People v. Lara

Annotate this Case
                                          FIFTH DIVISION
                                          June 27, 1997          
       




No. 1-95-1930


THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,  ) APPEAL FROM THE 
                                      ) CIRCUIT COURT OF
          Plaintiff-Appellee,         ) COOK COUNTY.              
                                      )     
                  v.                  )
                                      ) 
GABRIEL LARA,                         ) THE HONORABLE
                                      ) RICHARD NEVILLE,
          Defendant-Appellant.        ) JUDGE PRESIDING.         

     
     JUSTICE SOUTH delivered the opinion of the court:
     Defendant, 18-year-old Gabriel Lara, was charged by
indictment with the offense of first degree murder.  Following a
bench trial, the trial court entered a finding of guilty and  
sentenced defendant to 22 years in prison.  Defendant appeals.
     On December 9, 1993, the victim, 22-year-old Hector Ramos,
drove several coworkers home from Wauconda.  After stopping to
drop off a passenger, Hector drove into an alley near Augusta
Boulevard around 6 p.m. and encountered a van proceeding toward
his station wagon.  Hector, unable to drive around this van, 
reversed and backed to the end of the alley.  At that point, two
men exited the van.  Hector exited his station wagon and told his
passengers to get out with him.  Hector's passengers, Guadalupe
Trujillo, Onesimo Trujillo and Valentine Galvan, complied with
his request.  An argument ensued between Hector and the driver of
the van.  Hector and two of his three passengers then picked up
bricks from the alley, and the two men returned to the van. The
van was backed out of the alley and was driven away. 
     After the van left the scene, Hector and Valentine Galvan
dropped their bricks in the alley and returned to the station
wagon.  Guadalupe Trujillo placed the bricks he was holding into
the station wagon. Hector and his passengers proceeded to
Guadalupe Trujillo's residence at 1421 West Augusta Boulevard,
where he parked the station wagon and exited the vehicle.
     After Hector parked, the van appeared and was parked nearby.
Guadalupe and Onesimo Trujillo exited the station wagon, and
Valentine Galvan remained inside the vehicle.  Several
individuals exited the van, and the driver of the van started to
whistle.  A large group of men appeared, and Hector and the
driver of the van began to fight.  During this fight, Hector had
a brick in his hand. The driver of the van got the best of
Hector, and the fight ended.  At that time, Hector dropped the
brick to the ground. 
     After Hector dropped the brick to the ground, defendant
approached Hector and hit him in the head with a board. 
Valentine Galvan attempted to assist Hector but Valentine was
struck in the head with a beer bottle by the driver of the van.
Hector's station wagon was then stolen, presumably by someone
from the van.  Valentine and Hector went to the Trujillo
residence and then to the home they shared with Lydia Ramos. 
     Lydia Ramos, Hector's sister and the wife of Valentine,
testified that when Hector came home from work on December 9,
1993, around 7 p.m., he appeared to be tired, pale, sweaty and in
pain.  He also had a large bump on the right side of his head. 
She took Hector to Norwegian American Hospital, and he was later
transferred to Cook County Hospital, where he died on December
17, 1993. 
     Police investigation led to the arrest of defendant at his
residence.  On December 10, 1993, defendant told detectives that
he struck Hector in self-defense because Hector had picked up a
brick, turned toward him and raised up his arm as if he were
going to throw the brick at him. 
     The detectives also had a conversation with defendant's
brother, Miguel Lara.  Miguel stated that he observed the fight
between the victim and the man from the van.  He thought the
fight was over as one of the victim's friends took the bricks
away from the victim and threw them down.  Miguel told the
detectives that a man from the van hit the man from the station
wagon in the head with a two by four. 
     When the detectives told Miguel that defendant had already
told them that he had hit the victim in the head with the two by
four, Miguel agreed.  Miguel also agreed the man who was struck
had no bricks in his hand.   
     After speaking with Miguel, the detectives again spoke to
defendant.  The detectives informed defendant that his brother,
Miguel, stated that the victim did not have bricks in his hand. 
Defendant then told the detectives that, after the fight, he
"reacted" and just hit the victim in the head with the two by
four.
     Thereafter, defense counsel filed motions to quash
defendant's arrest and suppress various statements that he made
to the detectives and to suppress the showup identification.  The
trial court ruled that because of defendant's low IQ, his age,
educational background and inability to read well, he deserved
some additional "leeway."  Subsequently, the court suppressed
defendant's statement as direct evidence but allowed it as
impeachment. 
     The trial judge ruled that Miguel Lara's statement was
admissible as substantive evidence and denied defendant's motions
to quash the arrest and suppress the showup identification. 
Following a bench trial, the court entered a finding of guilty of
first degree murder.  After the denial of a post-trial motion and
a motion in arrest of judgment,  defendant was sentenced to 22
years in prison.  
                                  OPINION
     Defendant first contends that he was not proved guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt because he acted in self-defense.  The
standard for reviewing a conviction that is challenged on the
sufficiency of the evidence is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  People v. Dent, 230 Ill.
App. 3d 238, 595 N.E.2d 18 (1992).  Once a defendant has been
found guilty of a crime, the fact finder's role as weigher of the
evidence is preserved through a legal conclusion.  Dent, 230 Ill.
App. 3d 238, 595 N.E.2d 18.  On review, this court will not
reverse a criminal conviction unless the evidence is so
improbable or unsatisfactory that a reasonable doubt of
defendant's guilt is justified.  People v. Moore, 171 Ill. 2d 74,
662 N.E.2d 1215 (1996).  
     Self-defense is an affirmative defense to the charge of
murder.  When raised by defendant with some evidence, the State
has the burden of proving that defendant is guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.  People v. Rogers, 263 Ill. App. 3d 120, 635 N.E.2d 889 (1994).  Whether a killing is justified under the law
of self-defense is a question of fact to be decided by the trier
of fact.  People v. Turcios, 228 Ill. App. 3d 583, 593 N.E.2d 907
(1992).  A court must decide whether the facts and circumstances
would induce a reasonable apprehension of serious bodily harm in
light of defendant's perception of the situation when he used
force against his aggressor.  Rogers, 263 Ill. App. 3d at 127. 
Unless the record raises serious questions regarding the
appropriateness of the trier of fact's finding as to self-
defense, it should not be disturbed by a reviewing court. 
Turcios, 228 Ill. App. 3d 583, 593 N.E.2d 907. 
     In the present case, the court found that defendant did not
act in self-defense by striking the victim with a two by four in
the head, which was supported by ample evidence.  
     The testimony of Valentine Galvan and Onesimo Trujillo,
together with Miguel's statement, negated defendant's claim of
self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.  Valentine Galvan
testified that he saw the victim being struck by the board after
the fight was over and that the victim did not have any bricks in
his hands.  Although he testified that he did not see who struck
the victim, Galvan heard the man say, "I'm going to kill him
right now," before the man picked up the board.  The evidence
adduced at trial established that defendant struck the victim in
the head with the board. 
     Onesimo Trujillo testified that he saw the victim with a
brick in his hand.  However, when the fight between the victim
and the driver of the van ended, he saw the victim throw the
brick to the ground prior to being struck with the two by four. 
     Defendant's testimony that he acted in self-defense and that
the victim came at him with a brick was impeached by his prior
statement that the victim did not have any bricks in his hands
and that he reacted to the fight and struck the victim in the
head with the two by four. 
     Defendant's brother, Miguel, signed a statement the morning
after the incident that was admitted as substantive evidence
stating that, when the fight between the driver of the van and
the victim was over, neighbors removed bricks from the victim's
hands and tried to calm the victim down.  Defendant then picked
up a long piece of wood that was lying in front of their house,
with which he then struck the victim. 
     The court found that the State's witnesses, Valentine Galvan
and Onesimo Trujillo, were credible and accepted their
descriptions of the event.  The court further found that it was
highly persuasive testimony when defendant's brother came to
court and, through the use of a statement taken contemporaneously
with this event, said that the victim had nothing in his hands at
the time he was struck.  The court's finding is supported by the
evidence, and this court will not disturb that decision.  
     Defendant next contends that his conduct was not proved
beyond a reasonable doubt to be the cause of death.  Defendant
argues that the driver of the van was responsible for the injury
from which the victim died.    
     The State must prove all the material and essential facts
constituting the crime.  People v. Turner, 127 Ill. App. 3d 784,
469 N.E.2d 368 (1984).  When a defendant is charged with murder,
the State must prove both the fact of death and the criminal
agency causing death.  Turner, 127 Ill. App. 3d 784, 469 N.E.2d 368.  The evidence must show "that the defendant's act was,
beyond a reasonable doubt, a contributing cause to a death such
that the death did not result from a source unconnected with the
defendant's act."  People v. Brown, 57 Ill. App. 3d 528, 531, 373 N.E.2d 459, 461 (1978).  As previously indicated, we are obliged
to review the evidence in a light most favorable to the State. 
Dent, 230 Ill. App. 3d 238, 595 N.E.2d 18. 
     In this case, the State met its burden.  Eyewitness accounts
and defendant himself established that defendant struck the
victim in the head with a two by four.  Defendant admitted
striking the victim in the head with a two by four but proceeded
with the affirmative defense of self-defense.  The evidence 
established beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not act
in self-defense.  Thereafter, the defense and the State
stipulated to the cause of the victim's death. 
     In summary, it was stipulated that Dr. Lawrence Cogan, an
assistant Cook County medical examiner, would testify that the
victim was pronounced dead on December 17, 1993, and that "the
cause of death was blunt force injuries to the head, fracture of
the skull, the left temporal bone, cerebral contusions, epidural
hemorrhage, scalp hemorrhage.  Craniotomy; marked hypoxic
encephalomacia which actually means respirator change to the
brain *** softening and autolysis, thrombosis of dural and
cerebral vessels; focal areas of hemorrhage in the pons and
bronchopneumonia of the lungs, referring to the respirator
changes."    
      This evidence is sufficient to establish criminal agency. 
After considering all the evidence, the court found that the
victim's death was caused by defendant striking him in the head
with the two by four.  The stipulated cause of death is directly
traceable to defendant's acts and comports with the lower court's
finding.  Based on the record, it cannot be said that this
finding was unsupported by the evidence.
     Alternatively, defendant contends that the victim's cause of
death was the result of premature termination of life support
measures at the hospital.  There are dual standards in this state
for determining death.  "'[A] person is legally dead if he or she
had sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of total brain
function[s], according to usual and customary standards of
medical practice, or (2) irreversible cessation of circulatory
and respiratory functions according to usual and customary
standards of medical practice.'"  In re Estate of Sewart, 236
Ill. App. 3d 1, 14-15, 602 N.E.2d 1277 (1991), quoting In re
Haymer, 115 Ill. App. 3d 349, 355, 450 N.E.2d 940, 954 (1983).  
     When circulatory and respiratory functions are mechanically
maintained, the "irreversible cessation of total brain functions"
or brain death standard may be used.  Janus v. Tarasewicz, 135
Ill. App. 3d 936, 940, 482 N.E.2d 418 (1985).  Although the
courts have refused to establish criteria for determining brain
death because the advent of new research and technologies
continues to change the tests used for determining cessation of
brain function, they have required that a diagnosis of brain
death be made in accordance with the "usual and customary
standards of medical practice."  Janus, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 941. 
Therefore, expert medical opinion is necessary to a determination
of brain death.  Sewart, 236 Ill. App. 3d 1, 602 N.E.2d 1277. 
     In this case, the victim's cause of death was not a
contested issue at trial.  When the trial judge asked "[i]s there
any issue as to the cause of death?" the defense responded "no." 
Defendant and the State stipulated that an assistant Cook County
medical examiner's expert medical opinion was that the cause of
death was blunt force injuries to the victim's head.  The record
reflects this diagnosis of death was made according to usual and
customary standards of medical practice.  On this evidence, it 
appears that the cause of the victim's death was defendant's
striking the victim in the head with the two by four, not
premature termination of life support measures at the hospital.   
     After viewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to
the State, the evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant struck the victim in the head with a two by four,
causing the victim's death.  Thus, a rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of first degree murder beyond a
reasonable doubt were committed by defendant.  The evidence is
not so improbable or unsatisfactory that a reasonable doubt of 
defendant's guilt is justified.  Accordingly, we affirm
defendant's conviction and sentence for first degree murder.
     Pursuant to People v. Nicholls, 71 Ill. 2d 166, 374 N.E.2d 194 (1978), and relevant statutory provisions (725 ILCS 5/110-
7(h) (West 1994); 55 ILCS 5/4-2002.1 (West 1994)), we grant the
State's motion and incorporate as part of the judgment and
mandate a fee of $100 for defending this appeal.  In addition,
pursuant to People v. Agnew, 105 Ill. 2d 275, 473 N.E.2d 1319
(1985) and section 4-2002.1 of the Counties Code (55 ILCS 5/4-
2002.1 (1994)), we grant the State's motion and incorporate as
part of the judgment and mandate an additional fee of $50 for
oral argument in this case. 
     Affirmed.
     HARTMAN, P.J., and HOFFMAN, J., concur.


Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.