In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: February 28, 2011
S08Z1544. IN RE MARILYN RINGSTAFF
PER CURIAM.
Marilyn Ringstaff appeals the final decision of the Board to Determine
Fitness of Bar Applicants (“the Board”) denying her certification of fitness to
practice law. After reviewing the record, we conclude the Board erred;
accordingly, we reverse the Board’s decision and order that a certificate of
fitness to practice law be granted Ms. Ringstaff.
After conducting an informal meeting with Ms. Ringstaff, the Board
tentatively denied a certificate of moral fitness and issued specifications when
Ringstaff requested a formal hearing. Part A, §§ 7 and 8, Rules Governing
Admission to the Practice of Law. In its specifications, the Board recounted
Ringstaff’s conduct with regard to a minor traffic accident in which she was
charged with following too closely and with regard to her self-representation as
a first-year law student in the prosecution of the traffic charge at trial and on
appeal;1 the contents of a note Ringstaff sent to the trial court’s clerk when she
1
The Board stated in its specifications that Ringstaff had been involved in a minor traffic
accident in which her vehicle suffered no damage and that, despite the responding officer
permitting her to leave, applicant insisted that a police report be written, even after she was told
that issuance of a report was dependent upon her being charged with following too closely.
During the jury trial that applicant demanded and at which she represented herself, applicant
remitted payment of the $250 fine2 after being found guilty;3 and remarks
Ringstaff made to the Board during the informal hearing.4 Ringstaff filed an
answer in which she denied the specifications, and a hearing was held before a
hearing officer appointed by this Court.
Part A, § 8, Rules Governing
Admission to the Practice of Law. The hearing officer found by clear and
convincing evidence that Ringstaff possessed the integrity and good character
to be certified fit to practice law, concluded that the evidence presented against
Ringstaff bore upon her competence rather than her character and fitness, and
recommended that Ringstaff be permitted to sit for the Georgia bar exam. After
reviewing the hearing officer’s recommendation, the Board informed Ringstaff
of its final decision that she was not certified as fit to practice law and of its
acted in a way the Board described as evidencing “a total lack of understanding and mistrust of
the court and the law.” The Board also noted that applicant’s appeal to the Court of Appeals of
Georgia included ineffective assistance of counsel as an enumerated error.
2
The Board included in its specifications the contents of a letter applicant sent to the clerk
of the trial court along with payment of her fine. The note read as follows: “April: Thanks for
taking care of this - keep the change [smiley face] put it into a police/judicial education fund. I
can certainly say this has been an educational experience. I’m now a second-year law student
and can honestly relate to what a crooked and inequitable system of ‘justice’ we have. The
money was well-spent, I’m sure it will make me a better attorney [smiley face]. Marilyn
Ringstaff.” The Board did not include a quotation that follows Ms. Ringstaff’s name on the note
and which states: “All that is necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men do nothing.”
3
Applicant was found guilty in a jury trial and that judgment was affirmed on appeal in an
unreported decision. Ringstaff v. State, 265 Ga. App. XXVII (2004).
4
The Board stated applicant had made remarks during her informal interview with the
Board that the Board described as indicating applicant was “sure” she had been right in her belief
that the ticket should have been dismissed; that “every police officer lies[;]” that the police
officer who issued the citation had committed perjury when the officer testified about the citation
because the officer had issued the ticket based on the word of two “unreliable” witnesses; and
that the trial judge knew the officer had committed perjury.
2
rejection of the hearing officer’s recommendation.5
The Board advised
Ringstaff that it disagreed with the hearing officer’s conclusion that the evidence
presented at the hearing bore upon Ringstaff’s competence to practice law rather
than her character and her fitness to practice and, citing In re Cason, 249 Ga.
806 (294 SE2d 520) (1982), informed Ringstaff that she had failed to prove
“full and complete rehabilitation by clear and convincing evidence” as was
required “[i]n cases such as this involving questions about prior conduct
showing a disrespect for the law and lack of professionalism....” Ringstaff
timely initiated an appeal in this Court from the Board’s denial of her
application for certification of fitness to practice law. See Part F, § 7, Rules
Governing Admission to the Practice of Law.
1. The Board erred as a matter of law when it imposed upon Ringstaff the
burden of proving full and complete rehabilitation by clear and convincing
evidence. An applicant must shoulder the additional burden of proving
rehabilitation to establish good moral character “[w]here an applicant for
admission to the bar has a criminal record ” (In re Cason, supra, 249 Ga. at 808),
where an applicant has engaged in criminal conduct that was not prosecuted (In
re K. S. L., 269 Ga. 51 (495 SE2d 276) (1998)), or where an applicant seeks
reinstatement to the bar. In re Spence, 271 Ga. 630 (523 SE2d 323) (1999)
(applicant seeking reinstatement following disbarment); Matter of Oliver, 268
Ga. 882 (494 SE2d 333) (1998) (applicant seeking reinstatement following
5
The hearing officer’s findings of fact and recommendations are not binding on the
Board. Pt. A, § 8, Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law.
3
voluntary surrender of license). Inasmuch as this case presents none of these
circumstances, the rehabilitation standard was not applicable and the Board
erred in applying it.
2. This Court has a responsibility to the public “to see that those who are
admitted to practice are ethically cognizant and mature individuals who have the
character to withstand the temptations which are placed before them as they
handle other people’s money and affairs.” In re Cason, supra, 249 Ga. at 809.
The Board has the duty to “inquire into the character and fitness of applicants
for admission to the practice of law and ... [to] certify as fit to practice law those
applicants who have established to the Board’s satisfaction that they possess the
integrity and character requisite to be members of the Bar of Georgia.” Part A,
§ 1, Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law. See also In re Cason,
supra, 249 Ga. at 809 (“The function of the Fitness Board is to prevent those not
demonstrating the requisite moral character and fitness from being allowed to
become lawyers.”). The purpose of a hearing to determine character and fitness
is to “acquaint[ ] this court with the applicant’s innermost feelings and personal
views on those aspects of morality, attention to duty, forthrightness and selfrestraint which are usually associated with the accepted definition of ‘good
moral character.’” In re Lubonovic, 248 Ga. 243 (3) (282 SE2d 298) (1981). It
is the applicant’s burden to prove she possesses the requisite character and
moral fitness to practice law, and this Court will uphold the Board’s decision if
there is any evidence to support it. In re R. M. C., 272 Ga. 99 (1) (525 SE2d
100) (2000). Ultimately, the decision whether an applicant is fit to practice law
4
in Georgia rests with this Court. In re Spence, 275 Ga. 202, 204 (563 SE2d 129)
(2002). After reviewing the specifications cited by the Board in its tentative
decision and reiterated in its final decision6 and examining the transcript of the
informal hearing cited by the Board as the basis for its decision, we conclude
that there is no evidence to support the Board’s decision.
Twelve of the seventeen pages of the transcript of the Board’s informal
interview with applicant are devoted to discussions of the applicant’s pro se
representation in the trial of the traffic violation, the appeal, and the content of
the note she sent to the clerk of the trial court. When asked to tell the Board
about the trial, Ms. Ringstaff stated:
Well, it was a disaster from the start, I wasn’t expecting a trial to
begin with. I thought it would be dismissed because there was no
basis in Georgia law for them to give me a ticket to begin with. I
wrote a brief, – researched it very carefully and asked the judge to
dismiss it. I was at the beginning – first year of law school at the
time. I had no legal background and, but I still researched it very
thoroughly and I was sure that I was right on it and I asked the
judge to dismiss the case, and he would not. I, I don’t remember his
reason since it has been five years but he said this is going to trial
so – and it went to trial and everything that I asked the judge, he
refused – like I asked the police officer that had written the ticket
– I asked the judge to remove him from the room because he was a
prime witness. The judge would not agree to have him removed
and I asked the officer about the problems in their own police force
and he refused to let me ask those questions and the same officer
that wrote me a ticket had been recently involved in an incident that
had been publicized in the Rome papers and his partner had actually
raped a sixteen year old girl and the [judge] refused to let me
6
See Footnotes 1, 2, and 4, supra.
5
question him about that incident. ... He did not allow that, and he
would not allow me to talk about the numbers of the traffic tickets
that were issued in Floyd County ... this happened the month that
there was a lot of publication about the individual’s right to a jury
trial with traffic tickets and the right to indigent representation and,
I think, that’s why they pushed the trial on at least one or two.
When asked whether she had felt she was treated unfairly by the judge, Ms.
Ringstaff stated:
Yes, it should have been dismissed in the first place, I think, on the
basis of my brief and it was wrong to go to trial in the first place.
I think it was wrong to have the police officer stay in the room
when he was a prime witness in the case and, but there were several
major errors and he never –once he saw that I was unable to
represent myself he never asked me to – if I needed to take a break
or if I wanted to obtain representation at that time. He never asked
me any of those things when it became evident that I was not able
to represent myself.
With regard to whether the prosecutor had treated her unfairly, Ms. Ringstaff
stated: “I thought he brought a case that should never have been brought and –
I haven’t reviewed the case recently, but there are several things I thought of in
response to the prosecutor that I was unhappy with.” When asked about her
appellate contention that she received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial,
applicant stated:
I did not know the law at the time and I should have – the judge
should, I believe, have asked me if I wanted to take a break and get
counsel. There were many legal tactics I wasn’t aware of that I
should have perfected a record. There were several instances that
– I’m saying under the strictest standard an attorney would not have
6
done.
When asked what she had meant when she wrote to the trial court clerk
that the system of justice was crooked and inequitable, Ms Ringstaff stated:
Well, maybe I can explain. When I started in criminal law, I
remember studying some of the writings of Alan Dershowitz and
one of the articles that we read was his article that said, “every
police officer lies– every district attorney knows that every police
officer lies – every superior court judge knows that every district
attorney knows that every police officer lies and every appeals court
judge knows that a superior court judge knows that every district
attorney knows that every police officer lies” and I would never
have believed that had I not experienced that myself because those
officers lied on the stand and the district attorney knew that they
were doing it and, I believe, the Superior Court Judge knew it. It
was just a great miscarriage of justice and I still stand by those
words.
She told the Board “I would not write those words now and the only reason I did
at that time was because I knew April [the clerk to whom the note was
addressed]. I had talked to her several times on the phone and I thought it was
more of an off-the-record note to her.” When asked whether she believed the
system of justice is crooked and inequitable, Ms. Ringstaff responded: “No,
overall I believe it’s the best we’ve got, but there are problems in the system....”
While applicant continued to stand by her assertion that the police officer who
issued her the ticket committed perjury, she acknowledged that she did not know
whether the district attorney or the trial judge knew that. When asked whether
she believed the appellate court “knew the superior court judge knew it,” she
7
replied:
I don’t know how he could not by reading that record because it’s,
it’s very plain that the police gave me a ticket for an event they did
not witness –they knew nothing about it and it was – they were not
present at the scene. They based their entire information on an
unreliable witness that was – that had called 911 and gave them a
false 911 report and that’s what the police had based this ticket on.
Applicant was asked whether it was her position the trial court erred when in
permitted the prosecuting witness to sit at counsel table during the criminal trial,
to which she responded that it had been her belief at the time.7 She was asked
whether she should have been permitted to question the police officer about the
criminal charges the officer’s former partner faced,8 and she stated her belief
that the testimony would have shown “problems with police officers in general”
and that “the tendency of the officers to do un-policeman-like activity” would
have been relevant. When asked how she felt about police officers, Ms.
Ringstaff stated: “In general ..., I think they have a tough job to do and, I think,
overall do an excellent job, but I think the ones that were on the forces that we
have problems with, they should be called on the problems, but overall I think
they’re excellent.” She acknowledged that, as a result of her law school
education and courses on Professionalism, it would be inappropriate for a
7
This line of questioning goes more to applicant’s competence to try a case rather than her
moral character and fitness to practice law. The Director of the Office of Bar Admissions
testified before the hearing officer that competence is determined by the Board of Bar Examiners
and demonstrated by the bar examination.
8
This question goes more to applicant’s competence to try a case rather than her moral
character and fitness to practice law.
8
lawyer to write the note she wrote, and that she had learned the distinction
between what acts a lawyer, as compared to a lay person, should do. Upon
further questioning regarding several rules contained in the Rules of
Professional Conduct, Ms. Ringstaff affirmed the propriety of the principles that
a lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal system and for those who
serve it, including judges, other lawyers and witnesses and that a lawyer
commits professional misconduct when the lawyer engages in conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice. When asked, she stated her belief
that her pro se representation in the traffic case was not prejudicial to the
administration of justice.
The transcript of the informal hearing reflects that there is no evidence
supporting the specifications listed by the Board and the conclusion drawn by
the Board.
3. In her application, Ms. Ringstaff listed no criminal convictions or
criminal conduct. In a separate category, she listed traffic citations for speeding
(issued in 1983, 1990, and 2000), failure to come to a complete stop (2000), and
the 2002 citation for following too closely. She listed her 1984 discharge in
bankruptcy of several debts. The Director of the Office of Bar Admissions
testified before the hearing officer that the Board had received no complaints
about the applicant’s personal moral characteristics or her integrity, other than
the trial of the traffic citation and its aftermath and the informal hearing held by
the Board. The record contains the testimony before the hearing officer of an
attorney who had supervised Ms. Ringstaff’s work in the healthcare unit of the
9
Atlanta Legal Aid Society for two years . He described her as quiet, studious,
resourceful, conscientious, and very deferential to authority, and stated she had
not made any statements to him that were critical of the judicial system, judges,
or lawyers. A law-school professor described applicant as completely respectful
of all her classmates and testified she never heard applicant say anything
negative about law enforcement or display contempt or a lack of respect for any
category of persons. The professor stated she had no reservations about Ms.
Ringstaff’s character or fitness. Another law-school professor testified he had
never seen applicant display contempt for the legal system and found her always
to have conducted herself with great candor and truthfulness.
We conclude from our review of the record that Ms. Ringstaff established
that she possesses the integrity and character required to be a member of the
State Bar of Georgia. Inasmuch as the Board’s grounds for finding otherwise
are not supported by the record, we reverse the decision of the Board and direct
that it issue a certificate of fitness to practice law to Ms. Ringstaff.
4. In light of the above, we need not address applicant’s remaining
enumerations of error.
Certificate of Fitness to Practice Law granted. All the Justices concur.
10
