Estate of Parks v. O'Young

                                             THIRD DIVISION
                                             June 30, 1997



No. 1-95-4377

ESTATE OF BARBARA PARKS,           )
                                   )
          Plaintiff-Appellant,     )
                                   )    Appeal from the Circuit
     v.                            )    Court of Cook County.
                                   )
RICHARD O'YOUNG, M.D.,             )
                                   )
          Defendant-Appellee,      )
                                   )    HONORABLE MICHAEL J.
     and                           )    KELLY, JUDGE PRESIDING.
                                   )
ST. BERNARD HOSPITAL,              )
                                   )
          Defendant.               )


     JUSTICE GORDON delivered the opinion of the court:

     Barbara Parks, a former nurse at St. Bernard Hospital, filed
a four-count complaint against defendants St. Bernard Hospital
and Richard O'Young, M.D.  Counts I and II, directed against the
hospital, alleged defamation and retaliatory discharge; and
counts III and IV, directed against O'Young, alleged defamation
and tortious interference with contract.  Prior to trial, the
counts against St. Bernard Hospital were dismissed pursuant to a
settlement agreement.  At trial, the court directed a verdict in
favor of O'Young on the tortious interference count; and the jury
returned a verdict in favor of O'Young on the defamation count. 
The plaintiff appeals.
     Parks' estate, which was substituted as the appellant upon
Parks' death, argues that the trial court erred in granting three
of defendant's motions in limine which barred plaintiff from
presenting certain evidence and that the trial court erred in
granting the directed verdict on plaintiff's tortious
interference count.
     Plaintiff's tortious interference count against Doctor
O'Young alleged that on July 29, 1991 she was a recovery room
nurse and he was a staff physician at St. Bernard Hospital.  She
alleged that, on that date, she observed O'Young violently shake
the neck of a nine-year-old patient; verbally abuse that patient
by making racially charged remarks about that patient; and
mistreat the patient by inappropriately pulling on the traction
apparatus to which the patient's leg was connected.  The
plaintiff further alleged that she prepared an occurrence report
regarding that incident and gave the report to her supervisor. 
The plaintiff alleged that O'Young intentionally and with malice
interfered with her employment and caused her termination with
the hospital by making a false accusation that she had divulged
confidential information about the incident to the patient's
family.
                           I.  Motions in Limine
     Prior to trial, O'Young filed several motions in limine. 
The motions which are the subject of the instant appeal sought to
exclude the following:  evidence "relating to the specific nature
or factual particulars of an alleged incident or occurrence which
took place between Dr. O'Young and a minor patient *** on July
29, 1991"; evidence of purported misconduct by O'Young toward
other patients; and evidence of a telephone conversation, which
the plaintiff claimed to have overheard, between Reggie
Williamson, a hospital employee, and a person thought by Parks to
be O'Young.
     The plaintiff argues that the trial court erroneously
excluded evidence regarding O'Young's mistreatment of the patient
on July 29, 1991 as well as his mistreatment of "other black
children."  The plaintiff argues that testimony from other
witnesses who observed O'Young's treatment of the patient on July
29, 1991 as well as his treatment of "other black children" was
probative of her credibility.  She also argues that evidence
regarding the July 29, 1991 incident was highly probative of
O'Young's motivation to cause her discharge and would have shown
that he was angered by her filing an incident report against him
and that he feared possible discipline against himself.  
     The admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of
the trial court, and a reviewing court will not reverse the trial
court unless that discretion is abused.  Gill v. Foster, 157 Ill. 2d 304, 626 N.E.2d 190 (1993).  Evidence, though relevant, may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
such factors as prejudice, confusion, or potential to mislead the
jury.  Gill, 157 Ill. 2d 304, 626 N.E.2d 190; Patch v. Glover,
248 Ill. App. 3d 562, 618 N.E.2d 583 (1993).  It is within the
trial court's discretion to balance the probative value of
evidence against its prejudicial impact or tendency to create
confusion and to decide whether the evidence should be admitted. 
Dominguez v. St. John's Hospital, 260 Ill. App. 3d 591, 632 N.E.2d 16 (1993).
     The trial court's exclusion of evidence regarding O'Young's
alleged treatment of the patient on July 29, 1991 as well as his
alleged treatment of "other black patients" was not an abuse of
discretion.  That evidence would have been highly inflammatory in
that it suggested that O'Young was abusive toward child patients
and that he was racially prejudiced against black patients.  That
prejudicial impact far outweighed any marginal relevance that the
evidence had in terms of explaining the reason for Parks'
submission of an occurrence report against O'Young and in terms
of suggesting a motive for O'Young's alleged actions against
Parks.  Moreover, even without the excluded testimony, the
plaintiff was able to establish motive for O'Young's alleged
defamation and interference with contract based upon admitted
evidence showing that Parks filed an incident report on July 29,
1991 against O'Young in which she accused him of misconduct. 
Thus, there would be no material need to disclose the details of
the alleged misconduct contained in the incident report to
establish a retaliatory motive.
     The plaintiff next contends that the trial court improperly
granted O'Young's motion in limine to exclude the contents of a
telephone conversation overheard by Parks between Williamson and
another individual, whom Parks thought to be O'Young, in which
Parks heard Williamson state "Doctor O'Young, Parks told the
family?"  The trial court initially excluded Parks' testimony
concerning the content of that telephone conversation on the
basis that it was hearsay.  After further consideration, the
court reaffirmed its prior ruling to exclude the testimony not on
the basis of hearsay but because it was vague, equivocal, and
imprecise.
     Hearsay evidence is testimony in court regarding a statement
made out of court offered for the truth of the matter asserted. 
It rests upon the credibility of the out-of-court asserter. 
Lundberg v. Church Farm, Inc., 151 Ill. App. 3d 452, 502 N.E.2d 806 (1986).  See generally M. Graham, Cleary & Graham's Handbook
of Illinois Evidence 801.1 at 632 (6th ed. 1994) (hereinafter
referred to as M. Graham, Illinois Evidence).  The phrase
"matters asserted" in the definition of hearsay includes
"statements" that occur in question form if the declarant
implicitly intended to express the inference for which the
statement is offered.  See generally, M. Graham, Illinois
Evidence 801.1, at 635-36.  Cf. People v. Camp, 128 Ill. App. 3d
223, 470 N.E.2d 540 (1984) (holding that question "are you all
right to drive the car" does not presuppose inability to drive as
an implicit fact that must be true).  Arguably, Williamson's
statement was intended to express or repeat in question form the
narrative statement apparently made by the other party on the
telephone line (ostensibly O'Young).  That statement implicitly
asserts that the person conversing with Williamson was O'Young
and that O'Young told Williamson that Parks "told the family." 
While O'Young's statement if directly overheard would have been
admissible as an admission of a party opponent, Williamson's
implied statements concerning what he heard on the telephone from
O'Young would be barred as hearsay since it was being offered for
the truth of the matter asserted.
     The plaintiff alternatively argues, that even if hearsay,
Parks' testimony concerning Williamson's telephone conversation
should have been admitted under the present sense impression
exception to the hearsay rule.  The plaintiff cites to United
States v. Blakey, 607 F.2d 779, 784 (7th Cir. 1979) which defines
a present sense impression as "a statement describing or
explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was
perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter." 
The plaintiff argues that Parks' testimony would describe what
she saw and heard Williamson say.  We disagree.
     First we note that, although the present sense impression
rule is a hearsay exception recognized under the Federal Rules of
Evidence (see Fed. R. Evid. 803(1)), we are aware of no Illinois
cases that have applied that exception.  See 2 R. Hunter, Trial
Handbook for Illinois Lawyers 70.28, at 322-23 (7th ed. 1996)
(stating that Illinois has adopted spontaneous declaration
exception not present sense impression exception).  Moreover,
even if such an exception existed under Illinois law, it would
not be applicable to the instant case.
     The present sense impression exception has three
requirements:  (1) that the statement describe or explain the
event perceived; (2) that the declarant must have in fact
perceived the event described; and (3) that the description must
be substantially contemporaneous with the event in question. 
United States v. Mejia-Velez, 855 F. Supp. 607, 613-14 (E.D. N.Y.
1994); Miller v. Crown Amusements, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 703 (S.D.
Ga. 1993).  See Booth v. State, 306 Md. 313, 508 A.2d 976 (1986)
for historical analysis of present sense impression exception. 
The present sense impression exception allows the admission of a
declarant's report made to a third party concerning observations
that the declarant is making at a time contemporaneous with those
observations.  See, e.g., United States v. Hawkins, 59 F.3d 723,
730 (8th Cir. 1995) (tape recording of "911" telephone call);
Blakey, 607 F.2d 779 (tape recording of statements made by
individual who witnessed extortion); United States v. Cain, 587 F.2d 678, 681 (5th Cir. 1979) (state trooper's testimony
concerning CB radio transmission made by a witness to an
occurrence); Mejia-Velez, 855 F. Supp. 607 (tape recordings of
"911" telephone calls made contemporaneously by eyewitnesses to
shooting).  The reliability of the statement is derived from the
fact that the statement is safe from any error caused by a defect
in the declarant's memory and from the fact that there is little
or no time for the declarant to calculate misstatement.  Also,
the statement will usually be made to a third person (who
subsequently testifies to it) who, being present at the time and
scene of the observation, will probably have an opportunity to
observe the situation himself and be able to corroborate the
declarant's statement.  See generally, 2 J. Strong, McCormick on
Evidence 271, at 212 (4th ed. 1992).
     Here, Williamson, the declarant, was not reporting to or
discussing with Parks his observations of an event that was
occurring contemporaneously with his remarks.  Williamson's
statement, which Parks overheard, did not explain, characterize
or elucidate in any way a physical occurrence that he was
observing.  See Miller, 821 F. Supp. 703 (for present sense
impression exception to apply, declarant must have seen the
event).  See generally, J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence 271, at
213 (4th ed. 1992) ("present sense impressions are limited to
'describing or explaining' the event or condition perceived"). 
Williamson was merely engaged in a telephone conversation in
which he was listening to and questioning the person with whom he
was conversing.  To permit the present sense impression exception
to apply to overheard conversations, such as in the instant case,
would in effect permit this exception to substantially devour the
entire hearsay rule of exclusion.
     The plaintiff also argues that Parks' testimony concerning
Williamson's telephone conversation was not hearsay because it
was not offered to prove the matter asserted but only to prove
that Williamson made the statement.  We strongly disagree.  The
only relevance of Parks' testimony was to establish the truth of
the matter that O'Young made an accusation to Williamson that
Parks divulged information to the patient's family.  Absent that
purpose, Parks' testimony had no tendency to make the existence
of any consequential fact more probable.  If Williamson's
statement could not be offered for the truth of the matter
asserted, it served no other purpose than to establish that
Williamson was engaged in a telephone conversation at the nurses
station, a fact of no relevance to the matter in controversy. 
Moreover, aside from its hearsay infirmity, Parks' testimony was
speculative in so far as establishing the identity of the other
party to the telephone conversation.  Parks testified during her
deposition that she heard O'Young page Williamson and that
shortly thereafter she overheard Williamson talking on the
telephone at the nursing station.  No other evidence was offered
to establish the identity of the other party.  Consequently, the
court did not abuse its discretion in excluding that conversation
since the inference as to the identity of that party was too
remote and conjectural.  See In re Elias, 114 Ill. 2d 321, 499 N.E.2d 1327 (1986) (evidence is relevant where it is material and
probative); Butler v. Kent, 275 Ill. App. 3d 217, 655 N.E.2d 1120
(1995) (court may reject evidence that is not helpful in proving
a matter in controversy because the inference to be drawn is too
vague or conjectural); People v. Ward, 19 Ill. App. 3d 833, 313 N.E.2d 314 (1974).  
     In related argument, the plaintiff argues that the trial
court's ruling with respect to the Williamson conversation was
inconsistent with the court's ruling allowing Margaret Gleason,
the Vice President of Nursing at St. Bernard Hospital, to testify
concerning a conversation she had with Williamson.  In that
regard, Nurse Gleason testified that Williamson told her that the
patient's mother told him that a nurse in the room had asked the
patient to tell the mother about an incident that had occurred
earlier in the day.  The trial court overruled plaintiff's
hearsay objection to Gleason's testimony finding that the
testimony was not hearsay because it was not being offered for
the truth of the matter asserted but to show that the hospital
terminated Parks based on information gathered from sources other
than O'Young.
     The trial court's admission of Gleason's testimony was
correct and not inconsistent with its prior ruling prohibiting
Parks' testimony regarding Williamson's telephone conversation.
Extra-judicial statements are admissible to show that the
recipient of the statement was placed on notice or had knowledge
of a certain fact.  See People v. Camp, 128 Ill. App. 3d 223, 470 N.E.2d 540 (1984).  See generally, M. Graham, Illinois Evidence
801.5, at 647 (a statement is not hearsay when the fact that the
statement is made is relevant for its effect on the listener
without regard to the truth of the matter asserted).  Gleason's
testimony was not hearsay because it was not offered for the
truth of the matter asserted but to show the source of the
hospital's knowledge concerning Parks' misconduct that resulted
in her termination.  As will be discussed in greater detail
below, Gleason testified that the hospital terminated Parks
because she divulged confidential hospital information to the
patient's family.  She testified that one of the sources of
information to support the hospital's findings with respect to
Parks came from Williamson's report of his discussion with the
patient's family.  Thus, Gleason's testimony concerning her
conversation with Williamson was not being offered for the
categorical truth of the matter asserted by Williamson in that
conversation, namely, that Parks had divulged confidential
information to the patient's family.  Rather, it was offered to
show that Williamson was the source for the information provided
to the hospital upon which the hospital relied in its decision to
terminate Parks since, unlike a court, a hospital, like any other
private entity, is free to conduct its business in reliance upon
hearsay sources of information.  In contrast, as stated above,
Parks' testimony regarding Williamson's out-of-court telephone
statement was being offered to the court for the truth of the
matter, that O'Young told Williamson that Parks had spoken to the
patient's family.
                           II.  Directed Verdict
     The plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred in
directing a verdict during plaintiff's case-in-chief on
plaintiff's tortious interference count.
     Verdicts are to be directed only in those cases in which all
of the evidence, when viewed in its aspect most favorable to the
opponent, so overwhelmingly favors the movant that no contrary
verdict based on the evidence could ever stand.  E.g., Maple v.
Gustafson, 151 Ill. 2d 445, 603 N.E.2d 508 (1992); Mizowek v. De
Franco, 64 Ill. 2d 303, 356 N.E.2d 32 (1976); Pedrick v. Peoria &
Eastern R.R., 37 Ill. 2d 494, 229 N.E.2d 504 (1967).  In ruling
on a directed verdict, the court cannot weigh the evidence nor
determine the credibility of the witnesses.  It may only consider
the evidence in the light most favorable to the party resisting
the motion.  Maple, 151 Ill. 2d 445, 603 N.E.2d 508.
     In order to recover on the theory of tortious interference
with contract, a plaintiff must show:  the existence of a valid
and enforceable contract between the plaintiff and another;
defendant's awareness of this contractual relation; defendant's
intentional and unjustified inducement of a breach of the
contract; the subsequent breach by the other caused by
defendant's wrongful conduct; and damages.  HPI Health Care
Services, Inc. v. Mt. Vernon Hospital, Inc., 131 Ill. 2d 145, 545 N.E.2d 672 (1989); Reuben H. Donnelley Corp. v. Brauer, 275 Ill.
App. 3d 300, 655 N.E.2d 1162 (1995).  At trial, the defendant
argued that he was entitled to a directed verdict because the
plaintiff failed to present any evidence to support a finding
that he induced the hospital's decision to terminate Parks or
that the hospital's termination of Parks was caused by his
conduct.
     On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the directed verdict
should not have been granted because the evidence adduced at
trial created an inference that O'Young could have caused Parks'
termination because he informed the hospital that Parks revealed
confidential hospital information about O'Young's treatment of a
patient.  The plaintiff contends that the evidence also showed
that O'Young was motivated to cause Parks' discharge because she
had filed an incident report against him.
     At trial, O'Young testified as an adverse witness.  He
testified that on July 29, 1991 Parks filed an incident report
against him.  He stated that after he heard that Parks had filed
the report, he went to the supervisor of the operating room,
Jerilyn Barly, to confirm that a report had been filed and to
discover the contents of the report.  Barly confirmed that Parks
had filed the report.  O'Young testified that later that day he
went to the room of the patient who was the subject of Parks'
incident report to check the traction on the patient.  O'Young
stated that the patient's father was "mad" and wanted to change
doctors because a nurse had told him about the incident report. 
O'Young told that father that he did not do what was alleged. 
O'Young then paged Reggie Williamson, the night nurse supervisor,
to arrange for a doctor change.  O'Young stated that he told
Williamson that the father wanted to change doctors because he
was angry about an incident that had been relayed to him by a
nurse.  O'Young stated that, when he talked to Williamson, he did
not know the identity of the nurse who had talked to the
patient's father.  He stated that he did not discuss the incident
report with Williamson; he relayed to Williamson what the
patient's father told him.
     O'Young testified that after Williamson met with the patient
and the patient's family, he and Williamson discussed the matter
with Margaret Gleason.  According to O'Young, the primary purpose
of their discussion was the care of patient and the second
purpose was to discover why the father of the patient was upset. 
O'Young testified "I think they want [sic] to find out who the
nurse involved is, since I did not know who the nurse involved
was."  When asked whether the suspicion was that Parks was the
nurse involved, O'Young responded, "I think that was their
conclusion.  I did not make that conclusion."  O'Young stated
that some discussion also occurred on the issue of whether there
had been a breach of the standard procedure for reporting
occurrences in the operating room.
     On cross-examination by his attorney, O'Young testified that
no change in doctors occurred with respect to the patient and
that he continued to serve as the patient's physician through the
patient's discharge and follow-up care.  O'Young stated that he
never accused Barbara Parks of divulging confidential patient
information.  O'Young did not think Parks was the nurse involved
because the patient's father said he had spoken to a recovery
room nurse and Parks did not work in that capacity.  O'Young
testified that, as a staff physician, he had no authority to hire
or fire nurses; that he did not make a recommendation to anyone
at St. Bernard Hospital that Parks be suspended or fired; and
that he did not participate in any discussions with hospital
administrative personnel regarding their making of a decision to
fire or suspend Parks.
     Barbara Parks testified that after the incident involving
O'Young and the patient, she called her supervisor, Jerilyn
Barly, and was instructed to fill out an incident report.  She
stated that later in the day she visited the patient but refused
to discuss the incident with the patient's mother except to say
that she "wrote it."  Parks testified that when she returned to
work on July 30, 1991, Barly requested that she go to the nursing
office.  Margaret Gleason and Ronald Campbell, Gleason's
assistant, were in the office.  At that meeting, Parks denied
talking to the patient's mother on July 29.  Parks was given a
three-day suspension and went home.  She returned to the hospital
the following Monday at which time she met with Campbell and
Barly.  Campbell informed her that they had conducted an
investigation of the July 29 incident and determined that Parks
should be terminated.
     On cross-examination, Parks admitted that O'Young's
signature was not on the suspension notice and that O'Young was
not present when she received that document or the termination
document.  Barly and Gleason signed the suspension notice; and
Barly and Campbell signed the termination notice.  Parks admitted
that she had no firsthand knowledge that O'Young participated in
the hospital's decision to suspend her.  She admitted that she
had no knowledge that anyone at the hospital talked to O'Young
about whether the hospital should suspend her.  She stated that
she was told she was being terminated based upon the hospital's
investigation of an incident that occurred on July 29, 1991.  She
stated that the hospital told her that that they had concluded
that she had divulged confidential patient information to the
patient's family.
     Margaret Gleason testified that on the morning of July 29,
1991 Parks told her about the incident involving O'Young and a
patient.  Gleason visited the patient the next day; and later
that day, talked to the patient's mother who had filed a
complaint on the evening of July 29.
     When questioned as a defense witness, Gleason stated that on
July 29, 1991, at 5:00 p.m., Reggie Williamson, the house
coordinator, informed her that the mother of the patient had made
a complaint.  Pursuant to Gleason's request, Williamson visited
the mother and made a report.  He told Gleason that a nurse in
the patient's room had asked the patient to tell his mother what
had happened earlier in the day.  Gleason stated that on July 30,
1991, she met with Barly and Campbell to discuss the incident and
how it should be handled.  Based upon the information supplied by
Williamson, Gleason decided to suspend Parks for three days for
violating hospital confidentiality procedures.  Gleason stated
that when she met with Parks, Parks admitted that she told the
patient to tell his mother about the incident.  Gleason further
stated that later that day she met with the patient's mother and
the mother reiterated that the nurse told her son to tell her
about the incident.  According to Gleason, the decision to
terminate Parks was made by Janet Nohos and Doctor Carst. 
Gleason stated that O'Young did not participate in any meeting or
discussion concerning Parks' suspension or termination and did
not have any role or input in the hiring or firing of nurses. 
The decision to fire Parks was based solely on information
supplied by Williamson and Parks.
     After Gleason's testimony, the defense moved for directed
verdict and was granted a directed verdict on the tortious
interference count of plaintiff's complaint.  As discussed
above, Parks argues that the directed verdict should not have
been granted because a reasonable inference could have been drawn
from O'Young's testimony that he caused Parks' termination.  In
this regard the plaintiff argues that, based upon O'Young's
testimony, one could infer that O'Young told the hospital
administrators that Parks had disclosed confidential information
to the patient's family; that his disclosure was the cause of her
termination; and that he was motivated to seek Parks' termination
because she had filed an incident report against him.  These
contentions are, however, unsupported by the record.
     The evidence viewed in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff shows an absence of evidence establishing that O'Young
made accusatory statements against Parks or that O'Young caused
the hospital to terminate her.  The evidence at trial showed
merely that O'Young discussed with Jerilyn Barly the existence of
the incident report filed by Parks.  The evidence also showed
that O'Young discussed the care of the patient who was the
subject of the incident report with Williamson, Gleason, and the
patient's father.  No admissible testimony was elicited to show
that, during any of those discussions, O'Young accused Parks of
divulging confidential patient information.
     Evidence that O'Young did not participate in the hospital's
decision to terminate Parks was uncontroverted.  O'Young
testified that he did not make a recommendation to anyone at the
hospital that Parks be suspended or terminated and that he did
not participate in any discussions with hospital administrative
personnel regarding the decision to suspend or fire Parks.  Parks
testified that she had no firsthand knowledge that O'Young
participated in the hospital decision to suspend her.  She
admitted she had no knowledge that anyone at the hospital had
talked to O'Young about whether the hospital should suspend her. 
She stated that she was told that the hospital's decision to
terminate her was based upon its investigation of the incident
that occurred on July 29, 1991 and its conclusion that she had
divulged confidential patient information to the patient's
family.  Margaret Gleason, the vice president of nursing, stated
that the decision to terminate Parks was based solely upon
information supplied by Williamson and Parks.  Gleason also
testified that O'Young did not participate in any meeting or any
discussion concerning Parks' suspension or termination.  Finally,
none of the documents relating to Parks' suspension and
termination contained or mentioned O'Young's name.
     Despite the existence of evidence that could suggest that
O'Young had a motive to seek Parks' termination, that evidence
without more could not withstand the directed verdict motion. 
Given the lack of evidence establishing that O'Young accused
Parks of disclosing confidential information and given the
uncontroverted testimony that O'Young did not participate in
discussions or have any decision-making authority with respect to
Parks' employment status, no reasonable inference can be made
that O'Young caused Parks' termination solely because he had a
motive to do so.
     In related argument, the plaintiff argues that the court
should not have granted a directed verdict on the tortious
interference count because it did not grant a directed verdict on
the defamation count.  According to the plaintiff, a tortious
interference claim requires "a showing of less specific behavior
by the defendant" than does the defamation claim such that the
court should not have directed a verdict on the former if it did
not also do so on the latter.
     The elements necessary to establish tortious interference
with contract have been set forth above and will not be repeated
here.  Defamation per se, as the plaintiff notes, can be
established by proof of words that prejudice a person in his
profession or trade.  See Mittelman v. Witous, 171 Ill. App. 3d
691, 525 N.E.2d 922 (1988), aff'd, 135 Ill. 2d 220, 552 N.E.2d 973 (1989).  In the proper case, defamatory words also may
support a tortious interference with contract claim, if those
words cause the breach of contract.  Here, in denying the motion
for directed verdict on the defamation count, the trial court
gave no reason for its decision.  To the extent the defamation
action was based upon words uttered by O'Young that Parks had
divulged confidential patient information, there may be an
inconsistency in the court's rulings with respect to the
defamation and tortious interference with contract actions. 
However, that inconsistency would, if anything, raise questions
concerning the correctness of the court's ruling with respect to
the defamation count rather than vitiate its ruling on the
tortious interference count.  Any error regarding its ruling on
the defamation count would in any event be harmless since the
defamation count was adjudicated against the plaintiff by the
jury.  Moreover, notwithstanding the possibility of an underlying
inconsistency, it is possible to reconcile the court's rulings
because, even if O'Young may have spoken defamatory words
accusing Parks of divulging confidential patient information, as
discussed above, there was no evidence to suggest that any such
utterance impacted the hospital's decision to terminate Parks and
caused it to breach her employment contract.
     For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court
of Cook County is affirmed.
     Affirmed.
     COUSINS, Jr. P.J. and CAHILL, J., concur.