FOR PUBLICATION
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
DAVID A. BROOKS STEVE CARTER
Lyons, Sullivan & Brooks Attorney General of Indiana
Valparaiso, Indiana
GARY DAMON SECREST
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
TRACI JACOBS, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 75A03-0305-CR-179
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE STARKE CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable David P. Matsey, Judge
Cause No. 75C01-0301-FB-1
February 10, 2004
OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION
MATHIAS, Judge
Traci Jacobs (“Jacobs”) was convicted of Class B felony dealing in
methamphetamine,[1] Class B felony conspiracy to deal in
methamphetamine,[2] and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement[3] in
Starke Circuit Court. Jacobs appeals, raising the following restated
issues for appellate review:
I. Whether the testimony of a State witness was incredibly dubious;
and,
II. Whether the admission of two items into evidence was error.
Concluding that the incredible dubiosity rule is inapplicable to the facts
of this case and the admission of evidence in question was harmless error,
we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
On January 11, 2003, Jacobs, Michael Manns (“Manns”), and several
other individuals smoked the last of their methamphetamine in Sherry Gross-
Wireman’s (“Wireman’s”) trailer located at 5121 Driftwood Lane in North
Judson, Indiana.
Shortly thereafter, this group began manufacturing methamphetamine.
Jacobs’ involvement in this production included, among other tasks, the
removal of lithium strips from batteries with side cutters and pliers. Tr.
p. 384. Jacobs also negotiated the sale of the projected methamphetamine
to Ron Fisher, who indicated that he could “wholesale” the product for
$225.
The subsequent production of methamphetamine produced an odor that
could be detected far from the confines of Wireman’s trailer.
Consequently, the Starke County Sheriff’s Department arrived to
investigate. When the occupants of Wireman’s trailer saw the sheriff’s
deputies, they fled. Subsequently, Deputy Bret Hansen encountered Jacobs
behind a garage and yelled, “Police Stop!” twice in Jacobs’ direction. Tr.
p. 219. Jacobs attempted to flee, but Deputy Hansen was able to catch her
and place her under arrest.
After obtaining a search warrant, the deputies entered Wireman’s
trailer. Upon entering, the deputies discovered active methamphetamine
laboratories in two bedrooms, a purse with Jacobs’ library card, pliers,
and vice grips in it, and Manns passed out in one of the bedrooms. Manns
apparently had passed out as a result of the odors emanating from the
methamphetamine production process.
The State charged Jacobs by information with Class B felony dealing in
methamphetamine, Class B felony conspiracy to deal in methamphetamine, and
Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. Jacobs proceeded to jury
trial on February 13, 2003, and the jury found Jacobs guilty on all counts
on February 15, 2003. The trial court sentenced Jacobs to ten-years
executed in the Department of Correction for her Class B felony dealing in
methamphetamine conviction, ten-years executed in the Department of
Correction for her Class B felony conspiracy to deal in methamphetamine
conviction, and one-year executed in the Starke County Jail for her Class A
misdemeanor resisting law enforcement conviction. The trial court also
ordered Jacobs’ sentences to be served concurrently and gave Jacobs time-
served credit of 120 days. Jacobs now appeals.
I. Incredible Dubiosity
Jacobs contends that the evidence supporting her conviction is
insufficient because the testimony of the State’s chief witness, Manns, is
incredibly dubious.
In addressing a claim of insufficient evidence, an appellate court
must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences
supporting the judgment, without weighing the evidence or assessing witness
credibility, and determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have
found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Corbett v. State, 764 N.E.2d 622,
626 (Ind. 2002). However, under the incredible dubiosity rule, a reviewing
court may impinge upon the fact-finder’s responsibility to judge witness
credibility when “a sole witness presents inherently contradictory
testimony which is equivocal or the result of coercion and there is a
complete lack of circumstantial evidence.” Id. (quoting Tillman v. State,
642 N.E.2d 221, 223 (Ind. 1994)).
The application of the incredible dubiosity rule is precluded when
circumstantial evidence supports a conviction. Id. Jacobs’ library card,
pliers, and vice grips found in a purse is very strong circumstantial
evidence suggesting that Jacobs was involved in the production of
methamphetamine and corroborates Manns’ testimony—which indicated that,
despite her pregnancy, Jacobs was involved in the use, production, and sale
of methamphetamine. Tr. p. 300. Furthermore, Jacobs fled after the
sheriff’s department arrived at Wireman’s trailer. See Gee v. State, 526
N.E.2d 1152, 1154 (Ind. 1988) (“Flight from the scene of a crime may be
considered circumstantial evidence of guilt.”).
Because of the circumstantial evidence of Jacob’s guilt, the
incredible dubiosity rule may not be applied to this case, and sufficient
evidence was presented to support Jacob’s conviction.
II. The Admission of Evidence
The decision to admit or exclude evidence is a matter within the
sound discretion of the trial court. Pickens v. State, 764 N.E.2d 295, 297
(Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. An abuse of discretion occurs if a
trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts
and circumstances before the court. Id. Even if the trial court abused
its discretion in admitting evidence, we will not reverse a conviction if
the error is harmless. Bonner v. State, 650 N.E.2d 1139, 1141 (Ind. 1995).
A. The admission of the search warrant
Jacobs contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it
admitted the search warrant used to gain access to Wireman’s trailer. The
State concedes that the trial court abused its discretion, but contends
that Jacobs has failed to demonstrate that the error was prejudicial. Br.
of Appellee at 7.
If a trial court improperly admits a search warrant, a defendant must
demonstrate that the admission is prejudicial before his or her conviction
may be vacated. Guajardo v. State, 496 N.E.2d 1300, 1303 (Ind. 1986).
Jacob’s attempt to demonstrate prejudice is confined entirely to commenting
upon the lack of independent evidence of guilt and fails to demonstrate
that there is an aspect of the search warrant that prejudiced her at
trial.[4] Indeed, the presence of independent evidence of guilt is often
useful when determining whether an error contributed to a verdict.
However, before reversal may be had, the defendant must meet the initial
burden of demonstrating that there is information in or an aspect of the
search warrant that could contribute to his or her verdict if viewed by a
jury.
Prejudicial information is “often” contained in a search warrant;
however, this is not always the case. Guajardo, 496 N.E.2d at 1303. The
warrant that allowed the deputies to enter Wireman’s trailer contains no
mention of Jacobs and contains no allegations or information that was not
exposed to the jury at Jacobs’ trial by other means.[5] Ex. Vol., State’s
p. 68. Because Jacobs failed to demonstrate that the admission of the
search warrant contributed to her verdict and it is far from apparent that
the admission had such an affect, she is not entitled to relief as a result
of the admission.
B. The admission of Jacobs’ boots.
During the first day of trial, one of the State’s witnesses noticed
that the boots Jacobs wore at trial were similar to the boots found in one
of the rooms where methamphetamine was being manufactured. Consequently,
after the first day of trial, the State confiscated Jacobs’ boots and
entered them into evidence.
On appeal, Jacobs asserts that her boots should not have been
admitted on the basis that they were irrelevant to her guilt. In so
asserting, Jacobs states, “[c]an the possession of women’s black leather
boots . . . make it more or less likely that Traci Jacobs was manufacturing
methamphetamine?” Br. of Appellant at 9. Presumably, Jacobs is asserting
that the answer to this question is “obviously no.”
Jacobs’ assertion concerning the lack of influence of the admission of
her boots also speaks to the resulting prejudice of the admission.
Furthermore, the phrase “[t]hose exhibits were, in fact, prejudicial to
Traci Jacobs’ defense” constitutes the entirety of Jacobs’ prejudice
argument. Thus, Jacobs’ failure to demonstrate prejudice and the fact that
prejudice is far from apparent render any possible error in the admission
of her boots harmless.
Conclusion
Jacobs is not entitled to the application of the incredible dubiosity
rule, and any errors in the admission of evidence were harmless.
Affirmed.
SHARPNACK, J., and VAIDIK, J., concur.
-----------------------
[1] Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(A) (1998).
[2] Ind. Code §§ 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(A); 35-41-5-2 (1998).
[3] Ind. Code § 35-44-3-3 (a)(3) (1998).
[4] In light of Manns’ testimony, Jacobs’ library card, pliers, and vice
grips found in a purse, and Jacobs’ flight, we reject Jacobs’ assertion
that there is no independent evidence supporting her conviction.
[5] The presence of methamphetamine in Wireman’s trailer was not in dispute
in this case.
