Justia.com Opinion Summary:
Defendant was living with the mother of a developmentally disabled 17-year-old. He sexually assaulted her, but she did not immediately report it. He was convicted and received a 28-year sentence. On appeal, defendant complained that venirepersons were asked about why a victim might delay making a report. The appellate court found that the prosecutor had crossed the boundary of acceptable voir dire, but refused to excuse procedural default under the plain-error rule and affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed. The defendant also challenged failure to mention mandatory supervised release in the sentencing judgment, after which the Department of Corrections calculated the sentence to include an indeterminate MSR term of three years to natural life. The appellate court remanded under 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d), which states that for criminal sexual assault, "the term of mandatory supervised release shall range from a minimum of 3 years to a maximum of natural life of the defendant." The Supreme Court reversed. Indeterminate sentences have generally been abolished in Illinois, but, in 2005, were resurrected for certain specified sex offenses to create lifetime supervision for high-risk offenders because of the risk of recidivism. The new provisions contemplate indeterminate terms.Receive FREE Daily Opinion Summaries by Email
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This criminal case comes from Coles County. Defendant was living with the
mother of a 17-year-old girl who had developmental disabilities. In 2006, when he
found himself alone with the girl, he allegedly committed a criminal sexual assault
upon her, but she did not immediately report it. After she did, a jury found him guilty
in a 2007 trial in which he presented no evidence. In his appeal, Rinehart complained
of questions which the prosecutor was permitted to ask prospective jurors. Five
venirepersons were asked short questions, without objection, as to why a sexual
assault victim might delay the making of a report. The appellate court found that the
prosecutor had crossed the boundary of acceptable voir dire, but refused to excuse
the defendant’s procedural default under the plain-error rule, finding it inapplicable.
It affirmed the conviction. The supreme court, in this decision, ruled that the trial
court had not abused its discretion as to the voir dire which was permitted. It found
no error and, like the appellate court, allowed defendant’s procedural default to stand.
Thus, the conviction was again affirmed.
The defendant, however, had an issue concerning sentencing. He had received a
28-year term. He complained on appeal of the manner in which the trial court dealt
with his parole, also known as mandatory supervised release (MSR). The written
sentencing judgment did not mention MSR. Thereafter, the Illinois Department of
Corrections calculated defendant’s sentence to include an indeterminate MSR term
of three years to natural life. The sentencing judge had said that he was “a little bit
unclear *** what that [MSR] period would be. There’s some recent legislation that
would suggest to me that the applicable time *** is not less than three [years] and
could be up to natural life. *** I don’t think I have to make that as part of my finding.
It’s what the Department of Corrections will impose.”
The statutory amendment in question, which took effect in 2005, states that, for
the offense of criminal sexual assault, “the term of mandatory supervised release
shall range from a minimum of 3 years to a maximum of natural life of the
defendant.” The challenge presented by the defendant here calls for construction of
The Fourth District of the appellate court responded to Rinehart’s complaints in
2010 by remanding to the circuit court to set a determinate MSR term within the
statutory range of three years to natural life. The appellate court was of the view that
Illinois has a determinate sentencing structure and that an indeterminate MSR term
is inconsistent with that. It was aware that, about half a year earlier, the Second
District had ruled that trial courts can impose an indeterminate MSR sentence and the
Department of Corrections can later decide when release may occur. The appellate
court in this case disagreed with that other ruling (People v. Schneider, 403 Ill. App.
3d 301 (2010)) and declined to follow it.
In the decision issued today, the Illinois Supreme Court said that the court in the
Schneider case saw the impetus behind the statutory requirements more clearly.
Indeterminate sentences have generally been abolished in Illinois, but, in 2005, were
resurrected as to certain specified sex offenses in order to create lifetime supervision
for high-risk offenders and because of the risk of recidivism. The supreme court said
that these new provisions contemplate indeterminate, not determinate, terms, and the
appellate court should not have vacated what the circuit court had done. The circuit
court was upheld.
2012 IL 111719
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 111719)
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant,
v. THOMAS S. RINEHART, Appellee.
Opinion filed January 20, 2012.
JUSTICE THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with
Chief Justice Kilbride and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Garman,
Karmeier, and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.
In 2007, defendant Thomas Rinehart was convicted of criminal
sexual assault and sentenced to 28 years’ imprisonment. The
defendant appealed, and the appellate court affirmed his conviction
and sentence, but remanded with instructions for the circuit court of
Coles County to select a term of mandatory supervised release (MSR)
within the range of three years to natural life contained in section 5-81(d)(4) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d)(4)
(West 2006)). 406 Ill. App. 3d 272. The State appealed.
The central issue before us, then, is whether the appellate court
erred in holding that section 5-8-1(d)(4) requires the trial court to set
a determinate MSR term within the statutory range. In his request for
cross-relief, the defendant raises the issue of whether the trial court
erred in allowing the State to pose various questions during voir dire.
We affirm the defendant’s conviction and sentence, and vacate the
appellate court’s order on MSR.
In 2006, the defendant lived with his girlfriend, Hope Scott, and
her children, one of which was A.A., a then-17-year-old girl with
developmental disabilities. Sometime in August of that year, the
defendant borrowed Scott’s minivan to help her friends move to
Mattoon from Charleston, Illinois. A.A. rode alone with the defendant
on one trip. Several weeks later, she told Scott’s friends’ daughters
that the defendant had forced her to have sex in the back of the
minivan on the day they moved. Subsequently, the police arrested the
defendant, and charged him with criminal sexual assault.
The case proceeded to a jury trial. During jury selection, the
parties were permitted to question venire members pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 431 (Ill. S. Ct. R. 431 (eff. May 1, 2007)). The
State asked 5 of the 25 potential jurors who were questioned why a
sexual assault victim might delay in reporting an incident. The
exchanges between the prosecutor and the jurors were short.
“MS. KIGER [Assistant State’s Attorney]: Can you think
of some reasons why a sexual assault victim might not
immediately report an incident?
MR. WHITE [Prospective Juror]: Why they would not
report an incident?
MS. KIGER: Right away.
MR. WHITE: The victim?
MS. KIGER: Correct.
MR. WHITE: Well, they probably may say it really didn’t
happen, and then the falling out with the parents. Maybe there
was a relationship, you know, age difference relationship.
Then the parents found out about it, convinced, you know.
Children are children.
MS. KIGER: Can you think of a reason why a victim who
had had some things happen to them might not immediately
go to an adult or report it?
MR. WHITE: Scared.
MS. KIGER: Can you think of some reasons why a victim
of sexual assault might not immediately report it to someone?
MS. FULLER [Prospective Juror]: Fear, shame.
MS. KIGER: Can you think of a reason why a victim
might delay in reporting being raped or being a victim of
MS. HANFT [Prospective Juror]: Shame, embarrassment,
MS. KIGER: Can you think of some reasons why a sexual
assault victim might not automatically come forward?
MR. RALSTON [Prospective Juror]: Oh, I think maybe
fear, and think you would be a lesser person if something like
that happened to you.
MS. KIGER: Can you think of some reasons why a sexual
assault victim might not immediately report that?
MR. AYERS [Prospective Juror]: Yeah.
MS. KIGER: Can you tell me what some of those reasons
MR. AYERS: Same, fear and scared to come forward.”
Defense counsel did not object to any of these questions. The State
and the defense each excused one of these jurors, so only three of
those five venire members ultimately served on the jury.
At trial, A.A. testified for the State, and recounted the details of
the attack. According to A.A., while she and the defendant were
between towns, he pulled the minivan off a familiar state highway
and onto an unfamiliar rural side road. He stopped the van and turned
off its engine. A.A. could see trees and a fence, and a distant house.
She stated that the defendant ordered her to get into the back of the
van, where the rear seats had been removed, and take off her clothes.
She was scared and complied. She further stated that the defendant
joined her there and took off his clothes, then forced her to have sex.
Afterwards, they got dressed, and he instructed her not to tell anyone
before resuming the trip to Charleston. A.A. identified the defendant
as the man who attacked her.
Detective James Hite of the Coles County sheriff’s department
also testified for the State. He stated that he received a call on August
27, 2006, to investigate a sexual assault by the defendant against A.A.
Detective Hite contacted the Department of Children and Family
Services, who arranged an interview between a child advocacy center
staffer and A.A. He watched the interview and observed A.A.’s
demeanor. Detective Hite also took photographs of the site of the
attack, which were submitted into evidence by the State.
The defendant presented no evidence on his behalf. The jury
found him guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to 28 years’
imprisonment, but not to a specific MSR term. Instead, the court
“I further order that the defendant will serve a period of
[MSR] after serving his sentence as mandated by statute.
Counsel, [it is] a little bit unclear to me what that period
would be. There’s been some recent legislation that would
suggest to me that the applicable time upon the defendant for
this offense is not less than three and could be up to natural
life, as the statute indicates, regarding the mandatory
supervised release period. I don’t think I have to make that as
part of my finding. It’s what the Department of Corrections
will impose upon him, but there is a minimum three-year
mandatory supervised release period. As I understand the
statute, it could be beyond that period.”
The written sentencing judgment also did not mention MSR.
Thereafter, the Illinois Department of Corrections calculated the
defendant’s sentence to include an indeterminate MSR term of three
years to natural life. The defendant appealed.
The appellate court affirmed the defendant’s conviction, vacated
his MSR term, and remanded with directions to set an MSR term
within the statutory range. 406 Ill. App. 3d 272. The appellate court
first addressed the defendant’s argument that the State’s questions for
prospective jurors asked them to prejudge A.A.’s credibility and
predisposed them to believe her testimony, thus denying him a fair
trial. The appellate court noted that the defendant had forfeited review
of that issue, but considered whether it was plain error. Id. at 276. The
court concluded that allowing the questions was, indeed, error.
According to the appellate court,
“[The questions were] designed to expose whether a juror
would automatically perceive a delay in reporting to mean the
victim was lying about the incident. A negative response to
the State’s question could have indicated potential bias
against the veracity of the victim’s testimony. While
questions designed to discover bias are proper, these
questions to prospective jurors asked jurors to speculate as to
reasons why a victim might not come forward. While the
subject could be raised in voir dire through artful questions,
the questions asked by the prosecutor crossed the boundary of
acceptable voir dire.” Id.
The appellate court, however, refused to excuse the defendant’s
procedural default. First, the court held that the evidence in this case
was not closely balanced. Id. at 277. The State, through A.A.’s
testimony, presented evidence of the attack and its location, while the
defendant presented no evidence. Id. Second, the court held that the
error did not affect the fairness of the trial. Id. The appellate court
“[W]hile the voir dire questions crossed the line of propriety,
they did not indoctrinate the jury and deny defendant a fair
trial. The State’s questions, though improper, were not
pervasive. In addition, the jurors, during the same
questioning, recognized defendant’s innocence until proved
guilty and asserted they would be impartial. During trial, the
jurors heard the victim testify she was afraid to tell her
mother, who was defendant’s live-in paramour, because she
feared her mother would not believe her and would punish
her. The jurors did not have to rely on speculation for
determining the reason for A.A.’s delay in reporting the
The appellate court further held that the defendant did not receive
ineffective assistance of counsel because he could not show prejudice
from his attorney’s failure to object to the State’s questions. Id. at
The appellate court then addressed the defendant’s argument that
the trial court erred in not sentencing him to an MSR term within the
statutory range. The appellate court concluded that the Unified Code
of Corrections contains a determinate sentence structure, and an
indeterminate MSR term is inconsistent with that structure. Id. at 28081. Additionally, the court noted that the Code grants the trial court,
not the Prisoner Review Board, the power to impose an MSR term.
Id. at 281. According to the appellate court, “Because section 5-81(d)(4) contains an MSR term range for criminal sexual assault, the
court also possesses the duty to exercise its discretion and impose
MSR within that range. The trial court, and not DOC, is in the best
position to assess and weigh the factors relevant to determine whether
a defendant should serve three years’ MSR, natural life, or a term in
between.” Id. The appellate court acknowledged that People v.
Schneider, 403 Ill. App. 3d 301 (2010), reached the opposite result,
but declined to follow that case. Id. at 281-82.
This court granted the State’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S.
Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Feb. 26, 2010). In his response brief, the defendant
requested cross-relief, contending that the trial court erred in allowing
the State’s voir dire questions.
If the defendant succeeds on the issue raised in his request for
cross-relief, he would be entitled to a new trial. Thus, we will address
that issue first. Because defense counsel did not object to the State’s
questions, our discussion begins with plain error.
The plain-error doctrine offers criminal defendants a narrow path
to appellate review of procedurally forfeited trial errors. People v.
Walker, 232 Ill. 2d 113, 124 (2009). As a matter of convention, a
prerequisite–or as we have previously termed it, an initial or first step
(see People v. Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d 181, 191 (2008); People v. Kitch,
239 Ill. 2d 452, 462 (2011))–toward applying that doctrine is the
existence of an error. People v. Sargent, 239 Ill. 2d 166, 189 (2010).
Thus, we must determine whether the trial court erred in allowing the
State to ask certain venire members about their views on sexual
assault allegations in which there was a delay between an incident and
the reporting of it.
The constitutional right to a jury trial encompasses the right to an
impartial jury. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 721 (1961). The trial
court is primarily responsible for initiating and conducting voir dire
(People v. Strain, 194 Ill. 2d 467, 476 (2000)), though it must permit
the parties to supplement its examination “by such direct inquiry as
the court deems proper,” pursuant to Rule 431 (Ill. S. Ct. R. 431 (eff.
May 1, 2007)). Because there is no precise test for determining which
questions will filter out partial jurors (see People v. Washington, 104
Ill. App. 3d 386, 390 (1982)), the manner and scope of the
examination rests within the discretion of the trial court, and we
review such decisions for an abuse of discretion. An abuse of
discretion occurs when the conduct of the trial court thwarts the
purpose of voir dire examination–namely, the selection of a jury free
from bias or prejudice. People v. Williams, 164 Ill. 2d 1, 16 (1994);
People v. Cloutier, 156 Ill. 2d 483, 495-96 (1993) (“[t]he purpose of
voir dire is to ascertain sufficient information about prospective
jurors’ beliefs and opinions so as to allow removal of those members
of the venire whose minds are so closed by bias and prejudice that
they cannot apply the law as instructed in accordance with their
oath”); see also People v. Clark, 278 Ill. App. 3d 996, 1003 (1996)
(“The purpose of voir dire is to enable the trial court to select an
impartial jury and to ensure that the attorneys have an informed and
intelligent basis on which to exercise peremptory challenges.”).
Stated differently, a trial court does not abuse its discretion during
voir dire if the questions create “a reasonable assurance that any
prejudice or bias would be discovered.” People v. Dow, 240 Ill. App.
3d 392, 397 (1992).
Accordingly, voir dire questions, whether asked by the trial court
or by the parties with the sanction of the court, must not be “a means
of indoctrinating a jury, or impaneling a jury with a particular
predisposition.” People v. Bowel, 111 Ill. 2d 58, 64 (1986). Rather
than a bright-line rule, this is a continuum. Broad questions are
generally permissible. For example, the State may ask potential jurors
whether they would be disinclined to convict a defendant based on
circumstantial evidence. See People v. Freeman, 60 Ill. App. 3d 794,
799-800 (1978). Specific questions tailored to the facts of the case
and intended to serve as “preliminary final argument” (People v.
Mapp, 283 Ill. App. 3d 979, 989-90 (1996)) are generally
impermissible. But see People v. Faulkner, 186 Ill. App. 3d 1013
(1989) (holding that the State may inquire whether venire members
have deep-seated beliefs that prevent them from returning a guilty
verdict in a murder case where the State cannot produce direct
evidence of the victim’s body).
The defendant argues, tracking the appellate court’s analysis
below, that the State’s questions did not seek to uncover bias but,
rather, sought to preeducate potential jurors on an aspect of A.A.’s
expected testimony, and thereby bolster her credibility. According to
the defendant, the State encouraged potential jurors to imagine why
A.A. would not have told anyone about the incident when it
happened, and thus empathize with her. The defendant directs our
attention to People v. Bell, 152 Ill. App. 3d 1007 (1987), and People
v. Boston, 383 Ill. App. 3d 352 (2008).
In Bell, the defendant was charged with the murders of his
parents. During voir dire, the State asked a majority of the potential
jurors whether they believed that people have a natural impulse to
confess their wrongdoings, and whether they believed that a person
could carry out a plan to murder a family member as a solution to
problems in that relationship. The defendant did not object to these
questions. He was convicted. On appeal, the appellate court chose to
address the issue on the merits, and held that the questions were
improper “because they served primarily to indoctrinate the jurors as
to the State’s theory at trial and asked them to prejudge the facts of
the case.” Bell, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 1017.
In Boston, the defendant was charged with criminal sexual assault
of his girlfriend. During voir dire, the State asked all of the potential
jurors whether they believed that the government should not become
involved in domestic incidents; whether they believed that a woman
who obtains an order of protection against a man, and then invites
that man to her home, has given implied consent to a subsequent sex
act with the man, and has made herself responsible for any
subsequent violence with the man; and whether they believed that a
woman consents to a sex act if she does not scream or fight while she
is being assaulted. The defendant did not object to these questions. He
was convicted. On appeal, the appellate court did not discuss
forfeiture, and simply noted that the evidence was closely balanced.
Boston, 383 Ill. App. 3d at 356. The court held that the questions
were improper because they “highlighted factual details about the
case and asked prospective jurors to prejudge those facts,” and
concerned matters of law or instruction, which are not appropriate
areas of inquiry under Rule 431(a). Id. at 355.
The questions in this case differ from those in Bell and Boston.
Unlike the questions in those cases, the questions here were less factdriven, and more focused on potential jurors’ preconceptions about
sexual assault cases, in an effort to uncover any bias regarding
delayed reporting and the credibility of a victim who informed no one
about the alleged attack when it happened. An answer which
indicated a juror was less likely to believe a victim who did not
immediately report an incident would have given the State grounds
to exercise intelligently its peremptory challenges. The questions
were brief, and the State did not elaborate on the subject, but instead
accepted the answers it received and factored them into the decision
on which jurors to excuse. Further, unlike the State in Bell and
Boston, the State here did not ask every potential juror about this
subject, and instead posed a question on it to only five potential
jurors, one-fifth of the venire. Although we agree with the appellate
court that the subject could have been raised more artfully (406 Ill.
App. 3d at 276), and perhaps phrased in terms of a venire member’s
bias and ability to put any bias aside in reaching a verdict, we cannot
say that the trial court abused its discretion. Because there was no
error, the defendant’s procedural default must stand. Kitch, 239 Ill. 2d
Additionally, because there was no error, the defendant’s
ineffective assistance of counsel contention must fail. Defense
counsel’s failure to object to voir dire questions which the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in allowing was not objectively
unreasonable. People v. Manning, 241 Ill. 2d 319, 326 (2011).
We turn to the issue raised by the State in its appeal, whether the
appellate court erred in holding that section 5-8-1(d)(4) of the Unified
Code of Corrections requires the trial court to set a determinate MSR
term within the statutory range. Resolution of this issue is a matter of
statutory construction, and our review proceeds de novo. People v.
Cordell, 223 Ill. 2d 380, 389 (2006).
The primary objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the
intent of the legislature. Brucker v. Mercola, 227 Ill. 2d 502, 513
(2007). The plain language of the statute is the best indication of that
intent, and if that language is clear and unambiguous, it must be given
effect. People v. Christopherson, 231 Ill. 2d 449, 454-55 (2008).
Section 5-8-1(d) of the Unified Code of Corrections requires that
“every sentence shall include as though written therein a term [of
MSR] in addition to the term of imprisonment.” 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d)
(West 2006). Section 5-8-1(d)(4) provides that the MSR term for
certain sex offenses, including criminal sexual assault, “shall range
from a minimum of 3 years to a maximum of the natural life of the
defendant.” 730 ILCS 5-8-1(d)(4) (West 2006). That section does not
indicate whether the trial court should choose a term within that
range, or whether the term is the range itself. The statute may be read
either way, and its plain language does not indicate the legislature’s
If a statute’s language is unclear or ambiguous, if it is susceptible
of more than one reasonable reading, we must resort to other sources
to aid our inquiry. See People ex rel. Department of Professional
Regulation v. Manos, 202 Ill. 2d 563, 571 (2002). Such sources
include the maxim of in pari materia, under which two statutes, or
two parts of one statute, concerning the same subject must be
considered together in order to produce a “harmonious whole.” Sulser
v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 147 Ill. 2d 548, 555 (1992). Words
and phrases should be construed, not in isolation, but in light of other
relevant provisions. People v. Beachem, 229 Ill. 2d 237, 243 (2008).
“[W]e consider the statute in its entirety, keeping in mind the subject
it addresses and the legislature’s apparent objective in enacting it.”
People v. Cardamone, 232 Ill. 2d 504, 512 (2009); People ex rel.
Sherman v. Cryns, 203 Ill. 2d 264, 280 (2003) (“in determining the
intent of the General Assembly, we may properly consider not only
the language of the statute, but also the purpose and necessity for the
law, the evils sought to be remedied, and goals to be achieved”).
Section 5-8-1(d)(4) was part of Public Act 94-165 (eff. July 11,
2005), which amended various sections of the Code, including section
3-3-2, and added section 3-14-2.5. Section 3-3-2(a)(3.5) provides that
the Prisoner Review Board shall “hear *** and *** decide the
conditions of mandatory supervised release and the time of discharge
from mandatory supervised release, *** impose sanctions for
violations of mandatory supervised release and revoke mandatory
supervised release for those serving extended supervised release
terms pursuant to paragraph (4) of subsection (d) of Section 5-8-1.”
730 ILCS 5/3-3-2(a)(3.5) (West 2006).
Section 3-14-2.5, titled “Extended supervision of sex offenders,”
“(a) The Department shall retain custody of all sex
offenders placed on mandatory supervised release pursuant to
clause (d)(4) of Section 5-8-1 of this Code and shall supervise
such persons during their term of supervised release in accord
with the conditions set by the Prisoner Review Board
pursuant to Section 3-3-7 of this Code.
(b) A copy of the conditions of mandatory supervised
release shall be signed by the offender and given to him or her
and to his or her supervising officer. Commencing 180 days
after the offender’s release date and continuing every 180
days thereafter for the duration of the supervision term, the
supervising officer shall prepare a progress report detailing
the offender’s adjustment and compliance with the conditions
of mandatory supervised release including the offender’s
participation and progress in sex offender treatment. The
progress report shall be submitted to the Prisoner Review
Board and copies provided to the chief of police and sheriff
in the municipality and county in which the offender resides
and is registered.
(c) Supervising officers shall receive specialized training
in the supervision of sex offenders including the impact of
sexual assault on its victims.
(d) Releasees serving extended mandatory supervised
release terms pursuant to subsection (d) of Section 5-8-1 of
this Code may request discharge from supervision as provided
by subsection (b) of Section 3-3-8 of this Code. Requests for
discharge from extended mandatory supervised release shall
be supported by a recommendation by the releasee’s
supervising agent and an evaluation of the releasee completed
no longer than 30 days prior to the request for discharge from
supervision. The evaluation shall be conducted by a Sex
Offender Management Board approved sex offender evaluator
and shall be at the releasee’s expense.” 730 ILCS 5/3-14-2.5
Public Act 94-165 created a comprehensive scheme regarding
MSR for certain sex offenses, which marked a philosophical and
procedural change in how parole operates for defendants convicted of
such offenses. The appellate court here noted that the General
Assembly “carved out a limited exception for the crimes listed in
section 5-8-1(d)[(4)]” (406 Ill. App. 3d at 280), but refused to give
that decision any weight, and instead focused on a purported
inconsistency between section 5-8-1(d)(4) and the otherwise
determinate sentence structure of section 5-8-1(a). The Schneider
court saw the impetus behind section 5-8-1(d)(4) more clearly:
“Presumably the legislature, in using indeterminate language with
regard to the MSR term long after it generally abolished
indeterminate sentences, specifically intended indeterminate MSR
terms in sexual assault cases.” Schneider, 403 Ill. App. 3d at 308. The
legislature abandoned the structure of determinate MSR terms
accompanying other offenses and adopted a structure of indeterminate
or “extended” MSR terms for sex offenses precisely because it
viewed sex offenses differently, due to the risk of recidivism. See
94th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, March 10, 2005, at 82-83
(statements of Representative Gordon) (this legislation “creates
lifetime supervision for high-risk sex offenders”).
Further, under section 3-14-2.5(b), a sex offender’s parole officer
must prepare a progress report every 180 days, and under section 314-2.5(d) the offender may request discharge from MSR upon the
recommendation of the officer. These provisions contemplate
indeterminate MSR terms, not determinate terms. The appellate court
was incorrect in vacating the defendant’s MSR term. We affirm the
defendant’s conviction, and vacate the appellate court’s order on the
issue of MSR. The defendant’s MSR term is an indeterminate three
years to natural life.
For the reasons that we have stated, the judgment of the appellate
court is affirmed in part and vacated in part.
Affirmed in part and vacated in part.