Supreme Court of Florida
WILLIAM RAYMOND YATES,
STATE OF FLORIDA,
[May 31, 2001]
We have for review Yates v. State, 751 So. 2d 781 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).
We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
Yates challenges his sentence under the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act (the
“Act”) on several grounds, all of which have been addressed by this Court. See
Grant v. State, 770 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 2000) (rejecting an ex post facto challenge to
the Act and holding that the Act violates neither the single subject rule for legislation
nor principles of equal protection ); McKnight v. State, 769 So. 2d 1039 (Fla.
2000) (holding that a defendant has the right both to present evidence to prove that
the defendant does not qualify for sentencing under the Act and to challenge the
State’s evidence regarding the defendant’s eligibility for sentencing as a prison
releasee reoffender); State v. Cotton, 769 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2000) (holding that the
Act does not permit a “victim veto” which would violate a defendant’s due process
rights by precluding application of the Act in some instances but not others, as well
as holding that the Act is not void for vagueness and does not constitute a form of
cruel or unusual punishment); Ellis v. State, 762 So. 2d 912, 912 (Fla. 2000)
(recognizing that, “[a]s to notice, publication in the Laws of Florida or the Florida
Statutes gives all citizens constructive notice of the consequences of their actions”)
(quoting State v. Beasley, 580 So. 2d 139, 142 (Fla. 1991)). Accordingly, we
approve the decision of the district court to the extent it is consistent with Grant,
McKnight, Cotton,1 and Ellis.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, and PARIENTE, JJ., concur.
QUINCE, J., dissents.
1. In its decision in Yates, the Fifth District cited to its decision in Speed v.
State, 732 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), approved, 779 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 2001).
In our decision in Cotton, we disapproved the opinion in Speed to the extent that it
implied, in dicta, that a subsection of the Act gives to each victim a veto over the
imposition of the mandatory sentences that are prescribed in other parts of the Act.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal Certified Direct Conflict
Fifth District - Case No. 5D99-1900
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Leonard R. Ross, Assistant Public
Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida,
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Kellie A. Nielan, Assistant Attorney
General, Daytona Beach, Florida,