IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF ANN JANELLE RAYGOR LAHART AND WILLIAM J. LAHART Upon the Petition of ANN JANELLE RAYGOR LAHART, Petitioner-Appellee, And Concerning WILLIAM J. LAHART, Respondent-Appellant.

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA No. 2-437 / 01-1971 Filed June 19, 2002 IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF ANN JANELLE RAYGOR LAHART AND WILLIAM J. LAHART Upon the Petition of ANN JANELLE RAYGOR LAHART, Petitioner-Appellee, And Concerning WILLIAM J. LAHART, Respondent-Appellant. Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jasper County, Darrell Goodhue, Judge. William L. Lahart appeals from the district court's order denying his application for modification of the parties' decree of dissolution. AFFIRMED. Richard McConville of Coppola, Sandre, McConville & Carroll, P.C., West Des Moines, for appellant. Thomas Grabinski, Grinnell, for appellee. Considered by Habhab, Peterson, and Snell, Senior Judges.* *Senior Judges assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2001). PETERSON, S.J. This is an appeal from an order of the district court denying an application of William L. Lahart, father of three minor children, for modification of a decree of dissolution which requested that the primary care of the children be now awarded to him. Joint custody of the children had been awarded to both parties in the decree of dissolution with primary care awarded to the mother of the children. The decree of dissolution was entered on October 15, 1998, incorporating a stipulation in which the parties agreed to joint legal custody of the minor children with primary physical care placed with the mother, Ann Raygor Lahart. Specific visitation arrangements were granted to William. The minor children at that time were seventeen, thirteen, eleven, and seven years of age. The petition for modification filed on July 7, 2000, asserts that there has been a material change of circumstances since the entry of the decree warranting a change of the primary physical care to William. Our review of proceedings concerning the modification of child custody provisions of a dissolution decree is de novo. In re Marriage of Fox, 559 N.W.2d 26, 28 (Iowa 1997). We will give weight to the district court's fact finding, particularly when considering the credibility of witnesses, but we are not bound by such findings. Id. The standards we apply in a modification of primary care of children have been well established. The applying party must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the conditions since the entry of the decree establishing the custody or physical care arrangement have so materially and substantially changed that the children's best interests make it expedient to change the physical care or custody. The changed circumstances must not have been within the contemplation of the court at the time of the decree was entered and must be more or less permanent and relate to the welfare of the children. In re Marriage of Walton, 577 N.W.2d 869, 870 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998). The parent seeking to change physical care must establish the ability to administer more effectively to the children's well being. In re Marriage of Whalen, 569 N.W.2d 626, 628 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). The heavy burden upon a party seeking to modify custody stems from the principle that once custody or physical care of the children has been fixed, it should be disturbed only for the most cogent reasons. In re Marriage of Zabecki, 389 N.W.2d 396, 398 (Iowa 1986); In re Marriage of Frederici, 338 N.W.2d 156, 158 (Iowa 1983), In re Marriage of Mayfield, 577 N.W.2d 872, 873 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998). We consider the factors contained in Iowa Code section 598.21 in determining whether to modify a custody or physical care arrangement. Iowa Code § 598.21(8); In re Marriage of Bolin, 336 N.W.2d 441, 443 (Iowa 1983). Upon a de novo review of the record of the modification proceedings from the trial court, we determine that the trial court was correct in its denial of the application for modification of the decree of dissolution as it relates to the physical care of the children. William complains that Ann's approach to medical care for the children by the use of alternative medical care, such as herbal remedies and chiropractic services, endangers the children. This was an issue of conflict between the parties before the dissolution, and it appears that no significant change on this issue has developed since the dissolution. "Joint custody" does include equal participation in decisions concerning medical care, and we admonish the parties to recognize that requirement when medical issues arise. Iowa Code § 598.1(3) (1999). William represents that without his approval Ann has changed the primary religious resource in these children's lives by including them in the activities of a protestant religious church with which she has become affiliated and failed to be as intense as he would prefer in the instructional processes of the Roman Catholic Church. The record reflects that the children have been allowed to remain active in the Catholic Church although also attending church activities of the protestant church attended by Ann. Religion appears from the record to remain a significant part of the children's upbringing, and the broadening of the experience of the children does not represent a substantial change of circumstances in this case. William has remarried, and the relationship of his present wife with the children is good. He asserts that with her help while he is at work he can now provide appropriate care and nurturing to the children superior to the care being provided by Ann. He contends this is a material and substantial change of circumstances warranting a modification of the physical care arrangement. Remarriage itself is not a material and substantial change of circumstances to support a change of physical care. In re Marriage of Dethrow, 357 N.W.2d 44, 46 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984). William contends that Ann represented at the time of the dissolution that she was going to remain in the family home with the children. He acknowledges, however, that such was not a condition of the custodial arrangement at the time of the dissolution. In fact, the present living arrangement of Ann with the children is closer to William than before the dissolution. The lives of parties after a dissolution do not remain static. The court contemplates that many changes in the lives of the parties will occur after the entry of a decree of dissolution. The mere change in the residence of the children does not support a basis for change of physical care unless there are other factors connected with that change which reflect a material and substantial change of circumstances. William has identified a number of other concerns which are represented to the court as a substantial change of circumstances. Individually the expressed concerns are not sufficient to represent a material and substantial change of circumstances warranting a change of physical care of the children, nor does the sum of these complaints provide sufficient basis for a change of physical care. Much of the problems presented to the court in these proceedings are exacerbated by the lack of effective communication between the parties. The court cannot solve that problem, but can only urge the parties to seek a means of resolving this critical issue to avoid continuing conflict concerning the welfare of the children. The children are with an appropriate caretaker at this time. There are not sufficient reasons presented to uproot them. Accordingly, we affirm. Ann has requested contribution to her appellate attorney's fees. We direct William to contribute the sum of $650 to the attorney fees incurred by Ann in these proceedings and pay the costs incurred herein. AFFIRMED.