Justia.com Opinion Summary: Defendant, charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2)). She requested that the state produce the video recording of the stop made by the camera located in the arresting officer's vehicle. The recording had been destroyed as part of a regular purge. The circuit court granted defendant's motion for sanctions and barred the state from introducing testimony concerning what was contained on the videotape. The appellate and supreme courts affirmed. The state was placed on notice by defendant to produce the recording of her stop and arrest in the civil statutory summary suspension proceedings and took no action to preserve it; the sanction was reasonable.
Receive FREE Daily Opinion Summaries by Email Court description: On May 3, 2008, this defendant was stopped by a Northlake policeman for
drunken driving and refused to submit to a Breathalyzer test. The officer at the scene
notified her that, pursuant to the Illinois Vehicle Code, her driver’s license would be
summarily suspended. She was arrested, charged with misdemeanor DUI, and, later,
with speeding and driving an uninsured vehicle.
In the Cook County civil proceeding concerning her license, she sought
production of the videorecording which had been made by a camera located in the
officer’s squad car. The State agreed to this, but, by the time of the first trial date, the
Northlake police department had destroyed the tape pursuant to its own rules for
automatic expungement after 30 days.
The circuit court judge found no bad faith on the part of the State but did find a
discovery violation and ruled that, as a sanction, the officer could not testify as to
what was on the tape (activities during the actual stop). At the presentation of
evidence in the civil proceeding on the petition to rescind, the State presented no
witnesses and did call the officer to testify as to events not covered by the tape which
he did observe. The motion to rescind was granted.
In the criminal case, the same type of discovery sanction was imposed, and the
State appealed, claiming its prosecution of the matter was substantially impaired. The
appellate court upheld the sanctions imposed below.
In this decision, the supreme court affirmed the appellate court, agreeing that the
circuit court’s sanctioning order was not an abuse of discretion. The supreme court
did not agree with the State’s argument that a 1974 decision (People v. Schmidt, 56
Ill. 2d 572) should limit the discovery sanctions imposed in misdemeanor cases to the
narrow list referred to in that case. Recording devices carried by police cars are now
widespread, and have gone beyond the usages of 1974. The court held here that
videorecordings from squad-car mounted cameras are discoverable in misdemeanor
DUI cases. The court also noted that the sanctions did not preclude the officer from
testifying as to what he observed that was not recorded on the tape, although, in the
civil proceeding, the State had not called him to do so. Thus, the State had declined
opportunities to present evidence apart from what was barred by the sanction.
The appellate court’s judgment was affirmed.
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2011 IL 110920
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 110920)
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v.
MARINA KLADIS, Appellee.
Opinion filed December 30, 2011.
JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Chief Justice Kilbride and Justices Thomas, Garman, Karmeier,
Burke, and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1
Defendant, Marina Kladis, was charged with driving under the
influence of alcohol (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2006)).
She requested that the State produce the video recording of the stop
made by the camera located in the arresting officer’s vehicle. After
the State destroyed the recording, the circuit court of Cook County
granted defendant’s motion for sanctions and barred the State from
introducing testimony concerning what was contained on the
videotape. The State filed a certificate of substantial impairment and
a notice of appeal. The appellate court affirmed. 403 Ill. App. 3d 99.
We granted the State’s petition for leave to appeal and now affirm the
judgment of the appellate court.
¶2
¶3
BACKGROUND
On May 3, 2008, defendant was arrested for DUI by Northlake
police officer Phillip Gaske. On May 8, 2008—five days after her
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arrest and 25 days prior to the first court date on June 3,
2008—defendant filed and hand delivered to the State’s Attorney’s
office a petition to rescind her statutory summary license suspension.
Defendant also filed and delivered on the same date a document
captioned “Notice to Produce at Summary Suspension Hearing.” The
notice was premised upon our Rule 237 (Ill. S. Ct. R. 237 (eff. July
1, 2005)) and requested that at the first court date the State produce
the arresting officer along with copies of various reports and “any and
all video tapes of defendant” while she was in custody.
On June 3, 2008, at approximately 1:30 p.m., the parties appeared
in court for the first time.1 Because the State had not yet produced the
materials defendant had previously requested, defense counsel made
an oral motion for discovery, pursuant to People v. Schmidt, 56 Ill. 2d
572 (1974), which included the videotape. Because the State claimed
that it did not know whether such a tape existed, Officer Gaske—who
was present for the hearing—was questioned. Gaske confirmed that
his squad car had a camera mounted to the windshield which had
recorded his encounter with defendant.
The State thereafter agreed to produce all the requested
materials—including the videotape—to defense counsel.2 Later in the
day on June 3, the State mailed written discovery to counsel and a
request for the video recording to the Northlake police department.
By agreement, the hearing on defendant’s petition to rescind the
statutory summary suspension of her driver’s license was entered and
continued to June 17, 2008.
When the parties returned to court on that date, the State tendered
to defense counsel a two-page business record from the Northlake
police department. This document stated that pursuant to
1
No transcripts exist for the June 3, 2008, court date or for the
proceedings subsequently held on June 17, 2008. However, during a court
hearing on June 26, 2008, the parties stipulated as to what transpired on
those earlier dates.
2
We note that at no time did the State dispute that it received
defendant's Rule 237 request for production of the video recording, nor did
the State object to defendant’s oral Schmidt motion to preserve and produce
the same recording referenced in her earlier request for production. The
record, therefore, unquestionably establishes that the State was fully on
notice regarding defendant's repeated requests to obtain the recording, a
fact supported by its ready agreement during this hearing to produce it.
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departmental policy, video recordings are automatically purged within
30 days of arrest, and that the tape requested by defendant had been
erased at 4:24 a.m. on June 3, 2008, just hours before the parties first
appeared in court. Because the requested evidence had been
destroyed, and in view of the fact that, but for its absence, defendant
would have been ready to proceed on her petition to rescind the
statutory summary suspension, the court granted her leave to file a
written motion for sanctions against the State.3 The court scheduled
a hearing on the sanctions motion for June 26, 2008, and further
ordered that the hearing on the petition to rescind the statutory
summary suspension would proceed immediately after the court ruled
on the motion for sanctions.
Upon their return to court on June 26, the parties discovered that
the judge handling this case had been transferred, and they appeared
before a different judge who was unfamiliar with what had previously
transpired. The parties stipulated to the facts in the case up to that
point, and then engaged in brief argument on defendant’s sanctions
motion.
The court found that the “Notice to Produce” which accompanied
defendant’s petition to rescind her statutory summary suspension
placed the State on clear notice that she wished to have a copy of the
video recording at the first court date—a fact which the State did not
dispute. The State, however, did nothing in response. The court
observed that the State “could have called the police department and
got the tape prior to the time that it ran out” or it “could have filed an
answer *** stating its not our obligation [to produce the tape] yet
because we don’t deem this to be a discovery motion *** [because it
includes] things requested in here that we don’t have to supply to
you.”
Noting that this was “the third case I have had like this in three
weeks” where a defendant asked the State to preserve a video
recording and it was destroyed, the court found the recording of
defendant’s traffic stop to be “an important piece of evidence” and
held that imposition of a sanction against the State for its destruction
was proper. The court determined that it would bar the State from
introducing testimony relating to what was contained on the tape.
However, because no one had seen the recording, defendant called
3
This motion, which was premised on our Rule 219 (Ill. S. Ct. R.
219 (eff. July 1, 2002)), was filed on June 20, 2008.
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Officer Gaske to establish its contents and thereby clarify the scope
of the court’s ruling.
Gaske testified that the in-car video system begins recording five
seconds prior to the activation of the emergency lights. At that time,
the microphone he wears is also activated.4 According to Gaske, the
tape would have captured the following: images of defendant’s car
five seconds prior to the stop; the manner in which defendant pulled
over and curbed her vehicle; defendant’s actions when he approached
her vehicle; the manner in which defendant opened her car door and
exited her vehicle; and defendant’s performance of the field sobriety
tests. Gaske stated that he turned off the emergency lights prior to
transporting defendant to the station, and it was then that the
recording ended.
The court then clarified its sanction ruling, holding that “[t]he
video may not be used for any purpose from five seconds prior to the
lights going on at the time that the defendant was stopped getting out
of the car until she was taken away via the arrest.” The court
specified, however, that any driving or actions of defendant prior to
this were admissible, as were any of her actions after she was placed
under arrest.
The court then proceeded to conduct the hearing on defendant’s
petition for recision of the statutory summary suspension of her
driver’s license. Although defendant answered ready, the State
requested leave to immediately file a notice of appeal of the sanctions
ruling. However, because the State did not ask the court to certify an
interlocutory appeal on the sanctions issue and because there was no
final judgment in the statutory summary suspension matter at that
time, the State’s request was denied.
The hearing on defendant’s petition proceeded. Based upon the
evidence presented, the court held that Officer Gaske had no probable
cause to stop, detain and arrest defendant. Accordingly, defendant’s
petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension of her driver’s
license was granted.
Defense counsel then made an oral motion to quash arrest and
suppress evidence in defendant’s criminal DUI case. The court
4
After defendant’s arrest, Gaske realized that the microphone was
not on, and believed that the recording of that encounter would not have
had audio.
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instructed counsel to file a written pleading5 and the parties set a
return date by agreement. The State then renewed its request for leave
to file an appeal, which was granted. The State thereafter filed an
appeal of the sanctions ruling in the statutory summary suspension
case. However, it later voluntarily dismissed that action. Accordingly,
that ruling is not at issue here.
The parties returned on September 2, 2008. The court inquired of
the State whether it wished to “relitigate the sanctions for purposes of
trial.” The State responded that “[t]here is going to be a lot of the
same testimony, and we were here, basically, for arguments and for
ruling [on] the criminal case at hand.” The court then granted
defendant’s motion for sanctions in the DUI case, stating that its
ruling would be “exactly the same” as on June 26. The court held that
“the video may not be used, or any testimony regarding what is on the
video pertaining to just before the officer stopped the defendant and
the time that the defendant was placed in the squad car, which would
mean anything that happened on the street prior to her being placed
in the squad car.” As it had in the summary suspension matter, the
court again clarified that any relevant evidence of defendant’s
conduct which occurred before and after the recording would be
admissible.
After the court had ruled, the State maintained that the court’s
decision on the sanctions motion substantially impaired its ability to
prosecute defendant. Based upon the court’s understanding of the
State’s position, it granted the State leave to file a certificate of
substantial impairment and a notice of appeal of the sanction order.
The appellate court upheld the sanctions imposed by the trial
court in the DUI case. 403 Ill. App. 3d 99. Applying Schmidt, the
court held that the video recording was discoverable, and that the
State was placed on notice that it should not be destroyed.
Nevertheless, the State took no action in response to defendant’s
discovery request, which set the stage for the deletion of the
recording. The appellate court further determined that the sanction
imposed by the trial court was proportionate to the State’s discovery
violation and that there was no abuse of discretion.
We granted the State’s petition for leave to appeal (Ill. S. Ct. R.
315 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010)).
5
Defendant filed her “Motion to Quash Arrest and Suppress
Evidence Illegally Seized” on July 10, 2008.
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ANALYSIS
The State does not dispute that it was placed on notice by
defendant to produce the recording of her stop and arrest in the civil
statutory summary suspension proceedings. The State also does not
contest that its inaction resulted in the destruction of this recording,
and, in fact, concedes that the sanction was proper in that matter.
The State does contend, however, that its conduct has no import
with respect to defendant’s criminal DUI case. Asserting that
discovery in misdemeanor actions is strictly limited by our decision
in People v. Schmidt, 56 Ill. 2d 572 (1974), and noting that video
recordings are not included within Schmidt’s list of discoverable
items, the State maintains that it had no obligation to produce the
recording. The State therefore concludes that its failure to preserve
the recording was not sanctionable in the DUI case and the trial court
abused its discretion by doing so. We disagree.
A. Discovery Violation
The State contends that because the trial court had no discretion
to order discovery in a misdemeanor case beyond the limited areas set
forth in People v. Schmidt, 56 Ill.2d 572 (1974), it therefore erred in
imposing sanctions against the State. A trial court’s decision to
impose sanctions is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
People v. Ramsey, 239 Ill. 2d 342, 429 (2010). A trial court abuses its
discretion when its decision is “fanciful, arbitrary, or unreasonable to
the degree that no reasonable person would agree with it.” People v.
Ortega, 209 Ill. 2d 354, 359 (2004).
We must first determine whether the State’s failure to produce
and preserve the video recording of the stop and arrest in defendant’s
misdemeanor DUI case constitutes a discovery violation. This court
addressed the scope of discovery required in a misdemeanor case
nearly 40 years ago in People v. Schmidt, 56 Ill. 2d 572 (1974). There,
the defendant was charged with a misdemeanor DUI. She sought
pretrial discovery of various reports, including a “Driving While
Intoxicated Arrest Report,” which the State refused to produce. Id. at
573.
In holding that the requested report should have been tendered to
the defendant, we observed that it was only one of a number of items
a misdemeanor defendant may discover:
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“The State is required to furnish defendants in
misdemeanor cases with a list of witnesses (Ill. Rev. Stat.
1971, ch. 38, par. 114-9), any confession of the defendant (Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, par. 114-10), evidence negating the
defendant’s guilt (Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed.
2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194), and, in this particular case, the results
of the breathalyzer test (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 95½, par. 11501(g)). Additionally, the report which the defendant seeks
will be available at trial for use in impeachment of the
prosecution witness who prepared it. (People v. Cagle, 41 Ill.
2d 528.)” Id. at 575.
This ruling was based on “the discovery provided [for] by case law
and statute” at that time, and distinguished its limited scope from the
broader discovery available for felony cases under our Rule 411. Id.
at 574-75. Our decision to limit discovery in misdemeanor matters
was based on “our awareness of the very substantial volume of less
serious cases and the impact upon their expeditious disposition” if
broader discovery were required. Id. We concluded that there was “no
reason to depart from th[e] view” that the scope of discoverable items
noted in that opinion was “adequate for the lesser offenses” at the
time of that ruling. Id. at 575.
The State misapprehends our decision in Schmidt and interprets
it in a far too narrow manner. Schmidt determined the scope of
discovery in misdemeanor cases by considering relevant decisions,
statutes, and custom and practice as it existed in 1974. From this
survey, the Schmidt court drew together a number of items which
share important evidentiary value and are relevant to those charged
with offenses in crafting a defense. Indeed, our case law with respect
to discovery at that time was clear. We previously held that pretrial
discovery “presupposes a range of relevance and materiality which
includes not only what is admissible at the trial, but also that which
leads to what is admissible.” Krupp v. Chicago Transit Authority, 8
Ill. 2d 37, 41 (1956). The State overlooks the nature and relevancy of
these discovery items, instead focusing on the incorrect concept that
Schmidt set forth a rigid list which it believes should remain static
and not take into account the fundamental changes which have
occurred in law and society since that ruling.
Relevancy is “determined by reference to the issues, for generally,
something is relevant if it tends to prove or disprove something in
issue.” Bauter v. Reding, 68 Ill. App. 3d 171, 175 (1979). In the
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nearly four decades since we decided Schmidt, video recordings made
by in-squad car cameras in misdemeanor DUI cases have become as
relevant to the issue of proving or disproving guilt as the materials
specifically mentioned in Schmidt. As such, allowing their discovery
furthers the objectives of pretrial discovery to “enhance the truthseeking process, to enable attorneys to better prepare for trial, to
eliminate surprise and to promote an expeditious and final
determination of controversies in accordance with the substantive
rights of the parties.” D.C. v. S.A., 178 Ill. 2d 551, 561 (1997).
Since the time of Schmidt, the use of video recordings as evidence
at trial has become a common practice to allow a defendant the
opportunity to present an effective defense and to further the truthseeking process. We recently reaffirmed the general admissibility of
such evidence (People v. Taylor, 2011 IL 110067), and courts across
the country are increasingly relying on video recordings to present an
objective view of the facts in a case. See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550
U.S. 372 (2007) (relying on a squad car video recording, Supreme
Court reversed lower court’s denial of summary judgment on claim
against the officer for the use of excessive force; Court found that a
videotape capturing the events in question clearly contradicted the
version of the story told by the driver and adopted by the court of
appeals, and stated that the court of appeals should have viewed the
facts in the light depicted by the videotape); United States v.
Prokupek, 632 F.3d 460 (8th Cir. 2011) (reversing the district court’s
denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress on the basis that the
officer’s testimony at the suppression hearing was clearly
contradicted by his contemporaneous statements captured on the
squad-car video recording).
In sum, we conclude that the routine video recording of traffic
stops has now become an integral part of those encounters,
objectively documenting what takes place by capturing the conduct
and the words of both parties. We therefore hold that this important
and relevant evidence falls within the scope of materials held to be
discoverable under Schmidt. We therefore clarify that under Schmidt,
these video recordings are discoverable in misdemeanor DUI cases.
This conclusion is supported by several recent legislative
enactments regarding recordings of traffic stops made by law
enforcement officers. Although the passage of these laws occurred
subsequent to defendant’s arrest in this case, the great importance
placed by the General Assembly upon the production and
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preservation of video recordings made by squad car cameras during
law enforcement actions confirms our recognition of their significant
evidentiary value and relevance.
In late 2008 our legislature mandated that Illinois State Police
squad cars be equipped with recording equipment. 20 ILCS
2610/30(b) (West 2008) (Pub. Act 95-1009 (eff. Dec. 15, 2008)). The
law specified that both video and audio must be captured (id.) and
required that these recordings be maintained for a storage period of
at least 90 days before being destroyed. 20 ILCS 2610/30(f) (West
2008).
The following year, the General Assembly clarified and
broadened the production and preservation safeguards for police
recordings. It established the general rule that when any law
enforcement agency makes an in-squad video and audio recording in
connection with either law enforcement or investigative duties, that
recording shall be retained for a minimum period of 90 days. 720
ILCS 5/14-3(h-15) (West 2010) (Pub. Act 96-670 (eff. Aug. 25,
2009)). Significantly, the legislature has also mandated an extended
period of storage for certain recordings. Where “the recordings ***
are made as a part of an arrest or *** are deemed evidence in any
criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding” they cannot be
destroyed except “upon a final disposition and an order from the
court.” Id. We note that this heightened protection is triggered either
where, as here, an arrest occurred or where the recording is
considered to be evidence in any criminal, civil or administrative
proceeding. Significantly, the General Assembly placed no restriction
on this latter factor, encompassing all proceedings.
The transcript of the debates of the 2009 enactment reveals that
the General Assembly intended that the routine recording of traffic
stops by squad car cameras would be of benefit to both citizens and
law enforcement agencies by providing an objective record of what
occurred during the encounter. This is illustrated by remarks made by
the sponsor of this provision, who explained that “[i]t’s a tool for law
enforcement, but I also believe it is a tool for the citizens, too,
because then there is actual proof of what was said or what was done.
So I think it’s a protection for both.” 96th Ill. Gen. Assem., House
Proceedings, April 2, 2009, at 84-85 (statements of Representative
Dugan).
These enactments express the clear legislative intent that the
purpose of recording traffic stops and preserving these recordings for
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later production is to assist in the truth-seeking process by providing
objective evidence of what occurred between the law enforcement
officer and the citizen. As noted in the legislative history, the General
Assembly enacted these laws with the view that these recordings
could be useful to both the State and the defendant. If the recording
reflects the defendant committing an offense, the State could use it to
cement his or her guilt. The reverse is also true: if the recording does
not clearly reflect commission of a crime, the defendant could use it
in support of his or her defense. In either instance, the recording
assists the trier of fact in seeking the truth and at arriving at a just
result.
The State contends, however, that requiring discovery of video
recordings in misdemeanor DUI cases is unduly burdensome and will
delay the judicial process. Noting that the limited scope of
misdemeanor discovery set forth in Schmidt was partially driven by
consideration of the large number of misdemeanor actions and the
desire to efficiently move them through the system, the State contends
these same considerations apply with equal force today. We believe
that the particular facts of this case undermine the State’s general
assertions.
The record indicates that defendant’s request was not one that was
unique in any way. The State never formally objected to the request,
nor did it contend that it fell outside of Schmidt. Further, we note that
during oral argument before this court, counsel for the State was
asked to comment on the fact that the State had readily agreed to
produce and preserve the videotape in this matter. He responded: “We
have no problem tendering these videos in a particular case. If the
defendant asks for it, and it is available, we will do so. *** It’s just
a matter of collegiality.”
The video recording is relevant and admissible evidence because
it reveals what transpired during the traffic stop which serves to
further the truth-seeking function of a trial. This evidence may be
helpful to both the defendant and the State. Indeed, the flow of cases
actually going to trial may be eased upon allowing defendants and
their counsel to review these recordings: those which reflect events
favorable to the State may result in defendants willing to enter pleas
which they otherwise may not have contemplated. This also advances
the purpose of our DUI statutes to ensure that our roads remain safe
from impaired drivers.
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We therefore agree with the courts below that upon receiving the
written Rule 237 notice to produce the video recording five days after
defendant was arrested—and 25 days before it was destroyed—the
State was placed on notice and should have taken appropriate steps
to ensure that it was preserved.6
In sum, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
finding that the video recording of defendant’s stop and arrest was
subject to discovery in her misdemeanor DUI case and that the State
committed a discovery violation by allowing the destruction of the
recording. We next address the question of whether the sanction
imposed by the trial court was appropriate for the discovery violation.
B. Reasonableness of the Discovery Sanction
The State contends that the discovery sanction imposed by the
trial court was too harsh for the circumstances presented in this case
and, therefore, amounted to an abuse of discretion. According to the
State, the sanction was “effectively a dismissal of the charges as it
prevented the officer from testifying about all of the relevant facts
showing that defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol.”
We reject the State’s contentions.
The correct sanction to be applied for a discovery violation is a
decision appropriately left to the discretion of the trial court, and its
judgment shall be given great weight. People v. Morgan, 112 Ill. 2d
111, 135 (1986). The trial court is in the best position to determine an
appropriate sanction based upon the effect the discovery violation
will have upon the defendant. People v. Koutsakis, 255 Ill. App. 3d
306, 314 (1993). As stated, an abuse of discretion exists only where
the decision of the trial court is fanciful, arbitrary, or unreasonable to
6
Although the Rule 237 notice was filed in the civil summary
suspension proceeding, the State explained at oral argument that the
summary suspension proceeding and the criminal DUI case proceed in
tandem, before the same judge and with the same State’s Attorneys
handling both matters. Although the better practice would be for the
defendant to request production of the video recording in both proceedings,
we have no doubt that in this case the State was aware of the need to
preserve the recording. Indeed, defendant also made an oral motion for
discovery pursuant to Schmidt during the proceedings on the first court
date.
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the degree that no reasonable person would take the view adopted by
the trial court. Ortega, 209 Ill. 2d at 359.
The record clearly establishes that the discovery sanction imposed
by the trial court did not preclude the State from prosecuting
defendant. The court’s sanction ruling was narrowly tailored, and
provided that “[t]he video may not be used for any purpose from five
seconds prior to the lights going on at the time that the defendant was
stopped getting out of the car until she was taken away via the arrest.”
Notably, the court also clearly specified that any driving or actions of
defendant prior to the start of the recording were admissible, as were
any of her actions after she was placed under arrest.
Accordingly, under the court’s ruling, Officer Gaske was not
barred from testifying; rather, his testimony was limited to
observations regarding events other than those captured on the purged
recording. Thus, the State could have questioned Officer Gaske
concerning any erratic driving on the part of defendant prior to her
being stopped. Gaske could also have been questioned about
defendant’s behavior after he deactivated the lights and placed her in
his squad car to transport her back to the police station, which
occurred immediately after defendant performed the field sobriety
tests. Gaske could have offered any observations of indications of
intoxication at that time, including whether defendant exhibited
bloodshot and glassy eyes, slurred speech or an odor of alcohol. He
also could have testified to any problems with balance or dexterity
defendant may have had as she arrived at the police station for
processing. Thus, contrary to the State’s assertion that the court’s
sanction “removed all possible proof that defendant had been driving
under the influence of alcohol,” the State could have questioned
Gaske on any of these points. It declined to do so.
As stated, the authority to impose reasonable sanctions for
discovery violations lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.
Here, the court properly exercised its discretion in choosing from the
spectrum of available options and narrowly tailoring its sanction to
bar the State from introducing testimony regarding what was
contained in the video recording. Contrary to the State’s assertion that
the sanction was disproportionate to the discovery violation because
it “excluded all evidence that defendant was guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt,” the record establishes that the State made the
conscious decision not to participate in the trial and to forgo the
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opportunities available to present evidence apart from that which was
barred under the sanction.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in imposing this sanction against the State. We therefore
affirm the sanction order entered by the trial court against the State.
We remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings on the
State’s prosecution of defendant’s misdemeanor DUI case.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is
affirmed. This cause is remanded to the circuit court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Affirmed;
cause remanded.
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