People v. Meyer

                               NO. 5-97-0079

                                  IN THE

                        APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                              FIFTH DISTRICT
_________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,)  Appeal from the
                                    )  Circuit Court of
     Plaintiff-Appellee,            )  St. Clair County.
                                    )
v.                                  )  Nos. 94-DT-1025 &
                                    )       94-TR-52933
KEVIN L. MEYER,                     )  Honorable
                                    )  Robert J. Hillebrand,
     Defendant-Appellant.           )  Judge, presiding.
_________________________________________________________________

     JUSTICE RARICK delivered the opinion of the court:
     Defendant was convicted after a bench trial in St. Clair
County of speeding and driving under the influence of alcohol.  He
was sentenced to 12 months' probation and 100 hours of community
service and was ordered to pay $500 in fines and costs and to
undergo alcohol evaluation.  Defendant appeals, claiming that the
court erred in denying his motion to dismiss for the failure to
bring him to trial within 160 days of his purported demand for a
speedy trial.  We affirm.
     On October 18, 1994, defendant was charged with driving under
the influence of alcohol and speeding.  Defendant posted a cash
bond and was released the same day.  On October 24, defendant's
attorney filed a pleading entitled, "Entry of Appearance, Immediate
Jury Demand and Plea of Not Guilty."  On April 24, 1995, defendant
filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the State had violated the
speedy trial provisions by failing to bring him to trial within 160
days of his demand for a speedy trial.  The court denied
defendant's motion on the basis that the body of the pleading filed
on October 24 only stated defendant demanded a jury trial and that
therefore it did not comply with the provisions of the State
criminal code and local rule 7.04.  Defendant contends that the
court abused its discretion in finding that his pleading was
insufficient to invoke the speedy trial provisions, and he argues
that local rule 7.04 is inconsistent with the law and therefore
unenforceable.
     Section 103-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725
ILCS 5/103-5 (West 1994)) implements the right to a speedy trial
guaranteed by the Illinois Constitution.  People v. Reimolds, 92 Ill. 2d 101, 106, 440 N.E.2d 872, 874 (1982).  Under this section,
it is the duty of the State to bring a defendant to trial within
the statutory period.  92 Ill. 2d  at 106, 440 N.E.2d  at 875. 
Section 103-5(a) is applicable to those who are in custody, and it
provides a 120-day period within which trial must commence.  The
120-day period begins to run automatically when the accused is
taken into custody, and no demand for trial is necessary.  Section
103-5(b), available to those who have been released on bail or
recognizance, allows 160 days in which to commence trial.  Under
this provision, however, a demand for trial is required, and the
period provided by the statute does not begin to run until the
demand is made.  People v. Garrett, 136 Ill. 2d 318, 324, 555 N.E.2d 353, 356 (1990); People v. Baker, 273 Ill. App. 3d 327, 329,
652 N.E.2d 858, 860 (1995).  It is also well established that the
speedy trial demand must be clear and unequivocal.  Baker, 273 Ill.
App. 3d at 329, 652 N.E.2d  at 860; People v. Ground, 257 Ill. App.
3d 956, 959, 629 N.E.2d 783, 785 (1994).  In order for the demand
to qualify as clear and unequivocal, it must be set forth in the
title or heading of any pleading containing the demand, it must
state that the defendant "demands a speedy trial," and the body of
the pleading must make explicit reference to the speedy trial
statute.  People v. Dunskus, 282 Ill. App. 3d 912, 917, 668 N.E.2d 1138, 1142 (1996); Baker, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 329, 652 N.E.2d at
860-61; Ground, 257 Ill. App. 3d at 959, 629 N.E.2d  at 785; see
also People v. Staten, 159 Ill. 2d 419, 422, 639 N.E.2d 550, 552
(1994); People v. Erickson, 266 Ill. App. 3d 273, 276-77, 639 N.E.2d 979, 982 (1994).  As noted many times before, a defendant's
demand for speedy trial is extremely significant for it is the sole
means by which a defendant may preclude the State from prosecuting
him, regardless of how reprehensible the crime may be or how
overwhelming the evidence of guilt.  Staten, 159 Ill. 2d  at 422,
639 N.E.2d at 552-53; Ground, 257 Ill. App. 3d at 959, 629 N.E.2d 
at 785.  The purpose of section 103-5(b) is to secure a defendant's
speedy trial guarantee, not to provide the defendant with a
tactical weapon against prosecution.  Dunskus, 282 Ill. App. 3d at
918, 668 N.E.2d  at 1142.  Accordingly, a defendant who claims a
violation of a speedy trial right cannot prevail if the demand for
trial fails to comply with the terms of the governing speedy trial
provision.  Staten, 159 Ill. 2d  at 429, 639 N.E.2d  at 556. 
Defendant's purported speedy trial demand here failed to constitute
an effective demand for a speedy trial.  First, the demand was part
of a multiple pleading which included the entry of appearance by
defense counsel, the entry of a plea of not guilty, and the demand
for a jury trial.  Second, the heading of the pleading failed to
state that defendant demanded a speedy trial.  Third, the body of
the document made no reference to section 103-5(b) and in fact did
not even demand a speedy trial.  Defendant's pleading therefore
cannot be said to constitute a clear and unequivocal speedy trial
demand.  See Baker, 273 Ill. App. 3d 327, 652 N.E.2d 858; Erickson,
266 Ill. App. 3d 273, 639 N.E.2d 979; Ground, 257 Ill. App. 3d 956,
629 N.E.2d 783.  Because defendant failed to make a clear and
unequivocal demand for a speedy trial under section 103-5(b), the
160-day period within which trial had to begin never commenced. 
The trial court, accordingly, properly denied defendant's motion to
dismiss the charges against him for a statutory speedy trial
violation.
     While we need not address any of defendant's other contentions
raised on appeal, we choose to answer defendant's claim that local
rule 7.04 of the Rules of Practice for the Twentieth Judicial
Circuit is inconsistent with the law for speedy trial demands and
therefore is unenforceable.  We first note that circuit courts have
the inherent power to enact rules governing the practice and
procedure of the business conducted before them.  People ex rel.
Brazen v. Finley, 119 Ill. 2d 485, 491, 519 N.E.2d 898, 901 (1988). 
They are, however, without the power to change substantive law or
impose additional substantive burdens upon litigants.  119 Ill. 2d 
at 491, 519 N.E.2d  at 901.  Local rule 7.04 provides an expedient
means for ensuring the proper functioning of the statutory speedy
trial provision of section 103-5(b) and is less demanding than the
law as established in Ground.  It is therefore a proper exercise of
the circuit court's powers to promulgate rules not inconsistent
with the law.  Rule 7.04 requires that any demand for a speedy
trial be in writing, be filed with the clerk of the court, be
served upon the State's Attorney, and contain a caption stating it
is a "demand for immediate trial" or a "demand for immediate jury
trial."  This is no less than is required by Ground.  Rule 7.04
does not even require a specific reference to section 103-5(b) as
required by Ground and its progeny.  The fact that rule 7.04 also
requires the docket number of the cause to be on the pleading and
the defendant or his attorney to have signed the pleading is no
different than with any other case or pleadings.  Such requirements
are not overly burdensome and certainly cannot be viewed as
changing substantive law.  We therefore conclude that local rule
7.04 is a proper exercise of the circuit court's rule-making
powers.
     For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
circuit court of St. Clair County.

     Affirmed.

     WELCH, P.J., and MAAG, J., concur.