JASON EDWARD NEAL, Applicant-Appellant, vs. STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 9-1000 / 08-1713
Filed February 10, 2010
JASON EDWARD NEAL,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Douglas Staskal,
Judge.
Jason Neal appeals from the district court’s denial of his second
application for postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Jesse A. Macro Jr. of Gaudineer, Comito & George LLP, West Des
Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Thomas W. Andrews, Assistant
Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Joe Weeg, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellee State.
Heard by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Potterfield and Mansfield, JJ.
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POTTERFIELD, J.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
This appeal from the denial of Jason Neal’s second application for
postconviction relief requires us to consider again the retroactivity of State v.
Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d 549 (Iowa 2006), and the constitutional effectiveness of
Neal’s counsel at trial, on appeal, and on postconviction.
The facts of this case, as summarized on direct appeal from Neal’s 2003
conviction for first-degree murder are as follows:
According to the State’s version of events, David’s mother
left him in Neal’s care while she was at work. Neal became angry
at David because David wet his pants and punished David by
spanking him with a wooden paddle. Neal became “extra angry”
when he found David had also soiled his pants. As a result, Neal
pushed David into a bathroom wall causing David to hit his head on
the wall and the floor, rendering him unconscious. Neal then
cleaned David up, dressed him, and placed him in bed. After David
began vomiting and was having difficulty breathing, Neal
summoned a neighbor for help.
At the neighbor’s instruction, Neal summoned emergency
assistance. He told paramedics he didn’t know what happened to
David. At the hospital, David’s treating physician, Dr. Dawson,
“specifically asked [Neal] if [David] had had any kind of trauma of
any kind . . . including spanking and falling in [his questioning].”
Neal denied any trauma and said he was baking a cake when he
found David lying on his bed. After offering several versions, Neal
told police he pushed David into the bathroom wall.
Dr. Dawson would later testify that David was unconscious
upon arrival and exhibited retinal hemorrhaging, a classic symptom
of a battered child. Physicians also noted two distinct impact
injuries to the back of David’s head. David also had significant
bruising that extended from his lower back to the bottom of his back
and covered both sides of his buttocks. Dr. Gerdes, a pediatric
critical care specialist, opined that it was unlikely David would have
been able to walk after sustaining such injuries. The physicians’
consensus
opinion
was
that
David’s
injuries
were
contemporaneously inflicted.
A subsequent autopsy confirmed that David died from “blunt
force trauma to the head.” The coroner determined David’s fatal
injuries were caused by at least two separate impacts to the back of
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his head. The coroner also noted a deep laceration to the back of
David’s ear, a large bruise above his right eye, defensive wounds
on the back of his right hand, bruises around his neck, and
considerable bruising on his buttocks that were so extensive “they
actually occurred throughout the muscles of the buttock.”
Neal pled not guilty, and the matter proceeded to jury trial.
At trial Neal’s version of events differed in significant details from
the State’s. He disputed the severity of the spanking by testifying
he only struck David five or six times with a wooden paddle and did
not intend to injure him. Neal also disputed the State’s claim that
David’s head and buttocks injuries were contemporaneously
inflicted. He testified that after spanking David, David walked from
the bedroom to the bathroom while Neal went upstairs. Neal’s
testimony included the following:
Q. All right, So you’re done spanking and you went upstairs
with the paddle; is that right? A. Yes, I did.
Q. And you put it away? A. Yes.
Q. And then what did you do? A. And then I came back
downstairs to go back into–
Q. And at that point what do you see when you come back
downstairs? A. The bathroom door is open. David is standing
there and he’s not changing or anything like that. He’s just–he’s
standing there.
....
Q. Did he respond to you at all? A. He didn’t respond. He
wasn’t looking up or anything at me, and I kept–I said, “David,” and
then I guess as a reaction because I wasn’t getting his attention like
I wanted it, I pushed. I pushed David.
Q. With both hands? A. With both hands.
Q. Where did you push him on his body? A. Like in the
chest area. It wasn’t–when I pushed him, it wasn’t meant to be a
push like as hard as it was or like that. It was just–you know,
looking back on it, I wish I would have grabbed him by the
shoulders, you know, like some people do, but I just–it was a
reaction. I pushed, and he went back into the wall. And after he
went back into the wall–
Q. Well, let me ask you this: When you pushed him, was it
your intent to push him into the wall? A. No. My intent wasn’t for
him to hit the wall. It’s what happened.
Q. What part of his body hit the wall? A. Well, I didn’t–I
mean, I wasn’t back there to see, but I know his back hit the wall
and then the indentation, the back of his head hit the wall.
Neal also testified that he then picked David up, dressed
him, and placed him in bed. When Neal later noticed David had
vomited and was having trouble breathing, he summoned a
neighbor for assistance.
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In his motion for judgment of acquittal, Neal argued that the
evidence was insufficient to establish that he acted with malice
aforethought, an essential element of proof under both the State’s
premeditated and felony murder theories. The court rejected Neal’s
argument and submitted both theories of first-degree murder to the
jury. The jury returned a [general] verdict finding Neal guilty of firstdegree murder. Neal’s posttrial motions were denied, and a
judgment of conviction and sentence were entered accordingly.
State v. Neal, No. 03-0623 (Iowa Ct. App. July 28, 2004).
Neal now appeals from the denial of his second application for
postconviction relief, arguing: (1) the district court erred in determining that
Heemstra does not apply retroactively; (2) his trial co-counsel were ineffective for
a number of reasons; and (3) his trial, appellate, and postconviction counsel were
ineffective for failing to argue that child endangerment should merge into murder
and therefore cannot serve as the predicate felony for felony murder.
II. Standard of Review
We review postconviction relief proceedings for errors at law. Ledezma v.
State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 141 (Iowa 2001).
To the extent Neal’s argument
involves the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel, our review is
de novo. Hannan v. State, 732 N.W.2d 45, 50 (Iowa 2007).
III. Retroactivity of Heemstra
Neal argues that the district court’s conclusion that the Iowa Supreme
Court’s 2006 decision in Heemstra does not apply retroactively to his case
violates his due process rights.
See Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d at 558.
In
Heemstra, the supreme court found,“[I]f the act causing willful injury is the same
act that causes the victim’s death, the former is merged into the murder and
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therefore cannot serve as the predicate felony for felony-murder purposes.” Id.
However, the Heemstra court went on to say:
The rule of law announced in this case regarding the use of
willful injury as a predicate felony for felony-murder purposes shall
be applicable only to the present case and those cases not finally
resolved on direct appeal in which the issue has been raised in the
district court.
Id.
The Iowa Supreme Court later decided in Goosman v. State, 764 N.W.2d
539, 545 (Iowa 2009), that its refusal to apply Heemstra retroactively did not
violate federal due process. We find no reason to apply a different analysis in
considering Neal’s constitutional due process claim. See State v. James, 393
N.W.2d 465, 466 (Iowa 1986) (stating “we interpret provisions in our constitution
which are similar to those in the federal constitution as being identical in scope,
import and purpose,” after noting the due process guarantees of the state
constitution are identical to those of the federal constitution). Accordingly, we
affirm the district court’s finding that Heemstra does not apply retroactively to
Neal.
IV. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
We agree with the district court that Neal’s assertions of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel are not preserved. See Iowa Code § 822.8 (2007)
(“All grounds for relief available to an applicant under this chapter must be raised
in the applicant’s original . . . application. Any ground . . . not raised . . . may not
be the basis for a subsequent application, unless the court finds a ground for
relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately
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raised in the original . . . application.”). However, like the district court, we have
considered these claims and find them to be without merit.
In order to prove his trial counsel were ineffective, Neal must show that:
(1) counsel failed to perform an essential duty; and (2) prejudice resulted from
that failure. Taylor v. State, 352 N.W.2d 683, 684 (Iowa 1984). To establish the
first prong of the test, Neal must show that his counsel did not act as a
“reasonably competent practitioner” would have. State v. Simmons, 714 N.W.2d
264, 276 (Iowa 2006). To satisfy the second prong, prejudice, Neal “must show
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Taylor, 352
N.W.2d at 684.
A. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Neal claims trial counsel were ineffective for failing to object to
impermissible statements made by the prosecutor during closing argument. We
agree with the district court that although some of the statements made by the
prosecutor may have been improper, Neal cannot prove they prejudiced him in
the context of the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
“[A] verdict or
conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been
affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support.” Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2069, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 699
(1984). The record overwhelmingly supports the jury’s conviction of Neal for firstdegree murder.
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B. Witness Preparation
Neal claims trial counsel were ineffective for failing to properly prepare his
witnesses to refrain from stating he was in jail at the time of trial. There was
already evidence in the record that Neal had been arrested.
Therefore, the
testimony of Neal’s witnesses was cumulative, and Neal suffered no prejudice.
See State v. Moeller, 589 N.W.2d 53, 55 (Iowa 1997).
Further, given the
overwhelming nature of the evidence against Neal, he cannot prove he was
prejudiced as required by Strickland.
Neal also claims trial counsel were ineffective for failing to properly
prepare his expert witness for trial. Neal asserts his expert witness did not offer
anything material to support his case and instead surprised counsel with
damaging testimony.
A review of the record reveals Neal’s expert witness’s
testimony was helpful to his defense, most notably by lending credibility to Neal’s
version of the facts. In evaluating counsel’s effectiveness, we require more than
a showing that counsel’s strategy was not completely successful. Taylor, 352
N.W.2d at 684.
Neal cannot show his counsel were ineffective in their
preparation of Neal’s expert witness.
C. Admission of Photographs
Next, Neal argues his counsel were ineffective for failing to object to the
number and cumulative nature of the photographs admitted at trial. The strength
of the evidence supporting Neal’s conviction compels us to conclude Neal is
unable to show prejudice. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069,
80 L. Ed. 2d at 699-70.
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D. Merger of Child Endangerment and Murder
Finally, Neal argues his trial, appellate, and postconviction counsel were
ineffective for failing to argue that when the crime of child endangerment is the
same act that causes the victim’s death, the child endangerment conviction and
sentence merge into the murder and therefore cannot serve as the predicate
felony for felony murder purposes.
This argument was not presented to or
decided by the district court. Accordingly, it is not preserved, and we decline to
address it on appeal. See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002)
(“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be
both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on
appeal.”).
AFFIRMED.
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