JEFFERY L. CARPENTER v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JUNE 10, 2005; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2003-CA-001005-MR
JEFFERY L. CARPENTER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BUTLER CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RONNIE C. DORTCH, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 00-CR-00042
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, HENRY, AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Jeffery L. Carpenter has appealed from the
final judgment entered by the Butler Circuit Court on April 17,
2003, following a jury verdict of guilty on one count of sexual
abuse in the first degree,1 and guilty of persistent felony
offender in the first degree (PFO I).2
Carpenter was sentenced
to 15 years’ imprisonment pursuant to the jury’s recommendation.
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 510.110.
2
KRS 532.080(3).
Having concluded that (1) Carpenter’s motion for disposition of
pending charges was not filed in accordance with KRS 500.110 and
that he waived his speedy trial motion, and (2) the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike Juror No. 35
for cause, we affirm.
On August 10, 2000, Carpenter was indicted on 31
counts of sexual abuse in the first degree against a female
under 12 years of age.
An arrest warrant was served on
Carpenter on August 14, 2000.
Carpenter was scheduled to be
arraigned on September 5, 2000, but the arraignment was
continued until October 10, 2000.
At the arraignment, a
pretrial conference was scheduled for May 8, 2001, and a jury
trial was set for June 4, 2001.3
On February 19, 2002, Carpenter filed a pro se motion
for disposition of pending charges, i.e., a motion for speedy
trial, as well as various other discovery motions.
In a motion
filed on February 26, 2002, the Commonwealth moved the trial
court to set a trial date in Carpenter’s case.
During a hearing
held on March 12, 2002, the trial court noted that Carpenter was
scheduled for trial on April 29, 2002,4 for charges stemming from
3
On May 8, 2001, Carpenter failed to appear for a pretrial conference. The
Commonwealth noted that Carpenter was a fugitive and a bench warrant was
issued for his arrest in this case. Thus, the trial set for June 4, 2001,
was not held.
4
The trial scheduled for April 29, 2002, was continued until July 22, 2002,
after defense counsel realized during the pretrial conference, held on April
9, 2002, that he represented both co-defendants scheduled to be tried.
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an earlier indictment.
The trial court then set the instant
case for trial on November 22, 2002.5
On July 9, 2002, Carpenter was arraigned on a PFO I
indictment stemming from Carpenter’s previous felony convictions
which were discovered during his trial on other charges held on
July 22, 2002.6
Following a motion by the Commonwealth, the
trial court consolidated the indictment for sexual abuse in the
first degree and the indictment for PFO I.
Both were set to be
tried by a jury on December 11, 2002.
On August 27, 2002, Carpenter filed a pro se motion to
dismiss this case due to the Commonwealth’s failure to try him
in a timely manner.
A hearing on this issue was held on
September 3, 2002, wherein the trial court stated that in Butler
County jury panels were seated for four-month terms, running
from January through April, May through August, and September
through December.
The trial court reasoned that since Carpenter
had been tried in July on a separate indictment, he could not be
tried twice by the same jury panel.
Therefore, the trial court
denied Carpenter’s motion.
Carpenter’s trial set for December 11, 2002, was
continued until January 24, 2003, because the trial judge was
scheduled to undergo several medical tests.
5
A pretrial
However, defense counsel stated that he would need more time to prepare this
case, therefore, the trial was set for December 11, 2002.
6
This trial resulted in a hung jury.
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conference was held on January 14, 2003, wherein the trial judge
explained that he would be having surgery and would be
unavailable for trial on January 24, 2003.
Therefore, the trial
court set Carpenter’s trial for February 12, 2003.
A jury trial commenced in this case on February 12,
2003.
In a conference prior to trial, Carpenter renewed his
previous motion to dismiss the indictment for failure to provide
him a speedy trial.
The trial court denied this motion to
dismiss because Carpenter had been tried at the earliest date
possible.
During this conference, the Commonwealth agreed to
dismiss all charges except two counts of sexual abuse in the
first degree and the PFO I charge.
As mentioned previously, the jury found Carpenter
guilty on the first count of sexual abuse, but found him not
guilty on the second count of sexual abuse.
The jury also found
Carpenter guilty of being a PFO I, and recommended a sentence of
15 years.
The trial court entered an order on April 17, 2003,
formally sentencing Carpenter in accordance with the jury’s
recommendation.
This appeal followed.
Carpenter has raised two arguments on appeal.
First,
he argues that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the
indictment against him following his motion for a speedy trial
pursuant to KRS 500.110 and the expiration of the 180-day time
period.
Second, Carpenter argues that the trial court denied
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his due process rights when it refused to excuse a juror for
cause.
Carpenter’s first claim of error fails because he did
not comply with the requirements set forth in KRS 500.110, which
provides as follows:
Whenever a person has entered upon a
term of imprisonment in a penal or
correctional institution of this state, and
whenever during the continuance of the term
of imprisonment there is pending in any
jurisdiction of this state any untried
indictment, information or complaint on the
basis of which a detainer has been lodged
against the prisoner, he shall be brought to
trial within one hundred and eighty (180)
days after he shall have caused to be
delivered to the prosecuting officer and the
appropriate court of the prosecuting
officer’s jurisdiction written notice of the
place of his imprisonment and his request
for a final disposition to be made of the
indictment, information or complaint;
provided that for good cause shown in open
court, the prisoner or his counsel being
present, the court having jurisdiction of
the matter may grant any necessary or
reasonable continuance.
In construing KRS 500.110, it is helpful to consider cases which
interpret the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD),7 codified
7
“The Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) is a compact entered into by 48
states, the United States, and the District of Columbia to establish
procedures for resolution of one State’s outstanding charges against a
prisoner of another State.” New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 111, 120 S.Ct.
659, 662, 145 L.Ed.2d 560 (2000). “The IAD was adopted in Kentucky in 1974,
four years prior to KRS 500.110.” Dunaway v. Commonwealth, 60 S.W.3d 563,
567 (Ky. 2001).
KRS 440.450 states that the purpose of the IAD is “to encourage the
expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the
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at KRS 440.450 through KRS 440.990.8
“KRS 500.110 was adopted
after the IAD and [uses] the same language.
In addition, the
reasons supporting the IAD seem to apply with equal force to the
intrastate statute.”9
The record in this case indicates that on February 19,
2002, Carpenter filed his motion for disposition of “all pending
charges before this Court and jurisdiction” pursuant to KRS
500.110.
At the time this motion was filed, Carpenter was
incarcerated in the Eastern Kentucky Correctional Complex;
however, a detainer was not issued against him on the instant
charges until March 14, 2002, almost a month after he filed his
motion for a speedy trial.
This Court, in Huddleston v.
Jennings,10 stated:
The “triggering mechanism” which brings [KRS
500.110] into play is the lodging of a
detainer against a prisoner. The purpose of
the statute is not to ensure the speedy
disposition of every charge, or even of
those charges which potentially could form
the basis for a detainer being lodged. Its
purpose is to provide for the speedy
disposition only of such charges as have
actually resulted in a detainer being
lodged.
proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments,
informations or complaints.”
8
Dunaway, 60 S.W.3d at 567.
9
Id.
10
723 S.W.2d 381, 383 (Ky.App. 1986).
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Thus, pursuant to Huddleston, at the time Carpenter filed his
speedy trial motion he was not entitled to the relief he
requested under KRS 100.110.
Furthermore, even if Carpenter’s motion had been
properly filed, we conclude that he waived his right to a speedy
trial by failing to object when the trial court set a trial date
outside the 180-day period.
“‘[T]he most basic rights of
criminal defendants are . . . subject to waiver[.]’”11
A
defendant may waive his right to a speedy trial or “waiver may
be effected by action of counsel.”12
Counsel may especially
waive a defendant’s right to a speedy trial when the waiver
occurs due to a scheduling matter, because “[s]cheduling matters
are plainly among those for which agreement by counsel generally
controls.”13
In Ward v. Commonwealth,14 this Court held:
Ward waived his right to complain of the
[IAD] violation by acquiescing to be tried
outside the required time period and by
failing to raise the issue of alleged
noncompliance with the IAD on the numerous
occasions when he was before the trial court
prior to the expiration of the 120 days.
Likewise, Carpenter was present at a hearing held on
March 12, 2002, when the trial court scheduled December 11,
11
Hill, 528 U.S. at 114 (quoting Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 926,
111 S.Ct. 2661, 115 L.Ed.2d 808 (1991)).
12
Hill, 528 U.S. at 114.
13
Id. 528 U.S. at 115.
14
62 S.W.3d 399, 404 (Ky.App. 2001).
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2002, as the trial date for these charges.
Carpenter and his
counsel were certainly aware at that time that Carpenter had
filed a pro se motion for speedy trial.
Carpenter was before
the trial court numerous times prior to the expiration of the
180-day period, and therefore, he had ample opportunities to
request a trial date within the statutory-time frame.
Pursuant
to Hill and Ward, Carpenter’s silence constituted a waiver of
his motion for a speedy trial.15
Thus, Carpenter is entitled to
no relief on this issue.
Carpenter’s second claim of error is that he was
denied a fair trial because he had to use a peremptory strike to
challenge Juror No. 35, Regina Fields, after the trial court
refused to strike her for cause.
RCr 9.36 provides that “[w]hen
there is a reasonable ground to believe that a prospective juror
cannot render a fair and impartial verdict on the evidence, that
juror shall be excused as not qualified.”
“The determination of
whether to exclude a juror for cause lies within the sound
discretion of the trial court.”16
“Unless the action of the
trial court is clearly erroneous, we will not reverse it.”17
15
See also Parks v. Commonwealth, 89 S.W.3d 395, 397 (Ky. 2002) (stating that
defendant’s right to speedy trial under the IAD was waived when defense
counsel made no response to the trial judge’s proposed trial date outside of
the IAD time limits).
16
Caldwell v. Commonwealth, 634 S.W.2d 405, 407 (Ky. 1982) (citing Peters v.
Commonwealth, 505 S.W.2d 764 (Ky. 1974)).
17
Id. (citing Scruggs v. Commonwealth, 566 S.W.2d 405 (Ky. 1978)).
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During voir dire it was revealed that Fields had been
employed by the former Commonwealth’s Attorney and had also been
employed for four months by the Commonwealth’s Attorney who
tried Carpenter’s case.
During these four months, the
indictment was returned against Carpenter for the instant sexual
abuse charge.
During the voir dire questioning, Fields stated
that her position with the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s office was
mainly secretarial in nature, that she did not have any contact
with grand jury proceedings except to notify the grand jurors of
when sessions were to be held, and that she did not recall
handling any portion of Carpenter’s case.
She also stated that
during her employment at the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s office,
she did not prepare any documents that were used during grand
jury proceedings.
Fields stated that her association with the
Commonwealth’s Attorney’s Office as a former employee would not
impact her ability to listen to the evidence presented and to
render a fair and impartial verdict.
Carpenter moved the trial court to strike Fields for
cause, which it denied.
The trial court stated that before it
can strike a juror for cause under RCr 9.36 there must be a
“reasonable ground to believe that a prospective juror cannot
render a fair and impartial verdict on the evidence.”
Since
Fields stated she could render a fair and impartial verdict
based on the evidence, the trial court refused to strike her for
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cause.
Both Carpenter and the Commonwealth used a peremptory
strike to remove Fields from the venire.
RCr18 9.4019 entitles each party in a criminal case to
eight peremptory challenges; however, the rule provides that if
the trial court desires one or two alternate jurors to be
seated, the number of peremptory challenges is increased by one
on each side.
The trial court announced from the bench at the
close of voir dire that it intended to seat an alternate juror,
and that each side would be allowed nine peremptory challenges.
However, Carpenter only utilized eight of the nine peremptory
strikes afforded to him by the trial court.
It has been a long-standing rule in this Commonwealth
that in order to preserve a claim of error for the trial court’s
refusal to remove a prospective juror for cause, a party must
first use one of his peremptory challenges to remove that
18
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
19
RCr 9.40 states, in part, as follows:
(1)
If the offense charged is a felony, the
Commonwealth is entitled to eight (8)
peremptory challenges and the defendant
or defendants jointly to eight (8)
peremptory challenges. If the offense
charged is a misdemeanor, the
Commonwealth is entitled to three (3)
peremptory challenges and the defendant
or defendants jointly to three (3)
peremptory challenges.
(2)
If one (1) or two (2) additional jurors
are called, the number of peremptory
challenges allowed each side and each
defendant shall be increased by one (1).
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prospective juror.20
Thus, since Carpenter did not preserve this
issue under the requirements set forth in Thomas, he is not
entitled to any relief on appeal.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Butler
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Michael C. Lemke
Louisville, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
20
Thomas v. Commonwealth, 864 S.W.2d 252, 259 (Ky. 1993)(quoting Abramson,
Kentucky Practice, (Criminal Rules) Vol. 9, Sec. 25.50 (1987)). See also
Gamble v. Commonwealth, 68 S.W.3d 367, 374 (Ky. 2002).
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