Becovic v. City of Chicago

Annotate this Case
THIRD DIVISION
May 6, 1998

No. 1-97-1151

HUSEIN BECOVIC and ESE BECOVIC,

Plaintiff-Appellants,

v.

CITY OF CHICAGO, CITY OF CHICAGO
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS, CLARENCE
N. WOOD, ROBERT HALL, and THE JOHN
MARSHALL LAW SCHOOL FAIR HOUSING LEGAL
CLINIC,

Defendant-Appellees. )
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) Appeal from the
Circuit Court of
Cook County

No. 96CH1155

Honorable
Lester D. Foreman,
Judge Presiding.


PRESIDING JUSTICE LEAVITT delivered the opinion of the
court:
Claimant Robert Hall, who is legally blind, filed a
complaint with the City of Chicago Commission on Human Relations
(Commission) alleging respondents, Husein and Ese Becovic,
discriminated against him on the basis of his disability by
refusing to rent him an apartment, in violation of section 5-8-
030 of the Chicago Fair Housing Ordinance (Ordinance) (Chicago
Municipal Code  5-8-030 (1994)). The Commission found
respondents discriminated against Hall on the basis of his
disability and awarded him $2,500 in compensatory damages and
assessed a civil penalty in the amount of $250. Hall petitioned
for attorney fees, and the Commission eventually awarded him
$14,200 in attorney fees plus $430 in costs. Respondents
petitioned the circuit court of Cook County to review the award
of attorney fees, and the circuit court affirmed. Respondents
appeal, contending: (1) the award of damages in Hall's favor was
de minimis, precluding an award of attorney fees; and (2) the
amount of attorney fees awarded is against the manifest weight of
the evidence.
The evidence before the Commission revealed the following.
Respondents are owners of property located at 6021 North Winthrop
in Chicago, as well as various other rental properties throughout
the Chicago area. Hall is a legally blind individual who
requires the use of a seeing-eye dog. In March 1994, Hall
responded to an advertisement in the newspaper for an apartment
at 6021 North Winthrop. Following a telephone conversation with
Mrs. Becovic, Hall made arrangements to view the apartment on
March 28, 1994. Hall, his brother, and his brother's girlfriend
arrived at the appointed time to view the apartment. Hall's
seeing-eye dog, Upton, was with him at the time. According to
Hall, shortly after entering the premises, he was confronted by
Mrs. Becovic, who repeatedly stated "no pets!", "no pets!". Hall
informed Becovic that he was legally blind and that Upton was his
seeing-eye dog. Hall alleged he presented Becovic with an
identification card to that effect. Becovic responded that she
maintained a "no pet" policy and that if one tenant was permitted
to have a dog, all of her tenants would want dogs. At that
point, Hall and his companions left.
Hall filed the instant complaint on March 31, 1994, seeking
$12,000 in damages. On April 4, the Commission sent a copy of
the complaint to respondents. On April 8, an investigator for
the Commission spoke with respondents and was informed they were
willing to rent an apartment to Hall. Respondents' answer to
Hall's complaint contained a similar expression of willingness to
rent to Hall. Hall stated that at that point he had applied for
an apartment elsewhere and did not want to rent from respondents.
In August 1994, the John Marshall Law School Fair Housing
Legal Clinic (Clinic) filed an appearance of behalf of Hall.
Hall's prayer for damages was eventually raised to $35,300--$300
in out-of-pocket expenses, $5,000 for emotional distress, and
$30,000 in punitive damages. After a hearing on December 4,
1994, the Commission found Mrs. Becovic was not credible (she had
maintained she was not aware Hall was blind) and awarded Hall
$2,500 in compensatory damages. The Commission also assessed a
$250 civil penalty against respondents.
In petitioning for attorney fees, the Clinic listed six
individuals who performed legal services for Hall. This included
work by two attorneys, three senior law students working under
Supreme Court Rule 7-11, and one paralegal. The Clinic requested
$16,195 in legal fees and $430 in costs. The hearing officer
awarded fees of $14,200 for 193.3 hours of work, plus $430 in
costs. The Commission adopted the award of fees and costs in
these amounts. The circuit court affirmed this award, and
respondents now appeal.
This court has previously held the right of a local
commission to act to prevent housing discriminating springs from
the Illinois Human Rights Act (Act) (775 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq.
(West 1996)). See Atkins v. City of Chicago Comm'n on Human
Rels. ex rel. Lawrence, 281 Ill. App. 3d 1066, 1076-77, 667 N.E.2d 664 (1996). Section 7-108A of the Act provides:
"A political subdivision, or two or more political
subdivisions acting jointly, may create a local
department or commission as it or they see fit to
promote the purposes of this Act and to secure for all
individuals within the jurisdiction of the political
subdivision or subdivisions freedom from unlawful
discrimination ***. The provisions of any ordinance
enacted by any municipality or county which prohibits
broader or different categories of discrimination than
are prohibited by this Act are not invalidated or
affected by this Act." 775 ILCS 5/7-108A (West 1996).
The Act permits municipalities to pass anti-discrimination
measures more sweeping in scope than Illinois law, and Chicago's
fair housing provisions have been found to be expansive in scope.
Jasniowski v. Rushing, 287 Ill. App. 3d 655, 660-62, 678 N.E.2d 743 (1997).
In Atkins, this court held attorney fees and costs were
awardable in suits based on discrimination in real estate
transactions, pursuant to section 5/8B-104 of the Act. See
Atkins, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 1076-78. Section 5/8B-104 provides:
"Upon finding a civil rights violation, a hearing
officer may recommend and the Commission or any
three-member panel thereof may provide for any relief
or penalty identified in this Section, separately or in
combination, by entering an order directing the
respondent to:
***
(B) Actual Damages. Pay actual damages, as
reasonably determined by the Commission, for injury or
loss suffered by the complainant.
(C) Civil Penalty. Pay a civil penalty to
vindicate the public interest:
(i) in an amount not exceeding $10,000 if the
respondent has not been adjudged to have committed any
prior civil rights violation under Article 3;
***
(D) Attorney Fees; Costs. Pay to the
complainant all or a portion of the costs of
maintaining the action, including reasonable attorneys
fees and expert witness fees incurred in maintaining
this action before the Department, the Commission and
in any judicial review and judicial enforcement
proceedings.
***
(G) Make Complainant Whole. Take such action as
may be necessary to make the individual complainant
whole, including, but not limited to, awards of
interest on the complainant's actual damages from the
date of the civil rights violation." 775 ILCS 5/8B-104
(West 1996).
Respondents do not challenge the authority of the Commission to
award attorney fees in this case.
Rather, they allege attorney fees are not recoverable "if
the plaintiff's victory was purely technical or de minimis."
They rely on a variety of federal cases interpreting the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 (42 U.S.C.  1988
(1976)) and that section's requirement that a party be a
"prevailing party" to recover attorney fees. They conclude the
award in Hall's favor was de minimis, thereby precluding an award
of attorney fees under the federal authorities cited.
Assuming arguendo that attorney fees are not awardable where
the prevailing party's victory was "purely technical or de
minimis" (see generally Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 113 S. Ct. 566, 121 L. Ed. 2d 494 (1992)), respondents would still not
prevail on this issue. A finding of a civil rights violation
accompanied by a $2,500 award of compensatory damages and an
assessment of a $250 civil penalty represents more than a "purely
technical" victory and a "de minimis" recovery. See Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40
(1983) (holding plaintiffs will be found to be "prevailing
parties" for attorney fees purposes "if they succeed on any
significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the
benefit [they] sought in bringing suit"); Berlak v. Villa
Scalabrini Home for the Aged, 284 Ill. App. 3d 231, 236-37, 671 N.E.2d 768 (1996) (affirming a damages award of $3,700 trebled to
$11,200, plus $85,000 in attorney fees and costs, under the
Nursing Home Care Reform Act of 1979, holding plaintiff obtained
more than "a mere moral victory" under the reasoning of Farrar);
Brewington v. Illinois Dep't of Corrections, 161 Ill. App. 3d 54,
64-67, 513 N.E.2d 1056 (1987) (affirming an award of $12,669 in
attorney fees where plaintiff obtained injunctive relief under
the Human Rights Act but was denied any monetary recovery). The
cases cited by respondents involving nominal awards of $1 are
patently inapposite.
Respondents next challenge the amount of the attorney fees
awarded to Hall and the Clinic. The Commission awarded (and the
circuit court approved) $14,200 in attorney fees for 193 hours of
work done pursuing Hall's case. Respondents assert this award of
fees was exorbitant and unreasonable.
We cannot say the amount of attorney fees awarded in this
case represents an abuse of discretion. See Raintree Health Care
Ctr. v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 173 Ill. 2d 469, 494, 672 N.E.2d 1136 (1996) (trier of fact has discretion in determining
reasonableness of an award of attorney fees under the Illinois
Human Rights Act). As the very size of the record on appeal
indicates, considerable work was apparently done in pursuing this
suit. Depositions were taken, a conciliation conference and a
pretrial hearing were held, and eventually a full hearing was
conducted. While respondents did make some attempts at
accomodation and settlement, Mrs. Becovic persisted up until and
throughout the hearing in denying she was ever aware Hall was
blind, a story which the Commission found outright unbelievable.
The Commission painstakingly reviewed the records, time sheets,
and affidavits submitted by the various individuals who worked on
Hall's behalf, disallowed numerous entries as unreasonable or
excessive, and reduced the requested award of attorney fees from
$16,195 to $14,200 plus costs. In reviewing the Commission's
award, the circuit court commended the Commission for its
"circumspect" review of the charges and challenged respondents'
counsel to point to facts in the record upon which the court
could reverse the Commission's thorough finding. Counsel was
unable to find fault with any specific factual findings made by
the Commission.
Nor do we believe the circuit court's comments necessarily
indicate the Commission abused its discretion in this case. The
circuit court's comments appear at most to be inconsistent.
While at one point the circuit judge stated he believed the
amount of fees allegedly incurred and awarded was "unquestionably
exorbitant," he nevertheless later found the record supported the
award of fees. Moreover, respondents rely too heavily upon the
difference in hours spent by their counsel (21) and the hours
spent by the Clinic (193). Focusing solely on the number of
hours billed ignores the fact that the vast majority of the
Clinic's hours were billed by law students, whose billing rates
($50/hour) are assuredly much lower than those of practicing
attorneys. It is true, as respondents contend, an experienced
attorney would have spent far less time in pursuing a case such
as this; however, the billing rate for more experienced counsel
would be correspondingly greater. Thus, the net effect of
utilizing law students in this case may very well have been a
reduction in the cost of pursuing the case. See Brewington, 161
Ill. App. 3d at 65 (affirming an award of $12,669 in attorney
fees which included 388 hours of senior law students' time,
noting with approval the use of law students in providing
complainants with competent legal services at a rate well below
the standard market rate of fully licensed attorneys); Cameo
Convalescent Center, Inc. v. Senn, 738 F.2d 836, 846 (7th Cir.
1984) (approving an award of attorney fees for work done by law
clerks in an action under 42 U.S.C.  1988, noting "[s]uch a
policy encourages cost-effective delivery of legal services and,
by reducing the spiraling cost of civil rights litigation,
furthers the policies underlying civil rights statutes");
Littlefield v. Mack, 789 F. Supp. 914, 919 (N.D.Ill. 1992)
(rejecting defendant's objection to an award of attorney fees
which included 30 hours of work by a law student billed at a rate
of $60/hour, noting the work might otherwise have been done by an
attorney at much greater cost).
Respondents further argue the amount of fees should have
been reduced by any amount spent pursuing punitive damages, since
the Commission found such damages were unwarranted in the present
case. Respondents correctly note the general rule that if a
plaintiff does not prevail on all of his claims, hours spent on
unsuccessful claims may be excluded in calculating an award of
attorney fees. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434-35; Ustrak v.
Fairman, 851 F.2d 983, 988 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Factually unrelated
claims are treated as separate lawsuits, and therefore if the
plaintiff loses on such a claim he is not to be reimbursed for
the attorney's fees allocable to it"); Berlak, 284 Ill. App. 3d
at 238-39. Nevertheless, this rule is not applicable here. Cf.
Berlak, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 239 (refusing to reduce attorney fee
award where plaintiff sought, but was not awarded, additional
damages for pain, suffering, and disability, noting "the amount
of monetary recovery is but a single factor to consider in
determining the success of plaintiff's action"). Hall's claim
for punitive damages clearly arose from the same set of facts
upon which his housing discrimination claim was based. Where a
plaintiff's claims of relief involve a common core of facts or
are based on related legal theories, such that much of his
attorney's time is devoted generally to the litigation as a
whole, a fee award should not be reduced simply because all
requested relief was not obtained. See Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 575-76, 106 S. Ct. 2686, 91 L. Ed. 2d 466 (1986);
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434-35; Berlak, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 238-39
(refusing to reduce award of $85,000 in attorney fees where
plaintiff prevailed on only one count of her four-count
complaint, since all counts involved common core of facts and
similar legal theories); Brewington, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 64-67
(affirming an award of $12,669 in attorney fees where plaintiff
obtained injunctive relief under the Human Rights Act but was
denied any monetary recovery).
In conclusion, we also express our disagreement with
respondents' contention, asserted repeatedly in the course of
challenging the award of attorney fees in this case, to the
effect that "[t]here was no public purpose served by this
lawsuit." A relatively small damages award neither makes a
successful civil rights plaintiff's victory "de minimis" nor
justifies awarding attorney fees strictly in proportion to the
amount of damages awarded. Damage awards under the Human Rights
Act and other similar civil rights provisions infrequently
reflect the social benefits obtained in remedying discrimination
and vindicating civil rights. The availability of an award of
attorney fees both encourages citizens to bring suit when their
rights have been violated and provides incentives for attorneys
to undertake representation in socially beneficial cases where
the potential monetary recoveries are minimal. See, e.g., Harris
v. Manor Healthcare Corp., 111 Ill. 2d 350, 369-70, 489 N.E.2d 1374 (1986) (provisions of Nursing Home Care Reform Act
permitting awards of treble damages and attorney fees encourage
residents to seek redress for violations of their privacy,
religious freedom, speech, and other constitutional rights, since
"many violations of the Act will yield little in the way of
actual monetary damages"); Berlak, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 236-39
(affirming a damages award of $3,700 trebled to $11,200, plus
$85,000 in attorney fees and costs, under the Nursing Home Care
Reform Act of 1979); Grove v. Huffman, 262 Ill. App. 3d 531, 539,
634 N.E.2d 1184 (1994) (noting one of the purposes of allowing
attorney fees to be awarded under the Consumer Fraud Act is to
encourage consumers to bring actions to vindicate their rights
under the Act and that without such a provision it would be
difficult for injured consumers to obtain counsel in light of the
sums of money that are in dispute in most consumer fraud
litigation); Brewington, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 65 (affirming an
award of $12,669 in attorney fees where plaintiff obtained
injunctive relief under the Human Rights Act but was denied any
monetary recovery, reasoning that vindication of civil rights
will generally not produce large pecuniary awards and attorney
fee awards should not be reduced because the rights involved are
non-pecuniary in nature); Riverside, 477 U.S. at 574-78 (noting
Congress enacted civil rights legislation "specifically because
it found that the private market for legal services failed to
provide many victims of civil rights violations with effective
access to the judicial process" due to the fact "contingent fee
arrangements that make legal services available to many victims
of personal injuries would often not encourage lawyers to accept
civil rights cases, which frequently involve substantial
expenditures of time and effort but produce only small monetary
recoveries").
For the foregoing reasons, the judgement of the circuit
court of Cook County affirming the final administrative decision
of the City of Chicago Commission on Human Relations is affirmed
in its entirety.
AFFIRMED.
GORDON and CAHILL, JJ., concurring.

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