformation and that facts relied on by
52
See Myers, 42 S.W.3d at 596-98; Griffin, 942 S.W.2d at 291; and
LaCasce, 512 A.2d. at 315-16.
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the sentencing court ‘have some minimal indicium of reliability
beyond mere allegation.’”53
There must be sufficient factual
evidence in the record to support the trial court’s order of
restitution.54
Even where a defendant enters a guilty plea, “the
record must establish an adequate factual predicate for a
restitution order.”55
In some instances, a guilty plea and plea
agreement might satisfy this requirement, just as evidence
presented in the guilt phase of a trial might satisfy this
requirement in other instances.56
But, if this is not the case,
then this factual record must be established at the sentencing
hearing or a separate restitution hearing.
Fields provides an example of a restitution order
which “fail[ed] to satisfy even the Constitution’s minimal
reliability standard.”57
Though the defendant was ordered to pay
$140,000.00 in restitution, only one of the many allegedly
stolen or damaged items was even specifically identified.58
53
Fields, 123 S.W.3d at 917, quoting United States v. Silverman,
976 F.2d 1502, 1504 (6th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).
54
Fields at 917.
55
Id. at 918.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 917.
58
Id. at 915, 917.
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Moreover, there was no evidence in the record concerning the
valuation of the allegedly stolen or damaged items.59
The instant case poses similar problems.
The only
evidence regarding E.W. James’s alleged monetary damages or how
these damages were calculated was presented at the trial which
ended in a hung jury.
A summary of this evidence is as follows.
On or about October 13, 2001, E.W. James’s store manager, Robert
McClure, was alerted by another cashier that she had observed
F.C. a few days earlier behaving suspiciously while F.C. was
ringing up Noonan’s groceries.
F.C. repeatedly scanned an item,
used the “error correct” button60 on the cash register to remove
any charge for this item from the receipt, then placed the item
with the other groceries to be bagged, as if Nikki had been
charged for the item.
This prompted a review of all the
available computer records of F.C.’s cash register transactions.
However, E.W. James’s computer system stores a record of cash
register transactions for only thirty days, after which they are
automatically purged by the system.
Consequently, no store
records were available for cash register transactions older than
thirty days.
Twenty-seven of F.C.’s transactions61 between
59
Id. at 917.
60
The error correct button is used to remove a charge from a receipt
where a cashier accidentally charges a customer twice for the same
item. It is also used to remove a charge from a receipt when a
customer decides not to purchase an item after it has been scanned.
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September 20, 2001, and October 10, 2001, showed signs of
sweethearting: a pattern of using the error correct button
excessively62 to remove items from the total to be charged the
customer.63
The cumulative value of uncharged groceries on the
twenty-seven cash register transactions produced at trial is
$2,128.38.64
When confronted, F.C. admitted to sweethearting since
approximately March 2001 but only for Burton, Ashley, and
Noonan, no one else.
Bowman testified that the supermarket
calculated the total amount stolen through this sweethearting
scheme between March 2001 and when F.C. was caught in October
61
These transactions were introduced into evidence as Plaintiff’s
(Commonwealth’s) Exhibits 1-28, respectively. The discrepancy in
number is due to the fact that Exhibits 26 and 28 are duplicates of
the same transaction, number 296898. These transactions were
summarized on a chart introduced as Plaintiff’s (Commonwealth’s)
Exhibit 29, apparently compiled by E.W. James’s security
coordinator, Bowman. It, too, mistakenly lists twenty-eight
transactions because it lists transaction number 94867, introduced
as Exhibit 12, twice.
62
When the error correct button is used after ringing up an item, the
record of the transaction first shows the price of the item being
added to the total and then being subtracted from it.
63
The chart (Exhibit 29) purports to list the dollar amount for each
transaction of the groceries which the customer received, despite
the fact that they were not paid for. The figures for the chart are
based on handwritten figures written at the top of each cash
register transaction, which purport to show the total value of
uncharged merchandise on each receipt. It is unclear who performed
the arithmetic; but the Court has recalculated the figures, based on
the actual cash register receipts, as there were some obvious
arithmetical errors. The trial court should take notice of this
problem upon remand.
64
McClure testified that the losses during this period were $2,244.21;
but this figure was based on the previously described arithmetical
errors and included counting one transaction twice.
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2001 to be $15,217.51.
He said that this figure was based on
the evidence that E.W. James gathered and on what F.C. told him
but he did not elaborate.
At Burton’s and Noonan’s trial, F.C.
admitted that she helped Burton, Ashley, and Noonan steal more
than $300.00 in groceries combined.
However, she doubted that
the amount stolen could possibly have been as high as
$15,000.00.
She testified that her restitution had been set at
only $5,000.00 in her juvenile disposition because that was all
the losses that “they”65 could prove.
She also said that she had
no idea how E.W. James proved any of the losses beyond the
$2,128.38 for which computer records were available.
The trial court’s restitution order is based on the
factual premise that E.W. James lost $15,217.51 due to the
sweethearting scheme.
There is substantial evidence in the
record, including the testimony of F.C. and McClure and the
computer printouts of the cash register transactions introduced
as exhibits, to support the fact that E.W. James lost $2,128.38
through the sweethearting scheme.
But the only support for the
remaining losses is the naked assertion of McClure, with no
explanation of how this figure was reached.
This is the type of
unsupported allegation that was deemed insufficient to meet even
the minimal requirements of reliability imposed by the
65
It is unclear whether “they” refers to the Commonwealth, E.W. James,
or the police, or to some combination of them.
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constitutional provisions concerning due process at sentencing
in Fields.66
Because there was no substantial evidence in the
record to support the factual premise that E.W. James suffered
$15,217.51 in monetary damages, it was abuse of discretion for
the trial court to order restitution in that amount.
IMPROPER DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY
Finally, we address another unpreserved error which
might arise again on remand.
Specifically, the error was the
trial court’s improper delegation of authority to set
restitution to probation and parole.
When questions were raised
about the amount of E.W. James’s losses, rather than conduct a
sentencing hearing, the trial court said, “No, I don’t want to
fool with it all.
I’m going to say it’s $15,217.51.”
Yet, the
trial court then stated that probation and parole could amend
Burton’s restitution order if the court set it too high by
mistake.
This pattern of events suggests that the trial court
may not have not set Burton’s restitution order at $15,217.51
because it made a factual finding that the E.W. James suffered
$15,217.51 in monetary damages but, rather, arbitrarily picked
that figure, leaving it to probation and parole to decide the
issue.
The trial court’s attempt to delegate the power to set
restitution to probation and parole is contrary to KRS 532.033.
66
123 S.W.3d at 917-918.
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The statute plainly places the burden for making decisions about
restitution on the trial court, stating, in relevant part, as
follows:
shall:
“When a judge orders restitution, the judge
. . . (3) Set the amount of restitution to be paid;
(4) Set the amount and frequency of each restitution payment or
require the payment to be made in a lump sum[.]”
Based on the
plain meaning of KRS 532.033(3)-(4) and its use of the mandatory
“shall,” the trial court may not delegate the judicial authority
to set the amount of restitution owed or the timetable for
repaying it to probation and parole or any other individual or
entity.
Therefore, the trial court erred in suggesting that
probation and parole had any authority to alter Burton’s
restitution order.
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate that part of the
Fulton Circuit Court’s judgment setting Burton’s restitution at
$15,217.51 and remand for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jim Paitsel
Fulton, Kentucky
Albert B. Chandler, III
Attorney General of Kentucky
George G. Seelig
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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