Schumacher et al v Inslee et al, No. 3:2018cv05535 - Document 58 (W.D. Wash. 2020)
Court Description: ORDER granting Defendant SEIU 775's 49 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive and declaratory relief with respect to both the terminated opt-out system and the current affirmative consent system are DISMISSED with prejudice. Signed by Judge Marsha J. Pechman. (PM)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Schumacher et al v Inslee et al Doc. 58 Case 3:18-cv-05535-MJP Document 58 Filed 07/22/20 Page 1 of 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 8 9 10 LINDA SCHUMACHER, et al., 11 Plaintiffs, 12 13 14 v. CASE NO. C18-5535 MJP ORDER ON SEIU 775’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT JAY INSLEE, et al., Defendants. 15 16 The above-entitled Court, having received and reviewed: 17 1. Defendant SEIU 775’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ Claims 18 19 20 21 22 23 for Prospective Relief (Dkt. No. 49), 2. Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendant SEIU 775’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ Claims for Prospective Relief (Dkt. No. 51), 3. Defendant SEIU 775’s Reply in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ Claims for Prospective Relief (Dkt. No. 52), all attached declarations and exhibits, and relevant portions of the record, rules as follows: 24 ORDER ON SEIU 775’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 Dockets.Justia.com Case 3:18-cv-05535-MJP Document 58 Filed 07/22/20 Page 2 of 7 1 IT IS ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED; Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive and 2 declaratory relief with respect to both the terminated opt-out system and the current affirmative 3 consent system are DISMISSED with prejudice. 4 Background 5 Factual 6 In 2014, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616 (2014), 7 holding that the First Amendment prohibited the collection of “agency fees” from personal 8 assistants who did not wish to join or support their union. In the wake of that decision, the State 9 of Washington and Defendant SEIU 775 renegotiated the collective bargaining agreement 10 (“CBA”) of their Individual Providers (“IPs”) so that those IPs who did not wish to join the 11 union or pay union dues could opt out of doing so. Dkt. No. 24, ¶ 4. The constitutionality of 12 that opt-out system was affirmed by this Court in Hoffman v. Inslee, C14-200MJP (W.D. Wash. 13 Oct. 19, 2016). 14 Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Janus v. AFCME, Council 31, 138 S.Ct. 2448 15 (2018), the State of Washington and SEIU 775 undertook to halt deductions of any dues or fees 16 from IPs who had not given affirmative consent to such deductions. Dkt. Nos. 24-1, 25 ¶¶ 3-12. 17 Any IPs who had been subject to such deductions from July 16, 2018 forward were reimbursed. 18 Dkt. No. 25, ¶ 11. 19 On August 3, 2018, the union and the State entered into a Memorandum of 20 Understanding (“MOU”) formalizing the changes to the dues deduction practices indicated in the 21 above paragraph. Dkt. No. 24, ¶ 8, Dkt. No. 24-2. Article 4.1 of the 2017-2019 CBA was 22 revised to forbid deduction of union dues absent “proper authorization by a home care worker of 23 the Union for dues deduction in accordance with RCW 41.56.113(1)(a).” Dkt. No. 24-2. The 24 ORDER ON SEIU 775’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 Case 3:18-cv-05535-MJP Document 58 Filed 07/22/20 Page 3 of 7 1 current CBA’s Article 4.1 reflects the same revisions. Dkt. No. 47, 2nd Amended Complaint, ¶ 2 23 & n.9. 3 All four named plaintiffs are listed in the system which tracks the payment of union dues 4 and fees as a “non-member.” Dkt. No. 25, ¶ 13. Union dues deductions for each last occurred 5 on the following dates: 6 • Plaintiff Linda Schumacher: June 15, 2018 7 • Plaintiff Robb Israel: April 2, 2018 8 • Plaintiff Surena Israel: April 16, 2018 9 • Plaintiff Miranda Thorpe: October 2015 1 10 Dkt. No. 25, ¶¶ 14-17. 11 Procedural 12 This matter was filed as a putative class action on July 18, 2018, naming as Defendants 13 SEIU 775, Governor Jay Inslee and Cheryl Strange (Secretary of the Department of Social and 14 Health Services). Dkt. No. 1. An amended class action complaint was filed on July 17, 2018, 15 Dkt. No. 7. The matter was transferred from the Honorable Benjamin Settle of this district to 16 this Court upon a notice of related case (Hoffman v. Inslee, No. 16-35740 (9th Cir.). Dkt. No. 9. 17 A stay was entered on October 23, 2018 to permit Plaintiffs the opportunity to opt out of 18 a settlement reached in Hoffman (which was later re-named Routh v. Inslee). Dkt. No. 35. 19 Plaintiffs notified the Court of their decision to opt out of the Routh settlement on January 27, 20 2020. Dkt. No. 44. A Second Amended Complaint was filed (with Defendants’ consent) on 21 March 6, 2020. Dkt. No. 47. 22 23 24 1 Ms. Thorpe’s deductions ceased when she filed suit in Thorpe v. Inslee, 188 Wn.2d 282 (2017). ORDER ON SEIU 775’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3 Case 3:18-cv-05535-MJP Document 58 Filed 07/22/20 Page 4 of 7 1 Discussion 2 Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party demonstrates “that there is no 3 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 4 law.” FRCP 56(a). The facts appear uncontroverted, and Defendant SEIU 775 seeks dismissal 5 of Plaintiffs’ claims for prospective relief on the grounds that Plaintiffs have not established the 6 requisite standing to sue for relief on injunctive or declaratory grounds. 7 The establishment of Article III standing to sue is a foundational prerequisite to bringing 8 suit in federal court. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013). Article III 9 standing requires a plaintiff to demonstrate an injury that is “concrete, particularized, and actual 10 or imminent, fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.” Id. 11 at 409 (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010)). Injunctive 12 relief is premised upon a showing of a likelihood of repeated injury or future harm. City of L.A. 13 v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 110-11 (1982); B.C. v. Plumas Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d 1260, 1264 14 (9th Cir. 1999). Declaratory relief requires evidence that the declaration being sought will 15 remedy the alleged injury. Mayfield v. United States, 599 F.3d 964, 971-72 (9th Cir. 2010). 16 Neither injunctive nor declaratory relief may be premised on past injury. O’Shea v. 17 Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974); Leu v. Int’l Boundary Comm’n, 605 GF.3d 693, 694 (9th 18 Cir. 2010 (citing Fieger v. Michigan Supreme Court, 553 F.3d 955, 962 (6th Cir. 2009). 19 This Court addressed a similar request from the State Defendants in this matter earlier in 20 the case, finding at that time that Plaintiffs had “failed to demonstrate any injury in fact from the 21 allegedly unconstitutional procedure, and it is a shortcoming which is fatal.” Dkt. No. 36 at 6. 22 The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ position has not changed in any significant manner, dictating a 23 similar outcome. 24 ORDER ON SEIU 775’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4 Case 3:18-cv-05535-MJP Document 58 Filed 07/22/20 Page 5 of 7 1 Since June 2018, union dues have only been deducted from the paychecks of IPs “upon 2 proper authorization by a home care worker of the Union for dues deduction in accordance with 3 RCW 41.156.113(1)(a).” Dkt. No. 24-2, CBA Article 4.1. There is no dispute that no Plaintiff 4 has given dues deduction authorizations in conformity with the statute, and none has had union 5 dues deducted from their paychecks since the filing of this case in July 2018. None of the 6 Plaintiffs have expressed an intention to authorize future deductions or claimed they are being 7 injured by the cost allocations provisions of RCW 41.156.113(1)(a). Plaintiffs continue to lack 8 any “concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent” personal injury, “fairly traceable” to the 9 dues-deduction procedures of which they complain. 10 Plaintiffs do not salvage their First Amendment claim by their citation to Chicago 11 Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 307-309 (1985). The First Amendment 12 violation in that matter originated from the lack of safeguards around a process which called for 13 nonunion members to pay a fee proportionate to the amount of dues related directly to collective 14 bargaining (but not be assessed that portion related to other union activities). Plaintiffs here are 15 subject to no dues or fee deductions; the entire contribution to SEIU is completely voluntary, and 16 Plaintiffs have neither volunteered nor been assessed anything, and thus can establish no “First 17 Amendment injury.” 18 Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint adds an allegation that the procedure at issue also 19 violates Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights. This does nothing to alter the fundamental 20 defect in their position – they have not demonstrated an “injury in fact” under their new legal 21 theory, either. As was noted in the Court’s earlier order, Plaintiffs “cannot substitute a 22 conceptual constitutional violation for the requirements essential to their standing to bring suit.” 23 Dkt. No. 36, Order at 6. 24 ORDER ON SEIU 775’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 5 Case 3:18-cv-05535-MJP Document 58 Filed 07/22/20 Page 6 of 7 1 The other cases Plaintiffs cite in support of their position are distinguishable. In 2 DBSI/TRI IV Ltd. Partnership v. U.S., 465 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2006), the plaintiffs who were 3 granted standing (despite not yet having suffered an economic injury) were found to nevertheless 4 have suffered a concrete injury owing to their status as tenants under a new housing statutory 5 scheme with fewer procedural rights than their previous system. Id. at 1038. Though not yet 6 having been actually injured, they were subject to being injured in a redressable manner simply 7 by their status as tenants under the new housing system. Nothing about Plaintiffs’ current status 8 as non-dues paying employees subjects them to even the possibility of the injuries of which they 9 complain. 10 And, in Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 899 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2018), Plaintiff was 11 granted injunctive and declaratory relief based on her representation that she desired to purchase 12 the product which she alleged was being sold in a fraudulently misleading way. Id. at 970-71. 13 Plaintiffs here have made no representations nor submitted any evidence that they intend to pay 14 SEIU dues in the future and thus are not eligible to sue for a prospective injury to which they 15 will not be subject. 16 17 Conclusion Having failed to establish “injury in fact,” a prerequisite to Article III standing to sue, 18 Plaintiffs will not be permitted to pursue claims for injunctive and declaratory relief as regards 19 Defendant SEIU 775’s dues deduction process. The union’s motion for partial summary 20 judgment dismissing that portion of Plaintiffs’ claim (as set forth in ¶¶ 80-85 of the Second 21 Amended Complaint) is GRANTED. 22 23 24 ORDER ON SEIU 775’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 6 Case 3:18-cv-05535-MJP Document 58 Filed 07/22/20 Page 7 of 7 1 The clerk is ordered to provide copies of this order to all counsel. 2 Dated July 22, 2020. 3 4 5 A Marsha J. Pechman United States Senior District Judge 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 ORDER ON SEIU 775’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 7
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
