Kitchen v. First Student Inc, No. 3:2020cv05658 - Document 24 (W.D. Wash. 2020)
Court Description: ORDER denying Plaintiff's 17 Motion to Remand. Signed by Judge Richard A. Jones.(MW)
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Kitchen v. First Student Inc Doc. 24 1 THE HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 10 11 12 MECHELE A. KITCHEN CASE NO. 3:20-cv-05658-RAJ 13 Plaintiff, 14 15 ORDER v. FIRST STUDENT INC., 16 Defendant. 17 I. 18 19 INTRODUCTION This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand. Dkt. # 17. 20 Defendant opposes this motion. Dkt. # 19. For the reasons below, the Court DENIES the 21 motion. II. 22 23 BACKGROUND Plaintiff Mechele A. Kitchen (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint for damages related to 24 a vehicular collision against Defendant First Student Inc. (“Defendant”), a foreign profit 25 corporation, in Pierce County Superior Court. Dkt. # 1-2. On July 6, 2020, Defendant 26 timely filed a notice of removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) based on diversity 27 ORDER- 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Dkt. # 1. On July 22, 2020, the Court ordered 2 Defendant to show cause why, in the absence of facts surrounding the injury sustained 3 and related costs supporting the jurisdictional threshold, the case should not be remanded 4 to state court. Dkt. 11. Defendant responded to the Order. Dkt. # 13. Having 5 considered Defendant’s response, the Court concluded that it has jurisdiction pursuant to 6 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Dkt. # 16. On August 20, 2020, Plaintiff filed a motion to remand pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 7 8 § 1447(c) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Dkt. # 17. Plaintiff agreed that there is 9 complete diversity of citizenship between the parties but asserted that Defendant failed to 10 meet its burden in showing that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Id. at 1. On 11 September 4, 2020, Defendant responded to the motion, arguing that it had met its burden 12 to establish the required amount in controversy by a preponderance of evidence and that 13 the Court had so found. Dkt. # 19 at 2. III. 14 LEGAL STANDARD The district courts have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the amount 15 16 in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs, and is between citizens 17 of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). A defendant may remove a civil action brought 18 in a state court of which the district courts have original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. 19 § 1441(a). As the Court noted in its Order to Show Cause, there is a strong presumption 20 against removal jurisdiction. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). To 21 protect the jurisdiction of state courts, removal jurisdiction is strictly construed in favor 22 of remand, and any doubt as to the right of removal must be resolved in favor of remand. 23 Harris v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 698 (9th Cir. 2005); Gaus, 980 F.2d at 24 566. The party seeking a federal forum has the burden of establishing that federal 25 jurisdiction is proper. Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 682-83 (9th Cir. 26 2006). 27 ORDER- 2 1 Pursuant to the Court’s local rules, if the complaint filed in state court does not set 2 forth the dollar the dollar amount prayed for, the complaint may nonetheless be removed 3 “if a reasonable person, reading the complaint of the plaintiff, would conclude that the 4 plaintiff was seeking damages in an amount greater than [$75,000].” Local Rules W.D. 5 Wash. LCR 101(a). “The amount in controversy is simply an estimate of the total 6 amount in dispute, not a prospective assessment of defendant’s liability.” Lewis v. 7 Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 627 F.3d 395, 400 (9th Cir. 2010). 8 “Where it is not facially evident from the complaint that more than $75,000 is in 9 controversy, the removing party must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 10 amount in controversy meets the jurisdictional threshold.” Matheson v. Progressive 11 Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003). Under this burden, the defendant 12 must show that it is ‘more likely than not’ that the amount in controversy exceeds the 13 jurisdictional threshold. See Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 699 (9th 14 Cir. 2007). Applying this standard, plaintiff must show whether “it is more likely than 15 not Plaintiff can recover $75,000 if successful on all of her claims.” Patel v. Nike Retail 16 Servs., Inc., 58 F. Supp. 3d 1032, 1039 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (emphasis in original). IV. 17 18 DISCUSSION Despite the Court’s conclusion that it has jurisdiction over this matter, Dkt. # 16, 19 Plaintiff nonetheless asserts that Defendant has not, in fact, met its burden to show that, 20 more likely than not, the amount in controversy here exceeds $75,000, Dkt. # 17. 21 Plaintiff claims Defendant has established the amount is no more than $22,353.85, based 22 on Plaintiff’s emergency room visit, the cost of vehicle repair, and statutory attorney’s 23 fees. Dkt. # 17 at 5-6. This calculation, however, is improperly limited to the portion of 24 medical costs that Plaintiff has chosen to disclose and ignores the scope of Plaintiff’s 25 alleged harm and her requests for relief. See Chavez v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 888 26 F.3d 413, 418 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[The amount in controversy] includes all relief claimed at 27 the time of removal to which the plaintiff would be entitled if she prevails.”). ORDER- 3 1 In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she “suffered physical disability and pain, 2 emotional trauma, medical expenses, loss of earnings and earning capacity and other 3 damages,” as a result of the collision with Defendant. Dkt. # 1-1 ¶ 3.10. In her prayer for 4 relief, Plaintiff lists a broad range of general and specific damages “including past and 5 future medical expenses and other health expenses; pain and suffering, both mental and 6 physical, loss of enjoyment of life, past and future special damages . . . physical damage 7 to the vehicle involved in the collision, the cost to repair said damage, loss of use, rental 8 expenses, storage costs, and other out-of-pocket expenses . . . [as well as] [f]or such other 9 and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable.” Id. ¶ 5.1-5.3. Plaintiff does not 10 merely seek economic loss for her emergency room bills and for the physical damage to 11 her car; she claims she suffered physical disability significant enough to cause her to lose 12 earnings and to diminish her future earning capacity. As Defendant indicated in its 13 response to the Court’s Order to Show Cause, Plaintiff’s claim of diminished earning 14 capacity would likely extend for fifteen or more years, given Plaintiff’s age of 49 and 15 work life expectancy. Dkt. # 14 ¶ 4. A reasonable person reading Plaintiff’s Complaint 16 would conclude that the amount in controversy—based on her allegations of physical and 17 emotional harm, physical disability that impairs her ability to work in the future, limits 18 her earning capacity, and results in a loss of enjoyment of life, as well as all past and 19 future medical costs—exceeds $75,000. 20 Moreover, Plaintiff’s reliance on Matheson is misplaced. The complaint in 21 Matheson centered on an insured’s claim for loss of a truck, valued at $15,516, for a 22 period of less than two months. Id. at 1091. The plaintiffs requested compensation for 23 economic loss “in excess” of $10,000, emotional distress “in excess” of $10,000, and 24 punitive damages “in excess” of $10,000. Id. The Ninth Circuit found that there was “a 25 serious question whether more than $75,000 was in controversy” after considering the 26 facts of the complaint. Id. Specifically, the Court questioned “how deprivation of an 27 asset worth less than $16,000 for a period of two months could be worth as much as ORDER- 4 1 $10,000.” Id. The Court next questioned how emotional distress damages associated 2 with such a deprivation could be significantly more than $10,000, and ultimately found 3 that the circumstances did not support punitive damages significantly in excess of the 4 $10,000 floor requested. Id. Given the facts alleged, the Court concluded that the record 5 was “devoid of any evidence that [defendant] made the required showing of the amount 6 in controversy.” Id. 7 In Gaus v. Miles Inc.—also cited by Plaintiff in support of her motion to remand— 8 the Ninth Circuit ordered the district court to remand after finding that the defendant 9 failed to present any facts whatsoever to support federal jurisdiction. 980 F.2d 564, 567 10 (9th Cir. 1992). Concerned that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the 11 Court initially ordered the parties to file supplemental memoranda to show cause as to 12 why the case should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 565. 13 The plaintiff responded that state law prohibited a demand for a specific amount above 14 $10,000. Id. He nonetheless alleged the actual damages sought were “in the millions of 15 dollars,” but failed to point to any pleading supporting this allegation. Id. The defendant 16 made a similarly unsubstantiated assertion that “the matter in current controversy . . . 17 exceeds the sum of $50,000,” without setting forth any specific factual allegations to 18 support it. Id. at 567. Based on defendant’s failure to identify underlying facts in support 19 of its assertion that the amount in controversy requirement was satisfied, the Court 20 vacated the judgment and remanded the case. Id. 21 The case at hand is factually distinguishable from Matheson and Gaus. The relief 22 sought in Matheson for the temporary loss of a truck valued at less than $16,000 did not 23 support an amount in controversy above $75,000. The allegations of damages “in the 24 millions of dollars” in Gaus were unsupported by any factual allegations and were 25 therefore insufficient to establish an amount in controversy. Here, Plaintiff’s alleged 26 injury and concomitant request for various forms of relief would lead a reasonable person 27 to conclude that Plaintiff is seeking more than $75,000 and are sufficient to establish the ORDER- 5 1 Court’s jurisdiction. Dkt. # 1-2 at 3. The Court therefore denies Plaintiff’s motion to 2 remand. V. 3 4 5 6 7 8 CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to remand. Dkt. # 17. The Court will not award Plaintiff’s attorney’s fees, as Defendant’s basis for removing was not objectively unreasonable. See Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 139 (2005)(“[A]bsent unusual circumstances, attorney’s fees should not be awarded when the removing party has an objectively reasonable basis for removal.”). 9 10 DATED this 6th day of November, 2020. 11 13 A 14 The Honorable Richard A. Jones United States District Judge 12 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 ORDER- 6
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