In re Justin T.
Annotate this Case
1-96-3075
August 27, 1997
In re JUSTIN T., a Minor, ) APPEAL FROM THE
(The People of the State of ) CIRCUIT COURT OF
Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, ) COOK COUNTY,
Office of the Cook County ) ILLINOIS
Public Guardian, )
Respondent-Appellant). )
)
)
) No. 96-JA-3361
)
)
)
)
) THE HONORABLE
) JEFFREY M. ARNOLD
) JUDGE PRESIDING.
PRESIDING JUSTICE COUSINS delivered the opinion of the
court:
The minor, Justin T., by his attorney and guardian ad litem,
appeals from an order of the circuit court granting the State's
motion to dismiss the petition for adjudication of wardship filed
on behalf of the minor without first appointing an attorney and
guardian ad litem to represent the minor. On appeal, the minor
argues that the court's refusal to appoint a guardian ad litem
for the child, who was the subject of child protection
proceedings, violated the express requirements of the Juvenile
Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 1992)) and
denied the child due process of law and meaningful access to the
court.
BACKGROUND
On July 2, 1996, the State filed a petition for adjudication
of wardship on behalf of Justin T., a minor who was born on
October 11, 1993. The petition alleged that Justin was neglected
and abused. The petition listed Justin's mother as Lorie Ann T.
of Oak Forest, Illinois, and alleged that, on or about June 30,
1996, she left Justin with a friend without providing an adequate
plan for his care. The petition also alleged that Justin tested
positive for controlled substances at birth. The State also
filed a petition for the appointment of the Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) as Justin's temporary
custodian. This petition alleged that Lorie Ann's whereabouts
were unknown.
A hearing was held on both of the petitions on July 2, 1996.
At the hearing, the State advised the court that it would move to
dismiss the petition and present the basis for dismissal through
the testimony of the individual who called to report that Justin
was abused and neglected. At that time, the public guardian
asked to be appointed as attorney and guardian ad litem on behalf
of the minor. The State replied that its motion to dismiss
should precede the ruling on the public guardian's request to be
appointed. The public guardian argued that the minor had a
constitutional right to be heard and have a guardian appointed
under sections 1-5 and 2-17 of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS
405/1-5, 2-17 (West 1992)). The State responded that the hearing
on the motion to dismiss was not a hearing on the petition and
that it, as the moving party on the motion, had a right to
dismiss under the Code of Civil Procedure. The trial court
indicated that it would hear from the State and then decide what
should be done and allowed the State to call a witness.
The State called Gerald McNanari (McNanari) to testify in
support of the motion to dismiss. McNanari testified that he
called the DCFS hotline to report that Justin had been left at
his home. However, McNanari testified at the hearing that,
contrary to his report to DCFS, Justin was not just left at his
home but that Justin lived and his mother lived with McNanari at
his home. McNanari testified that he had been living with
Justin's mother for six or seven years. McNanari testified that
his report that Justin's mother had been raped in Justin's
presence was not true. He also stated that his report that
Justin's mother had told him that a loan shark struck Justin was
true but that he had no evidence to support her statement. When
the State asked McNanari why he made the false report, McNanari
testified that he wanted to get rid of Justin because Justin's
mother had left Justin with him for such a long time without
returning and Justin was getting on his nerves. He explained
that Justin's mother had a part-time babysitting job and that she
did not return because her employers were late returning and they
did not have a phone she could use to call him. McNanari further
testified that he made sure this situation would never happen
again by getting rid of the car to which Justin's mother had
access. Based on this testimony, the State then moved to dismiss
the petition.
The public guardian asked to question the witness and the
State responded that the public guardian lacked standing to do
so. The trial court then inquired about the allegations that
Justin's environment was injurious, that Justin was a drug-
exposed infant and that Justin's mother was undomiciled. The
State responded that Justin was now 2 1/2 years old and that the
testimony showed that the mother was not undomiciled. At that
point, Justin's mother, who was present in court, stated that she
had identification to prove her residence and the State tendered
the mother's driver's license to the trial court. After
reviewing Justin's mother's license, the trial court stated:
"Well, it appears that mother has a domicile, and that
domicile is with the friend that made the report. And I
would suggest to the guardian, if the guardian feels that
something more has to be done -- I'll note that the
Department did not take this minor into custody.
***
I'm sorry. They did take the minor into custody. Thank
you. It appears to me what they have is a dispute within the
house, and it *** started a ball rolling that shouldn't be
rolling. I'm going to grant your motion to dismiss the
petition. If the guardian feels there's a case here, they
can certainly file a citizen's petition and bring it back."
At this point, the public guardian again asked to question the
witness to which the State responded that the public guardian had
no standing in the matter. In response, the trial court stated,
"There's no one in the case except the State. A petition is
filed today." The petition was then dismissed without prejudice.
On July 9, 1996, a second petition for adjudication of
wardship was filed on behalf of Justin. The second petition was
identical to the original petition except that the second
petition stated the name of Justin's father and stated the
mother's whereabouts as "currently unknown" instead of "mother
currently undomiciled." The State again moved for temporary
custody. On July 10, 1996, an assistant public guardian was
appointed as Justin's attorney and guardian ad litem and a DCFS
guardianship administrator was appointed as Justin's temporary
custodian.
On November 14, 1996, an adjudicatory hearing was held at
which Justin was found to be a neglected minor. The basis of the
finding was that Justin tested positive for a controlled
substance at birth. The minor appeals from the trial court's
dismissal of the original petition.
We vacate.
OPINION
The public guardian contends that the trial court erred when
it refused to appoint a guardian ad litem for Justin before
granting the State's motion to dismiss the petition, because
section 2-17 of the Juvenile Court Act expressly requires the
trial court to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the child
who is the subject of child protection proceedings upon the
filing of a petition for adjudication of wardship which alleges
that a minor is abused or neglected. The State responds that
this case is moot because a subsequent petition, filed later on
behalf of Justin, has already been disposed of at an adjudicatory
hearing, thus disposing of the need for any relief to Justin in
this case.
A case on appeal becomes moot where the issue involved in
the trial court no longer exists because events occurring after
the filing of the appeal render it impossible for the reviewing
court to grant the complaining party effectual relief. In re A
Minor, 127 Ill. 2d 247, 255, 537 N.E.2d 292 (1989); In re A.F.,
234 Ill. App. 3d 1010, 1013, 602 N.E.2d 480 (1991); In re A.D.W.,
278 Ill. App. 3d 476, 480, 663 N.E.2d 58 (1996). Thus, questions
arising from a trial court's order are moot when, because of
developments following the issuance of that order, reversal of
the order can have no practical effect on the controversy. Harris
v. Education Officers Electoral Board of Community Consolidated
School District 110, 203 Ill. App. 3d 917, 920, 561 N.E.2d 204
(1990).
In the instant case, the State maintains that Justin's
rights cannot be affected by this appeal because a second
petition for adjudication for wardship for him has since been
adjudicated. In reply, however, the public guardian points out
that a court may consider moot issues if they involve a question
of public interest. In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d at 257.
When determining if a matter falls within the public
interest exception, courts consider the public nature of the
question, the desirability of an authoritative determination for
the future guidance of public officers and the likelihood of
future recurrence of the question. In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d at
257; In re Patricia S., 222 Ill. App. 3d 585, 589, 584 N.E.2d 270
(1991); In re A.F., 234 Ill. App. 3d at 1014. This case falls
within the public interest exception.
"[T]he proper adjudication of what is in the best interests
of minors is of surpassing public concern." In re A.F., 234 Ill.
App. 3d at 1014. We believe it is desirable that circuit court
judges receive guidance as to when they must appoint a guardian
ad litem whose function it is to secure the best interests and
welfare of minor children. See generally 704 ILCS 405/1-2 (West
1992). Furthermore, as the public guardian contends, given the
number of child neglect and dependency proceedings in which
public guardians are appointed, we believe this issue is likely
to recur should the State attempt to dismiss a petition before
adjudication proceedings begin. Therefore, we will address the
issue of whether the trial court improperly declined to appoint
an attorney and guardian ad litem for Justin before dismissing
the petition for adjudication of wardship.
Justin contends that the trial court was required to appoint
a guardian ad litem to represent him because the plain language
of section 2-17 of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-17
(West 1992)) provides that the court "shall" appoint a guardian
ad litem upon the filing of the petition that a minor is abused
or neglected. We agree.
Section 2-17 (1) provides in pertinent part:
"Immediately upon the filing of a petition alleging that the
minor is a person described in Section [ ] 2-3 or 2-4 of
this Article, the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem
for the minor if:
(a) such petition alleges that the minor is an abused
or neglected child." (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/2-17
(West 1992).
When interpreting a statutory provision and attempting to
determine the legislature's intent, a court must give the
legislative language its plain and ordinary meaning; legislative
intent is clear when the language of the provision is plain and
unambiguous and it will be given effect as written without
resorting to other aids for construction. Cella v. Sanitary
District Employees' & Trustees' Annuity & Benefit Fund, 266 Ill.
App. 3d 558, 564, 639 N.E.2d 1335 (1994).
In our view, the language of section 2-17 is plain, ordinary
and unambiguous. Section 2-17 requires the appointment of a
guardian ad litem upon the filing of a petition alleging that a
minor is a person described in section 2-3 of the Act titled a
"Neglected or abused minor" (704 ILCS 405/2-3 (West 1992)), or
section 2-4 of the Act titled a "Dependent minor" (705 ILCS
405/2-4 (West 1992)), and if the petition alleges that the minor
is an abused or neglected child. Here, our review of the record
shows that the original petition for adjudication of wardship
alleged that Justin was a neglected minor pursuant to section 2-
3(1)(a) for lack of care; section 2-3(1)(b) for being left in an
injurious environment; section 2-3(1)(c) for testing positive for
controlled substances; and section 2-3(2)(ii) for being at
substantial risk of physical injury. 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(a),(b),
(c), (2)(ii) (West 1992). Furthermore, we believe the trial
court had no discretion to decide whether to appoint an attorney
or guardian ad litem to represent Justin because the statute
unequivocally states that the court "shall" appoint a guardian ad
litem upon the filing of a petition in which it is alleged that a
minor is abused or neglected. See generally Newkirk v. Bigard,
109 Ill. 2d 28, 33, 485 N.E.2d 321 (1985)(the use of the word
"shall" in a statute indicates a mandatory obligation, unless the
obligation indicates otherwise). Thus, the trial court was
incorrect in its belief that there was "no one in the case except
the State" and that it could not appoint a guardian ad litem when
faced with the State's motion to dismiss. Rather, the trial
court should have appointed a guardian ad litem upon reviewing
the petition and finding that it alleged that Justin was a
neglected child.
We believe In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d 1, 566 N.E.2d 1345
(1991), supports our interpretation of the Act. In In re J.J.,
the State's Attorney moved to dismiss petitions of adjudication
of wardship for three minor children and the public guardian
objected. The circuit court dismissed the petitions on the basis
that it lacked authority to hear the merits of the State's motion
to dismiss because the State's Attorney's office had exclusive
authority to prosecute child abuse and neglect cases. In re
J.J., 142 Ill. 2d at 4. The appellate court reversed the circuit
court's ruling and held that the circuit court was required to
consider on its merits a motion to dismiss for adjudication of
wardship whenever dismissal is deemed warranted by the State,
because failure to do so overlooks the purposes behind the
Juvenile Court Act. In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d at 5. The Illinois
Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court and stated that, in
dependency and neglect cases, both the State's Attorney and the
court are charged with ensuring that the best interests of the
minor, the minor's family and the community are served. In re
J.J., 142 Ill. 2d at 8-9. The supreme court stated:
"The legislature has also determined that in all proceedings
brought under the Juvenile Court Act, the court may direct
the course thereof so as promptly to ascertain the
jurisdictional facts and fully to gather information bearing
upon the current condition and future welfare of persons
subject to [the Juvenile Court] Act.' " 142 Ill. 2d at 9,
quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 802-21(1).
In the instant case, if a guardian ad litem had been appointed at
the hearing on the original petition, the guardian would have
been able to cross-examine McNanari and provide the court with
additional information by which to make its determination on the
State's motion. Thus, we believe that the appointment of a
guardian ad litem upon the filing of a petition under section 2-
17 of the Act constitutes full compliance with the statutory
requirements of the Act and the legislature's intent to provide
the court with a way in which to fully gather information bearing
upon the current condition and future welfare of minors.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court
is vacated.
Vacated.
LEAVITT and CAHILL, JJ., concur.
August 27, 1997
In re JUSTIN T., a Minor, ) APPEAL FROM THE
(The People of the State of ) CIRCUIT COURT OF
Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, ) COOK COUNTY,
Office of the Cook County ) ILLINOIS
Public Guardian, )
Respondent-Appellant). )
)
)
) No. 96-JA-3361
)
)
)
)
) THE HONORABLE
) JEFFREY M. ARNOLD
) JUDGE PRESIDING.
PRESIDING JUSTICE COUSINS delivered the opinion of the
court:
The minor, Justin T., by his attorney and guardian ad litem,
appeals from an order of the circuit court granting the State's
motion to dismiss the petition for adjudication of wardship filed
on behalf of the minor without first appointing an attorney and
guardian ad litem to represent the minor. On appeal, the minor
argues that the court's refusal to appoint a guardian ad litem
for the child, who was the subject of child protection
proceedings, violated the express requirements of the Juvenile
Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 1992)) and
denied the child due process of law and meaningful access to the
court.
BACKGROUND
On July 2, 1996, the State filed a petition for adjudication
of wardship on behalf of Justin T., a minor who was born on
October 11, 1993. The petition alleged that Justin was neglected
and abused. The petition listed Justin's mother as Lorie Ann T.
of Oak Forest, Illinois, and alleged that, on or about June 30,
1996, she left Justin with a friend without providing an adequate
plan for his care. The petition also alleged that Justin tested
positive for controlled substances at birth. The State also
filed a petition for the appointment of the Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) as Justin's temporary
custodian. This petition alleged that Lorie Ann's whereabouts
were unknown.
A hearing was held on both of the petitions on July 2, 1996.
At the hearing, the State advised the court that it would move to
dismiss the petition and present the basis for dismissal through
the testimony of the individual who called to report that Justin
was abused and neglected. At that time, the public guardian
asked to be appointed as attorney and guardian ad litem on behalf
of the minor. The State replied that its motion to dismiss
should precede the ruling on the public guardian's request to be
appointed. The public guardian argued that the minor had a
constitutional right to be heard and have a guardian appointed
under sections 1-5 and 2-17 of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS
405/1-5, 2-17 (West 1992)). The State responded that the hearing
on the motion to dismiss was not a hearing on the petition and
that it, as the moving party on the motion, had a right to
dismiss under the Code of Civil Procedure. The trial court
indicated that it would hear from the State and then decide what
should be done and allowed the State to call a witness.
The State called Gerald McNanari (McNanari) to testify in
support of the motion to dismiss. McNanari testified that he
called the DCFS hotline to report that Justin had been left at
his home. However, McNanari testified at the hearing that,
contrary to his report to DCFS, Justin was not just left at his
home but that Justin lived and his mother lived with McNanari at
his home. McNanari testified that he had been living with
Justin's mother for six or seven years. McNanari testified that
his report that Justin's mother had been raped in Justin's
presence was not true. He also stated that his report that
Justin's mother had told him that a loan shark struck Justin was
true but that he had no evidence to support her statement. When
the State asked McNanari why he made the false report, McNanari
testified that he wanted to get rid of Justin because Justin's
mother had left Justin with him for such a long time without
returning and Justin was getting on his nerves. He explained
that Justin's mother had a part-time babysitting job and that she
did not return because her employers were late returning and they
did not have a phone she could use to call him. McNanari further
testified that he made sure this situation would never happen
again by getting rid of the car to which Justin's mother had
access. Based on this testimony, the State then moved to dismiss
the petition.
The public guardian asked to question the witness and the
State responded that the public guardian lacked standing to do
so. The trial court then inquired about the allegations that
Justin's environment was injurious, that Justin was a drug-
exposed infant and that Justin's mother was undomiciled. The
State responded that Justin was now 2 1/2 years old and that the
testimony showed that the mother was not undomiciled. At that
point, Justin's mother, who was present in court, stated that she
had identification to prove her residence and the State tendered
the mother's driver's license to the trial court. After
reviewing Justin's mother's license, the trial court stated:
"Well, it appears that mother has a domicile, and that
domicile is with the friend that made the report. And I
would suggest to the guardian, if the guardian feels that
something more has to be done -- I'll note that the
Department did not take this minor into custody.
***
I'm sorry. They did take the minor into custody. Thank
you. It appears to me what they have is a dispute within the
house, and it *** started a ball rolling that shouldn't be
rolling. I'm going to grant your motion to dismiss the
petition. If the guardian feels there's a case here, they
can certainly file a citizen's petition and bring it back."
At this point, the public guardian again asked to question the
witness to which the State responded that the public guardian had
no standing in the matter. In response, the trial court stated,
"There's no one in the case except the State. A petition is
filed today." The petition was then dismissed without prejudice.
On July 9, 1996, a second petition for adjudication of
wardship was filed on behalf of Justin. The second petition was
identical to the original petition except that the second
petition stated the name of Justin's father and stated the
mother's whereabouts as "currently unknown" instead of "mother
currently undomiciled." The State again moved for temporary
custody. On July 10, 1996, an assistant public guardian was
appointed as Justin's attorney and guardian ad litem and a DCFS
guardianship administrator was appointed as Justin's temporary
custodian.
On November 14, 1996, an adjudicatory hearing was held at
which Justin was found to be a neglected minor. The basis of the
finding was that Justin tested positive for a controlled
substance at birth. The minor appeals from the trial court's
dismissal of the original petition.
We vacate.
OPINION
The public guardian contends that the trial court erred when
it refused to appoint a guardian ad litem for Justin before
granting the State's motion to dismiss the petition, because
section 2-17 of the Juvenile Court Act expressly requires the
trial court to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the child
who is the subject of child protection proceedings upon the
filing of a petition for adjudication of wardship which alleges
that a minor is abused or neglected. The State responds that
this case is moot because a subsequent petition, filed later on
behalf of Justin, has already been disposed of at an adjudicatory
hearing, thus disposing of the need for any relief to Justin in
this case.
A case on appeal becomes moot where the issue involved in
the trial court no longer exists because events occurring after
the filing of the appeal render it impossible for the reviewing
court to grant the complaining party effectual relief. In re A
Minor, 127 Ill. 2d 247, 255, 537 N.E.2d 292 (1989); In re A.F.,
234 Ill. App. 3d 1010, 1013, 602 N.E.2d 480 (1991); In re A.D.W.,
278 Ill. App. 3d 476, 480, 663 N.E.2d 58 (1996). Thus, questions
arising from a trial court's order are moot when, because of
developments following the issuance of that order, reversal of
the order can have no practical effect on the controversy. Harris
v. Education Officers Electoral Board of Community Consolidated
School District 110, 203 Ill. App. 3d 917, 920, 561 N.E.2d 204
(1990).
In the instant case, the State maintains that Justin's
rights cannot be affected by this appeal because a second
petition for adjudication for wardship for him has since been
adjudicated. In reply, however, the public guardian points out
that a court may consider moot issues if they involve a question
of public interest. In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d at 257.
When determining if a matter falls within the public
interest exception, courts consider the public nature of the
question, the desirability of an authoritative determination for
the future guidance of public officers and the likelihood of
future recurrence of the question. In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d at
257; In re Patricia S., 222 Ill. App. 3d 585, 589, 584 N.E.2d 270
(1991); In re A.F., 234 Ill. App. 3d at 1014. This case falls
within the public interest exception.
"[T]he proper adjudication of what is in the best interests
of minors is of surpassing public concern." In re A.F., 234 Ill.
App. 3d at 1014. We believe it is desirable that circuit court
judges receive guidance as to when they must appoint a guardian
ad litem whose function it is to secure the best interests and
welfare of minor children. See generally 704 ILCS 405/1-2 (West
1992). Furthermore, as the public guardian contends, given the
number of child neglect and dependency proceedings in which
public guardians are appointed, we believe this issue is likely
to recur should the State attempt to dismiss a petition before
adjudication proceedings begin. Therefore, we will address the
issue of whether the trial court improperly declined to appoint
an attorney and guardian ad litem for Justin before dismissing
the petition for adjudication of wardship.
Justin contends that the trial court was required to appoint
a guardian ad litem to represent him because the plain language
of section 2-17 of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-17
(West 1992)) provides that the court "shall" appoint a guardian
ad litem upon the filing of the petition that a minor is abused
or neglected. We agree.
Section 2-17 (1) provides in pertinent part:
"Immediately upon the filing of a petition alleging that the
minor is a person described in Section [ ] 2-3 or 2-4 of
this Article, the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem
for the minor if:
(a) such petition alleges that the minor is an abused
or neglected child." (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/2-17
(West 1992).
When interpreting a statutory provision and attempting to
determine the legislature's intent, a court must give the
legislative language its plain and ordinary meaning; legislative
intent is clear when the language of the provision is plain and
unambiguous and it will be given effect as written without
resorting to other aids for construction. Cella v. Sanitary
District Employees' & Trustees' Annuity & Benefit Fund, 266 Ill.
App. 3d 558, 564, 639 N.E.2d 1335 (1994).
In our view, the language of section 2-17 is plain, ordinary
and unambiguous. Section 2-17 requires the appointment of a
guardian ad litem upon the filing of a petition alleging that a
minor is a person described in section 2-3 of the Act titled a
"Neglected or abused minor" (704 ILCS 405/2-3 (West 1992)), or
section 2-4 of the Act titled a "Dependent minor" (705 ILCS
405/2-4 (West 1992)), and if the petition alleges that the minor
is an abused or neglected child. Here, our review of the record
shows that the original petition for adjudication of wardship
alleged that Justin was a neglected minor pursuant to section 2-
3(1)(a) for lack of care; section 2-3(1)(b) for being left in an
injurious environment; section 2-3(1)(c) for testing positive for
controlled substances; and section 2-3(2)(ii) for being at
substantial risk of physical injury. 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(a),(b),
(c), (2)(ii) (West 1992). Furthermore, we believe the trial
court had no discretion to decide whether to appoint an attorney
or guardian ad litem to represent Justin because the statute
unequivocally states that the court "shall" appoint a guardian ad
litem upon the filing of a petition in which it is alleged that a
minor is abused or neglected. See generally Newkirk v. Bigard,
109 Ill. 2d 28, 33, 485 N.E.2d 321 (1985)(the use of the word
"shall" in a statute indicates a mandatory obligation, unless the
obligation indicates otherwise). Thus, the trial court was
incorrect in its belief that there was "no one in the case except
the State" and that it could not appoint a guardian ad litem when
faced with the State's motion to dismiss. Rather, the trial
court should have appointed a guardian ad litem upon reviewing
the petition and finding that it alleged that Justin was a
neglected child.
We believe In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d 1, 566 N.E.2d 1345
(1991), supports our interpretation of the Act. In In re J.J.,
the State's Attorney moved to dismiss petitions of adjudication
of wardship for three minor children and the public guardian
objected. The circuit court dismissed the petitions on the basis
that it lacked authority to hear the merits of the State's motion
to dismiss because the State's Attorney's office had exclusive
authority to prosecute child abuse and neglect cases. In re
J.J., 142 Ill. 2d at 4. The appellate court reversed the circuit
court's ruling and held that the circuit court was required to
consider on its merits a motion to dismiss for adjudication of
wardship whenever dismissal is deemed warranted by the State,
because failure to do so overlooks the purposes behind the
Juvenile Court Act. In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d at 5. The Illinois
Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court and stated that, in
dependency and neglect cases, both the State's Attorney and the
court are charged with ensuring that the best interests of the
minor, the minor's family and the community are served. In re
J.J., 142 Ill. 2d at 8-9. The supreme court stated:
"The legislature has also determined that in all proceedings
brought under the Juvenile Court Act, the court may direct
the course thereof so as promptly to ascertain the
jurisdictional facts and fully to gather information bearing
upon the current condition and future welfare of persons
subject to [the Juvenile Court] Act.' " 142 Ill. 2d at 9,
quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 802-21(1).
In the instant case, if a guardian ad litem had been appointed at
the hearing on the original petition, the guardian would have
been able to cross-examine McNanari and provide the court with
additional information by which to make its determination on the
State's motion. Thus, we believe that the appointment of a
guardian ad litem upon the filing of a petition under section 2-
17 of the Act constitutes full compliance with the statutory
requirements of the Act and the legislature's intent to provide
the court with a way in which to fully gather information bearing
upon the current condition and future welfare of minors.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court
is vacated.
Vacated.
LEAVITT and CAHILL, JJ., concur.
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