Justia.com Opinion Summary: An undercover agent made a controlled purchase of heroin from the defendant. Evidence showed that the transaction took place 443 feet from the "High Mountain Church and Preschool." Defendant was convicted of delivering a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a school, a Class 1 felony. The appellate court reduced the conviction to simple delivery (a Class 2 felony) after finding that a preschool is not a "school" within the meaning of section 407(b)(2) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act. The supreme court affirmed. The 1991 amendment that added the "school" provision also amended or created numerous other acts to increase the penalty for various offenses taking place on or around school grounds; it defined "school" as "any public or private elementary or secondary school, community college, college or university." Precedent has interpreted the Act accordingly, not encompassing a preschool.
Receive FREE Daily Opinion Summaries by Email Court description: In 2007, near 49th Street and West Augusta Boulevard in Chicago, an undercover
agent made a controlled purchase of heroin from this defendant. At a jury trial in the
circuit court of Cook County, evidence was introduced that the transaction took place
443 feet from the “High Mountain Church and Preschool.” Young was convicted of
delivering a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a school, a Class 1 felony. On
direct review, the appellate court reduced the conviction to simple delivery (a Class 2
felony) after finding that a preschool is not a “school” within the meaning of section
407(b)(2) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act. The State appealed.
The term “school” is not defined in any other portion of the Controlled Substances
Act. However, the 1991 amendatory act which added the “school” provision at issue
here also amended or created numerous other pieces of legislation to increase the
penalty for various different offenses which take place on or around school grounds.
In so doing, it defined “school” as “any public or private elementary or secondary
school, community college, college or university.” Two appellate court decisions which
are 20 years old have held that this definition is also applicable to the “school”
provision at issue here, which was implemented by the same amendatory act.
In numerous amendments since that time, the legislature has not chosen to alter this
two-decades-old result reached in the appellate court. Because the legislature has not
clearly indicated an intention contrary to that judicial construction, the meaning of
“school” within the Controlled Substances Act should be understood in the same sense
attributed to it by the courts in those previous decisions, that is, as not encompassing
a preschool.
The appellate court’s judgment was affirmed.
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2011 IL 111886
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 111886)
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v.
ANTHONY YOUNG, Appellee.
Opinion filed December 15, 2011.
JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Chief Justice Kilbride and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Garman,
Karmeier, and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
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Section 407(b)(2) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (the
Act) (720 ILCS 570/407(b)(2) (West 2008)) provides that the offense
of delivery of a controlled substance is a Class 1 felony when
committed within 1,000 feet of the real property comprising any
“school.” The single issue before us in this appeal is whether the term
“school” contained in this section includes preschools. The appellate
court held that it did not and reduced defendant’s conviction to simple
delivery of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/401(d) (West
2008)), a Class 2 felony. No. 1-08-2690 (unpublished order under
Supreme Court Rule 23).
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the
appellate court.
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BACKGROUND
Defendant Anthony Young was charged with one count of
delivery of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/401(d) (West
2008)) and one count of delivery of a controlled substance within
1,000 feet of the real property comprising any school (720 ILCS
570/407(b)(2) (West 2008)). Prior to trial, in the circuit court of Cook
County, defendant filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude
evidence of the location of the preschool, arguing that a preschool is
not a “school” within the meaning of section 407(b)(2) of the Act.
The trial court denied the motion.
At defendant’s jury trial, the State presented evidence which
established that defendant was arrested on June 28, 2007, after an
undercover officer drove to the location where defendant was
standing on the sidewalk at 4958 West Augusta Boulevard in
Chicago, and made a controlled purchase of a substance containing
heroin from defendant. According to testimony adduced at trial, the
incident occurred approximately 443 feet from the “High Mountain
Church and Preschool.” No other testimony was offered to describe
the “High Mountain Church and Preschool” or its attendees.
The jury found defendant guilty of delivery of a controlled
substance within 1,000 feet of a school, but the appellate court
reduced the conviction to delivery of a controlled substance, finding
that a preschool is not a “school” within the meaning of section
407(b)(2) of the Act.
We granted the State’s petition for leave to appeal.
ANALYSIS
Section 407(b)(2) of the Controlled Substances Act provides, in
pertinent part:
“(b) Any person who violates:
(1) subsection (d) of Section 401 [720 ILCS 570/401]
in any school *** or within 1,000 feet of the real property
comprising any school *** is guilty of a Class 1 felony,
the fine for which shall not exceed $250,000[.]” 720 ILCS
570/407(b)(2) (West 2006).
The State argues that the appellate court misconstrued this statute
when it found that a preschool was not a “school” within the meaning
of the statute. The parties agree that the issue before us is one of
statutory construction and, for that reason, our review is de novo.
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People v. Almore, 241 Ill. 2d 387, 394 (2011) (whether statutory
terms have been construed correctly is a question of law, which is
reviewed de novo).
When construing a statute, this court’s primary objective is to
ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent, keeping in mind
that the best and most reliable indicator of that intent is the statutory
language itself, given its plain and ordinary meaning. People v.
Howard, 233 Ill. 2d 213, 218 (2009); People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312,
323 (2007). To discern the plain meaning of statutory terms, it is
appropriate for the reviewing court to consider the statute in its
entirety, the subject it addresses, and the apparent intent of the
legislature in enacting it. Howard, 233 Ill. 2d at 218; Perry, 224 Ill.
2d at 323. Unless the language of the statute is ambiguous, this court
should not resort to further aids of statutory construction and must
apply the language as written. People v. Glisson, 202 Ill. 2d 499, 50405 (2002); Perry, 224 Ill. 2d at 323.
The appellate court below, when determining the meaning of
“school” as that term is used in section 407(b)(2), first noted that the
term is undefined in the statute or any other portion of the Controlled
Substances Act. The court then looked to two prior cases, People v.
Goldstein, 204 Ill. App. 3d 1041 (1990), and People v. Owens, 240
Ill. App. 3d 168 (1992), wherein the term “school,” as used in section
407(b), had been interpreted.
In Goldstein, the court found the meaning of “school” to be
uncertain since, if interpreted literally, the term could include an
endless number of possible educational facilities. Goldstein, 204 Ill.
App. 3d at 1045. The court then noted that section 407(b)(2) was
added to the Controlled Substances Act by Public Act 84-1075 (Pub.
Act 84-1075 (eff. Dec. 2, 1985)), which also amended or created
numerous pieces of legislation to increase the penalty for violations
if the offense took place on or around school grounds. Goldstein, 204
Ill. App. 3d at 1045. In three other statutes amended by Public Act
84-1075, the term “school” was specifically defined to mean “any
public or private elementary or secondary school, community college,
college or university.” Goldstein, 204 Ill. App. 3d at 1045-48. The
Goldstein court then concluded that the legislature intended the words
“any school” in section 407(b)(2) to refer, as they do elsewhere in
Public Act 84-1075, to “ ‘any public or private elementary or
secondary school, community college, college or university.’ ”
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Goldstein, 204 Ill. App. 3d at 1048-49 (quoting Pub. Act 84-1075
(eff. Dec. 2, 1985).
In Owens, the court reached the same conclusion, noting that “the
primary purpose of Public Act 84-1075 *** was to make Illinois
schools a safer environment, one free from the pressures placed on
students, primarily by gangs but also by others, to buy and sell
firearms and drugs.” Owens, 240 Ill. App. 3d at 171.
Both Goldstein and Owens were decided almost two decades ago.
In the interim since Goldstein was decided, the legislature has
amended section 407(b)(2) nearly a dozen times. See Pub. Act 87-524
(eff. Jan. 1, 1992) (extended scope of the section to activities
occurring on school transport conveyances); Pub. Act 87-754 (eff.
Sept. 29, 1991) (reorganized); Pub. Act 87-895, art. 2, § 2-29 (eff.
July 14, 1992) (revision and renumbering of certain sections); Pub.
Act 87-1225 (eff. Dec. 22, 1992) (further revisions and renumbering);
Pub. Act 89-451 (eff. Jan. 1, 1997) (in subdivisions (b)(1) through
(b)(6) inserted “on the real property comprising any church,
synagogue, or other building, structure, or place used primarily for
religious worship, or on any public way within 1,000 feet of the real
property comprising any church, synagogue, or other building,
structure, or place used primarily for religious worship”); Pub. Act
90-164 (eff. Jan. 1, 1998) (in subdivisions (b)(1) through (b)(6)
inserted “on the real property comprising any of the following places,
buildings, or structures used primarily for housing or providing space
for activities for senior citizens: nursing homes, assisted-living
centers, senior citizen housing complexes, or senior centers oriented
toward daytime activities, or on a public way within 1,000 feet of the
real property comprising any of the following places, buildings, or
structures used primarily for housing or providing space for activities
for senior citizens: nursing homes, assisted-living centers, senior
citizen housing complexes, or senior centers oriented toward daytime
activities”); Pub. Act 91-353 (eff. Jan. 1, 2000) (deleted “on any
public way” and “on a public way” preceding “within 1,000 feet”
throughout subsection (b)); Pub. Act 91-673 (eff. Dec. 22, 1999)
(substituted “operated or managed by a public housing agency or
leased by a public housing agency as part of a scattered site or mixedincome development” for “operated and managed by a public housing
agency” throughout subsection (b)); Pub. Act 92-16 (eff. June 28,
2001) (combined the amendments by Public Acts 91-353 and 91673); Pub. Act 93-223 (eff. Jan. 1, 2004) (added the subsection
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(a)(1)(A) designation, and inserted subsection (a)(1)(B)); Pub. Act
94-556 (eff. Sept. 11, 2005) (deleted the text from subsection
(a)(1)(B)).
Given the length of time since Goldstein interpreted the meaning
of the term “school,” as well as the number and nature of the
amendments to section 407 since Goldstein was decided, it seems
clear that the legislature has had ample opportunity to amend the
statute to broaden the meaning of “school” had it seen fit to do so. It
did not. We conclude, therefore, that the term “school” in section
407(b)(2) now has a settled meaning and it would be inappropriate for
us to change the meaning at this juncture.
As this court stated in In re Marriage of O’Neill, 138 Ill. 2d 487,
495 (1990), it is a well-established principle of statutory construction
that “where terms used in [a] statute have acquired a settled meaning
through judicial construction and are retained in subsequent
amendments or re-enactments of the statute, they are to be understood
and interpreted in the same sense theretofore attributed to them by the
court unless a contrary intention of the legislature is made clear.” See
also R.D. Masonry, Inc. v. Industrial Comm’n, 215 Ill. 2d 397 (2005)
(where the legislature chooses not to amend terms of a statute after
judicial construction, it will be presumed that it has acquiesced in the
court’s statement of legislative intent); 2A Norman J. Singer,
Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 46:04, at 152-53 (6th ed.
2000) (“if the term utilized has a settled legal meaning, the courts will
normally infer that the legislature intended to incorporate the
established meaning”).
We note, further, that the legislature, through Public Act 91-360,
amended article 2 of the Criminal Code of 1961, the “General
Definitions” section, to add section 2-19.5 (720 ILCS 5/2-19.5 (West
1999)). This section, which became effective July 29, 1999, provides
a definition for the term “school” that is nearly identical to the one
used 14 years earlier in Public Act 84-1075. It provides that, for the
purposes of the Code, a “school” is “a public, private or parochial
elementary or secondary school, community college, college or
university and includes the grounds of the school.” Because the
Controlled Substances Act is not part of the Criminal Code, this
definition is not dispositive of the issue before us. However, it is
further indication that the legislature intended, in the context of
criminal offenses, that the term “school” be interpreted in this
manner.
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¶ 19
Of course, the legislature is free, if it so wishes, to amend the
Controlled Substances Act to define the term “school” to include
preschools. However, until such time, we must continue to apply the
definition of “school” which our legislature has adopted.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, we affirm the judgment of the appellate
court.
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Affirmed.
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