FOR PUBLICATION
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES:
BRIAN E. HICKS GORDON A. ETZLER
Griffin, Hicks & Hicks KEVIN G. KERR
Indianapolis, Indiana Hoeppner Wagner & Evans LLP
Valparaiso, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
FRED SHENVAR and MARSHALL & SAXSON )
CONSTRUCTION, INC., )
)
Appellants-Defendants, )
)
vs. ) No. 64A05-0004-CV-139
)
PAUL L. JOHNSON, THOMAS G. MIKOS, and )
BLAST CAMP RECREATIONAL GAMES, INC., )
)
Appellees-Plaintiffs. )
APPEAL FROM THE PORTER SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Raymond D. Kickbush, Senior Judge
Cause No. 64D05-9812-CP-2675
January 17, 2001
OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION
BROOK, Judge
Case Summary
Appellants-defendants Fred Shenvar (“Shenvar”) and Marshall & Saxson
Construction, Inc. (“Marshall & Saxson”) (collectively, “appellants”)
appeal the trial court’s judgment in favor of appellees-plaintiffs Paul L.
Johnson (“Johnson”), Thomas G. Mikos (“Mikos”), and Blast Camp Recreational
Games, Inc. (“Blast Camp”) (collectively, “appellees”) on their complaint
for declaratory judgment to set aside a tax deed. We affirm in part and
vacate in part.
Issues
Appellants raise two issues for review, which we restate as follows:
I. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Blast Camp was
entitled to receive notice of tax deed proceedings; and
II. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Shenvar failed
to make “diligent inquiry” to determine the addresses of Johnson
and Mikos for tax deed notification purposes.
Facts and Procedural History[1]
The facts most favorable to the trial court’s judgment indicate that
Johnson and Mikos,[2] sole shareholders of Blast Camp, purchased
approximately twenty acres of real estate in Porter County (“the Nike
site”).[3] On September 16, 1994, Johnson and Mikos received a warranty
deed for the Nike site as tenants in common; the deed specified that tax
bills were to be mailed to Johnson at “348 Main” in Hobart, Indiana. Also
on this date, Johnson and Mikos obtained a mortgage on the property from
Bank One Merrillville, N.A. (“Bank One”). Johnson and Mikos leased the
property to Blast Camp, which had managed and operated a public
recreational paintball facility on the Nike site since 1988 and maintained
a retail store at 348 Main Street in Hobart.[4] Blast Camp did not
publicly record its lease interest; however, a large orange advertising
sign at the entrance to the Nike site facility displayed Blast Camp’s name
and the phone number of its Hobart store.
Sometime after September 16, 1994, Blast Camp closed its store at 348
Main Street and moved to 608 Third Street in Hobart; the store’s phone
number remained the same. Neither Johnson nor Mikos notified the Porter
County auditor or treasurer of the address change. Because of the address
change, the 1995 and 1996 Nike site property tax notices were returned to
the Porter County treasurer. The property taxes were not paid, and the
auditor initiated tax sale proceedings in 1997. Pursuant to Indiana Code
Section 6-1.1-24-4, the auditor sent Johnson and Mikos notice of the sale
via certified mail at the 348 Main Street address; the post office returned
the notice as “Attempted, not deliverable.” On October 9, 1997, Shenvar
purchased the Nike site property at a tax sale for $18,000 plus $65 in
costs and $836.17 in outstanding taxes. Shortly thereafter, Shenvar
assigned his interest in the tax sale certificate to Marshall & Saxson, a
real estate holding company owned by Shenvar and his wife. In April 1998,
Shenvar’s teenage son participated in recreational paintball at Blast Camp.
In June 1998, Shenvar ordered a title search of the property that revealed
Johnson and Mikos’s mortgage to Bank One.
On July 9, 1998, and on July 27, 1998, pursuant to Indiana Code
Section 6-1.1-25-4.5, Shenvar sent tax sale redemption notices via
certified mail to Johnson and Mikos at the 348 Main Street address; these
notices were returned as undeliverable. On July 10, 1998, Shenvar mailed a
similar notice to Bank One; Michelle Draschil signed the certified mail
receipt on July 13, 1998. Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 6-1.1-25-4.5,
Shenvar published notice in the Vidette & Portage Times once each week for
three consecutive weeks in July and August 1998.
On September 10, 1998, pursuant to Indiana Code Section 6-1.1-25-4.6,
Shenvar sent a tax deed petition notice via certified mail to Johnson and
Mikos at 348 Main Street; neither Johnson nor Mikos received the notice.
On the same date, Shenvar mailed a tax deed petition notice to Bank One,
which received the notice the following day. Shenvar then published notice
of his petition for a tax deed in the Vidette & Portage Times on September
17, 1998.[5] On October 12, 1998, Shenvar filed a petition for a tax deed
with the Porter Superior Court, which ordered the auditor to issue a tax
deed to the Nike site to Marshall & Saxson. The tax deed was executed on
October 26, 1998, and recorded the following day. Shortly thereafter,
Shenvar drove by the Nike site, obtained Blast Camp’s telephone number from
a sign on the property, and called Mervyn Erickson (“Erickson”), the
manager of the Blast Camp store in Hobart. Shenvar stated that he was the
owner of the property and offered to continue Erickson’s employment as
store manager.
On December 3, 1998, appellees filed a complaint for declaratory
judgment to set aside the tax deed to the Nike site, as well as a petition
for a temporary order to restrain Shenvar from ejecting appellees from the
property. The trial court granted appellees’ petition on December 30,
1998. On June 2, 1999, appellees filed a summary judgment motion, which
the trial court later denied. On October 16, 1999, appellees requested
special findings of fact and conclusions thereon pursuant to Indiana Trial
Rule 52(A). A bench trial was held on October 27, 1999. On December 14,
1999, the trial court issued its findings of fact and the following
conclusions:
1. The statutory requirement of making “diligent inquiry” to
determine the name and address of owners of public record are words in
the statute [Indiana Code Section 6-1.1-25-4.5] that are not useless
phrases. They are there for a purpose. The perfunctory inquiry of
mailing of notices to an address when it is known that no purpose will
be served does not comply with “diligent inquiry.” More is required.
An honest and well-directed effort should have been made by Shenvar to
ascertain the names and addresses of the owners of this property.
Shenvar had the knowledge and expertise of being able to do elementary
detective work in this regard. Such inquiry should be as full as the
circumstances as [sic] the particular situation will permit. Here,
Shenvar’s son participated in recreation facilities [sic] at Blast
Camp. This Court does not believe it credible that Shenvar did not
know recreational operations that were being conducted on that
property. Nor does this Court find it credible that an investor of
$18,000.00 in 20 acres of real estate in Porter County did not drive
by that facility on a well-paved road to observe a posted sign prior
to obtaining his Tax Deed all of which was located less than 10 miles
of his residence in this County. In short, this Court does not find
such claimed lack of knowledge on Shenvar’s part to be credible.
2. Due diligence in this case would also have dictated Shenvar
to contact Bank One, the listed mortgage holder on this property, once
Shenvar obtained the Lawyer’s Title Report as to the real estate prior
to obtaining the Tax Deed. He did not do that.
3. “Due diligence” and due inquiry would also require Shenvar
to call the phone number listed on the advertising sign to ascertain
the correct location of the owners of this property prior to obtaining
the Tax Deed. This information was easily obtainable and would not
have placed an undue burden of time or expense on him.
4. Johnson’s and Mikos’ contention that they thought that their
mortgage holder, Bank One, was paying taxes directly (as had been done
on the mortgage payments on Johnson’s residence) is not unreasonable.
It is not an uncommon practice with mortgage companies to pay taxes
directly; hence, this was Johnson’s and Mikos’ answer as to why they
had not paid any real estate taxes.
5. Blast Camp Recreational Games, Inc., the user of the
property in question, had a use which was open and notorious which use
could have easily been determined by Shenvar by a visual inspection of
the property (without any trespassing); Blast Camp therefore was also
entitled to a written notice of the filing of the Petition for Tax
Deed which Shenvar failed to do.
In its judgment, the trial court stated that Shenvar “did not exercise due
inquiry to determine the addresses and notification of Johnson, Mikos and
Blast Camp and give them written notice as required by statute” and
declared Shenvar’s tax deed null and void.
Discussion and Decision
Standard of Review
Where, as here, a party has requested specific findings of fact and
conclusions thereon pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52(A), we may affirm the
judgment on any legal theory supported by the findings. In re Paternity of
Winkler, 725 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). We must first determine
whether the evidence supports the findings and second, whether the findings
support the judgment. Id. We will reverse the judgment only if it is
clearly erroneous. Id. “Findings of fact are clearly erroneous when the
record lacks any evidence or reasonable inferences from the evidence to
support them.” Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous even though there is
evidence to support it if our examination of the record leaves us with the
firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. “To determine whether
the findings or judgment are clearly erroneous, we consider only the
evidence favorable to the judgment and all reasonable inferences flowing
therefrom, and we will not reweigh the evidence or assess witness
credibility.” Id.
I. Was Blast Camp Entitled to Notice?
Appellants first contend that because Blast Camp did not have a
publicly recorded interest in the Nike site, the trial court erred in
concluding that Blast Camp was entitled to notice of tax deed proceedings.
Indiana Code Section 6-1.1-25-4.5(a) provides that a purchaser is entitled
to a tax deed to the property at issue only if the purchaser “gives notice
of the sale, the date of expiration of the period of redemption, and the
date on or after which a petition for the tax deed will be filed to the
owner and any person with a substantial property interest of public record
in the tract or real property.” Section 6-1.1-25-4.6(a) provides that
notice of the purchaser’s filing of a petition for the tax deed “and the
date on or after which the petitioner intends to make application for an
order on the petition shall be given to the owner and any person with a
substantial interest of public record in the tract or real property[.]”
Section 6-1.1-24-1.9 defines “substantial property interest of public
record” in relevant part as “title to or interest in a tract possessed by a
person and recorded in the office of a county recorder or available for
public inspection in the office of a circuit court clerk no later than the
hour and date the sale is scheduled to commence under this chapter.”
We agree with appellants that the only parties with “substantial
property interest of public record” in the Nike site were Johnson, Mikos,
and Bank One, and that only these parties were entitled to notice under
sections 6-1.1-25-4.5 and -4.6. Appellees’ arguments focus on Blast Camp’s
open and obvious use of the property and the public availability of its
phone number. However, the fact that Shenvar might have used Blast Camp as
a source of information or even as a mailing address[6] for notifying
Johnson and Mikos is not dispositive of whether Blast Camp was entitled to
notice as a matter of law. Therefore, we vacate those portions of the
trial court’s judgment which state that Blast Camp was entitled to written
notice of tax deed proceedings.
II. Due Diligence and Notification
Appellants further contend that the trial court erred in concluding
that Shenvar did not “exercise due inquiry” in notifying Johnson and Mikos
of the tax deed proceedings. At trial, both parties stipulated to the
propriety of the auditor’s and treasurer’s actions during the tax deed
proceedings, but appellees challenged the sufficiency of Shenvar’s efforts
to comply
with the notice requirements of Indiana Code Section 6-1.1-25-4.5. See Tax
Certificate Investments, Inc. v. Smethers, 714 N.E.2d 131, 133 (Ind. 1999)
[hereinafter TCI] (“The first notice [under Ind. Code § 6-1.1-25-4.5]
announces the fact of the sale, the date the redemption period will expire,
and the date on or after which a tax deed petition will be filed. The
second notice [under Ind. Code § 6-1.1-25-4.6] announces that the purchaser
has petitioned for a tax deed.”) (statutory citations omitted).
While a tax deed creates a presumption that a tax sale and all of the
steps leading to the issuance of the tax deed are proper, this
presumption may be rebutted by affirmative evidence to the contrary.
Moreover, title conveyed by a tax deed may be defeated if the notices
were not in substantial compliance with the manner prescribed in
accordance with our notice statutes, [Indiana Code Sections] 6-1.1-25-
4.5 and 4.6.
Maudlin v. Hall, 700 N.E.2d 469, 471 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (citing Ind. Code
§ 6-1.1-25-16(7)) (citation omitted).
Indiana Code Section 6-1.1-25-4.5(b) reads in relevant part as
follows:
The purchaser or assigneee or, in a county having a consolidated city,
a county having a population of more than two hundred thousand
(200,000) but less than four hundred thousand (400,000), or a county
where the county auditor and county treasurer have an agreement under
section 4.7 of this chapter, the county auditor shall give the notice
[of the tax sale] by sending a copy of the notice by certified mail to
the [owner and any person with a substantial property interest of
public record] at their last known addresses. However, if the address
of the owner or person with a substantial property interest of public
record upon diligent inquiry cannot be located by the purchaser or
assignee or, in a county having a consolidated city, a county having a
population of more than two hundred thousand (200,000) but less than
four hundred thousand (400,000), or a county where the county auditor
and county treasurer have an agreement under section 4.7 of this
chapter, the county auditor, notice may be given by publication in the
manner described in [Indiana Code Section] 6-1.1-22-4(b) once each
week for three consecutive weeks.
(Emphases added.) Appellants claim that Shenvar substantially complied
with this section by mailing notices to Johnson and Mikos at their last
known address: 348 Main Street in Hobart. The “diligent inquiry” language
of section 6-1.1-25-4.5(b), appellants argue, does not require a purchaser
to “perform an investigation at or near the property” to ascertain the
owner’s address.
Appellees respond that the “diligent inquiry” language of section 4.5
expresses the due process[7] requirement that notice be “reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of
the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections.” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). “The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the
required information, and it must afford a reasonable time for those
interested to make their appearance. But if with due regard for the
practicalities and peculiarities of the case these conditions are
reasonably met the constitutional requirements are satisfied.” Id. at 314-
15 (citations omitted). If Shenvar’s duty was merely to send notice to the
last known address, appellees contend, then the “diligent inquiry” language
of section 6-1.1-25-4.5(b) is without meaning. See In re Visitation of
J.P.H., 709 N.E.2d 44, 46 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (“Where possible, every word
[in a statute] must be given effect and meaning (.”). Appellees argue that
after the initial notices to Johnson and Mikos were returned as
undeliverable, Shenvar should have inspected the nearby Nike site,[8]
contacted Bank One, or examined the local telephone directory to ascertain
Johnson’s and Mikos’s current addresses in conformance with due process.
We have found no cases specifically addressing the “diligent inquiry”
language of section 4.5 with respect to a purchaser’s responsibility to
determine the property owner’s[9] current address for due process
notification purposes. Appellants suggest that our supreme court’s
unanimous decision in TCI is dispositive of the issue before us. In TCI, a
quitclaim deed “relinquishing all right, title and interest” of Ellen
Smethers in the disputed property was not recorded after Ellen and her
husband David divorced; consequently, the Smethers remained joint owners of
public record. During tax deed proceedings, TCI’s predecessor in interest
mailed notices to “Smethers, David E. and Ellen E.” that were received by
David at the property address; however, David did not discuss the notices
with Ellen for several months. Approximately six months after a court
granted TCI a tax deed to the subject property, David and Ellen jointly
sought to invalidate it.
In addressing the adequacy of TCI’s notice to the Smethers, our
supreme court “assume[d] without deciding that Ellen was entitled to
notice.” TCI, 714 N.E.2d at 133. The court then referred to the dictates
of Mullane and discussed the issue of due process as follows:
We addressed the requirements of due process in the context of tax
sale notice in Elizondo v. Read, 588 N.E.2d 501 (Ind.1992). In
Elizondo, the county auditor sent notices of redemption and of deed
issuance to the Elizondos at the address on file with the auditor’s
office. Because the Elizondos had moved twice, the notices were
returned as unclaimed or undeliverable. After publication of notice
in local newspapers in accordance with the applicable statute, the
property was deeded to the tax sale buyers. Had the auditor checked
personal property records, or real estate transfer cards, she could
have found a current address for the Elizondos. However, the
Elizondos had made no effort to update their address with the
auditor’s office. We held that “[a]ll that is required is ( notice to
the owner’s last known address, that is, the last address of the owner
of the specific property in question of which the auditor has
knowledge from records maintained in its office.” Although the
auditor had other addresses on file, some of which happened to be more
current, we held that sending notice to the last address listed for
the property at issue was sufficient.
Although the purchaser of the property rather than the county auditor
was responsible for sending the notice in this case, the requirements
for notice were the same. The purchasers sent notice to the recorded
owners of the property, at their listed address. Had Ellen wished to
receive notices at another address, she had ample opportunity to
update the property records. She did not do so.[[10]] TCI was
entitled to rely on the official property records in complying with
the statutory notice requirement. It appropriately sent notices to
joint owners of record at the address those owners had provided.
Indiana caselaw has for some time held the property owner accountable
for ensuring that official property records reflect a correct address.
In Holland v. King, 500 N.E.2d 1229, 1237 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986), the
court stated: “Our legislature intended to place the burden of
notifying the county taxing authority of the taxpayer’s correct
address upon the taxpayer. If the county sends notice to the
taxpayer’s last known address as supplied by the taxpayer, and the
notice reaches this address, then notice is sufficient.(” The
controlling statute in Holland did not expressly state that notice
sent to the last known address was sufficient. The case here is even
stronger, where the “last known address” requirement has been
specifically incorporated. The conclusion that it is the taxpayer’s
burden to update his or her address remains consistent with the
statute as revised.
Id. at 134 (citations and footnote omitted). The supreme court found in
favor of TCI, concluding that “[a] single notice to joint owners of record
listed at a single address suffices under the plain language of [Indiana
Code Section 6-1.1-25-4.5], as well as under the requirements of due
process.” Id. at 135.
Appellants seize on the TCI court’s language regarding the duty of
property owners to “ensur[e] that official property records reflect a
correct address,” but this responsibility is obviously separate from and
exclusive of a purchaser’s duty of diligent inquiry under section 6-1-1.25-
4.5(b). Indeed, the facts of TCI are sufficiently distinguishable as to
require a different result on due process grounds. In that case, David
Smethers received actual notice of the tax deed proceedings; under the
circumstances, TCI satisfied its duty of diligent inquiry by mailing notice
to his last known address. In the instant case, however, the notices
Shenvar sent to Johnson’s and Mikos’s last known address were returned as
undeliverable. Shenvar contends that a purchaser’s statutory duty of
diligent inquiry is fully satisfied by mailing notices to a property
owner’s last known address; even if more is required, he argues, he met
this additional burden by ordering an independent title search,[11]
inspecting public records and the local telephone directory,[12] and
mailing certified notices to Bank One.
We disagree. The fact remains that Shenvar did not take steps
“reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances” to notify Johnson and
Mikos of the tax deed proceedings, such as requesting their current mailing
addresses from Bank One or calling the telephone number he saw on the Blast
Camp sign. As Justice Jackson observed in Mullane, “[W]hen notice is a
person’s due, process which is a mere gesture is not due process. The
means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the
absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it.” 339 U.S. at 315.[13]
The “diligent inquiry” mentioned in section 6-1.1-25-4.5(b) must not only
be given meaning, as appellees suggest, but it must also comport with the
requirements of due process, “with due regard for the practicalities and
peculiarities of the case.” Id. at 314. Under the facts of this case, we
agree with the trial court’s conclusion that Shenvar, as the purchaser of
the subject property, failed to make “diligent inquiry” to determine the
addresses of property owners Johnson and Mikos.[14] Consequently, Shenvar
failed to provide Johnson and Mikos with adequate notice of the tax deed
proceedings.
Affirmed in part and vacated in part.
SULLIVAN, J., and NAJAM, J. concur.
-----------------------
[1] We heard oral argument in this case on December 11, 2000, in
Indianapolis. We commend both parties for the quality of their preparation
and presentations.
[2] Johnson is a resident of LaPorte, Indiana, and Mikos is a
resident of Wisconsin.
[3] The record indicates that the property at issue once contained a
Nike missile installation.
[4] Blast Camp operated a second store in Michigan City, Indiana.
[5] See Ind. Code § 6-1.1-25-4.6(a):
Notice of the filing of this petition and the date on or after which
the petitioner intends to make application for an order on the
petition shall be given to the owner and any person with a substantial
interest of public record in the tract or real property in the same
manner as provided in section 4.5 of this chapter, except that only
one (1) publication is required.
[6] Appellants contend that “there was no mail receptacle at the
subject real estate which could allow Blast Camp, as an occupant, to
receive mail. This fact can be evidenced by the photographs admitted at
trial.” Appellants’ Brief at 15. As appellees observe, this fact was
neither found by the trial court nor “established by the evidence
designated in support of that fact.” Appellees’ Brief at 2. Appellants
also baldly assert that it is against “U.S. Postal regulations to send a
certified letter addressed to ‘occupant’ as that would violate one’s right
to privacy since a certified letter requires a signature from the
recipient.” Appellants’ Brief at 15-16. Appellees correctly respond that
appellants have waived this argument by failing to cite relevant authority
therefor as required by Indiana Appellate Rule 8.3(A)(7). See, e.g.,
McConnell v. Porter Memorial Hosp., 698 N.E.2d 865, 868 (Ind. Ct. App.
1998), trans. denied.
[7] See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”).
[8] As previously mentioned, the trial court specifically discredited
Shenvar’s testimony that he had not seen the Blast Camp sign at the Nike
site prior to obtaining the tax deed.
[9] We recognize that the notification provisions of section 4.5 also
apply to “persons with substantial property interest of public record,” but
we shall refer only to “property owners” for simplicity’s sake.
[10] She also has not demonstrated that TCI had actual notice of her
change of address at the time of either notification. David and Ellen
Smethers contend that the decree dissolving their marriage, which was
a public record, should have alerted TCI to the fact that Ellen was no
longer residing at the property. This argument is unavailing, since
TCI had no legal obligation to investigate the status of the marriage.
Further, the same decree also provided that the real estate in
question was to be “set over” to David. Although we have assumed
without deciding that Ellen was entitled to notice, the claim that the
decree of dissolution provided TCI with adequate notice of the need
for separate mailings but did not impair Ellen’s entitlement to notice
is questionable. If anything, it suggested that Ellen was no longer
the owner.
TCI, 714 N.E.2d at 134 n.3.
[11] We note that section 6-1.1-25-4.5 does not specifically require
a purchaser to conduct a title search of the subject property.
Nevertheless, section 6-1.1-25-4.7 provides that a county auditor and
county treasurer may enter into a mutual agreement for the county auditor
to perform “[n]otification and title search under section 4.5” instead of
the purchaser. Although we do not reach the question of whether a
purchaser’s duty of diligent inquiry requires the performance of a title
search, we reiterate that section 4.5 requires a purchaser to send notice
to “the owner and any person with a substantial property interest of public
record in the tract or real property.”
[12] At trial, appellees introduced evidence that Blast Camp’s phone
number was listed in the August 1997 Portage/Valparaiso/Hobart white and
yellow pages. Appellees claim that Johnson’s LaPorte phone number is
listed, but there is no evidence that this number is listed in the Hobart
directory. Shenvar lives in Ogden Dunes in Porter County, whereas LaPorte
is located in LaPorte County.
[13] See also Elizondo, 588 N.E.2d at 505 (“Real estate is too
valuable an asset to permit slipshod inquiry into the ownership interests
in such property.”) (Givan, J., dissenting).
[14] We believe our holding today is consistent with our supreme
court’s holdings in both TCI and Elizondo, the latter of which concerned
notices of tax deed proceedings mailed by the county auditor. We agree
that “the auditor does not have knowledge of, nor should be required to
seek knowledge of, information contained in records or documents not
routinely maintained by and within the auditor’s office.” Elizondo, 588
N.E.2d at 504. Thus, a county auditor’s duty of diligent inquiry under
section 6-1.1-25-4.5(b) is confined to the records maintained in its
office. Our holding does not place a more rigorous duty of inquiry on tax
sale purchasers, but rather adheres to the established principle that the
adequacy of due process is a fact-sensitive determination that varies from
case to case. Here, Shenvar knew that Bank One held a mortgage on and that
Blast Camp was an occupant of the subject property, but failed to use this
knowledge to make diligent inquiry as to Johnson’s and Mikos’s addresses.
