C. E. PENNINGTON COMPANY v. B & H ELECTRICAL CONTRACTORS, INC., AND UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY and G. E. MAIER COMPANY v. UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY AND C. E. PENNINGTON COMPANY
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DECEMBER 22, 2005; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2001-CA-001242-MR
C. E. PENNINGTON COMPANY
APPELLANT
ON REMAND FROM KENTUCKY SUPREME COURT
2004-SC-228-D AND 2004-SC-239-D
v.
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM L. GRAHAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 94-CI-00255
B & H ELECTRICAL CONTRACTORS,
INC., AND UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY
AND:
APPELLEES
NO. 2001-CA-001243-MR
G. E. MAIER COMPANY
APPELLANT
ON REMAND FROM KENTUCKY SUPREME COURT
2004-SC-228-D AND 2004-SC-239-D
v.
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM L. GRAHAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 94-CI-00255
UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY AND
C. E. PENNINGTON COMPANY
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JUDGE. 1
DYCHE AND McANULTY, JUDGES; JOHN D. MILLER, SENIOR
PER CURIAM:
C. E. Pennington Company and G. E. Maier Company
bring these appeals from an Order and Judgment of the Franklin
Circuit Court, entered May 10, 2001, sitting without jury; and
from Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment of the
Franklin Circuit Court, entered April 9, 2001, sitting without
jury.
Pennington appeals two of the court's awards:
1)
$47,100.00 in liquidated damages to the University of Kentucky
(UK), arguing that the court erred in awarding said damages
without UK providing proof of actual monetary damages; and 2)
prejudgment interest on a damage award of $39,000.00 to B & H
Electrical Contractors (B&H).
Pennington and Maier appeal the
court's award to UK of $406,112.06 in replacement costs for
installation of a netting system in the Nutter Field House, and
prejudgment interest thereon, arguing that the court erred in
its application of the law.
Pennington and Maier also argue
that delay by the trial court violated their civil due process.
We affirm.
1
Senior Judge John D. Miller sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
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FACTUAL HISTORY
We adopt the facts as stated in the concurring opinion
from the first appeal:
Pennington was the general
contractor for the construction of a $6
million field house at the University.
Pennington subcontracted the installation of
a $300,000 netting system to Maier. Two
aspects of the project are relevant here.
The project fell behind schedule and the
netting system did not work properly.
Because of the delay the University withheld
$47,000 2 [sic] from the payment due
Pennington as liquidated damages under the
contract, and after becoming frustrated with
Maier's attempts to repair the netting
system the University replaced it at a cost
of $406,000 3 [sic]. At trial, the University
sought $406,000 [sic] from Pennington for
replacing the net and Pennington claimed
over against Maier for a like amount.
Pennington sought the $47,000 [sic] from the
University which it had withheld as
liquidated damages.
In what was essentially a separate
lawsuit, another subcontractor on the job, B
& H, sought $39,000 from Pennington for
extra electrical work caused by Pennington's
damaging work it had already completed.
After a bench trial the court
below awarded the University the $406,000
[sic] it sought against Pennington and
Pennington was granted judgment over against
Maier. It upheld the University's
withholding of $47,000 [sic] in liquidated
damages. It also awarded B & H $39,000
against Pennington for extras. In addition
the court awarded prejudgment interest on
both the $406,000 awarded to the University
and the $39,000 awarded to B & H.
Both Pennington and Maier
2
The actual amount was $47,100.00.
3
The actual amount was $406,112.06.
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appealed.
Pennington's appeal related to the
$39,000 awarded B & H and the $47,000 [sic]
withheld by the University as liquidated
damages. The sole issue raised by
Pennington on the B & H claim was whether
prejudgment interest was proper. The sole
issue raised in the appeal on liquidated
damages was whether the University could
withhold liquidated damages without proving
actual monetary damages.
Maier's appeal dealt with the
$406,000 [sic] award to the University.
Essentially Maier attacked the trial court's
legal and factual conclusions underpinning
the amount awarded and further argued that,
whatever the amount, it should not include
prejudgment interest.
On October 31, 2003, this Court issued an unpublished
opinion affirming the circuit court.
On February 9, 2005, the
Kentucky Supreme Court accepted discretionary review, vacated
the prior opinion, and remanded the case to this Court for
consideration of the merits of the issues raised on appeal. 4
Back before this Court, in addition to the issues outlined in
the facts above, the parties filed supplemental briefs alleging
a denial of due process.
ISSUES I - IV:
PENNINGTON AND MAIER V. UK
THE NETTING SYSTEM
FACTS:
4
C.E. Pennington Company v. B&H Electrical Contractors, Inc.; G.E. Maier
Company; and University of Kentucky, 2004-SC-0228-DG; G.E. Maier Company v.
University of Kentucky; C.E. Pennington Company; and B&H Electrical
Contractors, Inc., 2004-SC-0239-DG.
-4-
In order to address Pennington’s and Maier's four
issues pertaining to the netting system, the following facts are
helpful.
UK contracted with Pennington, who in turn
subcontracted with Maier, who in turn subcontracted with Alpha
Pro Fab (Alpha), for a netting system, to be installed as one of
the final components of the construction of the Nutter Field
House.
The netting system consisted of a series of nets raised
and lowered with nine hoisting machines consisting of sheaves
and motors and airplane cables.
The nets were used to subdivide
the field house floor into various areas for use for different
activities.
The main floor area was a football field surrounded
by a 290 meter track.
The track area was separated from the
football field area by six perimeter nets, four on the sides and
corners, and one end net in each end zone.
The football field
was divided by a center net at the fifty yard line.
There were
also four batting cages along one side enclosed by nets.
After some delays, Alpha installed the bulk of the
netting system in April, 1993.
Although the field house itself
was declared substantially complete in July, 1993, this
certificate excluded the netting system.
By September, 1993,
correspondence from the project architect to Pennington advised
that the netting system was not in conformance with the
contract.
A series of meetings, evaluations and correspondence
-5-
indicated that there were operational problems, such as nets not
lowering properly and failed fuses; general safety concerns;
plus the system not generally meeting contract specifications.
For example, non-insulated copper jump wires had been installed
to bypass fuses.
In October, 1993, the project architect gave
Pennington a list of variances from the contract and a time
certain to get the system within contract specifications.
Following a meeting on January 5, 1994, with
Pennington and Maier, who agreed that problems existed, Maier
sent in an installer to rework many of the system's components
and thus bring the netting system into compliance with the
contract.
On April 15, 1994, the system was still not working
and the project architect gave Pennington final notice to
complete the system.
On May 10, 1994, the netting system was
declared substantially complete, with the exception of punch
list items including installation of brakes on the batting cage
netting and a safety device feature on the center curtain.
UK
paid Pennington for the netting system but withheld $15,000.00
for the incomplete work.
Pennington and Maier assured UK that
the system met the contract specifications, and Maier issued an
extended five-year written warranty to UK, in addition to the
standard contract's one-year warranty.
The field house and thus, the system, saw more use
when school began in the fall of 1994.
-6-
Warranty calls were made
monthly to Pennington, Maier, and Alpha from September, 1994,
through February, 1995.
The majority of the problems consisted
of cables tangling and nets not reaching the floor.
There was conflicting evidence regarding responses to
the warranty calls.
Pennington, Maier, and Alpha indicated on
several occasions that although one of them responded, the
responder either could not do any work because UK refused to
make a lift available or there was no problem because the nets
were lowered to the turf.
In contrast, UK indicated that either
there was no response; someone responded but did not do any
work; or someone responded and performed some installation of
parts.
On one occasion, another subcontractor, B&H Electric,
performed electrical service to the batting cages.
In January, 1995, during this period of problem calls,
UK asked runner-up bidder and contract system specification
drafter Athletic and Performance Rigging (APR) to evaluate the
netting system.
APR reported questions of structural integrity,
more specifically that the cabling was "an accident ready to
happen."
Thomas McReynolds, a structural engineer with forty
years experience, spent three hours looking at the system,
reporting that while he did not see anything that indicated
imminent failure, he recommended inspection of the system by a
rigging expert and that the system not operate during the
upcoming football banquet.
Pennington was notified of the
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netting problems and was directed to notify Maier that immediate
action was required.
In February, 1995, Maier recommended to UK the
installation of specific parts to alleviate the warranty problem
calls, and informed Pennington that Alpha would be down to
review the warranty items the week of February 20 or February
27.
Meanwhile, UK had the netting system independently
inspected from February 10 through 14, 1995.
Structural
engineer McReynolds selected Randy Davidson, who had over fifty
years experience in rigging and described himself as "Dr. Doom,"
to assist in the investigation.
Ethan Buell, McReynolds'
partner and a structural engineer, also assisted.
After the first day, as the inspection revealed that
the "wiring/cables" on the batting cages were "so taut as to
constitute an imminent hazard," it was recommended that the
cages be safe-tied off.
At the end of the four days, the
investigation concluded that the system posed a potential and
substantial danger and imminent hazard while being used and
while in static modality.
The recommendation that the system be
safe-tied off was immediately carried out.
McReynolds and Davidson submitted independent reports.
McReynolds identified problems with truss sizing, spacing, and
connection; block connections; hoisting drums; head and mule
-8-
blocks; mounting frames; and cables and cable connections; and
recommended replacement of major components.
Davidson also
identified problems with these major components, concluding that
many were substandard and/or damaged.
On March 2, 1995, the project architect advised
Pennington of the continued netting system problems and the
inspection, and requested efforts to render the system in
compliance with the specifications.
Pennington was directed to
provide the name of a qualified subcontractor by March 13, 1995,
(exclusive of Maier and Alpha); and informed that failure to do
so would result in UK finding a qualified contractor and seeking
reimbursement from Pennington.
Although Pennington, at its
request, was given an additional two days to recommend a
replacement subcontractor, it never complied.
On March 21,
1995, UK sought a proposal from APR to complete the netting
system, per Article 26 of the contract.
In response to UK's evaluation, on April 25, 1995, a
business associate of Alpha spent five hours inspecting the
system at the request of Pennington, Maier, and Alpha.
In
direct contrast to UK's evaluation, his report concluded that
the system was safe, worked in smooth operation, and was within
or exceeded industry standards, with only some maintenance
and/or replacement items needed.
-9-
UK notified Pennington on July 27, 1995, that it was
intending to contract with APR to bring the netting system into
compliance with the contract.
On August 18, 1995, Pennington
notified Maier that it would seek to recover from Maier any
damages it might suffer from a recovery by UK.
On September 23, 1995, a civil engineer spent two to
three hours inspecting the system on behalf of Pennington,
Maier, and Alpha. He concluded that the system was not complete;
80% of the cables at the drums were kinked or bird-caged and
needed replacement; all drums needed to be reworked or replaced;
cable clamps were improperly installed; warped shim plates
required replacement; and some truss connections were missing.
On September 1, 1995, UK contracted with APR, who
after determining that repair would prove more costly than
replacement, began work in December, 1995, to remove the old
netting system and install a new one.
This work was completed
on March 26, 1996, at a total cost to UK of $406,112.06.
ISSUES I-IV:
SUMMARY OF ISSUES:
Before us, Pennington and Maier contend trial court
error in finding a breach of warranty on the netting system and
damages in the amount of $406,112.06, plus prejudgment interest.
Appellants claim error on four specific theories:
1) UK's
claims are barred by its acceptance and payment; 2) Pennington
-10-
and Maier did not have sufficient opportunity to correct the
warranty deficiencies; 3) even assuming a breach of warranty, UK
is not entitled to damages for replacement of the netting
system; and 4) an award of prejudgment interest is inequitable
due to the trial court's delay in trying the case and rendering
a decision.
For the following reasons, we conclude that the
trial court's findings are supported by substantial evidence and
that the trial court correctly applied the law.
ISSUE I:
ACCEPTANCE OF AND PAYMENT FOR THE SYSTEM
The contract between Pennington and UK, signed October
29, 1991, contains Articles 24 and 49 which provide:
ARTICLE 24 – CORRECTION OF WORK AFTER FINAL
PAYMENT
Neither the final certificate of payment nor
any provisions in the Contract Document
shall relieve the Contractor of
responsibility for faulty materials or
workmanship and, unless otherwise specified,
he shall remedy any defects due thereto and
pay for any damage to other Work resulting
therefrom, which shall appear within a
period of one year from the date of the
certificate of substantial completion
approved by the Owner. The Owner shall give
notice of observed defects with reasonable
promptness.
ARTICLE 49 – GUARANTEE AND WARRANTY
Neither the final certificate of payment nor
any provisions in the Contract Documents nor
partial or entire use or occupancy of the
premises by the Owner shall constitute an
acceptance of work not done in accordance
with the Contract Documents or relieve the
Contractor of liability in respect to any
-11-
express warranties or responsibility for
faulty materials or workmanship.
The Contractor shall guarantee that labor,
equipment and materials will be free of
defects for a period of one (1) year from
the date shown on the certificate of
substantial completion unless special
conditions and/or additional warranty
periods are required and as defined in Part
V of Contract Documents, if applicable. The
Owner will give notice of observed defects
with reasonable promptness. Expendable
items and wear from ordinary use are
excluded from this guarantee. Prior to the
final payment of the Work, the Contractor
shall assemble and present to the Architect
all guarantees and warranties required by
the Contract Documents.
(Emphases in original.)
Following the bench trial, the trial court concluded
as a matter of law that Pennington breached the above contract
provisions and, pursuant to Article 49, Shreve v. Biggerstaff,
777 S.W.2d 616, 617 (Ky.App. 1989), and Weil v. B.E. Buffaloe &
Co., 251 Ky. 673, 65 S.W.2d 704 (1938), that UK did not waive
the defects in the netting system by declaring the project
substantially complete.
Before us, Pennington and Maier argue
that the trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding that
UK's actions did not amount to a wavier, arguing both that the
defects were open and obvious, and that changes in the system
which led to problems were approved by UK.
We disagree.
The record is clear that UK began having chronic
problems with the system with more use of it during the fall
-12-
1994 semester, and in response, exercised their warranty rights
by notifying Pennington and Maier, with limited success.
The
record is also clear that despite these warranty problems, UK
did not become aware of defects in the system caused by a
failure to meet original and amended contract specifications of
many of the major system components until a detailed evaluation
of the system nine months after the substantial completion date.
The authorities cited by Pennington and Maier fail to
persuade us.
In Weil, supra at 65 S.W.2d 710-11, a case relied
on by the trial court, the appellate court stated:
(T)he owner of the building does not forfeit
his right to assert a claim against the
builder for damages by taking possession of
it. It may be otherwise where the owner,
having knowledge of the defects, has stood
by silently and then accepted the work as a
sufficient compliance with the contract and
later raises objection. . . . But, under the
circumstances here disclosed, where
seasonable complaint was made, and the
contractor showed some defiance, and
willfully proceeded to use the objectionable
material, and the construction would have
been delayed in a substantial degree if he
had been legally stopped, it must be
regarded that there was an election by the
owner to accept the work and recover for the
breach of contract and that the contractor
cannot escape the consequences of the
breach.
Citations omitted.
When Pennington and Maier admit, as in
Shreve, supra, that there were defects in the installation, UK
does not forfeit their claim for damages by "taking possession
-13-
and assuming control . . . or by not discovering all of the
defects or omissions in . . . construction(,)" citing Cassinelli
v. Stacy, 238 Ky. 827, ___, 38 S.W.2d 980, 985 (1931).
"Generally, the interpretation of a contract . . . is
a question of law for the courts and is subject to de novo
review."
Cantrell Supply, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,
94 S.W.3d 381, 385 (Ky.App. 2002).
Based on our review, we
believe that the trial court correctly applied the law.
ISSUE II:
ADEQUATE NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY
Pennington and Maier next argue that the trial court
erred as a matter of law in concluding that they were given
adequate notice and opportunity to correct the netting system
deficiencies.
We disagree.
The trial court concluded that Pennington and Maier
failed to correct the netting system deficiencies, despite
adequate notice and opportunity, based on the following
findings:
1) from the time of the installation of the system in
April, 1993, until the date of substantial completion on May 9,
1994, Pennington and Maier were on notice of issues related to
the system, including electrical and operational problems; 2)
operational problems peaked during the fall of 1994, prompting
monthly calls to Pennington, Maier, and Alpha from September,
1994, through January, 1995, only some of which resulted in
-14-
problems being addressed; 3) in February, 1995, UK had the
system evaluated by APR, a structural engineer, and a rigging
expert, resulting in identification of numerous problems and
safety issues, causing the system to be safe-tied off; 4) in
March, 1995, Pennington was notified that the installation was
not pursuant to contract specifications, and was asked to
provide the name of a contractor other than Maier or Alpha to
provide the remedy; 5) Pennington failed to provide the name of
another contractor; 6) in April, 1995, Pennington, Maier, and
Alpha's evaluation resulted in findings of problems that were
correctable; and 7) in May, 1995, Pennington was notified that
UK had arranged to have the system corrected by another
contractor.
Before us, in asserting that they could not have, as a
matter of law, breached their warranty as they were not provided
with a sufficient amount of time to correct the maintenance
problems, Pennington and Maier rely solely on Middletown
Engineering Company v. Climate Conditioning Company, Inc., 810
S.W.2d 57, 60 (Ky.App. 1991), arguing that Middletown holds as a
matter of law that one hundred twenty-six days to cure a defect
does not amount to a breach of warranty, or as they state:
"as
a matter of law, the fact that a repair may take longer than
four months to correct does not even raise an inference of a
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breach of warranty."
Our reading of Middletown, however, yields
a different interpretation.
In that case, the issue pertained to whether the trial
court's grant of summary judgment was proper; in other words, if
there existed a genuine issue of material fact.
The appellate
court found that no evidence, or genuine issue of material fact,
existed as to the untimeliness of the repair, thus no error in
the grant of summary judgment.
The court's statement, that
"(t)he fact that repair took 126 days in and of itself raises no
inference one way or another as to whether the seller failed to
correct the defect within a reasonable period," merely pointed
out that there was no evidence in that case that the time frame
amounted to a breach of warranty.
In the instant case, Pennington and Maier were on
notice of problems with the system beginning as early as within
five months following substantial completion, which continued
for five months until safety concerns prompted UK to seek
additional evaluations and assistance.
During this time frame,
despite numerous warranty calls that put them on notice,
Pennington and Maier's response was inconsistent and inadequate.
The evaluation following the safety concerns revealed that the
system was not installed pursuant to contract specifications.
We are not persuaded by Pennington and Maier's sole authority,
-16-
and thus do not conclude that the trial court incorrectly
applied the law in this case.
ISSUE III:
AWARD OF $406,112.06 TO UK
IN DAMAGES TO REMOVE AND REPLACE
THE NETTING SYSTEM
With regard to the replacement of the netting system,
the trial court found that UK contracted with APR to perform
corrective work and that APR determined that reuse of the
previous system would be more costly than replacing the entire
system; concluding:
7. Pursuant to Murray v. McCoy, Ky.App.,
949 S.W.2d 613 (1996), Baker Pool Co. v.
Bennett, Ky., 411 S.W.2d 335 (1967) and
State Property & Buildings Commission of
Dept. of Finance v. H.W. Miller Const. Co.,
Ky., 385 S.W.2d 211 (1964), the cost of
replacing the defective netting system is
the appropriate measure of damages.
* * *
9. The Court concludes as a matter of law
that if UK is entitled to recover damages
from Pennington for the alleged defective
installation and/or breach of warranty
concerning the netting system installed by
Maier, then Pennington has a contractual
right with Maier to recover the identical
damages from Maier.
10. UK is entitled to recover its costs to
remove and replace the defective netting
system totaling $406,112.06.
Before us, Pennington and Maier argue that the trial
court erred as a matter of law in concluding that UK was
entitled to the cost of replacement as damages, arguing that the
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applicable case law holds that at most, UK was entitled to the
cost of remedying the defective construction, because UK failed
to produce any evidence of the cost of repair versus
replacement.
We disagree.
Murray v. McCoy, 949 S.W.2d 613, 614-15 (Ky.App.
1996), sets forth the applicable law on this issue:
The measure of damages in cases
where there is faulty construction not in
accordance with a building contract is
stated in Baker Pool Company v. Bennett,
Ky., 411 S.W.2d 335, 338 (1967):
In the case at bar there is the
issue and conflicting testimony as to
whether or not the pool could be repaired.
If it could reasonably have been repaired,
then the measure of damage is different from
the measure if the jury determines that it
cannot be repaired. The law in this
situation was fully discussed in State
Property & Buildings Commission, etc. v.
H.W. Miller Construction Company, Inc., Ky.,
385 S.W.2d 211, wherein we pointed out that
if the structure can reasonably be repaired
'the real measure of damages for defective
performance of a construction contract is
the cost of remedying the defect, so long as
it is reasonable'. We then pointed out that
if the structure cannot be repaired, or if
the expense of repair is unreasonable, the
test is the difference between market value
of the building as it should have been
constructed and the market value as it
actually was constructed.
(Citations omitted.)
The court went on to state that damages
for both repair and diminution in value are not exclusive of one
another:
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The purpose of remedial damages is
to put the owner in the same position he
would have been in had the contract been
performed. State Property & Buildings
Commission, etc. v. H.W. Miller Construction
Company, Inc., Ky., 385 S.W.2d 211 (1964).
Although generally, repairs will
successfully remedy defects caused by the
contractor's poor workmanship, there are
those situations where the repairs will not
give the owner a structure as valuable as
the original contract contemplated.
Id. at 615.
Pennington and Maier argue that the trial court
misapplied the applicable law by concluding that replacement of
the system was the appropriate amount of damages in this case,
as opposed to reasonable costs for repair, arguing that UK
failed to present any evidence that repair would be more costly
than replacement.
Remembering that the netting system consisted of a
series of nets raised and lowered with nine hoisting machines
consisting of sheaves and motors and airplane cables, the
following was offered in evidence:
1. An evaluation revealed that there were
significant problems with trusses; hoisting
drums; cables and cable guides; attachment
of mounting frames; cable connections; and
rigging materials, such that replacement was
recommended on multiple components.
2. From March 15, 1995, until the netting
system was replaced and completed on March
26, 1996, UK was without use of the facility
for which the netting system was
contemplated, as the four perimeter nets
were safe-tied off for safety reasons.
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3. In its June 29, 1995, proposal, APR
indicated that "the safest and most cost
effective means of restoring the netting
systems original specified quality would be
to replace the entire system," listing 14
items of replacement, with the exception of
some existing wiring at the control station,
at a cost of $358,808.00.
4. APR further explained in its proposal
why the existing netting system components
were not to be re-used:
"The existing winch motors were modified
during the initial installation to allow the
motor to pull more amps and thus increased
the lifting capacity. This modification
voided any warranty and will effect [sic]
the life of the motor.
The mounting frames and supports appear
unacceptable and possibly would not safely
hold any type of motorized winch or any
imposed loads.
The trusses that now exist are 9-1/2"
triangular trusses fabricated by Alpha Pro
Fab. During our inspection, we found the
support Z's to be non-uniform and poorly
fabricated. This will effect [sic] the load
capacity and could result in a serious
failure. The original specification called
for a minimum of 14" triangular trusses.
These trusses were specified to allow the
system to be supported on 30'0" centers. It
is questionable if these trusses, now being
used, will allow for the imposed loads.
There is no loading information available on
the existing trusses, so Athletic and
Performance Rigging cannot warrant the
existing trusses as to capacities or
suitability. . . .
The netting throughout the facility is
showing signs of heavy wear. During our
inspection, we found the four (4) perimeter
nets to be different sizes and contain
various amounts of down lines indicating
field modifications. The existing nets have
D-rings on 3'0" centers and many of these Drings have broken loose and need
replacement. The cost to re-fabricate the
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nets and put the D-rings on 18" centers
would be greater than a total replacement.
I have enclosed a statement from the Carron
Net Company concerning any re-work on the
existing netting.
The control station that is presently being
used, is not to specification. The new
control station shall allow the winches to
be run individually or in a series. The
existing wiring can be re-used, which shall
save an [sic] substantial amount of money.
There will be additional conduit and wiring
required to the new motor locations. The
control station shall be fabricated as
originally specified and installed in the
same locations, using the existing wiring.
As discussed in our meeting June 12, 1995,
the existing cables and blocks are
unacceptable and should be replaced. Many
of the cables are kinked and have been
spliced together. The rigging blocks are
not as specified and unacceptably designed.
During our examination of the existing
equipment, we found a variety of major
problems that will effect [sic] the long
term use of the netting system. It is our
opinion that re-use of any of the major
components in the existing netting system,
would be more expensive as well as detract
from the integrity of the system as regards
safety and function. Athletic and
Performance Rigging cannot accept the
liability associated with using another
contractors equipment or warranty any such
materials. We feel it would be in the best
interest of the University to replace the
entire netting system, using a sole
manufacturer which will assure safety,
reliability, and service." Exhibit UK-184.
5. Although anticipating replacement of
some components, in a July 19, 1995, memo UK
recommended reuse of:
a. the netting, to which APR replied that
"the labor involved in taking down the nets,
removing the "D" rings and reinstalling new
"D" rings made the reuse of the netting
impractical and more expensive than
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providing new nets. The number of down
lines on the perimeter nets varies due to
field modifications and added net panels.
APR has indicated that the perimeter nets
should be uniform and should lower and raise
in the same manner, which is the reason for
the relocation of the "D" rings. Many of
the "D" ring connections on the existing
netting have also failed due to the way the
cable rubs against the strings as the nets
are raised and lowered. All new connections
would have to be made to prevent that
failure in the future."
b. the trusses: to which APR replied that
"the existing trusses are smaller than
specified and may not be able to carry the
required load over a sustained period of
time without failing. APR will provide 14"
trusses as specified and have provided
engineering load data indicating the maximum
deflection. The existing trusses are 9-1/2"
and have demonstrated a tendency to flex and
displace under loading."
c. the electric housing motors: to which
APR replied that "the existing motor
controls were modified during the initial
installation to allow the motor to pull more
amps and thus increase the lifting capacity.
APR's concern is that this modification
would void any warranty and will effect
[sic] the life of the motor." Exhibit UK185.
6. In contrast, Pennington and Maier
presented somewhat conflicting evidence that
although the system had problems, the
problems were correctable.
According to Murray, the purpose of remedial damages
is to put the owner in the same position he would have been in
had the contract been performed, and such damages can consist
both of repair cost and diminution in value.
The evidence
supported the inability of UK to re-use major components of the
-22-
system, essentially, that as the cost of repair exceeded
replacement, the cost to repair would be the cost to replace.
Additionally, UK was without full use of the field house in the
manner in which it was constructed for over a year, from
February, 1995, until March, 1996.
Based on the above, as the
evidence of damages has sufficient probative value to induce
conviction in the mind of a reasonable person, (see generally
Kentucky State Racing Commission v. Fuller, 481 S.W.2d 298, 308
(Ky. 1972)), we find no error by the trial court.
ISSUE IV:
AWARD TO UK OF
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
ON $406,112.06 DAMAGES AWARD
The trial court concluded that UK was entitled to
recover prejudgment interest on the $406,112.06 damages award
for Pennington’s and Maier's failure to honor its warranty
obligations.
Pennington and Maier argue that justice and equity
do not allow for an award of interest due to the delay in the
trial court's trying of the case and rendering a decision.
We
disagree.
While we cannot agree with UK that the damages imposed
herein amount to fixed and ascertainable damages subject to
prejudgment interest as a matter of law, we do believe that
under Nucor Corporation v. General Electric Co., 812 S.W.2d 136,
141 (Ky. 1991), whether to assess damages in this instance is
-23-
subject to judicial discretion, and, in light of all the
circumstances, we can find no abuse of that discretion.
Pennington’s and Maier's argument relates specifically
to that time between the beginning of the bench trial in May,
1998, and the rendering of the decision in April and May, 2001.
Because pursuant to Nucor, in reviewing the trial court's
discretion we are directed to look at deficiencies in the
performance of the injured party, it is important to note that
UK was timely in its pursuit of this breach of warranty claim.
The Field House was declared substantially complete except for
the netting system in July, 1993.
The netting system was
installed in April, 1993, and problems immediately ensued up
through substantial completion on May 9, 1994, with Maier
backing the system with an extended five-year warranty.
Warranty calls were made from September, 1994, through January,
1995, not all of which were answered or completed.
Evaluations
of the system resulted in its being safe-tied off in February,
and March, 1995, for safety reasons.
Negotiations with APR
through the summer of 1995 resulted in APR beginning
installation in December, 1995, and completing same March 26,
1996.
The next day, March 27, 1996, UK was allowed to cross-
claim against Pennington for breach of warranty on the netting
system.
In the meantime, UK made payment to APR on May 9, 1996
for replacement of the netting system.
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Maier was added in as a
third-party defendant on July 25, 1996.
UK made the request for
a trial date in October, 1997, when the date of May 18, 1998,
was set.
Although Pennington and Maier's complaint rests upon
the delay from the beginning of the trial on May 18, 1998, and
the rendering of the decision on April 9, 2001, the record
indicates that Pennington and Maier were parties to the delay.
Following the recess of the trial in May, 1998, the parties did
not request a new date until February, 1999, and at that time
specifically requested that it be continued to the end of
August, 1999.
Following the trial ending in September, 1999,
Pennington and Maier failed to utilize the procedures set forth
in Kentucky Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 1.050(8) to alert the trial
court that the case was ready for submission.
UK has been
without the use of this money since May, 1996.
The trial court
balanced the facts and equities and determined that prejudgment
interest was appropriate.
We can find no abuse of discretion.
ISSUE V:
PENNINGTON V. UK
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES OF $46,100.00
AWARDED TO UK AGAINST PENNINGTON
The October 29, 1991, contract between Pennington and
UK contained a liquidated damages provision.
provided:
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Part V, Article 3
It is mutually understood and
agreed by and between the parties hereto
that time is of the essence in the
performance of this contract and that the
Owner, the University of Kentucky, will
sustain substantial monetary and other
damages in the event of a failure or delay
by the Contractor in the completion of the
work hereby contracted. It is further
understood and agreed upon and made part of
this Contract that the work must be begun,
performed, and completed without delay by
the Contractor and if the Contractor fails
to begin, perform with interruption, and
completes said work in due and proper time,
he may be declared in default of this
Contract. Fixed and liquidated damages in
the amount of $300.00 per calendar day shall
be assessed against the Contractor for each
calendar day during which the work under
this contract remains incomplete after the
Substantial completion date, as the same may
be revised by any extensions for time
granted by the Owner in accordance with
Article 21, "Delays and Extensions of Time"
of the General Conditions of this contract.
Due to a 157 day delay in substantial completion, UK assessed
liquidated damages against Pennington at the contract rate of
$300.00 per day for a total of $47,100.00.
Post-trial,
Pennington argued before the trial court that liquidated damages
were improper as UK had failed to provide evidence of actual
damages.
The trial court disagreed, concluding that UK was
justified in assessing the liquidated damages against
Pennington.
Before us, Pennington argues that the trial court
erred as a matter of law in concluding that UK was justified in
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assessing liquidated damages, arguing insufficient evidence of
actual damages suffered by UK.
We disagree.
The Kentucky Supreme Court addressed this issue in
Mattingly Bridge Company, Inc. v. Holloway & Son Construction
Co., 694 S.W.2d 702 (Ky. 1985).
In that case, the prime
contractor, Holloway, had a contract with the Kentucky
Department of Highways that assessed liquidated damages at
$750.00 per day past the completion date agreed upon in the
contract.
Although the Department did not formally accept
completion for more than six months past the breach date,
Holloway and the Department agreed upon a liquidated amount of
17 2/3 days.
Holloway had a subcontract with Mattingly that
also allowed for liquidated damages, and provided for a
completion date 15 days earlier than that between Holloway and
the Department of Highways.
In turn, although it was undisputed
that Mattingly's breach of its date of completion did not cause
Holloway's breach, Holloway assessed liquidated damages against
Mattingly for 193 days computed from the completion date in the
subcontract to the date when the Department of Highways formally
accepted the project.
The Court found that the language of the
Mattingly subcontract tied the end date of the time period for
liquidated damages to the prime contract, and therefore remanded
to the trial court to reduce the amount of liquidated damages to
32 2/3 days, the number of days in breach between Mattingly's
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substantial completion date and the date agreed upon by Holloway
and the Department.
Several points in Mattingly are of import to us.
One,
the Mattingly Court indicated that it was reasonable to
interpret the failure of Mattingly to complete by the date in
the subcontract a per se trigger of Holloway's right to
liquidated damages.
Pennington's breach which is not in
dispute, triggered UK's right to liquidated damages.
Two, insofar as UK's having to prove actual damages,
the Court indicated that while:
Historically contract provisions specifying
liquidated damages were viewed with
disfavor, as devices to extract penalties
and forfeitures and against public
policy . . . . In time the rule evolved
that such devices would be recognized as a
useful commercial tool to avoid litigation
to determine actual damages.
Id. at 705(citations omitted).
Additionally, "(t)he
liquidated damages clause seeks to substitute the words of the
contract for an evidentiary determination of what damages flowed
from such default, and such an arrangement was not unreasonable
in the circumstances."
Id., at 706.
Thus, the liquidated
damages provision is an accepted tool to avoid litigation to
determine actual damages.
Three, the Court in Mattingly directed, that in any
event, insofar as liquidated damages:
-28-
(T)wo restrictions remain: they should be
used only (1) where the actual damages
sustained from a breach of contract would be
very difficult to ascertain and (2) where,
after the breach occurs, it appears that the
amount fixed as liquidated damages is not
grossly disproportionate to the damages
actually sustained.
Id. at 705(citations omitted)(emphasis in original).
Insofar as
the first prong, we have no doubt that ascertainment of actual
damages to UK for inability to use the field house as a
multipurpose sports practice facility would be very difficult.
It appears to us that this type of situation would be the type
perfectly suited for a liquidated damages contract provision.
As to the second prong, the Mattingly Court again
provides assistance.
The Court found that 32 2/3 days gave
Holloway full benefit of its contract with Mattingly for
liquidated damages, while any sum over the 32 2/3 days could
only be viewed as a windfall; grossly disproportionate to the
actual injury; and in essence a penalty or forfeiture.
In the
instant case, the claim of 157 days (which is not disputed on
appeal by Pennington) gives UK the full benefit of its contract
with Pennington for liquidated damages for breach (also not
disputed by Pennington).
Pennington, as the party challenging
the damages, has the burden of proving that the damages exact a
penalty.
See generally Uncle George Orphans Home, Inc. v.
-29-
Landrum, 551 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Ky.App. 1977).
This they have
failed to do.
Pennington places reliance on Wehr Constructors, Inc.
v. Steel Fabricators, Inc., 769 S.W.2d 51 (Ky.App. 1988), to
support its claim that proof of actual damages is necessary to
support an assessment of liquidated damages.
In Wehr, a prime
contractor assessed liquidated damages against a subcontractor
for delay under a subcontract provision.
While it was found
that the subcontractor did breach the contract by a delay, it
was also found that Wehr sustained no loss.
Referring to the
second prong in Mattingly, Wehr indicated that "(t)his second
requirement (that liquidated damages is not grossly
disproportionate to the damages actually sustained) presupposes
that some actual damage has occurred."
Id. at 55.
To impose
liquidated damages against the subcontractor in Wehr, in a case
where Wehr sustained no damages, would be grossly
disproportionate and, as stated in Mattingly, a "windfall" for
Wehr.
There is no such windfall herein for UK.
It is
undisputed that UK was without the full intended use of its
facility for months beyond the completion date as anticipated in
the contract between Pennington and UK.
Pennington breached
that contract, and UK is entitled to recover liquidated damages
for the breach.
Where the relevant facts are undisputed and the
dispositive issue becomes the legal effect of those facts, our
-30-
review is de novo.
Western Kentucky Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
Inc. v. Revenue Cabinet, 80 S.W.3d 787, 790 (Ky.App. 2001).
Having reviewed the applicable law, we conclude that the trial
court correctly applied the law to the facts in this issue.
Further, due to our conclusion that UK is entitled to
the liquidated damages in the amount of $47,100.00, we need not
address Pennington's cross-claim for prejudgment interest on
that amount.
ISSUE VI:
PENNINGTON V. B&H
AWARD OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST ON
$39,000.00 IN DAMAGES
TO B&H AGAINST PENNINGTON
The November 4, 1991, subcontract between Pennington
and B&H contained the following provision:
Article 5
Changes in the Work
5.1 The Owner may make changes in the Work
by issuing Modifications to the Prime
Contract. Upon receipt of such a
Modification issued subsequent to the
execution of the Subcontract Agreement, the
Contractor shall promptly notify the
Subcontractor of the Modification. Unless
otherwise directed by the Contractor, the
Subcontractor shall not thereafter order
materials or perform Work which would be
inconsistent with the changes made by the
Modifications to the Prime Contract.
5.2 The Subcontractor may be ordered in
writing by the Contractor, without
invalidating this Subcontract, to make
changes in the Work within the general scope
of this Subcontract consisting of additions,
-31-
deletions or other revisions, including
those required by Modifications to the Prime
Contract issued subsequent to the execution
of this Agreement, the Subcontract Sum and
the Subcontract Time being adjusted
accordingly. The Subcontractor, prior to
the commencement of such changed or revised
Work, shall submit promptly to the
Contractor written copies of a claim for
adjustment to the Subcontract Sum and
Subcontract Time for such revised Work in a
manner consistent with requirements of the
Subcontract Documents.
5.3 The Subcontractor shall make claims
promptly to the Contractor for additional
cost, extensions of time and damages for
delays or other causes in accordance with
the Subcontract Documents. A claim which
will affect or become part of a claim which
the Contractor is required to make under the
Prime Contract within a specified time
period or in a specified manner shall be
made in sufficient time to permit the
Contractor to satisfy the requirements of
the Prime Contract. Such claims shall be
received by the Contractor not less than two
working days preceding the time by which the
Contractor's claim must be made. Failure of
the Subcontractor to make such a timely
claim shall bind the Subcontractor to the
same consequences as those to which the
Contractor is bound.
On November 12, 1992, B&H completed installation of
the lighting fixtures on the steel girders in the field house,
pursuant to the subcontract.
On December 10, 1992, Pennington
met with B&H to discuss the impact on the lighting fixtures if
Pennington power-washed the steel girders in preparation for
painting.
It was undisputed that B&H advised Pennington to
protect the lighting fixtures during the power-wash or risk
-32-
water damage.
According to Pennington, B&H further advised that
regardless of protection the lights would still function if they
were not turned on for a while after the washing.
power-washed the girders.
Pennington
When the lights were turned back on
the ballasts in thirty-two of the fixtures failed because of
water damage.
direction.
B&H immediately fixed the lights at Pennington's
The labor invoice included overtime hours; plus
charges for lift rental, fuel for lifts, and material.
When B&H
presented a bill for $19,556.16, Pennington refused to pay.
The trial court concluded as a matter of law that
under the subcontract the replacement of the ballasts
constituted "extra work"; that Pennington did not need to give
written approval of the extra work as the parties' course of
dealing abrogated same; that Pennington's authorization for
extra work was silent as to the value, thus B&H could recover
its reasonable expenses; that Pennington breached the
subcontract by refusing to pay B&H; and B&H was entitled to
recover liquidated damages in the amount of $19,556.16 (the
total amount of the bill), plus prejudgment interest at the rate
of 8% from April 22, 1993 (the date of the bill).
Before us, Pennington contends that the issue was not
one of liquidated damages but of reasonableness of repairs; thus
arguing that the trial court erred as a matter of law in
concluding that the damages were liquidated and in awarding
-33-
prejudgment interest as a matter of right instead of applying
equitable principles.
Ultimately, Pennington argues that the
prejudgment interest award was in error.
We disagree.
In making the initial award of $19,556.16, the trial
court classified the damages alternatively as "special" and as
"liquidated."
According to Nucor, supra at 141, "liquidated" is
defined generally as "(m)ade certain or fixed by agreement of
parties or by operation of law," and as it constitutes an unpaid
debt, subject to prejudgment interest.
Special damages are
those "alleged to have been sustained in the circumstances of a
particular wrong," more in the nature of "unliquidated damages"
which "cannot be determined by a fixed formula and must be
established by a judge or jury."
Black's Law Dictionary (8th Ed.
2004).
Where the terms of a contract specify a sum
payable for non-performance, it is a
question of construction whether this sum is
to be treated as a penalty or as liquidated
damages. The difference in effect is this:
The amount recoverable in case of a penalty
is not the sum named, but the damage
actually incurred. The amount recoverable as
liquidated damages is the sum named as such.
William R. Anson, Principles of the Law of Contract 470 (Arthur
L. Corbin ed., 3d Am. ed. 1919).
According to Nucor, supra at 144, while prejudgment
interest follows from liquidated damages as a matter of right,
whether prejudgment interest may be allowed in unliquidated
-34-
types of damages is left to judicial discretion, "in the light
of all the circumstances," citing to Comment d, Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 354, "Interest on Damages."
We find no abuse of discretion in the award of
prejudgment interest.
Pennington makes no claim that the
findings of the trial court are clearly erroneous, and upon our
review, it is clear that the trial court's findings of fact that
B&H's expenses were reasonable are supported by the record.
Pennington admitted that it was told by B&H to cover the
lighting fixtures and to not directly spray the fixtures when
power-washing the steel girders.
Pennington further admitted to
power-washing the fixtures, only covering the lights and
ballasts "to some degree."
It is further undisputed that while
fully operational before the power-washing, thirty-two of the
lighting fixtures failed when turned on after the power-washing.
It is undisputed that B&H repaired the damage.
As such, the
evidence has sufficient probative value to support the trial
court's conclusion.
Kentucky State Racing Commission, supra at
308.
According to Nucor, supra at 143:
Interest is charged not only because of the
value to the one who uses money, but also as
compensation to the one who has been
deprived of the use of money. Interest is
not recovered according to a rigid theory of
compensation for money withheld, but is
given in response to considerations of
-35-
fairness; it is denied when its exaction
would be inequitable ... the tendency of the
courts is to charge and allow interest in
accordance with the principles of equity, to
accomplish justice in each particular case.
Quoting 47 C.J.S. "Interest & Usury" § 6 (1982).
B&H
immediately rectified the damage caused by Pennington in
December, 1992; asked for payment in April, 1993; filed a lien
on the damages in January, 1994; and originated this lawsuit in
February, 1994.
We therefore cannot conclude that the court's
award of prejudgment interest is an abuse of discretion.
See
generally Church and Mullins Corp. v. Bethlehem Minerals Co.,
887 S.W.2d 321, 325 (Ky. 1992).
ISSUES VII AND VIII:
PENNINGTON AND MAIER V. B&H AND UK
VIOLATION OF CIVIL DUE PROCESS
Lastly, Pennington and Maier assert civil due process
violations, contending prejudice by the trial court in rendering
its findings of fact, conclusions of law, order, and judgment in
April and May, 2001, after having conducted the bench trial for
four days in May, 1998, and for six days in August and
September, 1999.
Upon review of these issues, we agree with B&H
and UK that these issues are not preserved for our review, in
that they were never raised before the trial court.
Although
Pennington and Maier point to their prehearing statements as
sufficient preservation, a review of this particular reference
-36-
indicates that both appellants raised delay only in the context
of the award of prejudgment interest, issues that have been
addressed earlier in this opinion.
Additionally, by their own actions they establish that
this issue was not brought to the trial court's attention.
In
October, 1997, the court set a trial date of May 18, 1998, upon
UK's request, not appellants'; appellants jointly moved to
continue the May 18, 1998 trial date; and in February, 1999,
following the recess of the initial four days of trial, the
parties requested that the trial be continued specifically to
the end of August, 1999.
Furthermore, appellants failed to utilize the
procedures in SCR 1.050(8) to alert the trial court that the
case was ready for submission.
It is well settled that "a question not raised or
adjudicated in the court below cannot be considered when raised
for the first time in this court."
Combs v. Knott County Fiscal
Court, 283 Ky. 456, 141 S.W.2d 859, 860 (1940).
We thus decline
to consider appellants' due process violation claims.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment and order of
the Franklin Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
-37-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT
C. E. PENNINGTON COMPANY:
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE UNIVERSITY
OF KENTUCKY:
Thomas H. Burnett
J. Bruce Miller
Lexington, Kentucky
Lynn C. Stidham
Stidham & Associates, P.S.C.
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT G. E.
MAIER COMPANY:
Curtis L. Cornett (admitted
pro hac vice)
Cors & Bassett, LLC
Cincinnati, Ohio
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE B & H
ELECTRICAL CONTRACTORS, INC.:
James D. Elam
Lexington, Kentucky
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