Clasablanca v. Kitsap County Sheriff's Department et al, No. 3:2019cv05061 - Document 30 (W.D. Wash. 2019)

Court Description: ORDER granting 15 Motion to Dismiss and 17 Motion to Dismiss without prejudice and with leave to amend. Amended Complaint due by 6/14/2019. Signed by Judge Benjamin H. Settle. (MGC)

Download PDF
Clasablanca v. Kitsap County Sheriff's Department et al Doc. 30 1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 6 7 8 CASE NO. C19-5061 BHS RICKEY CLASABLANCA, Plaintiff, 9 10 v. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS KITSAP COUNTY and CONMED, LLC., 11 Defendants. 12 13 14 15 16 17 This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Kitsap County’s (“Kitsap County”) motion to dismiss, Dkt. 15, and Kitsap County and Conmed, LLC’s (“Conmed”) (collectively “Defendants”) joint motion to dismiss, Dkt. 17. The Court has considered the pleadings filed in support of and in opposition to the motions and the remainder of the file and hereby grants the motions for the reasons stated herein. 18 I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 19 On September 27, 2018, Plaintiff Rickey Clasablanca (“Clasablanca”) filed a tort 20 claim with the Kitsap County Clerk of the Board of Commissioners alleging negligence 21 and deliberate indifference. Dkt. 14, 1.1–1.3. On November 28, 2018, Clasablanca filed 22 ORDER - 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 a complaint against the Kitsap County Sheriff’s Department (“Sheriff’s Department”), 2 Kitsap County, and Conmed in the Kitsap County Superior Court for the State of 3 Washington. Dkt. 1-1. On January 22, 2019, Kitsap County and the Sheriff’s Department 4 filed a notice of removal in this Court. Dkt. 1. On January 29, 2019, Kitsap County and 5 the Sheriff’s Department filed a motion to dismiss. Dkt. 9. On February 19, 2019, the 6 parties stipulated that Casablanca would amend the complaint and remove the Sheriff’s 7 Department as a defendant and Kitsap County and the Sheriff’s Department would 8 withdraw their motion to dismiss. Dkt. 12. 9 On March 14, 2019, Clasablanca filed his amended complaint. Dkt. 14. On March 10 28, 2019, Kitsap County filed a motion to dismiss. Dkt. 15. Also on March 28, 2019, 11 Defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss. Dkt. 17. On April 7, 2019, Casablanca 12 responded to Kitsap County’s motion to dismiss, Dkt. 19, and responded to Defendants’ 13 joint motion to dismiss, Dkt. 21. On April 19, 2019, Defendants replied to Casablanca’s 14 response to their motion, Dkt. 26, and Kitsap County replied to Clasablanca’s response to 15 its motion, Dkt. 27. 16 17 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Clasablanca was incarcerated in the Kitsap County Jail from February 12, 2016, to 18 July 28, 2016. Dkt. 14, 2.2. Clasablanca worked in the jail’s kitchen. Id. 2.3. On 19 March 14, 2016, Clasablanca walked by an electrical outlet in the kitchen and was 20 shocked by electricity. Id. 2.10. He was “startled by a sudden explosion and shower of 21 sparks from the hazardous outlet” and sustained a burn to his leg. Id. 2.10–2.11. 22 ORDER - 2 1 Recoiling from the injury, Clasablanca suffered a severe injury to his lower back. Id. 2 2.11. 3 Kitsap County was notified that Clasablanca was injured, “but chose not to send 4 medical personnel to examine and evaluate [Clasablanca’s] injuries.” Id. 2.12. Through 5 Clasablanca’s release date, his back injury was neither diagnosed nor treated. Id. 2.17. 6 During this period, Clasablana alleges that Conmed and Kitsap County “engaged in, 7 cooperated in, and displayed deliberate indifference to [Clasablanca’s] injuries and not 8 only denied him adequate diagnosis and medical care, but engaged in concerted efforts to 9 create a false justification for refusing to diagnose and treat his severe back injury” and 10 that Conmed’s employees “intentionally [took] actions designed to ensure that 11 [Clasablanca] would be denied diagnostic and medical care regarding his back injury.” 12 Id. 2.18, 5.4(c). 13 III. DISCUSSION Casablanca’s amended complaint alleges claims for premises liability, negligence, 14 15 and deliberate indifference against Kitsap County and for “professional/medical 16 negligence” against Conmed. Dkt. 14. Kitsap County moves to dismiss Clasablanca’s 17 claim for negligence and premises liability. Dkt. 15. Conmed and Kitsap County move 18 jointly to dismiss “all claims arising out of medical care.” Dkt. 16. 19 A. 20 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) Standard Motions to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 21 Procedure may be based on either the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of 22 sufficient facts alleged under such a theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Department, ORDER - 3 1 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Material allegations are taken as admitted and the 2 complaint is construed in the plaintiff’s favor. Keniston v. Roberts, 717 F.2d 1295, 1301 3 (9th Cir. 1983). Despite this, courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion 4 couched as a factual allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To survive 5 a motion to dismiss, the complaint does not require detailed factual allegations but must 6 provide the grounds for entitlement to relief and not merely a “formulaic recitation” of 7 the elements of a cause of action. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 8 (2007). Plaintiffs must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on 9 its face.” Id. at 570. “[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by 10 identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to 11 the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. 12 B. 13 Evidence Outside the Complaint As a threshold matter, the Court must address Clasablanca’s argument that “the 14 Court should consider the statutory disclosures made prior to suit and take a dim view of 15 a 12(b)(6) motion in which the Defendant pleads ignorance of the basis for the allegations 16 against it based on the complaint alone.” Dkt. 19 at 9. Washington State requires that 17 individuals asserting a tort claim against government defendants submit the claim for 18 review 60 days before filing their case in court. RCW 4.96.010, .020. The required 19 “Standard Tort Claim” form involves substantial disclosure of information supporting the 20 claim, such as police reports and medical records. See RCW 4.92.100; Dkt. 22-3 at 2. 21 Clasablanca argues that because he complied with this requirement prior to filing his 22 case, Defendants have “received a veritable cornucopia of evidence” and should fully ORDER - 4 1 understand the case against them. Dkt. 19 at 9; see also Dkt. 21 at 13–16. In support of 2 his response briefs, Clasablanca submits the 114-page tort claim form he submitted to 3 Kitsap County and a 34-page letter he sent to Conmed “making a statutory offer to 4 mediate in good faith and describing [Clasablanca’s] complaints against Conmed.” Dkts. 5 22, 22-4, 22-5. 6 However, a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is not intended only 7 as Clasablanca argues, to ensure a defendant has “sufficient facts to understand why it is 8 being sued.” Dkt. 19 at 9. A motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) also tests 9 whether a complaint contains enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible, not 10 just conceivable. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Clasablanca provides no authority for the 11 proposition that an administrative exhaustion process relieves him of his obligation to 12 draft a complaint which provides facts to support all of the required elements of his 13 claims. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79. 14 Further, in general a court may not consider matters outside the pleadings in 15 deciding a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Doing 16 so requires treating the motion as a request for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 17 56. Id. 18 In response to Kitsap County’s motion to dismiss his premises liability claims, 19 Clasablanca asks that if the Court grants Kitsap County’s motion to dismiss, it grant the 20 motion with leave to amend. Dkt. 19 at 10–11. Kitsap County argues that Clasablanca has 21 converted the motion and requests that if the Court denies its motion to dismiss, it should 22 grant summary judgment instead. While the Court will not consider the extrinsic ORDER - 5 1 evidence Clasablanca has submitted on this motion, because the Court grants the motion 2 to dismiss but finds the claims may be cured by amendment, the Court grants the motion 3 to dismiss with leave to amend and denies Kitsap County’s request for summary 4 judgment. 5 In response to Defendants’ joint motion to dismiss his medical care claims, 6 Clasablanca asks the Court to convert the motion to dismiss to one for summary 7 judgment, and then allow him to engage in discovery before submitting a response. Dkt. 8 21 at 17. Defendants ask the Court not to consider the extrinsic evidence submitted on the 9 medical care claims and to grant the motion to dismiss. Dkt. 26 at 1. The Court finds that 10 Clasablanca’s claims do not survive the motion to dismiss but may be cured by 11 amendment. Therefore, the Court will grant the motion to dismiss with leave to amend. 12 C. Merits 13 1. Premises Liability 14 To state a claim for negligence, “the plaintiff must show (1) the existence of a duty 15 to the complaining party, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) a resulting injury, and (4) that the 16 breach was the proximate cause of the injury.” Reynolds v. Hicks, 134 Wn.2d 491, 495 17 (1998). In general, for a possessor of land to breach his or her duty to an invitee, the 18 possessor must have actual or constructive notice of the unsafe condition, or the 19 possessor or his or her employees must have caused the unsafe condition. Ingersoll v. 20 DeBartolo, Inc., 123 Wn.2d 649, 652 (1994) (citing Smith v. Manning’s, Inc., 13 Wn.2d 21 573 (1942)); Wiltse v. Albertson’s Inc., 116 Wn.2d 452, 453–54 (1991). It is the invitee’s 22 ORDER - 6 1 burden to show that the premises owner had actual or constructive notice of the hazard. 2 Tavari v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 176 Wn. App. 122, 307 (2013). 3 The parties agree that the applicable duty in this case is that of an owner of 4 premises to an invitee. See Dkt. 15 at 4; Dkt. 19 at 4. Kitsap County argues that the 5 allegations in Clasablanca’s complaint fail to provide any factual basis that it had actual 6 or constructive notice that the electrical outset was unsafe. Dkt. 15 at 5. Some allegations 7 in Clasablanca’s complaint regarding Kitsap County’s alleged breach of duty could be 8 construed as factual, such as that Kitsap County failed to regularly inspect the premises 9 for defects in electrical outlets, failed to follow safety procedures for preventive 10 maintenance, failed to repair the outlet, or failed to warn of its danger. See Dkt. 19 at 5–6 11 (citing Dkt. 14, 2.1–2.11). However, any of these theories of breach would need to 12 contain an accompanying basis for causation. To satisfy the causation element on these 13 theories, the complaint would have to include allegations making it plausible, not just 14 possible, that the faulty outlet had persisted for some length of time such that Kitsap 15 County should have discovered its faulty state. The complaint lacks these allegations. 16 Clasablanca also argues that the complaint “includes clear factual allegations of . . 17 . how [he] alleges Defendants had actual notice of the defect”—that Kitsap County 18 “created the defect” or “was aware of the defect through actual notice (employees, 19 agents, or inmates had reported the defect).” Dkt. 19 at 6 (citing Dkt. 14, 2.9). 20 Considering these allegations regarding affirmative acts and the previously discussed 21 allegations regarding failure to act, it appears to the Court that Clasablanca’s complaint 22 sets out all possible ways Kitsap County could potentially be liable for the condition of ORDER - 7 1 the outlet without including any facts or circumstances which permit the Court to “infer 2 more than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Therefore, 3 Clasablanca’s claims for premises liability are dismissed. While the Court understands 4 that Clasablanca has already withdrawn his complaint and filed an amended version 5 pursuant to stipulation of the parties, see Dkt. 27 at 3–4, the Court finds it is not 6 absolutely clear that Clasablanca’s claims cannot be cured by amendment. Therefore, the 7 Court dismisses Clasablanca’s premises liability claims without prejudice and with leave 8 to amend. 9 10 2. Deliberate Indifference The Court understands Clasablanca’s claim for deliberate indifference to be a 11 claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that Kitsap County was deliberately indifferent to his 12 serious medical need in violation of the Eight Amendment. “While local governments 13 may be sued under § 1983, they cannot be held vicariously liable for their employees’ 14 constitutional violations.” Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, 728 F.3d 1086, 1096 (9th Cir. 15 2013). To state a claim against a municipality under § 1983, a Plaintiff must allege 16 sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that the execution of a policy, custom, or 17 practice was the “moving force” that resulted in the deprivation of his constitutional 18 rights. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691–92 (1978). Because a 19 municipality may not be sued under a respondeat superior theory, “[a] plaintiff must 20 therefore show ‘deliberate action attributable to the municipality [that] directly caused a 21 deprivation of federal rights.’” Horton by Horton v. City of Santa Maria, 915 F.3d 592, 22 603 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 415 (1997)). ORDER - 8 1 Clasablanca argues that paragraphs 4.2–4.10 of his amended complaint contain 2 specific facts showing a Monell violation. Dkt. 21 at 10–13 (citing Dkt. 14, 4.2–4.10). 3 In fact, the cited paragraphs contain no specific facts which suggest deliberate action 4 attributable to Kitsap County directly causing a deprivation of federal rights. See Horton, 5 915 F.3d at 592. Clasablanca alleges that Kitsap County hired Conmed to provide 6 medical care to inmates, that Kitsap County “negligently failed to provide reasonable 7 medical diagnostic effort and reasonable medical care” to him, that Kitsap County 8 “engaged in a pattern of deliberate indifference” to his medical condition “which was the 9 result of broad policies, customs, practices, and procedures implemented by [Conmed],” 10 and that Kitsap County was deliberately indifferent “when its employees, following a 11 common practice which is known and prevalent in the Kitsap County Jail, cooperated 12 with [Conmed] to create a record in order to try to justify denying prisoners medical 13 treatment.” Dkt. 14, 4.2–4.9. Earlier in the complaint, Clasablanca alleges that Kitsap 14 County was aware of his injury “via actual notice,” but “chose not to send medical 15 personnel to examine and evaluate” his injuries. Id. 2.1. These allegations are simply 16 legal conclusions, which the court is not bound to accept as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 17 While it is certainly possible that someone told a medical provider or guard that 18 Clasablanca was injured and needed medical treatment and that these responsible parties 19 not only failed to refer Clasablanca for treatment but recorded false or misleading 20 statements in the medical or inmate records, and that these actions were taken according 21 to jail practice, Clasablanca has simply not provided any facts or circumstances to bring 22 his allegations past the threshold of plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557. Therefore, the ORDER - 9 1 Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss, but grants leave to amend as it is possible 2 that Clasablanca’s claims may be cured by amendment. 3 3. 4 The elements of a claim that a health care provider breached his or her duty to a Professional/Medical Negligence 5 patient by failing to follow the standard of care are set out in RCW 7.70.040. The 6 plaintiff must prove that: “(1) [t]he health care provider failed to exercise that degree of 7 care, skill and learning expected of a reasonably prudent health care provider at that time 8 in the profession or class to which he or she belongs, in the State of Washington, acting 9 in the same or similar circumstances,” and “(2) [s]uch failure was a proximate cause of 10 the injury complained of.” RCW 7.70.040. 11 Clasablanca alleges that Kitsap County was aware “via actual notice” of his 12 injuries, that Kitsap County contracted with Conmed to provide some medical services to 13 inmates, and that Kitsap County and Conmed “negligently failed to diagnose and treat” 14 his severe back injury and “not only denied him adequate diagnostic and medical care, 15 but engaged in concerted efforts to create a false justification for refusing to diagnose and 16 treat his severe back injury.” Dkt. 21 at 6 (citing Dkt. 14, 2.1–2.8). Again, while it is 17 entirely possible that these things occurred, Clasablanca has failed to match his legal 18 allegations with basic facts—with respect to this claim, Clasablanca has failed to even 19 articulate whether or not he had any interaction with a particular medical provider who 20 may be found to have failed to provide the standard of care. Therefore, the Court grants 21 Defendants’ motion to dismiss, but grants leave to amend as it is possible that 22 Clasablanca’s claims may be cured by amendment. ORDER - 10 1 2 IV. ORDER Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that Clasablanca’s claims are DISMISSED 3 without prejudice and with leave to amend. Clasablanca may file an amended complaint 4 as stated herein no later than June 14, 2019. 5 Dated this 3rd day of June, 2019. A 6 7 BENJAMIN H. SETTLE United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 ORDER - 11

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.