Armstead v. Sheahan
Annotate this Case
Sixth Division
FILED: 08/21/98
No. 1-97-0338
BARBARA ARMSTEAD, ) Appeal from the Circuit
) Court of Cook County
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. )
) No. 96 CH 06165
MICHAEL F. SHEAHAN, )
Sheriff of Cook County, and )
COOK COUNTY SHERIFF'S )
MERIT BOARD, et al. ) Honorable
) Robert V. Boharic,
Defendants-Appellants. ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE ZWICK delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendants, Michael F. Sheahan, Sheriff of Cook County, and the Cook County
Sheriff's Merit Board (Merit Board), appeal the circuit court's reversal of a final
administrative decision based upon a determination that the Merit Board lacked
jurisdiction to issue the decision.
The undisputed facts establish that on February 26, 1993, the Sheriff of Cook
County (the Sheriff) instituted an employment policy which prohibited unlawful
involvement with drugs; the presence of drugs or controlled substances or their
metabolites in an employee's system; the use of cannabis or non-prescribed controlled
substances; or the abuse of legally prescribed drugs or controlled substances by sworn
employees of the Department, at any time, while on or off-duty.
On April 6, 1994, plaintiff Barbara Armstead submitted to a random drug test in
accordance with the employment policy set forth above. The results of that test
indicated the presence of cannabinoids, a derivative of marijuana, and on April 11,
1994, plaintiff was suspended with pay. A hearing was conducted on June 21, 1994,
pursuant to the decision in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,
84 L. Ed. 2d 494, 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985). At the conclusion of that hearing, plaintiff
was suspended without pay. On July 18, 1994, the Sheriff filed charges before the
Merit Board, seeking termination of plaintiff's employment based upon her violation of
the employment policy prohibiting drug use. A hearing on the matter was held on
February 15, 1996, and on May 17, 1996, the Merit Board ordered that plaintiff's
employment be terminated for cause.
Plaintiff thereafter filed a timely complaint in the circuit court of Cook County
seeking administrative review of the Merit Board's decision to terminate her
employment. Plaintiff argued that (1) the Merit Board lacked jurisdiction to issue the
termination order, (2) the Merit Board's decision was against the manifest weight of
the evidence, and (3) the decision was arbitrary and caricious. The circuit court
reversed the Merit Board's decision, finding that the Board lacked jurisdiction to
terminate plaintiff's employment because the charges against her were not timely filed.
The Merit Board now appeals that ruling.
Administrative agencies, such as the Merit Board, exercise purely statutory
powers and possess no inherent or common law powers. Newkirk v. Bigard, 109 Ill. 2d 28, 37, 485 N.E.2d 321 (1985); Schalz v. McHenry County Sheriff's Department
Merit Comm'n, 113 Ill. 2d 198, 202, 497 N.E.2d 731 (1986). Therefore, any power or
authority claimed by an administrative agency must find its source within the
provisions of the statute by which the agency was created. Schalz, 113 Ill. 2d at 202.
Furthermore, such rules as are lawfully adopted by an administrative agency pursuant
to statutory authority have the force of law and bind the agency to them. Kaszynski v.
Department of Public Aid, 274 Ill. App. 3d 38, 45, 653 N.E.2d 1330 (1995); Stull v.
Department of Children & Family Services, 239 Ill. App. 3d 325, 332, 606 N.E.2d 786
(1992). To the extent that an agency acts outside its statutory authority, it acts without
jurisdiction. Business & Professional People for the Public Interest v. Illinois
Commerce Comm'n, 136 Ill. 2d 192, 243, 555 N.E.2d 693 (1989).
Although the term "jurisdiction" is not strictly applicable to an administrative
body, it is used to designate the authority of the administrative body to act. Newkirk,
109 Ill. 2d at 37. Thus, in the administrative law context, the term "jurisdiction" has
three aspects: (1) personal jurisdiction (i.e., the agency's authority over the parties and
intervenors involved in the proceedings); (2) subject-matter jurisdiction (i.e., the
agency's power over the general class of cases to which the particular case belongs);
and (3) an agency's scope of authority under its statute. Business & Professional
People for the Public Interest, 136 Ill. 2d at 243. The third aspect is considered the
inherent power of an agency to make or enter the particular order involved. Business
& Professional People for the Public Interest, 136 Ill. 2d at 243-44; City of Chicago v.
Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 65 Ill. 2d 108, 112, 357 N.E.2d 1154 (1976).
Agency actions which are beyond the scope of an administrative agency's jurisdiction
or authority are void. City of Chicago, 65 Ill. 2d at 112-13.
The only issue presented in this appeal is whether the Merit Board had authority
to order termination of plaintiff's employment. In deciding this issue, we examine the
power conferred upon the Merit Board by its enabling act.
Sections 3-7011 and 3-7012 state as follows:
"3-7011. Disciplinary measures. Disciplinary measures
prescribed by the Board may be taken by the sheriff for the punishment
of infractions of the rules and regulations promulgated by the Board.
Such disciplinary measures may include suspension of any deputy sheriff
in the County Police Department, any full-time deputy sheriff not
employed as a county police officer or county corrections officer and any
employee in the County Department of Corrections for a reasonable
period, not exceeding 30 days, without complying with the provisions of
Section 3-7012 hereof.
3-7012. Removal, demotion or suspension. Except as is
otherwise provided in this Division, no deputy sheriff in the County
Police Department, no full-time deputy sheriff not employed as a county
police office or county corrections officer and no employee in the County
Department of Corrections shall be removed, demoted or suspended
except for cause, upon written charges filed with the Board by the Sheriff
and a hearing before the Board thereon upon not less than 10 days'
notice at a place to be designated by the chairman thereof. 55 ILCS 5/3-
7011, 5/3-7012 (West 1996).
In addition, the rules and regulations governing the Merit Board provide that "[t]he
Sheriff or his designated representative, may recommend discharge, demotion or
suspension for a period of time in excess of thirty days *** provided charges against
that person have been filed with the board and pending the decision of the Board on
those charges." Rules and Regulations of the Cook County Sheriff's Merit Board, Art.
VIII, A(3).
The record before us demonstrates that the Sheriff filed charges against plaintiff
on July 18, 1994, and a hearing on the matter was held on February 15, 1996. The
Merit Board ordered that plaintiff's employment be terminated for cause on May 17,
1996. Therefore, plaintiff was afforded the statutory protections mandated by section
3-7012 prior to the Merit Board's decision to terminate her employment for cause.
In her administrative review action, plaintiff argued that the Board lacked
jurisdiction to enter the termination order because the charges against her were not
filed within 30 days of the date of her suspension. In support of this contention,
plaintiff relied upon Zurek v. Cook County Police and Corrections Merit Board, 42 Ill.
App. 3d 1044, 1047-48, 356 N.E.2d 1079 (1976), which held that charges must be
filed against an employee within the initial 30-day period if discharge, demotion or
suspension for more than thirty days is sought. We note, however, that in the 22 years
since Zurek was decided, the language of the relevant Merit Board rule has been
altered. Significantly, that rule no longer requires that charges against an employee be
filed "during the original period of suspension." In light of this critical change in the
rule, we find Zurek is not controlling in the case at bar.
The current rule requires only that charges be filed with the Board before the
Sheriff recommends discharge, which was done here.
In reaching this conclusion, we note that plaintiff's complaint for administrative
review did not challenge the propriety of her pre-termination suspension. Rather,
plaintiff appealed the validity of her termination and sought reinstatement of her
employment. The issue of whether the Sheriff acted properly in suspending plaintiff
with pay from April 11, 1994, until June 21, 1994, was not before the circuit court and
is not before this court. Accordingly, we need not address plaintiff's argument that her
suspension with pay violated the terms of sections 3-7011 and 3-7012. The
termination proceedings brought against plaintiff were independent of the pre-
termination suspension and did not affect the Merit Board's jurisdiction to terminate
plaintiff's employment for cause. Because the due process safeguards incorporated in
the above statutory sections were complied with, we hold that the Merit Board had
jurisdiction to order termination of plaintiff's employment.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is
reversed, and the cause is remanded for determination of the remaining issues
presented in plaintiff's complaint for administrative review.
Reversed and remanded.
CAMPBELL, P.J., and GREIMAN, J., concur.
FILED: 08/21/98
No. 1-97-0338
BARBARA ARMSTEAD, ) Appeal from the Circuit
) Court of Cook County
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. )
) No. 96 CH 06165
MICHAEL F. SHEAHAN, )
Sheriff of Cook County, and )
COOK COUNTY SHERIFF'S )
MERIT BOARD, et al. ) Honorable
) Robert V. Boharic,
Defendants-Appellants. ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE ZWICK delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendants, Michael F. Sheahan, Sheriff of Cook County, and the Cook County
Sheriff's Merit Board (Merit Board), appeal the circuit court's reversal of a final
administrative decision based upon a determination that the Merit Board lacked
jurisdiction to issue the decision.
The undisputed facts establish that on February 26, 1993, the Sheriff of Cook
County (the Sheriff) instituted an employment policy which prohibited unlawful
involvement with drugs; the presence of drugs or controlled substances or their
metabolites in an employee's system; the use of cannabis or non-prescribed controlled
substances; or the abuse of legally prescribed drugs or controlled substances by sworn
employees of the Department, at any time, while on or off-duty.
On April 6, 1994, plaintiff Barbara Armstead submitted to a random drug test in
accordance with the employment policy set forth above. The results of that test
indicated the presence of cannabinoids, a derivative of marijuana, and on April 11,
1994, plaintiff was suspended with pay. A hearing was conducted on June 21, 1994,
pursuant to the decision in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,
84 L. Ed. 2d 494, 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985). At the conclusion of that hearing, plaintiff
was suspended without pay. On July 18, 1994, the Sheriff filed charges before the
Merit Board, seeking termination of plaintiff's employment based upon her violation of
the employment policy prohibiting drug use. A hearing on the matter was held on
February 15, 1996, and on May 17, 1996, the Merit Board ordered that plaintiff's
employment be terminated for cause.
Plaintiff thereafter filed a timely complaint in the circuit court of Cook County
seeking administrative review of the Merit Board's decision to terminate her
employment. Plaintiff argued that (1) the Merit Board lacked jurisdiction to issue the
termination order, (2) the Merit Board's decision was against the manifest weight of
the evidence, and (3) the decision was arbitrary and caricious. The circuit court
reversed the Merit Board's decision, finding that the Board lacked jurisdiction to
terminate plaintiff's employment because the charges against her were not timely filed.
The Merit Board now appeals that ruling.
Administrative agencies, such as the Merit Board, exercise purely statutory
powers and possess no inherent or common law powers. Newkirk v. Bigard, 109 Ill. 2d 28, 37, 485 N.E.2d 321 (1985); Schalz v. McHenry County Sheriff's Department
Merit Comm'n, 113 Ill. 2d 198, 202, 497 N.E.2d 731 (1986). Therefore, any power or
authority claimed by an administrative agency must find its source within the
provisions of the statute by which the agency was created. Schalz, 113 Ill. 2d at 202.
Furthermore, such rules as are lawfully adopted by an administrative agency pursuant
to statutory authority have the force of law and bind the agency to them. Kaszynski v.
Department of Public Aid, 274 Ill. App. 3d 38, 45, 653 N.E.2d 1330 (1995); Stull v.
Department of Children & Family Services, 239 Ill. App. 3d 325, 332, 606 N.E.2d 786
(1992). To the extent that an agency acts outside its statutory authority, it acts without
jurisdiction. Business & Professional People for the Public Interest v. Illinois
Commerce Comm'n, 136 Ill. 2d 192, 243, 555 N.E.2d 693 (1989).
Although the term "jurisdiction" is not strictly applicable to an administrative
body, it is used to designate the authority of the administrative body to act. Newkirk,
109 Ill. 2d at 37. Thus, in the administrative law context, the term "jurisdiction" has
three aspects: (1) personal jurisdiction (i.e., the agency's authority over the parties and
intervenors involved in the proceedings); (2) subject-matter jurisdiction (i.e., the
agency's power over the general class of cases to which the particular case belongs);
and (3) an agency's scope of authority under its statute. Business & Professional
People for the Public Interest, 136 Ill. 2d at 243. The third aspect is considered the
inherent power of an agency to make or enter the particular order involved. Business
& Professional People for the Public Interest, 136 Ill. 2d at 243-44; City of Chicago v.
Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 65 Ill. 2d 108, 112, 357 N.E.2d 1154 (1976).
Agency actions which are beyond the scope of an administrative agency's jurisdiction
or authority are void. City of Chicago, 65 Ill. 2d at 112-13.
The only issue presented in this appeal is whether the Merit Board had authority
to order termination of plaintiff's employment. In deciding this issue, we examine the
power conferred upon the Merit Board by its enabling act.
Sections 3-7011 and 3-7012 state as follows:
"3-7011. Disciplinary measures. Disciplinary measures
prescribed by the Board may be taken by the sheriff for the punishment
of infractions of the rules and regulations promulgated by the Board.
Such disciplinary measures may include suspension of any deputy sheriff
in the County Police Department, any full-time deputy sheriff not
employed as a county police officer or county corrections officer and any
employee in the County Department of Corrections for a reasonable
period, not exceeding 30 days, without complying with the provisions of
Section 3-7012 hereof.
3-7012. Removal, demotion or suspension. Except as is
otherwise provided in this Division, no deputy sheriff in the County
Police Department, no full-time deputy sheriff not employed as a county
police office or county corrections officer and no employee in the County
Department of Corrections shall be removed, demoted or suspended
except for cause, upon written charges filed with the Board by the Sheriff
and a hearing before the Board thereon upon not less than 10 days'
notice at a place to be designated by the chairman thereof. 55 ILCS 5/3-
7011, 5/3-7012 (West 1996).
In addition, the rules and regulations governing the Merit Board provide that "[t]he
Sheriff or his designated representative, may recommend discharge, demotion or
suspension for a period of time in excess of thirty days *** provided charges against
that person have been filed with the board and pending the decision of the Board on
those charges." Rules and Regulations of the Cook County Sheriff's Merit Board, Art.
VIII, A(3).
The record before us demonstrates that the Sheriff filed charges against plaintiff
on July 18, 1994, and a hearing on the matter was held on February 15, 1996. The
Merit Board ordered that plaintiff's employment be terminated for cause on May 17,
1996. Therefore, plaintiff was afforded the statutory protections mandated by section
3-7012 prior to the Merit Board's decision to terminate her employment for cause.
In her administrative review action, plaintiff argued that the Board lacked
jurisdiction to enter the termination order because the charges against her were not
filed within 30 days of the date of her suspension. In support of this contention,
plaintiff relied upon Zurek v. Cook County Police and Corrections Merit Board, 42 Ill.
App. 3d 1044, 1047-48, 356 N.E.2d 1079 (1976), which held that charges must be
filed against an employee within the initial 30-day period if discharge, demotion or
suspension for more than thirty days is sought. We note, however, that in the 22 years
since Zurek was decided, the language of the relevant Merit Board rule has been
altered. Significantly, that rule no longer requires that charges against an employee be
filed "during the original period of suspension." In light of this critical change in the
rule, we find Zurek is not controlling in the case at bar.
The current rule requires only that charges be filed with the Board before the
Sheriff recommends discharge, which was done here.
In reaching this conclusion, we note that plaintiff's complaint for administrative
review did not challenge the propriety of her pre-termination suspension. Rather,
plaintiff appealed the validity of her termination and sought reinstatement of her
employment. The issue of whether the Sheriff acted properly in suspending plaintiff
with pay from April 11, 1994, until June 21, 1994, was not before the circuit court and
is not before this court. Accordingly, we need not address plaintiff's argument that her
suspension with pay violated the terms of sections 3-7011 and 3-7012. The
termination proceedings brought against plaintiff were independent of the pre-
termination suspension and did not affect the Merit Board's jurisdiction to terminate
plaintiff's employment for cause. Because the due process safeguards incorporated in
the above statutory sections were complied with, we hold that the Merit Board had
jurisdiction to order termination of plaintiff's employment.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is
reversed, and the cause is remanded for determination of the remaining issues
presented in plaintiff's complaint for administrative review.
Reversed and remanded.
CAMPBELL, P.J., and GREIMAN, J., concur.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
