Justia.com Opinion Summary: Defendant pled guilty to intimidation (720 ILCS 5/12-6(a)(1)) and criminal damage to property (720 ILCS 5/21-1(1)(a)) and was sentenced to concurrent extended terms of 10 and 6 years, respectively, followed by one year of mandatory supervised release. Her sentences were to be served consecutively to any punishment she received for violating MSR in an unrelated case. She was also ordered to pay restitution. The appellate court vacated the extended-term portion of her criminal damage to property sentence, reducing the sentence for that offense to three years; found that, other than the extended-term sentencing issue, the trial court did not abuse its discretion; held that the trial court did not err in ordering her sentences to be served consecutively to any punishment for violating MSR in an unrelated case; and vacated the restitution order because the trial court failed to admonish her about the possibility that she would be ordered to pay restitution. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed with respect to the restitution order and otherwise affirmed.
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2011 IL 111382
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 111382)
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant and CrossAppellee, v. DEANDRA SNYDER, Appellee and Cross-Appellant.
Opinion filed December 1, 2011.
JUSTICE KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Chief Justice Kilbride and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Garman,
Burke, and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
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Pursuant to a partially negotiated plea, defendant, Deandra
Snyder, pled guilty to intimidation (720 ILCS 5/12-6(a)(1) (West
2008)) and criminal damage to property (720 ILCS 5/21-1(1)(a)
(West 2008)) and was sentenced to concurrent extended terms of
imprisonment of 10 and 6 years, respectively, followed by one year
of mandatory supervised release (MSR). Her sentences were to be
served concurrently with each other but consecutively to any
punishment she received for violating MSR in an unrelated case. She
was also ordered to pay restitution.
On appeal, defendant argued that (1) the circuit court of Peoria
County erred in imposing extended-term sentences on both
convictions; (2) her sentence was excessive; (3) the court should not
have ordered her sentences to be served consecutively to any
punishment she received for violating MSR in an unrelated case; and
(4) the court failed to admonish her about the possibility that she
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would be ordered to pay restitution. The appellate court vacated the
extended-term portion of her criminal damage to property sentence,
reducing the sentence for that offense to three years; found that, other
than the extended-term sentencing issue, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in sentencing her; held that the trial court did not err in
ordering her sentences to be served consecutively to any punishment
she received for violating MSR in an unrelated case; and vacated the
restitution order because the trial court failed to admonish her about
the possibility that she would be ordered to pay restitution. 403 Ill.
App. 3d 637.
We allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R.
315 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010). Defendant also seeks cross-relief, arguing
that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the maximum 10year extended-term sentence for intimidation. For the following
reasons, we reverse that portion of the appellate court’s judgment
vacating the restitution order and affirm the appellate court’s
judgment in all other respects.
I. BACKGROUND
On August 20, 2008, defendant, who had been dating Corey
Simmons and was seven months pregnant with his child, drove to his
apartment complex. When she arrived, she saw a parked car
belonging to Jessica King, who had also been dating Simmons. She
got a knife from her vehicle and slashed the convertible top and all
four tires of King’s car, causing $2,891 in damage. When King and
Simmons confronted her, she began yelling and swinging the knife at
them. Eventually, she got in her vehicle and left.
Defendant was charged with armed violence (720 ILCS 5/33A2(a) (West 2008)), two counts of attempted first degree murder (720
ILCS 5/8-4(a), 9-1 (West 2008)), unlawful possession of a weapon by
a felon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2008)), intimidation (720 ILCS
5/12-6(a)(1) (West 2008)), and criminal damage to property (720
ILCS 5/21-1(1)(a) (West 2008)). She agreed to plead guilty to
intimidation and criminal damage to property in exchange for
dismissal of the remaining charges. There was no agreement as to
sentencing.
Before accepting defendant’s guilty plea, the trial court
admonished her that she faced a minimum of probation and a
maximum of extended prison terms of 10 years for intimidation and
6 years for criminal damage to property, followed by one year of
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MSR. The court failed to admonish her as to the possibility that she
would be ordered to pay restitution or fines.
Defendant’s presentence investigation report indicates that, in
June 2007, she pled guilty to arson and obstruction of justice,
stemming from an incident in which she set fire to King’s vehicle.
She was sentenced to three years in prison for arson and directed to
have no contact with King or Simmons. For obstruction, she was
sentenced to 30 months of probation and ordered to take anger
management classes. In January 2008, she was released from prison
and began serving MSR on the arson conviction. At the time of the
present offenses, she was in violation of the court’s order prohibiting
her from having contact with King or Simmons, was on probation for
arson, was on MSR for obstruction of justice, and had not yet begun
her anger management classes. She also had 2005 misdemeanor
convictions for theft and criminal damage to property and was on
probation for those offenses when she committed the 2007 arson.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated that, in imposing
sentence, it had considered aggravating and mitigating factors. The
aggravating factors included defendant’s prior criminal history and
the fact that she was on probation and MSR when she committed the
present offenses. The court also emphasized the need to deter others.
In mitigation, the court noted that defendant had a newborn child and
that there was some culpability by King and Simmons, who were
involved in a “love triangle” with defendant. The court found that
defendant was a very dangerous person with serious mental and anger
management issues that needed to be addressed.
After considering the presentence investigation report, counsel’s
arguments, evidence in aggravation and mitigation, and defendant’s
statement in allocution, the court sentenced her to concurrent
extended terms of imprisonment of 10 years for intimidation and 6
years for criminal damage to property, followed by one year of MSR.
The sentences were to be served consecutively to any punishment she
received for violating MSR in the unrelated arson case. She was also
ordered to pay $2,891 in restitution. She filed a motion to reconsider
sentence but did not seek leave to withdraw her guilty plea. Her
motion to reconsider sentence was denied. She filed a timely notice
of appeal.
On appeal, defendant first argued, and the State conceded, that the
trial court erred in imposing extended-term sentences on both of her
convictions. 403 Ill. App. 3d at 639. The appellate court agreed and
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vacated the extended-term portion of her criminal damage to property
sentence, reducing the sentence on that offense from six to three
years. Id. at 640.
Defendant next argued that her sentence was excessive. The
appellate court disagreed, finding that, other than the extended-term
sentencing issue, which was corrected, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in sentencing defendant. Id. at 641. The appellate court
noted that, in determining her sentence, the trial court had properly
considered the presentence investigation report, defendant’s statement
in allocution, counsel’s arguments, and the aggravating and
mitigating factors. Id. at 640. The appellate court found that prison
sentences of 10 years for intimidation and 3 years for criminal
damage to property were not excessive given the significant
aggravating factors in the case. Id. at 641.
Defendant next argued that the trial court erred in ordering her
sentences to be served consecutively to any punishment she received
for violating MSR in the unrelated arson case. The appellate court
disagreed.
Finally, defendant argued that the trial court erred in failing to
admonish her as to the possibility that she would be ordered to pay
restitution. The appellate majority agreed, finding that the trial court’s
failure to admonish her as to the possibility that she would be ordered
to pay restitution violated Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402(a)(2) (eff.
July 1, 1997). Id. at 641. Following the Fourth District’s opinion in
People v. Jenkins, 141 Ill. App. 3d 602 (1986), the appellate majority
held that the appropriate remedy for such an error was to vacate the
restitution order. 403 Ill. App. 3d at 642. The majority reasoned that
this court had adopted Jenkins’ approach in People v. Whitfield, 217
Ill. 2d 177 (2005).
Justice Schmidt dissented as to the vacatur of the restitution order,
noting that the Fourth District had impliedly repudiated Jenkins’
holding that a court’s admonishments constituted an implied promise;
that Whitfield neither referred to nor relied on Jenkins; that Whitfield
was based on a negotiated plea for a specific sentence, not an open
plea; and that, here, defendant was not denied the benefit of any
bargain with the State because there was no agreement as to
sentencing. 403 Ill. App. 3d at 642-44 (Schmidt, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Justice Schmidt would have followed the
Second District’s approach in People v. Seyferlich, 398 Ill. App. 3d
989 (2010), reasoning that it was not the court’s role to bargain with
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defendant and that if she regretted her plea as a result of the
restitution order, the proper remedy was to allow her to withdraw her
plea. 403 Ill. App. 3d at 645 (Schmidt, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Justice Schmidt opined that there was no
indication that defendant was prejudiced or denied real justice as a
result of the faulty admonition and that vacating the restitution order
defeated the legislative purpose of trying to make victims whole.
This court allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal.
II. ANALYSIS
A. The State’s Appeal
Rule 402 requires that the trial court give a defendant certain
admonishments before accepting a guilty plea, including “the
minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by law.” Ill. S. Ct. R.
402 (eff. July 1, 1997).
In the present case, it is undisputed that the trial court failed to
substantially comply with Rule 402 (a)(2) in that it failed to admonish
defendant as to the possibility that she would be ordered to pay
restitution. The issue on appeal is whether the proper remedy for
failing to admonish defendant, who entered a partially negotiated
guilty plea, as to the possibility that she would be ordered to pay
restitution is to vacate the restitution order or give her the opportunity
to withdraw her plea. Here, defendant did not move to withdraw her
guilty plea, and, at oral argument before this court, defense counsel
made it clear that defendant does not want to withdraw her plea.
Because this issue concerns the interpretation of a supreme court
rule, a question of law, our review is de novo. Robidoux v. Oliphant,
201 Ill. 2d 324, 332 (2002).
In vacating the restitution order in the present case, the appellate
majority relied heavily on Jenkins, 141 Ill. App. 3d 602. In Jenkins,
the defendant entered an open guilty plea. Id. at 604. The trial court
admonished him pursuant to Rule 402 before he entered his plea but
did not mention restitution. The trial court ordered him to pay
restitution as part of his sentences. On appeal, he argued that his
guilty plea must be vacated because he was not admonished that his
sentences might include restitution. Id. at 608. The Fourth District
concluded that “the restitution order exceeded the ‘maximum
sentence’ of which the defendant had been admonished upon entry of
his guilty plea.” Id. at 609. Although the defendant sought to vacate
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his plea, the Jenkins court concluded that the appropriate remedy was
to vacate the restitution order, noting that as long as the restitution
order was vacated, the sentences imposed were within the limits
stated to the defendant before he entered his plea.
In his dissent from the appellate majority’s vacatur of the
restitution order in the present case, Justice Schmidt relied on
Seyferlich, 398 Ill. App. 3d 989. In Seyferlich, the defendant, who
entered an open plea, was admonished that her sentence could include
a fine of up to $25,000 but not that she could be ordered to pay
restitution. Id. at 990. She was ordered to pay $46,311 in restitution.
On appeal, she argued that the trial court erred in failing to admonish
her of the possibility of restitution. Citing Jenkins, she argued that the
amount of restitution must be reduced to $25,000—the maximum
financial penalty she was told she faced as a result of her guilty plea.
In rejecting her argument, the Second District in Seyferlich
explained that the Fourth District’s remedy in Jenkins—vacatur of the
restitution order—was inappropriate. Id. at 991. The Seyferlich court
noted that the cases upon which the Jenkins court relied characterized
the trial court’s admonishments as “implied promises” and viewed the
admonishments as part of a bargaining process between the court and
the defendant. The Seyferlich court rejected this view, noting that the
admonishments, which are required by Rule 402, are designed to
ensure that the defendant’s guilty plea is intelligently and
understandingly made, as required by Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S.
238 (1969). The Seyferlich court noted that it is not the trial court’s
role to bargain with a defendant to obtain his or her guilty plea.
The Seyferlich court also recognized that the Fourth District’s
opinion in People v. Harris, 359 Ill. App. 3d 931 (2005), called into
doubt the continued viability of its prior opinion in Jenkins.
Seyferlich, 398 Ill. App. 3d at 991-92. In Harris, the court held that
if the trial court’s failure to properly admonish a defendant results in
the denial of “real justice” or in prejudice to the defendant, the
reviewing court should vacate the guilty plea. Harris, 359 Ill. App. 3d
at 936. The Harris court noted that the defendant did not seek to
vacate his guilty plea but, instead, sought the wrong remedy—to
amend the sentencing order. Id. at 937.
The Seyferlich court concluded that “[i]f defendant would not
have pleaded guilty but for the incomplete admonition, her remedy
was to seek leave to withdraw her plea.” Seyferlich, 398 Ill. App. 3d
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at 992. The court found that Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d 177, did not dictate
a different result. Seyferlich, 398 Ill. App. 3d at 992. We agree.
In Whitfield, the defendant entered a negotiated plea to first
degree murder in exchange for a 25-year prison term. Whitfield, 217
Ill. 2d at 179. The court failed to admonish him that he would have
to serve three years of MSR in addition to the negotiated prison term.
Id. at 180. He argued that the MSR was not part of the negotiated
sentence and that he was entitled to enforce his bargain with the State.
Id. at 186-87. Recognizing that the MSR could not legally be stricken,
he argued that, to best approximate his bargain with the State, his
prison term should be reduced by three years. Id. at 187.
As we noted in Whitfield, the “benefit of the bargain” theory
espoused by defendant was rooted in Santobello v. New York, 404
U.S. 257 (1971). Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 184-85. In Santobello, the
Court held that “when a plea rests in any significant degree on a
promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be
part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be
fulfilled.” Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262. In Whitfield, we restated that
holding as follows: “if a defendant shows that his plea of guilty was
entered in reliance on a plea agreement, he may have a due process
right to enforce the terms of the agreement.” Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at
189. In Whitfield, we agreed with the defendant’s argument that “his
constitutional right to due process and fundamental fairness was
violated because he pled guilty in exchange for a specific sentence,
but received a different, more onerous sentence.” Id. at 188-89. In
granting his request to reduce his prison term, we concluded that
“adding the statutorily required three-year MSR term to defendant’s
negotiated 25-year sentence amounts to a unilateral modification and
breach of the plea agreement by the State, inconsistent with
constitutional concerns of fundamental fairness.” Id. at 190.
In vacating the restitution order in the present case, the appellate
majority, citing Whitfield, stated that “[t]he Jenkins approach has been
adopted by our supreme court.” 403 Ill. App. 3d at 642. Despite the
appellate majority’s statement to the contrary, we did not rely on or
adopt Jenkins’ reasoning in Whitfield. Instead, our holding in
Whitfield was premised on the “benefit of the bargain” analysis,
which was appropriate because of Whitfield’s fully negotiated plea.
The significant difference between Whitfield and the present case
is that Whitfield fully negotiated for a specific prison term, whereas,
here, defendant pled guilty with no promise as to sentencing. She pled
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guilty in exchange for the State’s agreement to drop the remaining
charges against her, which the State has done. Therefore, she has
received the full “benefit” of her bargain. The remedy in Whitfield
was fashioned to give Whitfield the “benefit of the bargain” he made
with the State. In Whitfield, we concluded that we should give weight
to Whitfield’s preference, rather than simply giving him an
opportunity to withdraw his plea. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 202-03,
205. However, nothing in Whitfield indicates that this specific
enforcement remedy is available where, as here, a defendant enters a
partially negotiated plea. Contrary to the appellate court’s holding,
Whitfield’s remedy—based on a “benefit of the bargain” analysis—is
inapplicable to defendant’s partially negotiated plea because she
received the benefit of the bargain she made with the State.
We agree with and adopt the Second District’s reasoning and
conclusion in Seyferlich and hold that the appropriate remedy for the
trial court’s failure to admonish defendant, who entered a partially
negotiated guilty plea, as to the possibility that she would be ordered
to pay restitution is to allow her the opportunity to withdraw her plea.
In so holding, we expressly overrule the Fourth District’s holding in
Jenkins—that the appropriate remedy for failing to admonish a
defendant who entered a partially negotiated plea as to the possibility
of restitution is to vacate the restitution order instead of allowing him
the opportunity to withdraw his plea.
Therefore, as in Seyferlich, if defendant in this case would not
have pleaded guilty but for the incomplete admonishment, she should
have sought leave to withdraw her guilty plea. See Seyferlich, 398 Ill.
App. 3d at 992. Allowing a defendant a fresh opportunity to decide
whether to plead guilty, with full knowledge of the possible
consequences, adequately protects her rights and avoids awarding a
windfall due to the trial court’s error. It also provides both the parties
and the trial court an incentive to ensure adequate admonishments,
while taking into consideration victims’ rights to obtain restitution.
However, in the present case, we need not determine whether the
incomplete admonishment requires vacatur of defendant’s guilty plea
because, at oral argument, defense counsel made it clear that
defendant does not want to withdraw her plea. Instead, she seeks a
remedy to which she is not entitled—vacatur of the restitution order.
Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the appellate court’s
judgment vacating the restitution order.
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B. Defendant’s Request for Cross-Relief
In her request for cross-relief, defendant argues that the trial court
abused its discretion in imposing the maximum 10-year extendedterm sentence for intimidation. We disagree.
A reviewing court gives substantial deference to the trial court’s
sentencing decision because the trial judge, having observed the
defendant and the proceedings, is in a much better position to
consider factors such as the defendant’s credibility, demeanor, moral
character, mentality, environment, habits, and age. People v.
Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 212-13 (2010). Therefore, a reviewing
court may not modify a defendant’s sentence absent an abuse of
discretion. Id. at 212. An abuse of discretion will be found where “the
sentence is ‘greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the
law[ ] or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.’ ”
Id. (quoting People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 210 (2000)).
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to the maximum 10-year
extended-term sentence for intimidation. The record demonstrates
that the court properly considered the presentence investigation
report, defendant’s statement in allocution, counsel’s arguments, and
the aggravating and mitigating factors. The aggravating factors
included defendant’s prior criminal history and the fact that she was
on probation and MSR when she committed the present offenses. The
court also emphasized the need to deter others. In mitigation, the
court noted that defendant had a newborn child and that there was
some culpability by King and Simmons. The court further found that
defendant was a very dangerous person with serious mental and anger
management issues that needed to be addressed. Given the significant
aggravating factors in this case, we cannot say that the sentence of 10
years’ imprisonment for intimidation “is ‘greatly at variance with the
spirit and purpose of the law[ ] or manifestly disproportionate to the
nature of the offense.’ ” See Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d at 212.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse that portion of the appellate
court’s judgment vacating the restitution order and affirm the
appellate court’s judgment in all other respects.
Appellate court judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part;
circuit court judgment affirmed as modified.
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