People v. Segoviano
Annotate this Case
FIRST DIVISION
JUNE 29, 1998
No. 1-95-4286
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ANTONIO SEGOVIANO,
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
) Appeal from the
Circuit Court of
Cook County
No. 93 CR 27560
Honorable
Vincent M. Gaughan,
Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE O'MARA FROSSARD delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant Antonio Segoviano appeals from his convictions for
attempted robbery and murder after a jury trial in which an
imposter testified as an occurrence witness and the real occurrence
witness gave exculpatory testimony.
We address the following issues on appeal: (1) whether
defendant's due process rights were violated by the introduction of
false testimony from an imposter witness; and (2) whether the trial
court properly denied defendant's motion to quash arrest and
suppress evidence. We hold that the introduction of false
testimony by the imposter witness during trial violated defendant's
due process rights. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and
remand for a new trial.
I. FACTS
On November 9, 1993, at approximately 4:30 p.m., defendant,
Arnel Robinson, Mario Rodriguez and Jerome J. Lewis were at the
projects near 31st and Halsted Streets in Chicago. They talked
about purchasing narcotics. These individuals walked down 31st
Street to a pay phone where Jerome J. Lewis, also known as "J.J.,"
called his girlfriend for a ride. Mario Rodriguez was with Jerome
J. Lewis at the pay phone. While Lewis was on the phone, defendant,
also known as "Little Cap" or "Little Capone," and Arnel Robinson
were standing a few feet away. Arnel Robinson showed defendant the
black .357 gun he carried in his pants and the two agreed that they
would locate a suitable victim to rob.
A currency exchange was located nearby. There was an alley
next to the currency exchange which veered off into another alley
and then led out to the main street. Defendant and Arnel Robinson
agreed that defendant would go into the currency exchange and
locate an individual to rob while Robinson waited in the mouth of
the alley.
At this time, Onesimo Beltran and Martin Alvarez pulled into
the alley in their truck. Mr. Alvarez had to stop at the currency
exchange to pick up a city sticker he had ordered a week ago. Mr.
Alvarez went into the currency exchange while Mr. Beltran waited in
the truck and began scraping off the old city sticker from the
windshield.
Defendant followed Mr. Alvarez into the currency exchange.
Mr. Alvarez spoke with Steven Schoenberg, the manager, who informed
him that his sticker had not yet arrived. While they were
conversing, defendant etched his nickname, "Little Cap," into the
wall. Mr. Schoenberg told defendant to stop.
Defendant followed Mr. Alvarez out of the currency exchange
and into the alley. At the mouth of the alley, Arnel Robinson
grabbed Mr. Alvarez. Defendant continued walking beyond the bend
in the alley to where Mr. Beltran was scraping the city sticker off
his truck's window. Defendant demanded money. Mr. Beltran replied
that he did not have any money and closed the door of the truck.
Defendant began walking back down the alley toward the currency
exchange.
Two shots were fired. Mr. Beltran looked in the mirror of his
truck and saw people grabbing at Mr. Alvarez. Mr. Beltran called
to Mr. Alvarez. Mr. Alvarez, bleeding, got in the truck and the
two drove to their home, where they called an ambulance. Mr.
Alvarez died from a gunshot wound to his chest.
At trial, one of the witnesses the People called to testify on
the first day of trial stated that his name was "Jerome Lewis."
"Jerome Lewis" testified that he preferred to be called "Stacy."
He stated that he was currently serving time in jail in Minnesota.
"Jerome Lewis" testified that shortly after 4 o'clock on
November 9, 1993, he was near a pay phone at 31st Street between
Lituanica and Halsted Streets in Chicago. The witness stated he
was going to call his girlfriend on the pay phone to get a ride to
pick up some drugs. The witness, "Jerome Lewis," testified that
while he was at the pay phone, he heard defendant talking to Arnel
Robinson. Specifically, the witness testified that "[defendant]
asked Arnel would he help him stick up the Mexican guy" and that
Arnel Robinson replied, "Let's do it." The witness stated that
defendant was 10 to 12 feet away when he said this and that Mario
Rodriguez was also present. The witness then testified that he saw
Arnel go into the alley and defendant go into the currency
exchange. The witness said defendant came out of the currency
exchange after two or three minutes, held his left hand above his
head with all five fingers showing and then reentered the currency
exchange. The witness stated that the "Mexican guy" exited the
currency exchange and walked into the alley with defendant
following behind him. The witness stated that Arnel was already in
the alley at this time. Next, the witness testified, he began
crossing the street when he heard two gunshots coming from the
alley. After the gunshots, the witness stated that defendant
crossed the street to where defendant's mother was standing and the
witness left with his girlfriend, who had come to pick him up.
During cross-examination, this witness first testified that
his name is "Stacy Lewis" and that he has an older brother named
"Jerome" who also goes by the name "J.J." The witness testified
that he had used his brother's name in connection with prior
arrests but that he did not use his brother's name in connection
with this case. The witness then stated that his own name is
"Jerome" and that his brother's name is "Stacy." The witness
admitted that he had used other dates of birth in prior encounters
with the law.
The following day, the People called three more witnesses.
After all the witnesses testified, the court held a hearing outside
the jury's presence to determine whether the person who testified
earlier was actually Jerome Lewis or was Jerome Lewis's brother.
At this hearing, defense counsel presented the testimony of another
individual calling himself "Jerome Lewis." The trial court then
declared that an independent investigation would be held to
determine whether "your brother or you were the person at that
location at 31st by the currency exchange."
The next day, outside the presence of the jury, the prosecutor
told the trial court that the witness, "Jerome Lewis," who had
previously testified, admitted he was not present at the scene of
the shooting. The prosecutor explained the situation to the court
as follows:
"He says that in fact he was not present. He said it was
his brother who was present; that he testified because he
thought his brother might run into some problems if the
brother testified for the State. So he came down here to
testify figuring he was safe up in Minnesota. He said he
learned about the incident from his brother after it
happened, and that's why he did that. I asked Mario
Rodriguez to look at the individual and he did, and he
said that was not the J.J. who was present at the
incident."
The prosecutor then suggested that the trial court declare a
mistrial, stating that, "I believe the jury has heard this
evidence. I don't know if there's any way that can be cured and
still allow a fair ruling or fair disposition on the part of the
jury." The defense counsel opposed a mistrial, stating, "The
State's obligation is simply to correct, to explain to the jury
that testimony should be disregarded. *** I believe it would be a
jeopardy issue if your honor declared a mistrial." The trial court
denied the People's motion for a mistrial, stating that the trial
"has not been reduced to a farce and a sham."
The court ordered the prosecutor to formally withdraw the
false testimony in the jury's presence with an explanation of what
occurred. The prosecutor addressed the court as follows:
"[PROSECUTOR]: Judge, just briefly. As an assistant
State's Attorney one of my functions is to prosecute obviously
felons. In addition, I also have an obligation to see that
justice is done here. So I would like to inform the Court and
the jury that the other day we put a witness on who to my
belief was a person by the name of Jerome Lewis, a witness to
the incident.
Upon further investigation I determined that in fact he
was Stacy Lewis the brother of Jerome Lewis and was in fact
not a witness to the incident, and as a result of that fact
his testimony which he completely fabricated obviously should
not have been presented.
I'm asking at this time that the jury disregard that and
that his testimony be withdrawn and that he perjured himself
while on the stand.
THE COURT: Mr. Lewis' testimony will be stricken, and
I'm going to tell you to disregard completely all the
testimony that this person from Minnesota penitentiary said
and completely disregard that."
The People next called the real Jerome Lewis. He testified
that his name is Jerome John Lewis and that he has an older brother
named Stacy Lewis or Stacy Cueto. He testified that he was at the
pay phone with defendant calling his girlfriend for a ride. He
stated that he heard two gunshots coming from the alley, but that
the gunshots did not come from defendant. The real Jerome Lewis
then testified that he had no recollection whatsoever of being at
the police station later that morning and did not recall speaking
with the assistant State's Attorney.
The jury returned its guilty verdict on August 24, 1995.
Defendant filed his posttrial motion for a new trial on September
26, 1995. He filed an amended motion for a new trial on September
28, 1995. The trial court denied the motion and this appeal
followed. Defendant was sentenced to 45 years' imprisonment for
murder and 15 years' imprisonment for attempt armed robbery with
the sentences to be served concurrently.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Due Process of Law
Defendant first argues that his convictions for first degree
murder and attempted armed robbery should be reversed because the
People called an imposter witness at trial. The People's witness,
Stacy Cueto, impersonated Cueto's brother, J.J. Lewis. Defendant
asserts that the introduction of this false testimony violated
defendant's due process rights. Defendant submits that this court
should remand the matter for a hearing to determine whether further
prosecution should be barred by double jeopardy.
The People maintain that defendant waived this issue by
failing to file a timely posttrial motion. Even if defendant did
not waive the issue, the People argue, any harm that defendant may
have suffered from the improper testimony was cured when the jury
was repeatedly instructed that the testimony had been stricken and
should not be considered.
The first contention we will address is whether defendant
waived this issue for review by failing to file a timely post-trial
motion. Section 116-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides
that a defendant must file a written motion for a new trial within
30 days following the entry of a finding or the return of a
verdict. 725 ILCS 5/116-1 (West 1994). In this case, defendant
filed his motion for a new trial 32 days after the jury returned
its verdict.
While ordinarily defendant may be deemed to have waived review
of this issue, the waiver rule is not absolute. Plain error may be
considered where the record clearly shows that an alleged error
affecting substantial rights was committed. 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a);
People v. Stout, 110 Ill. App. 3d 830, 835, 443 N.E.2d 19 (1982).
The purpose of the plain error rule is to afford certain
protections to the accused by correcting serious injustices and to
protect and preserve the integrity and reputation of the judicial
process. People v. Young, 128 Ill. 2d 1, 46, 538 N.E.2d 453
(1989). The rule may be applied in criminal cases where the
evidence is closely balanced or the error is of such magnitude that
its commission denies the accused a fair and impartial trial.
Young, 128 Ill. 2d at 47.
While defendant filed his posttrial motion two days beyond the
statutory limit, this was not a situation where the defendant
failed to raise the issue in his motion. Here, defendant raised
the alleged due process violation in his posttrial motion and
argued it at the hearing on the motion. The motion fairly notified
the State and the trial court of the alleged error and provided the
court with an opportunity to remedy the error. Further, the
alleged error in this case concerns a due process violation which
deprived defendant of his liberty based on testimony from an
imposter witness. As such, the alleged error is of such magnitude
that its commission denied defendant a fair and impartial trial.
Accordingly, we will review the issue as plain error.
A mistrial should be granted only when there is a manifest
necessity to stop the proceedings or where the ends of justice
would be defeated by continuing the trial. People v. Redd, 135 Ill. 2d 252, 323, 553 N.E.2d 316 (1990); People v. Camden, 219 Ill.
App. 3d 124, 135, 578 N.E.2d 1211 (1991). It must appear that the
jury has been so influenced and prejudiced that it would not be
fair and impartial to continue the trial and that the damaging
effect of the evidence cannot be remedied by admonitions or
instructions. Camden, 219 Ill. App. 3d at 136. The denial of a
request for a mistrial will not be disturbed unless the trial
court's decision was a clear abuse of discretion. People v. Hall,
114 Ill. 2d 376, 405, 499 N.E.2d 1335 (1986).
Further, it has long been recognized that a criminal
conviction obtained through the knowing use of false testimony is
contrary to fundamental principles of fairness in a civilized
society and constitutes a violation of due process. People v.
Jimerson, 166 Ill. 2d 211, 223, 652 N.E.2d 278 (1995); People v.
Cihlar, 111 Ill. 2d 212, 216-17, 489 N.E.2d 859 (1986); People v.
Cornille, 95 Ill. 2d 497, 448 N.E.2d 857 (1983); see also Napue v.
Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1217, 79 S. Ct. 1173 (1959).
Such a conviction must be set aside if there is any reasonable
likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the jury's
verdict. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 678, 678-80, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481, 492, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3381-82 (1985); People v. Olinger,
176 Ill. 2d 326, 345, 680 N.E.2d 321 (1997).
In this case, Stacy Cueto testified at trial as "Jerome
Lewis." He stated that he heard defendant ask Arnel Robinson if
Arnel would help him "stick up the Mexican guy" and that Arnel
Robinson replied, "Let's do it." The witness then testified that
he saw Arnel go into the alley and defendant go into the currency
exchange. The witness said defendant came out of the currency
exchange after two or three minutes, held his left hand above his
head with all five fingers showing and then reentered the currency
exchange. The witness stated that the "Mexican guy" exited the
currency exchange and walked into the alley with defendant
following behind him. The witness stated that Arnel was already in
the alley at this time. Next, the witness testified, he began
crossing the street when he heard two gunshots coming from the
alley. The witness stated that defendant crossed the street after
the gunshots were fired.
The real Jerome Lewis later testified that defendant was
standing with him at the pay phone during the alleged robbery. He
stated that he heard two gunshots coming from the alley, but that
the gunshots did not come from defendant.
We find that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
the prosecution's motion for a mistrial. The jury, through Stacy
Cueto's false testimony, heard a detailed account of defendant's
participation in the armed robbery. This testimony came from a
critical witness. Further, this was not a situation where the jury
heard harmful testimony but was quickly instructed to disregard.
We acknowledge that it took time for the court to conduct a hearing
and an investigation to determine the true identity of the witness
testifying as "Jerome Lewis." However, as a result, the court did
not instruct the jury to disregard the false testimony until two
days later.
The impressions formed by this testimony sat uncorrected in
the jurors' minds for two days. Even in light of the other
evidence of defendant's guilt, there was a reasonable likelihood
that the imposter's testimony inculpating the defendant affected
the jury's verdict and deprived defendant of a fair trial. As our
supreme court stated in Cornille, "It is antithetical to our system
of justice to refuse to grant a new trial for a defendant when it
is convincingly established that he was convicted on the basis of
false testimony." Cornille, 95 Ill. 2d at 507.
Moreover, the damaging effect of Stacy Cueto's false testimony
could not have been cured by jury instruction. While the trial
court ordered that the testimony be stricken and instructed the
jury to disregard, this did not eliminate the possibility of
prejudice. We acknowledge the principle that faith in the ability
of a properly instructed jury to separate issues and reach a
correct result is the cornerstone of the jury system. People v.
Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 376, 583 N.E.2d 515 (1991); People v.
Mikell, 217 Ill. App. 3d 814, 830, 577 N.E.2d 1300 (1991).
Normally it would be presumed that the jury followed these
instructions and completely disregarded the impostor's testimony;
however, based on the totality of the circumstances we find that
Stacy Cueto's false testimony tainted the fundamental fairness of
the trial, such that the continuation of the proceeding defeated
the ends of justice and denied the defendant due process. Defendant
did not receive a trial resulting in a "verdict worthy of
confidence." Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 131 L. Ed. 2d 490, 506, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1566 (1995).
Errors, even of a constitutional nature, may be regarded as
harmless; however, the prosecution has the burden to show beyond a
reasonable doubt that the violation did not contribute to
defendant's conviction. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24,
17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 710, 87 S. Ct. 824, 828 (1967). If spite of the
other evidence in the record, we are unable to say, beyond a
reasonable doubt as required by Chapman, that the testimony of the
imposter witness did not contribute to the defendant's conviction.
Accordingly, we reverse defendant's conviction and remand the
matter for a new trial.
Defendant argues that further prosecution should be barred by
double jeopardy. The double jeopardy clause "'bars retrials where
"bad-faith conduct by judge or prosecutor" [citation] threatens the
"[h]arassment of an accused by successive prosecutions or
declaration of a mistrial so as to afford the prosecutor a more
favorable opportunity to convict" the defendant.' [Citation.]" Lee
v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 33, 53 L. Ed. 2d 80, 89, 97 S. Ct. 2141, 2147 (1977); see also People v. Ortiz, 151 Ill. 2d 1, 600 N.E.2d 1153 (1992).
For purposes of double jeopardy, the United States Supreme
Court has distinguished between judgments reversing convictions due
to trial error and judgments reversing convictions for evidentiary
insufficiency. People v. Mink, 141 Ill. 2d 163, 173, 565 N.E.2d 975 (1990). The double jeopardy clause precludes retrial after a
court of review has concluded that the trial evidence was legally
insufficient to convict, but does not preclude retrial if an error
in the proceedings leading to the conviction caused the reversal.
Mink, 141 Ill. 2d at 173-74.
In the instant case, reversal is based on our determination
that the defendant has been convicted by means of a judicial
process defective in a fundamental respect. However, the evidence
presented at trial was legally sufficient for a jury to decide that
defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the
double jeopardy clause does not preclude retrial of a defendant
whose conviction as in this case is reversed because of an error in
the proceedings leading to the conviction. Mink, 141 Ill. 2d at
173-74.
Furthermore, although it was the defense and not the State who
discovered Cueto's real identity and who produced the real Jerome
Lewis, the State, upon learning of the false testimony, moved that
the trial court declare a mistrial. The defense opposed a mistrial
and the judge denied the People's motion. Accordingly, we find
that the State's request for a mistrial upon discovering the nature
of the perjured testimony defeats any notion of prosecutorial
misconduct that would require further prosecution be barred by
double jeopardy.
B. Motion to Quash Arrest and Suppress Statements
Since we are reversing and remanding for a new trial, we need
not resolve the remaining issues on appeal. However, we will
address defendant's argument that the trial court erred in denying
his motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence.
In this case, we are presented with a situation where a
warrantless arrest was executed in a residence where defendant was
an invited guest. It is disputed whether the police were given
voluntary consent to enter the premises. The trial court's
determination concerning such factual matters will not be disturbed
unless manifestly erroneous. People v. Adams, 131 Ill. 2d 387,
400, 456 N.E.2d 561 (1989).
A warrantless arrest in a private residence is proper if the
police have probable cause to arrest and an occupant of the
dwelling gives the police voluntary consent to enter or exigent
circumstances exist which justify the arrest. Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573, 590, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 653, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1382
(1980) (holding that the fourth amendment prohibits a warrantless
arrest in a private residence unless it is accompanied by exigent
circumstances); People v. Bean, 84 Ill. 2d 64, 417 N.E.2d 608
(1981) (holding that fourth amendment rights were not violated,
even in the absence of exigent circumstances, where consent given
and arrest based on probable cause). This rule necessitates two
considerations: (1) whether the police had probable cause to
arrest; and (2) whether Martha Jacquez voluntarily consented to
having the police enter her home or whether exigent circumstances
existed to justify defendant's arrest.
Probable cause for arrest exists when the facts and
circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge are
sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe
that an offense has been committed and that the person arrested
committed the offense. People v. Henderson, 266 Ill. App. 3d 882,
640 N.E.2d 1344 (1994).
Mere suspicion is inadequate to establish probable cause to
arrest, but evidence relied upon by arresting officers need not be
sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt or even be
admissible at trial. People v. Wilson, 260 Ill. App. 3d 364, 632 N.E.2d 114 (1994). The determination, which considers only
information available to officers before the arrest, must focus on
the factual considerations upon which reasonable, prudent people,
not legal technicians, act. People v. Adams, 131 Ill. 2d 387, 398,
546 N.E.2d 561 (1989).
We find that the information available to the officers before
the arrest indicated that there was a reasonable probability that
defendant committed the offense. Officer Thomas Taglioli testified
at the hearing on the motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence.
He testified that Ms. Nadine Lopez stated she heard two gunshots
coming from the area of the currency exchange and saw several males
leaving the area. She said that defendant, Arnel Robinson, J.J.
and Mario Rodriguez were among the individuals she saw fleeing the
scene. The record indicates that Mario Rodriguez also identified
defendant as a participant in the shooting of Martin Alvarez. As
such, the trial court did not err in finding that probable cause
existed for the arrest.
We will next address the question of whether Ms. Jacquez
voluntarily consented to the police entering her apartment to
arrest defendant.
Voluntary consent to entry need not be given by the defendant
to justify a warrantless, at-home arrest. Such consent may be
obtained from a third party. People v. Chambers, 261 Ill. App. 3d
123, 132, 633 N.E.2d 123 (1994). The consent may be in the form of
words, gesture or conduct. People v. Gross, 166 Ill. App. 3d 413,
423-24, 519 N.E.2d 1043 (1988) (holding that entry was consensual
where defendant opened his apartment door for officers then sat
down at his kitchen table and officers followed him into
apartment). Voluntariness of consent is determined by the totality
of the circumstances. People v. Salgado, 83 Ill. App. 3d 653, 404 N.E.2d 432 (1980). Whether consent is voluntary is a factual
determination and a reviewing court should not substitute its
judgment for that of the trier of fact unless the finding is
manifestly erroneous. People v. Ellis, 187 Ill. App. 3d 295, 543 N.E.2d 196 (1989).
In this case, there was conflicting testimony on whether Ms.
Jacquez gave the police voluntary consent to enter her apartment.
At the hearing on the motion to quash arrest and suppress
statements, Ms. Jacquez testified that she went to the park to get
defendant because a friend told her he was high on PCP. Ms.
Jacquez drove defendant to her home and put him in her bedroom.
Ms. Jacquez stated that she heard a knock on the door at around
11:30 p.m. When she answered the door, six or seven police
officers "said they wanted Tony." The officers indicated they
wanted to speak with defendant about the same shooting they had
talked to him about earlier. She stated that the officers did not
have a warrant and they "just pushed their way into the house."
Specifically, Ms. Jacquez testified as follows:
"Q. Did you at any time consent to allow the officers to
enter your home?
A. No, I did not."
She testified that the officers then began searching the rooms,
grabbed defendant, handcuffed him and took him to the squad car.
Officer Thomas Taglioli and Officer Michael Jetel's testimony
contradicted that of Ms. Jacquez. Officer Taglioli testified that
he was at Martha Jacquez's apartment with approximately six other
tactical officers. They knocked on the door, but there was no
response. He stated that Ms. Jacquez then appeared outside the
building with another female. Officer Taglioli testified that Ms.
Jacquez denied knowing where defendant was at first, but later told
the officers he was in her apartment on the second floor. The
officers all entered the building and Ms. Jacquez led them up the
staircase in the common area. At the top of the stairs, Officer
Jetel asked Ms. Jacquez if he could enter the apartment and she
took him in the apartment and the door was closed. The other
officers waited in the hallway. Officer Taglioli testified that
when the door was next opened, Officer Jetel motioned to the other
officers that defendant was in the front bedroom. The officers
arrested defendant.
Officer Michael Jetel's testimony mirrored that of Officer
Taglioli. He stated that the officers did not threaten or coerce
Ms. Jacquez into letting them into her apartment. He also stated
that Ms. Jacquez "never told us we couldn't come in." Officer Jetel
testified that Ms. Jacquez told them defendant was upstairs in her
apartment. He said that Ms. Jacquez opened the door to the
apartment building and the officers followed her up the stairs. At
her apartment door, she let Officer Jetel in, closed the door and
"whispered that Tony's in the front bedroom."
The trial court found from a review of the testimony that the
totality of the circumstances indicated that Ms. Jacquez
voluntarily consented to the police entering her apartment. We
find no manifest error in the trial court's finding of consensual
entry. Further, we note that our conclusion does not change even
if we use a de novo standard of review. See Ornelas v. United
States, 517 U.S. 690, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911, 116 S. Ct. 1657 (1996).
Defendant also contends that the court erred in failing to
suppress defendant's statements made at the police station as
having been obtained in violation of the fourth amendment
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. The People
argue that no evidence need be suppressed because probable cause
existed for defendant's arrest and the statements defendant sought
to suppress were made at the police station and not in Ms.
Jacquez's home.
Even if a defendant is arrested in his home without a warrant
in violation of Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639,
100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980), his subsequent incriminating statements
made outside his home will not be suppressed if the arrest was made
with probable cause. New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 21, 109 L. Ed. 2d 13, 22, 110 S. Ct. 1640, 1645 (1990). In the instant case,
the police had probable cause to arrest defendant. Further,
defendant's incriminating statements were lawfully obtained at the
police station. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying
the motion to suppress defendant's statements. See People v. Long,
208 Ill. App. 3d 627, 635-36, 567 N.E.2d 514 (1990).
In light of all of the foregoing, we affirm the trial court's
ruling on defendant's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence.
However, we reverse and remand for a new trial in that the
introduction of false testimony through the imposter witness
violated defendant's due process rights.
Reversed and remanded.
BUCKLEY, P.J., and GALLAGHER, J., concur.
JUNE 29, 1998
No. 1-95-4286
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ANTONIO SEGOVIANO,
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
) Appeal from the
Circuit Court of
Cook County
No. 93 CR 27560
Honorable
Vincent M. Gaughan,
Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE O'MARA FROSSARD delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant Antonio Segoviano appeals from his convictions for
attempted robbery and murder after a jury trial in which an
imposter testified as an occurrence witness and the real occurrence
witness gave exculpatory testimony.
We address the following issues on appeal: (1) whether
defendant's due process rights were violated by the introduction of
false testimony from an imposter witness; and (2) whether the trial
court properly denied defendant's motion to quash arrest and
suppress evidence. We hold that the introduction of false
testimony by the imposter witness during trial violated defendant's
due process rights. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and
remand for a new trial.
I. FACTS
On November 9, 1993, at approximately 4:30 p.m., defendant,
Arnel Robinson, Mario Rodriguez and Jerome J. Lewis were at the
projects near 31st and Halsted Streets in Chicago. They talked
about purchasing narcotics. These individuals walked down 31st
Street to a pay phone where Jerome J. Lewis, also known as "J.J.,"
called his girlfriend for a ride. Mario Rodriguez was with Jerome
J. Lewis at the pay phone. While Lewis was on the phone, defendant,
also known as "Little Cap" or "Little Capone," and Arnel Robinson
were standing a few feet away. Arnel Robinson showed defendant the
black .357 gun he carried in his pants and the two agreed that they
would locate a suitable victim to rob.
A currency exchange was located nearby. There was an alley
next to the currency exchange which veered off into another alley
and then led out to the main street. Defendant and Arnel Robinson
agreed that defendant would go into the currency exchange and
locate an individual to rob while Robinson waited in the mouth of
the alley.
At this time, Onesimo Beltran and Martin Alvarez pulled into
the alley in their truck. Mr. Alvarez had to stop at the currency
exchange to pick up a city sticker he had ordered a week ago. Mr.
Alvarez went into the currency exchange while Mr. Beltran waited in
the truck and began scraping off the old city sticker from the
windshield.
Defendant followed Mr. Alvarez into the currency exchange.
Mr. Alvarez spoke with Steven Schoenberg, the manager, who informed
him that his sticker had not yet arrived. While they were
conversing, defendant etched his nickname, "Little Cap," into the
wall. Mr. Schoenberg told defendant to stop.
Defendant followed Mr. Alvarez out of the currency exchange
and into the alley. At the mouth of the alley, Arnel Robinson
grabbed Mr. Alvarez. Defendant continued walking beyond the bend
in the alley to where Mr. Beltran was scraping the city sticker off
his truck's window. Defendant demanded money. Mr. Beltran replied
that he did not have any money and closed the door of the truck.
Defendant began walking back down the alley toward the currency
exchange.
Two shots were fired. Mr. Beltran looked in the mirror of his
truck and saw people grabbing at Mr. Alvarez. Mr. Beltran called
to Mr. Alvarez. Mr. Alvarez, bleeding, got in the truck and the
two drove to their home, where they called an ambulance. Mr.
Alvarez died from a gunshot wound to his chest.
At trial, one of the witnesses the People called to testify on
the first day of trial stated that his name was "Jerome Lewis."
"Jerome Lewis" testified that he preferred to be called "Stacy."
He stated that he was currently serving time in jail in Minnesota.
"Jerome Lewis" testified that shortly after 4 o'clock on
November 9, 1993, he was near a pay phone at 31st Street between
Lituanica and Halsted Streets in Chicago. The witness stated he
was going to call his girlfriend on the pay phone to get a ride to
pick up some drugs. The witness, "Jerome Lewis," testified that
while he was at the pay phone, he heard defendant talking to Arnel
Robinson. Specifically, the witness testified that "[defendant]
asked Arnel would he help him stick up the Mexican guy" and that
Arnel Robinson replied, "Let's do it." The witness stated that
defendant was 10 to 12 feet away when he said this and that Mario
Rodriguez was also present. The witness then testified that he saw
Arnel go into the alley and defendant go into the currency
exchange. The witness said defendant came out of the currency
exchange after two or three minutes, held his left hand above his
head with all five fingers showing and then reentered the currency
exchange. The witness stated that the "Mexican guy" exited the
currency exchange and walked into the alley with defendant
following behind him. The witness stated that Arnel was already in
the alley at this time. Next, the witness testified, he began
crossing the street when he heard two gunshots coming from the
alley. After the gunshots, the witness stated that defendant
crossed the street to where defendant's mother was standing and the
witness left with his girlfriend, who had come to pick him up.
During cross-examination, this witness first testified that
his name is "Stacy Lewis" and that he has an older brother named
"Jerome" who also goes by the name "J.J." The witness testified
that he had used his brother's name in connection with prior
arrests but that he did not use his brother's name in connection
with this case. The witness then stated that his own name is
"Jerome" and that his brother's name is "Stacy." The witness
admitted that he had used other dates of birth in prior encounters
with the law.
The following day, the People called three more witnesses.
After all the witnesses testified, the court held a hearing outside
the jury's presence to determine whether the person who testified
earlier was actually Jerome Lewis or was Jerome Lewis's brother.
At this hearing, defense counsel presented the testimony of another
individual calling himself "Jerome Lewis." The trial court then
declared that an independent investigation would be held to
determine whether "your brother or you were the person at that
location at 31st by the currency exchange."
The next day, outside the presence of the jury, the prosecutor
told the trial court that the witness, "Jerome Lewis," who had
previously testified, admitted he was not present at the scene of
the shooting. The prosecutor explained the situation to the court
as follows:
"He says that in fact he was not present. He said it was
his brother who was present; that he testified because he
thought his brother might run into some problems if the
brother testified for the State. So he came down here to
testify figuring he was safe up in Minnesota. He said he
learned about the incident from his brother after it
happened, and that's why he did that. I asked Mario
Rodriguez to look at the individual and he did, and he
said that was not the J.J. who was present at the
incident."
The prosecutor then suggested that the trial court declare a
mistrial, stating that, "I believe the jury has heard this
evidence. I don't know if there's any way that can be cured and
still allow a fair ruling or fair disposition on the part of the
jury." The defense counsel opposed a mistrial, stating, "The
State's obligation is simply to correct, to explain to the jury
that testimony should be disregarded. *** I believe it would be a
jeopardy issue if your honor declared a mistrial." The trial court
denied the People's motion for a mistrial, stating that the trial
"has not been reduced to a farce and a sham."
The court ordered the prosecutor to formally withdraw the
false testimony in the jury's presence with an explanation of what
occurred. The prosecutor addressed the court as follows:
"[PROSECUTOR]: Judge, just briefly. As an assistant
State's Attorney one of my functions is to prosecute obviously
felons. In addition, I also have an obligation to see that
justice is done here. So I would like to inform the Court and
the jury that the other day we put a witness on who to my
belief was a person by the name of Jerome Lewis, a witness to
the incident.
Upon further investigation I determined that in fact he
was Stacy Lewis the brother of Jerome Lewis and was in fact
not a witness to the incident, and as a result of that fact
his testimony which he completely fabricated obviously should
not have been presented.
I'm asking at this time that the jury disregard that and
that his testimony be withdrawn and that he perjured himself
while on the stand.
THE COURT: Mr. Lewis' testimony will be stricken, and
I'm going to tell you to disregard completely all the
testimony that this person from Minnesota penitentiary said
and completely disregard that."
The People next called the real Jerome Lewis. He testified
that his name is Jerome John Lewis and that he has an older brother
named Stacy Lewis or Stacy Cueto. He testified that he was at the
pay phone with defendant calling his girlfriend for a ride. He
stated that he heard two gunshots coming from the alley, but that
the gunshots did not come from defendant. The real Jerome Lewis
then testified that he had no recollection whatsoever of being at
the police station later that morning and did not recall speaking
with the assistant State's Attorney.
The jury returned its guilty verdict on August 24, 1995.
Defendant filed his posttrial motion for a new trial on September
26, 1995. He filed an amended motion for a new trial on September
28, 1995. The trial court denied the motion and this appeal
followed. Defendant was sentenced to 45 years' imprisonment for
murder and 15 years' imprisonment for attempt armed robbery with
the sentences to be served concurrently.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Due Process of Law
Defendant first argues that his convictions for first degree
murder and attempted armed robbery should be reversed because the
People called an imposter witness at trial. The People's witness,
Stacy Cueto, impersonated Cueto's brother, J.J. Lewis. Defendant
asserts that the introduction of this false testimony violated
defendant's due process rights. Defendant submits that this court
should remand the matter for a hearing to determine whether further
prosecution should be barred by double jeopardy.
The People maintain that defendant waived this issue by
failing to file a timely posttrial motion. Even if defendant did
not waive the issue, the People argue, any harm that defendant may
have suffered from the improper testimony was cured when the jury
was repeatedly instructed that the testimony had been stricken and
should not be considered.
The first contention we will address is whether defendant
waived this issue for review by failing to file a timely post-trial
motion. Section 116-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides
that a defendant must file a written motion for a new trial within
30 days following the entry of a finding or the return of a
verdict. 725 ILCS 5/116-1 (West 1994). In this case, defendant
filed his motion for a new trial 32 days after the jury returned
its verdict.
While ordinarily defendant may be deemed to have waived review
of this issue, the waiver rule is not absolute. Plain error may be
considered where the record clearly shows that an alleged error
affecting substantial rights was committed. 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a);
People v. Stout, 110 Ill. App. 3d 830, 835, 443 N.E.2d 19 (1982).
The purpose of the plain error rule is to afford certain
protections to the accused by correcting serious injustices and to
protect and preserve the integrity and reputation of the judicial
process. People v. Young, 128 Ill. 2d 1, 46, 538 N.E.2d 453
(1989). The rule may be applied in criminal cases where the
evidence is closely balanced or the error is of such magnitude that
its commission denies the accused a fair and impartial trial.
Young, 128 Ill. 2d at 47.
While defendant filed his posttrial motion two days beyond the
statutory limit, this was not a situation where the defendant
failed to raise the issue in his motion. Here, defendant raised
the alleged due process violation in his posttrial motion and
argued it at the hearing on the motion. The motion fairly notified
the State and the trial court of the alleged error and provided the
court with an opportunity to remedy the error. Further, the
alleged error in this case concerns a due process violation which
deprived defendant of his liberty based on testimony from an
imposter witness. As such, the alleged error is of such magnitude
that its commission denied defendant a fair and impartial trial.
Accordingly, we will review the issue as plain error.
A mistrial should be granted only when there is a manifest
necessity to stop the proceedings or where the ends of justice
would be defeated by continuing the trial. People v. Redd, 135 Ill. 2d 252, 323, 553 N.E.2d 316 (1990); People v. Camden, 219 Ill.
App. 3d 124, 135, 578 N.E.2d 1211 (1991). It must appear that the
jury has been so influenced and prejudiced that it would not be
fair and impartial to continue the trial and that the damaging
effect of the evidence cannot be remedied by admonitions or
instructions. Camden, 219 Ill. App. 3d at 136. The denial of a
request for a mistrial will not be disturbed unless the trial
court's decision was a clear abuse of discretion. People v. Hall,
114 Ill. 2d 376, 405, 499 N.E.2d 1335 (1986).
Further, it has long been recognized that a criminal
conviction obtained through the knowing use of false testimony is
contrary to fundamental principles of fairness in a civilized
society and constitutes a violation of due process. People v.
Jimerson, 166 Ill. 2d 211, 223, 652 N.E.2d 278 (1995); People v.
Cihlar, 111 Ill. 2d 212, 216-17, 489 N.E.2d 859 (1986); People v.
Cornille, 95 Ill. 2d 497, 448 N.E.2d 857 (1983); see also Napue v.
Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1217, 79 S. Ct. 1173 (1959).
Such a conviction must be set aside if there is any reasonable
likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the jury's
verdict. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 678, 678-80, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481, 492, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3381-82 (1985); People v. Olinger,
176 Ill. 2d 326, 345, 680 N.E.2d 321 (1997).
In this case, Stacy Cueto testified at trial as "Jerome
Lewis." He stated that he heard defendant ask Arnel Robinson if
Arnel would help him "stick up the Mexican guy" and that Arnel
Robinson replied, "Let's do it." The witness then testified that
he saw Arnel go into the alley and defendant go into the currency
exchange. The witness said defendant came out of the currency
exchange after two or three minutes, held his left hand above his
head with all five fingers showing and then reentered the currency
exchange. The witness stated that the "Mexican guy" exited the
currency exchange and walked into the alley with defendant
following behind him. The witness stated that Arnel was already in
the alley at this time. Next, the witness testified, he began
crossing the street when he heard two gunshots coming from the
alley. The witness stated that defendant crossed the street after
the gunshots were fired.
The real Jerome Lewis later testified that defendant was
standing with him at the pay phone during the alleged robbery. He
stated that he heard two gunshots coming from the alley, but that
the gunshots did not come from defendant.
We find that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
the prosecution's motion for a mistrial. The jury, through Stacy
Cueto's false testimony, heard a detailed account of defendant's
participation in the armed robbery. This testimony came from a
critical witness. Further, this was not a situation where the jury
heard harmful testimony but was quickly instructed to disregard.
We acknowledge that it took time for the court to conduct a hearing
and an investigation to determine the true identity of the witness
testifying as "Jerome Lewis." However, as a result, the court did
not instruct the jury to disregard the false testimony until two
days later.
The impressions formed by this testimony sat uncorrected in
the jurors' minds for two days. Even in light of the other
evidence of defendant's guilt, there was a reasonable likelihood
that the imposter's testimony inculpating the defendant affected
the jury's verdict and deprived defendant of a fair trial. As our
supreme court stated in Cornille, "It is antithetical to our system
of justice to refuse to grant a new trial for a defendant when it
is convincingly established that he was convicted on the basis of
false testimony." Cornille, 95 Ill. 2d at 507.
Moreover, the damaging effect of Stacy Cueto's false testimony
could not have been cured by jury instruction. While the trial
court ordered that the testimony be stricken and instructed the
jury to disregard, this did not eliminate the possibility of
prejudice. We acknowledge the principle that faith in the ability
of a properly instructed jury to separate issues and reach a
correct result is the cornerstone of the jury system. People v.
Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 376, 583 N.E.2d 515 (1991); People v.
Mikell, 217 Ill. App. 3d 814, 830, 577 N.E.2d 1300 (1991).
Normally it would be presumed that the jury followed these
instructions and completely disregarded the impostor's testimony;
however, based on the totality of the circumstances we find that
Stacy Cueto's false testimony tainted the fundamental fairness of
the trial, such that the continuation of the proceeding defeated
the ends of justice and denied the defendant due process. Defendant
did not receive a trial resulting in a "verdict worthy of
confidence." Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 131 L. Ed. 2d 490, 506, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1566 (1995).
Errors, even of a constitutional nature, may be regarded as
harmless; however, the prosecution has the burden to show beyond a
reasonable doubt that the violation did not contribute to
defendant's conviction. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24,
17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 710, 87 S. Ct. 824, 828 (1967). If spite of the
other evidence in the record, we are unable to say, beyond a
reasonable doubt as required by Chapman, that the testimony of the
imposter witness did not contribute to the defendant's conviction.
Accordingly, we reverse defendant's conviction and remand the
matter for a new trial.
Defendant argues that further prosecution should be barred by
double jeopardy. The double jeopardy clause "'bars retrials where
"bad-faith conduct by judge or prosecutor" [citation] threatens the
"[h]arassment of an accused by successive prosecutions or
declaration of a mistrial so as to afford the prosecutor a more
favorable opportunity to convict" the defendant.' [Citation.]" Lee
v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 33, 53 L. Ed. 2d 80, 89, 97 S. Ct. 2141, 2147 (1977); see also People v. Ortiz, 151 Ill. 2d 1, 600 N.E.2d 1153 (1992).
For purposes of double jeopardy, the United States Supreme
Court has distinguished between judgments reversing convictions due
to trial error and judgments reversing convictions for evidentiary
insufficiency. People v. Mink, 141 Ill. 2d 163, 173, 565 N.E.2d 975 (1990). The double jeopardy clause precludes retrial after a
court of review has concluded that the trial evidence was legally
insufficient to convict, but does not preclude retrial if an error
in the proceedings leading to the conviction caused the reversal.
Mink, 141 Ill. 2d at 173-74.
In the instant case, reversal is based on our determination
that the defendant has been convicted by means of a judicial
process defective in a fundamental respect. However, the evidence
presented at trial was legally sufficient for a jury to decide that
defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the
double jeopardy clause does not preclude retrial of a defendant
whose conviction as in this case is reversed because of an error in
the proceedings leading to the conviction. Mink, 141 Ill. 2d at
173-74.
Furthermore, although it was the defense and not the State who
discovered Cueto's real identity and who produced the real Jerome
Lewis, the State, upon learning of the false testimony, moved that
the trial court declare a mistrial. The defense opposed a mistrial
and the judge denied the People's motion. Accordingly, we find
that the State's request for a mistrial upon discovering the nature
of the perjured testimony defeats any notion of prosecutorial
misconduct that would require further prosecution be barred by
double jeopardy.
B. Motion to Quash Arrest and Suppress Statements
Since we are reversing and remanding for a new trial, we need
not resolve the remaining issues on appeal. However, we will
address defendant's argument that the trial court erred in denying
his motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence.
In this case, we are presented with a situation where a
warrantless arrest was executed in a residence where defendant was
an invited guest. It is disputed whether the police were given
voluntary consent to enter the premises. The trial court's
determination concerning such factual matters will not be disturbed
unless manifestly erroneous. People v. Adams, 131 Ill. 2d 387,
400, 456 N.E.2d 561 (1989).
A warrantless arrest in a private residence is proper if the
police have probable cause to arrest and an occupant of the
dwelling gives the police voluntary consent to enter or exigent
circumstances exist which justify the arrest. Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573, 590, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 653, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1382
(1980) (holding that the fourth amendment prohibits a warrantless
arrest in a private residence unless it is accompanied by exigent
circumstances); People v. Bean, 84 Ill. 2d 64, 417 N.E.2d 608
(1981) (holding that fourth amendment rights were not violated,
even in the absence of exigent circumstances, where consent given
and arrest based on probable cause). This rule necessitates two
considerations: (1) whether the police had probable cause to
arrest; and (2) whether Martha Jacquez voluntarily consented to
having the police enter her home or whether exigent circumstances
existed to justify defendant's arrest.
Probable cause for arrest exists when the facts and
circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge are
sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe
that an offense has been committed and that the person arrested
committed the offense. People v. Henderson, 266 Ill. App. 3d 882,
640 N.E.2d 1344 (1994).
Mere suspicion is inadequate to establish probable cause to
arrest, but evidence relied upon by arresting officers need not be
sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt or even be
admissible at trial. People v. Wilson, 260 Ill. App. 3d 364, 632 N.E.2d 114 (1994). The determination, which considers only
information available to officers before the arrest, must focus on
the factual considerations upon which reasonable, prudent people,
not legal technicians, act. People v. Adams, 131 Ill. 2d 387, 398,
546 N.E.2d 561 (1989).
We find that the information available to the officers before
the arrest indicated that there was a reasonable probability that
defendant committed the offense. Officer Thomas Taglioli testified
at the hearing on the motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence.
He testified that Ms. Nadine Lopez stated she heard two gunshots
coming from the area of the currency exchange and saw several males
leaving the area. She said that defendant, Arnel Robinson, J.J.
and Mario Rodriguez were among the individuals she saw fleeing the
scene. The record indicates that Mario Rodriguez also identified
defendant as a participant in the shooting of Martin Alvarez. As
such, the trial court did not err in finding that probable cause
existed for the arrest.
We will next address the question of whether Ms. Jacquez
voluntarily consented to the police entering her apartment to
arrest defendant.
Voluntary consent to entry need not be given by the defendant
to justify a warrantless, at-home arrest. Such consent may be
obtained from a third party. People v. Chambers, 261 Ill. App. 3d
123, 132, 633 N.E.2d 123 (1994). The consent may be in the form of
words, gesture or conduct. People v. Gross, 166 Ill. App. 3d 413,
423-24, 519 N.E.2d 1043 (1988) (holding that entry was consensual
where defendant opened his apartment door for officers then sat
down at his kitchen table and officers followed him into
apartment). Voluntariness of consent is determined by the totality
of the circumstances. People v. Salgado, 83 Ill. App. 3d 653, 404 N.E.2d 432 (1980). Whether consent is voluntary is a factual
determination and a reviewing court should not substitute its
judgment for that of the trier of fact unless the finding is
manifestly erroneous. People v. Ellis, 187 Ill. App. 3d 295, 543 N.E.2d 196 (1989).
In this case, there was conflicting testimony on whether Ms.
Jacquez gave the police voluntary consent to enter her apartment.
At the hearing on the motion to quash arrest and suppress
statements, Ms. Jacquez testified that she went to the park to get
defendant because a friend told her he was high on PCP. Ms.
Jacquez drove defendant to her home and put him in her bedroom.
Ms. Jacquez stated that she heard a knock on the door at around
11:30 p.m. When she answered the door, six or seven police
officers "said they wanted Tony." The officers indicated they
wanted to speak with defendant about the same shooting they had
talked to him about earlier. She stated that the officers did not
have a warrant and they "just pushed their way into the house."
Specifically, Ms. Jacquez testified as follows:
"Q. Did you at any time consent to allow the officers to
enter your home?
A. No, I did not."
She testified that the officers then began searching the rooms,
grabbed defendant, handcuffed him and took him to the squad car.
Officer Thomas Taglioli and Officer Michael Jetel's testimony
contradicted that of Ms. Jacquez. Officer Taglioli testified that
he was at Martha Jacquez's apartment with approximately six other
tactical officers. They knocked on the door, but there was no
response. He stated that Ms. Jacquez then appeared outside the
building with another female. Officer Taglioli testified that Ms.
Jacquez denied knowing where defendant was at first, but later told
the officers he was in her apartment on the second floor. The
officers all entered the building and Ms. Jacquez led them up the
staircase in the common area. At the top of the stairs, Officer
Jetel asked Ms. Jacquez if he could enter the apartment and she
took him in the apartment and the door was closed. The other
officers waited in the hallway. Officer Taglioli testified that
when the door was next opened, Officer Jetel motioned to the other
officers that defendant was in the front bedroom. The officers
arrested defendant.
Officer Michael Jetel's testimony mirrored that of Officer
Taglioli. He stated that the officers did not threaten or coerce
Ms. Jacquez into letting them into her apartment. He also stated
that Ms. Jacquez "never told us we couldn't come in." Officer Jetel
testified that Ms. Jacquez told them defendant was upstairs in her
apartment. He said that Ms. Jacquez opened the door to the
apartment building and the officers followed her up the stairs. At
her apartment door, she let Officer Jetel in, closed the door and
"whispered that Tony's in the front bedroom."
The trial court found from a review of the testimony that the
totality of the circumstances indicated that Ms. Jacquez
voluntarily consented to the police entering her apartment. We
find no manifest error in the trial court's finding of consensual
entry. Further, we note that our conclusion does not change even
if we use a de novo standard of review. See Ornelas v. United
States, 517 U.S. 690, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911, 116 S. Ct. 1657 (1996).
Defendant also contends that the court erred in failing to
suppress defendant's statements made at the police station as
having been obtained in violation of the fourth amendment
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. The People
argue that no evidence need be suppressed because probable cause
existed for defendant's arrest and the statements defendant sought
to suppress were made at the police station and not in Ms.
Jacquez's home.
Even if a defendant is arrested in his home without a warrant
in violation of Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639,
100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980), his subsequent incriminating statements
made outside his home will not be suppressed if the arrest was made
with probable cause. New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 21, 109 L. Ed. 2d 13, 22, 110 S. Ct. 1640, 1645 (1990). In the instant case,
the police had probable cause to arrest defendant. Further,
defendant's incriminating statements were lawfully obtained at the
police station. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying
the motion to suppress defendant's statements. See People v. Long,
208 Ill. App. 3d 627, 635-36, 567 N.E.2d 514 (1990).
In light of all of the foregoing, we affirm the trial court's
ruling on defendant's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence.
However, we reverse and remand for a new trial in that the
introduction of false testimony through the imposter witness
violated defendant's due process rights.
Reversed and remanded.
BUCKLEY, P.J., and GALLAGHER, J., concur.
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