Marshall v. Washington State Bar Association et al, No. 3:2011cv05319 - Document 79 (W.D. Wash. 2012)
Court Description: ORDER granting 52 53 Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings. by Samuel Conti.(TD)
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Marshall v. Washington State Bar Association et al Doc. 79 1 2 3 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 5 AT SEATTLE 6 7 BRADLEY MARSHALL, Plaintiff, 8 v. For the Western District of Washington United States District Court 9 10 11 WASHINGTON STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, et al., Defendants. 12 13 14 15 I. ) Case No. CV-11-5319 SC ) ) ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR ) JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) INTRODUCTION This case constitutes Plaintiff Bradley Marshall's 16 ("Marshall") fourth attempt to challenge his disbarment by the 17 Washington Supreme Court. 18 that his disbarment was motivated by racial prejudice on the part 19 of the fifty-four defendants in this action, including Washington 20 State, the Washington State Bar Association ("WSBA"), WSBA's Board 21 of Governors, WSBA's Disciplinary Board, several individually named 22 frontline actors, and the Washington Supreme Court and ten of its 23 current and former justices (collectively, "Defendants"). 24 alleged similar due process and equal protection violations in his 25 disciplinary proceedings before the WSBA and in his disbarment 26 hearing before the Washington Supreme Court. 27 (or could have raised) nearly identical issues in two prior 28 collateral attacks filed in federal district court and bankruptcy Marshall, an African-American, alleges Marshall Marshall also raised Dockets.Justia.com 1 court, an appeal filed with the Ninth Circuit, and two petitions 2 for writs of certiorari filed with the United States Supreme Court. 3 Marshall has been unsuccessful in each and every one of these 4 actions. 5 collateral attack as "vexatious and frivolous." 6 seventh to address the alleged impropriety of Marshall's disbarment 7 proceedings. United States District Court For the Western District of Washington This court is the Now before the Court are motions for judgment on the pleadings 8 9 In fact, the Ninth Circuit characterized his last brought by the WSBA Defendants and the State Defendants.1 ECF Nos. 10 52 ("WSBA Defs.' Mot."); 53 ("State Defs.' Mot."). 11 fully briefed. 12 60 ("WSBA Reply").2 13 December 5, 2011 and May 7, 2012. 14 concludes that Marshall's claims fail as a matter of law. 15 is effectively asking the Court to review the final judgment of the 16 Washington Supreme Court. 17 Court lacks jurisdiction to do so. 18 courts have found that Marshall's prior collateral attacks were 19 also barred by Rooker-Feldman, the Court could not find otherwise. 20 The doctrine of res judicata requires that the Court respect the 21 1 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 The Motions are ECF Nos. 57 ("Opp'n"), 59 ("State Defs.' Reply"), The Court held hearings on this matter on ECF Nos. 50, 77. The Court Marshall Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Indeed, as a number of other The "State Defendants" consist of Washington State, the Washington Supreme Court, and the ten Washington Supreme Court justices named in this action. The remaining defendants are the "WSBA Defendants." The WSBA Defendants have joined in the legal argument section of State Defendant's Motion. ECF No. 54. 2 Marshall also filed a surreply, ECF No. 61 ("Surreply"), sparking the parties to file an impressive number of additional motions. The State and WSBA Defendants filed an objection and motion to strike the surreply. ECF Nos. 63, 65. Marshall filed a response and a motion to strike Defendants' motion to strike. ECF No. 64, 66. Defendants filed an opposition to Marshall's motion to strike. ECF No. 67. It appears that all the parties have violated various local rules in filing this additional briefing. Nevertheless, the Court has reviewed and considered all arguments submitted. 2 1 final judgments previously entered against Marshall in his two 2 prior collateral attacks. 3 Defendants' motions for judgment on the pleadings and DISMISSES 4 WITH PREJUDICE Marshall's claims in their entirety. 5 further wasteful and vexatious re-litigation of this matter, the 6 Court issues an injunction, as described in Section V infra, 7 requiring Marshall to submit a motion for leave to file before 8 initiating any future suits against Defendants. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS To prevent United States District Court For the Western District of Washington 9 10 II. BACKGROUND 11 A. Marshall's Disbarment and Subsequent Appeal 12 Marshall was admitted to practice law in Washington in 1986. 13 ECF No. 44 ("TAC"). 14 been disciplined on three separate occasions. 15 Disciplinary Proceeding Against Marshall ("In re Marshall"), 167 16 Wash. 2d 51, 83 (Wash. 2009). 17 "failing to respond to the WSBA's requests for information." 18 In 1998, he was reprimanded "for conduct involving dishonesty, 19 fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation." 20 given an eighteen-month suspension for deceitful conduct, failing 21 to remit client funds, and failing to abide by his clients' 22 decisions, among other things. 23 Prior to his disbarment in 2009, Marshall had See In re In 1989, he was admonished for Id. Id. And in 2007, he was Id. Marshall's disbarment proceedings commenced in 2006, when 24 Marshall's former clients complained and the WSBA charged Marshall 25 with twelve counts of violating the Washington Rules of 26 Professional Conduct. 27 alleged that Marshall: demanded additional fees to continue a 28 lawsuit that was paid for on a flat fee basis; filed a lawsuit and Id. at 58. Among other things, the WSBA 3 1 a lien against a client who refused to pay him additional fees; 2 engaged in a deceptive attempt to compel settlement; and failed to 3 obtain consent for a conflict of client interest. 4 defense, Marshall argued that the disbarment proceedings 5 constituted a violation of his due process and equal protection 6 rights. 7 engaged in "selective prosecution." United States District Court For the Western District of Washington In his Marshall also argued that WSBA had Id. Initially, Teena Killian ("Killian") was appointed as hearing 8 9 RJN Ex. A ¶ 167.3 Id. officer for Marshall's disciplinary proceedings. In re Marshall, 10 167 Wash. 2d at 65. 11 applied for a position as disciplinary counsel with the WSBA. 12 On or about June 22, 2006, Killian recused and her previous orders 13 were vacated. 14 after challenges to their appointments. 15 10, 2006, the chief hearing officer, James M. Danielson 16 ("Danielson"), appointed himself as hearing officer in Marshall's 17 case. 18 during the proceedings. 19 a seven-day hearing, Danielson made 175 findings of fact and 20 recommended that Marshall be disbarred. 21 Disciplinary Board unanimously agreed. Id. Id. At some point after May 25, 2006, Killian Id. The next two hearing officers were removed Id. Finally, on August Marshall did not challenge Danielson's appointment Id. Sometime around March 2007, following Id. at 58. The WSBA Id. The case proceeded to the Washington Supreme Court, where 22 23 Marshall disputed Danielson's factual findings and argued that his 24 due process rights had been violated because Danielson was biased. 25 Id. at 66. 26 that Killian had applied for a job with the WSBA, (2) Danielson 27 3 28 Specifically, Marshall argued that: (1) Danielson knew The WSBA Defendants filed a Request for Judicial Notice ("RJN") in support of their motion for judgment on the pleadings and their reply papers, attaching a number of exhibits. ECF No. 51 ("RJN"). 4 1 received an annual salary from the WSBA and participated in WSBA 2 committees, and (3) Danielson refused some of Marshall's requests 3 for discovery and testimony. 4 Id. at 68. On October 1, 2009, the Washington Supreme Court issued a against Danielson. 7 complaint concerning Killian was "unfounded" since Killian had 8 recused and her orders had been vacated; Danielson's WSBA salary 9 United States District Court final unanimous ruling, rejecting each of Marshall's complaints 6 For the Western District of Washington 5 "d[id] not bias him any more than the salary paid to any judge who Id. at 69. The court found that: Marshall's 10 hears cases brought by the State of Washington"; and Marshall 11 "fail[ed] to make a compelling argument that any of Mr. Danielson's 12 adverse rulings were the result of bias or prejudice." 13 court ultimately decided to disbar Marshall, finding that he 14 "committed a number of different violations, which individually 15 would have warranted disbarment." 16 2009, the court denied Marshall's request for a rehearing. 17 Marshall, 2009 Wash. LEXIS 1191 (Dec. 23, 2009). 18 Id. at 58. Id. The On December 23, In re Subsequently, Marshall appealed his disbarment, filing a 19 petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme 20 Court. 21 09-1357 ("Cert Pet."), 2010 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1765. 22 other things, Marshall argued that Washington's disciplinary system 23 was "structurally and operationally dysfunctional," that his 24 disbarment proceedings had been conducted in "bad faith," and that 25 his due process rights had been violated. 26 Again, Marshall complained that Danielson knew about Killian's job 27 application with the WSBA, that Danielson was biased because of his 28 involvement with the WSBA, and that Danielson unfairly ruled Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Marshall v. WSBA, No. 5 Among See id. at **40-43. 1 against Marshall's discovery requests. Id. at 40-41. 2 States Supreme Court denied Marshall's petition. 3 The United 130 S. Ct. 3480 (2010). Marshall v. WSBA, While his disciplinary proceedings were still pending in 6 Washington state court, Marshall filed two unsuccessful collateral 7 attacks in federal court. 8 suit against the WSBA and the State of Washington in the federal 9 United States District Court B. 5 For the Western District of Washington 4 Marshall's First Collateral Attack district court for the Western District of Washington. First, on May 15, 2008, Marshall filed RJN Ex. D. 10 The case was assigned to Judge James L. Robart ("Judge Robart"). 11 Marshall sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of 12 substantive due process, procedural due process, equal protection, 13 his First Amendment rights, his right to counsel, and the duty of 14 fair representation. 15 Danielson and Killian's involvement with his disciplinary 16 proceedings. 17 "the attorney disciplinary system in the State of Washington is 18 fraught with racial discrimination" and that the WSBA 19 "discriminates against ethnic minorities in investigations, 20 charging, prosecuting, and sanctioning attorneys . . . ." 21 38. 22 enforcement because he is an African-American.4 Id. Once again, Marshall complained of See, e.g., id. at 11-13. Marshall also argued that Id. at Marshall suggested that he had been singled out for selective Id. at 39. Marshall relied on four ABA studies as evidence of structural 23 24 25 26 27 28 4 As evidence of racial discrimination, Marshall pointed out that the three other attorneys who worked with him on one of the matters for which he was sanctioned had not been subject to disciplinary proceedings. RJN Ex. D at 39. Two of these attorneys were Caucasian, the other, Wheeler, was African-American. Id. Marshall alleged that "the only known factor distinguishing Wheeler and Marshall is that Wheeler had been a WSBA hearing officer and was known by the WSBA staff." Id. 6 "Clark Report," which found that few lawyers serving within the 3 disciplinary system were minorities; (2) the 1992 "McKay Report," 4 which recommended that all disciplinary prosecutors be independent 5 of the WSBA and an appropriate number of adjudicators should be 6 minority members; (3) the "1993 ABA report," which recommended that 7 Washington's disciplinary system be made independent from the WSBA; 8 and (4) the "2006 ABA Report," which called for "hearing officers, 9 United States District Court deficiencies in Washington's disciplinary system: (1) the 1970 2 For the Western District of Washington 1 review committees, and the Disciplinary Board to be subject to 10 oversight by an independent administrative committee, while 11 disciplinary counsel would be subject to primary oversight by the 12 Washington Supreme Court." 13 Id. at 5-7. Judge Robart dismissed the case with prejudice, finding that 14 he lacked jurisdiction to intervene in a disciplinary action. RJN 15 Ex. E at 5. 16 the findings of the disciplinary board in Washington state courts 17 and, after a final decision by the Washington Supreme Court, 18 Marshall could seek review in the United States Supreme Court. Judge Robart also stated that Marshall could challenge 19 C. 20 Id. Marshall's Second Collateral Attack Marshall's second collateral attack was filed in federal 21 bankruptcy court. On May 1, 2009, one week after Marshall's oral 22 argument in his disbarment hearings before the Washington Supreme 23 Court, Marshall filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition. 24 Then on October 27, 2009, almost one month after the Washington 25 Supreme Court issued its disbarment order, Marshall filed an 26 adversary complaint against Washington State and the WSBA in 27 bankruptcy court, again alleging due process, equal protection, and 28 fair representation violations in connection with his disbarment 7 RJN Ex. H. Philip H. Brandt ("Judge Brandt"). 3 once as a matter of right, adding eight new defendants, all of whom 4 are named in the instant action. 5 proceedings, Marshall alleged structural deficiencies and racial 6 bias in the Washington disciplinary system, citing the same four 7 ABA reports. 8 his rights to a fair and impartial hearing were violated because 9 United States District Court proceedings. 2 For the Western District of Washington 1 RJN Ex. L at 61-65. Danielson and Killian were biased. See id. at 6-10. The case was assigned to Judge Marshall amended his complaint RJN Ex. M. As in prior Once again, Marshall alleged that See id. at 17-32. Though the 10 issue was not raised in Marshall's amended complaint, later motion 11 practice and appeals revealed that Marshall's aim was to avail 12 himself of the automatic stay imposed under the Bankruptcy Code to 13 prevent the Washington Supreme Court from disbarring him.5 14 Ex. R at 3-4. See RJN Judge Brandt dismissed the action with prejudice, finding, 15 16 among other things, that Marshall's claims were barred by the 17 Rooker-Feldman doctrine and that the WSBA Defendants were immune 18 from suit. 19 Marshall's motion to file a second amended complaint -- the 20 complaint would have added as defendants members of the WSBA Board 21 of Governors and the justices of the Washington Supreme Court. 22 RJN Ex. Q at 20. RJN Exs. P, Q at 5-7. Judge Brandt also denied See Marshall then appealed the bankruptcy court's decision to the 23 24 federal district court for the Western District of Washington and 25 then to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 26 denied. Both appeals were The federal district court judge, Judge John C. Coughenour 27 28 5 Marshall raised a similar issue in his first petition for a writ of certiorari before the United States Supreme Court. 8 had been "conclusively adjudicated and decided by the Washington 3 Supreme Court, and [Marshall] is barred from re-litigating those 4 questions under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and from litigating 5 the claims he could have brought before that court by claim 6 preclusion." 7 "There could be no more iconic case where Rooker-Feldman must 8 apply." 9 United States District Court ("Judge Coughenour"), concluded that Marshall's due process claims 2 For the Western District of Washington 1 jurisdiction to review Marshall's disbarment under Rooker-Feldman Id. RJN Ex. R. at 7. Judge Coughenour also remarked: The Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that it lacked 10 and that Marshall's "conjectured constitutional 'violations' . . . 11 are simply attempts to relitigate due process arguments 12 conclusively decided by the Supreme Court of Washington during his 13 disbarment proceedings." 14 Fed. Appx. 661, 662 (9th Cir. 2011). 15 the lower courts' decision to deny Marshall leave to amend: "Adding 16 additional members of the Bar Association or the Justices of the 17 Supreme Court of Washington as defendants would be futile under 18 Rooker-Feldman and the principles of absolute immunity, in addition 19 to needlessly prolonging this vexatious and wasteful litigation." 20 Id. at 663. 21 Marshall v. Wash. State Bar Ass'n, 448 The Ninth Circuit also upheld Marshall once again filed a petition for a writ of certiorari 22 with the United States Supreme Court. 23 April 16, 2012. That petition was denied on ECF No. 76. 24 D. Marshall's Third Collateral Attack -- The Instant Action 25 On April 22, 2011, Marshall filed the instant action pro se, 26 his third collateral attack on the proceedings that culminated in 27 his disbarment. 28 operative complaint in the action, looks much like the complaints Marshall's Third Amended Complaint ("TAC"), the 9 1 he filed in his previous collateral attacks. 2 Exs. D, L, M. 3 Washington disciplinary system (again citing the Clark and 1993 and 4 2006 ABA Reports), and the alleged bias of Danielson and Killian. 5 See TAC ¶¶ 17, 36, 55-76. 6 Compare TAC with RJN Once again, Marshall targets the structure of the Marshall explicitly alleges that his disbarment and previous id. ¶¶ 21-31. 9 United States District Court suspensions were the result of racial discrimination. 8 For the Western District of Washington 7 See, e.g., proceedings, Marshall alleges that Defendants selectively enforced As in his first collateral attack and his disbarment 10 Washington's ethics rules, refusing to take action against white 11 lawyers while selectively targeting African-American attorneys for 12 disciplinary action. 13 suggests that he was singled out for prosecution because he brought 14 discrimination claims against Defendants. 15 See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 31, 37-41. Marshall also See id. ¶ 82. For the first time, Marshall alleges various ex parte 16 communications among Danielson, the WSBA, and the justices of 17 Washington Supreme Court during various WSBA meetings. 18 id. ¶¶ 71, 73, 78-81, 83, 85. 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 See, e.g., For example, Marshall alleges: [O]n March 28, 2007, on the very night before defendant Danielson issued his decision in the Marshall case, a meeting of the discipline committee task force #2 of the [WSBA] Board of Governors was held in which Danielson was a member. While defendant Danielson was not present, he was immediately notified of the results of the meeting by e-mail. Included in this meeting were two members of the Board of Governors and one member of the Disciplinary Counsel's Office. These undisclosed ex parte contacts fraudulently corrupted the legal process by influencing judges and members of the Disciplinary Board. 26 27 Id. at 71. Marshall does not specifically allege what was 28 discussed during this meeting or any of the other meetings 10 1 referenced in the TAC. Unlike the previous actions, Marshall's current suit frames 2 3 Defendants' alleged wrongdoing as employment discrimination, 4 alleging violations of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 5 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and Section 49.60.030 of the Revised Code 6 of Washington.6 7 appears to be the same: he seeks damages and injunctive relief in 8 connection with his disciplinary proceedings. See TAC ¶¶ 42, 53, 55. However, Marshall's goal United States District Court For the Western District of Washington 9 10 III. LEGAL STANDARD 11 "After the pleadings are closed -- but early enough not to 12 delay trial -- a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." 13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). 14 the moving party clearly establishes on the face of the pleadings 15 that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that it 16 is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 17 Inc. v. Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1989). 18 Moreover, a motion for judgment on the pleadings is subject to the 19 same standard of review as a motion to dismiss, and thus the 20 pleading must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, 21 to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. 22 v. Rowley, 569 F.3d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Cafasso, U.S. 23 ex rel. v. General Dynamics C4 Systems, Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1055 24 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Johnson with approval). 25 plausible on its face when the plaintiff pleads "factual content 26 6 27 28 "Judgment on the pleadings is proper when Hal Roach Studios, Johnson A claim is Marshall filed an intake questionnaire with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on September 30, 2009 and the EEOC issued Marshall a Notice of Right to Sue on January 24, 2011. RJN Exs. W, X, Z. 11 1 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 2 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." 3 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. 4 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). Ashcroft v. 5 6 IV. A. 7 As a preliminary matter, the Court addresses the parties' 9 United States District Court The Court Takes Judicial Notice of Filings in Other Cases Related to Marshall's Disbarment 8 For the Western District of Washington DISCUSSION 10 arguments regarding judicial notice. Defendants have requested 11 that the Court take judicial notice of pleadings, orders, opinions, 12 and other filings related to Marshall's disciplinary proceedings, 13 Marshall's previous attempts to litigate the propriety of his 14 disbarment, and Marshall's filings with the EEOC. 15 Circuit has held that courts may properly take judicial notice of 16 proceedings in other courts, court filings, and other matters of 17 public record.7 18 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006); United States ex rel. Robinson 19 Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th 20 Cir. 1992). 21 is GRANTED. The Ninth See Reyn's Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 Accordingly, Defendants' request for judicial notice Marshall objects to Defendants' request for judicial notice on 22 23 the grounds that Defendants "have not shown or even proffered that 24 these proposed documents are relevant to this case." 25 10. 26 are clearly relevant to the issue of whether Marshall has had a 27 7 28 This argument lacks merit. Surreply at The documents attached to the RJN The Ninth Circuit has also held that judicial notice of EEOC filings is proper. Cunningham v. Litton Indus., 413 F.2d 887, 889 (9th Cir. 1969). 12 and state proceedings. 3 outside the pleadings would violate the "longstanding precedent 4 that directs the Court to construe the Complaint in the light most 5 favorable to the non-moving party." 6 also unavailing. 7 for judgment on the pleadings into a motion for summary judgment by 8 relying on court pleadings, filings, and decisions to determine 9 United States District Court full and fair opportunity to litigate this matter in prior federal 2 For the Western District of Washington 1 whether a claim has already been litigated. Marshall also argues that relying on facts Id. at 11. This argument is A court does not automatically transform a motion See Reyn's Pasta 10 Bella, 442 F.3d at 746 n.6 (taking judicial notice of court filings 11 "[t]o determine what issues were actually litigated" in a prior 12 action). 13 B. Marshall's Claims Are Barred By Rooker-Feldman 14 Defendants argue that Marshall's current collateral attack, 15 like his two prior collateral attacks, is barred by the Rooker- 16 Feldman doctrine. 17 18-19. 18 WSBA Defs.' Mot. at 14-18; State Defs.' Mot at The Court agrees. Rooker-Feldman is derived from two Supreme Court cases: Rooker 19 v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of 20 Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). 21 stands for the relatively straightforward principle that federal 22 district courts do not have jurisdiction to hear de facto appeals 23 from state-court judgments." 24 1050 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1492 (2011). 25 constitutes a forbidden de facto appeal when "a federal plaintiff 26 asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state 27 court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that 28 decision." Id. "It Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, (internal quotations and citation omitted). 13 A suit Put 1 another way: "If claims raised in the federal court action are 2 'inextricably intertwined' with the state court's decision such 3 that the adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the 4 state ruling . . . , then the federal complaint must be dismissed 5 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." 6 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003). Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, dismissed under Rooker-Feldman, including Feldman, one of the cases 9 United States District Court This case presents facts similar to others which have been 8 For the Western District of Washington 7 from which the doctrine takes its name. In Feldman, the District 10 of Columbia's highest court denied the plaintiff's applications for 11 admission to the bar of the District of Columbia. 12 Instead of appealing to the United States Supreme Court, the 13 plaintiff filed suit in federal district court, alleging violations 14 of the Fifth Amendment and Sherman Act and seeking an order 15 requiring the defendants to grant the plaintiff immediate admission 16 to the District of Columbia bar. 17 that it lacked jurisdiction. 18 Supreme Court agreed, finding that district courts "do not have 19 jurisdiction . . . over challenges to state court decisions in 20 particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings, even if those 21 challenges allege that the state court's action was 22 unconstitutional." 23 Id. 460 U.S. at 468. The district court found Id. at 470. The United States Id. at 486. Likewise, the Ninth Circuit has applied Rooker-Feldman to bar 24 federal lawsuits which challenged state attorney disciplinary 25 proceedings. 26 Court, 410 F.3d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 2005), the plaintiff was 27 licensed to practice in Oklahoma but lived and practiced in 28 Arizona. For example, in Mothershed v. Justices of the Supreme The Supreme Court of Arizona censured the plaintiff for 14 Court of Oklahoma disbarred him. 3 plaintiff filed suit against the disciplinary commissions and 4 supreme courts of Arizona and Oklahoma in federal district court, 5 asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for due process and other 6 constitutional violations, as well as various common law claims. 7 Id. 8 it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the plaintiff's 9 United States District Court the unauthorized practice of law and, subsequently, the Supreme 2 For the Western District of Washington 1 disciplinary proceedings under Rooker-Feldman. Mothershed, 410 F.3d at 605. The The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's conclusion that Id. at 607. The Court finds that Marshall's claims in the instant action 10 11 are precisely the type of collateral attack on state judicial 12 proceedings that are barred under Rooker-Feldman. 13 to directly and indirectly challenge the final decision of the 14 Washington Supreme Court to disbar and suspend him, asserting those 15 decisions were erroneous, unlawful, and discriminatory. 16 lacks jurisdiction to do so. 17 directly overturn his disbarment order, his claims are still barred 18 since all of his alleged injuries and damages flow from that 19 order.8 20 treated [him] in a disparate and racially discriminatory fashion 21 8 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Marshall seeks This Court Even if Marshall is not seeking to See TAC ¶¶ 47 ("In disciplining [Marshall], the Defendants Marshall has taken inconsistent positions on the nature of the injunctive relief he seeks. The TAC is silent on the matter. At the Court's December 5, 2011 hearing, Marshall stated that he wanted the Court to "enjoin the disbarment order." ECF No. 50 ("Dec. 5, 2011 Hearing Transcript") at 24. At the May 7, 2012 hearing, Marshall initially indicated that, under Rooker-Feldman, the Court does not have the power to overturn the Washington Supreme Court's disbarment order and that he was only seeking systemic reforms to the WSBA disciplinary system. Later in the hearing, he changed course and again indicated that he was seeking to enjoin the disbarment order. The Court assumes that Marshall's first and last statements on the issue are accurate. In any event, Marshall lacks standing to ask the Court to reform the WSBA disciplinary system as he is no longer a member of the bar. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983) 15 Defendants in suspending . . . and then disbarring [Marshall] 3 . constitute racial discrimination . . . in violation of 42 USC § 4 1981[.]"), 55 ("In suspending [Marshall] . . . and later disbarring 5 him . . . the Defendants practiced racial discrimination in 6 violation of RCW 49.60[.]"). 7 inextricably intertwined with the Washington Supreme Court's 8 decision and the Court cannot rule on them without undercutting 9 United States District Court [in violation of Title VII] . . . ."), 53 ("The actions of the 2 For the Western District of Washington 1 that ruling.9 . . Accordingly, his claims are Even if the Court had some doubt about its lack of 10 11 jurisdiction (and it does not), res judicata would require the 12 Court to apply Rooker-Feldman. 13 Section IV.C infra, the instant action raises the same claims that 14 were brought or could have been brought in Marshall's two prior 15 collateral attacks in federal court. 16 collateral attacks were dismissed with prejudice on Rooker-Feldman 17 grounds. 18 different conclusion here. As discussed in more detail in Both of these previous Accordingly, the Court could not possibly reach a 19 Marshall argues that Rooker-Feldman should not apply in the 20 instant action because he did not have an opportunity to present 21 his claims for racial discrimination in state court. 22 18. Opp'n at 17- This argument is predicated on the Eleventh Circuit's decision 23 24 25 26 27 28 9 At the Court's May 7, 2012 hearing, Marshall indicated that he is also bringing a claim for breach of contract, based on some kind of implied contract between himself and the WSBA. Marshall explained that the WSBA breached this contract when it disciplined and disbarred him in a racially discriminatory manner. This claim fails as it is not pled in the TAC. Even if it was, the claim would be barred by Rooker-Feldman as it is inextricably intertwined with the Washington Supreme Court's disbarment order. Accordingly, granting Marshall leave to amend his complaint for a third time would be futile. 16 inapposite. 3 plaintiffs, without providing them notice or an opportunity to 4 participate in the lien proceedings. 5 plaintiffs subsequently filed suit in federal district court 6 alleging due process violations. 7 Eleventh Circuit found that the "crucial issue" in determining 8 whether Rooker-Feldman should apply was "whether plaintiffs had a 9 United States District Court in Wood v. Orange, 715 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1983). 2 For the Western District of Washington 1 That case is reasonable opportunity to raise their objections in the proceedings In Wood, a state court entered liens against the Wood, 715 F.2d at 1545. Id. at 1545. The On appeal, the 10 where the judgment creating the liens was entered and affirmed." 11 Id. at 1547. 12 an opportunity because they did not learn of the liens until their 13 creditors called, "well after the time for filing an appeal had 14 elapsed." The court held that the plaintiffs were denied such Id. at 1548. 15 Unlike the plaintiffs in Wood, Marshall was well aware of the 16 disciplinary charges brought against him and fully participated in 17 the disciplinary proceedings. 18 filed an EEOC complaint for racial discrimination in connection 19 with his May 2007 suspension in May 2008 and that he learned of the 20 alleged misconduct in his disbarment proceedings in August 2008.10 21 Opp'n at 17, n.1. 22 opportunity to present his allegations of racial discrimination and 23 bias to the Washington Supreme Court -- both during his disbarment 24 hearing and in his petition for rehearing -- as well as to the 25 10 26 27 28 Further, Marshall admits that he Accordingly, Marshall had a reasonable The Court notes that Marshall could have advanced his current theories of racial discrimination even before May 2008. Marshall's charges of racial discrimination are predicated upon allegations that the WSBA has a history of selectively enforcing ethics violations. Evidence of this alleged selective enforcement was presumably available to Marshall at the outset of his disciplinary proceedings. 17 certiorari. 3 rejected Marshall's charges of bias in its disbarment order. 4 Marshall, 167 Wash. 2d at 69. 5 the Washington Supreme Court never discussed "racial 6 discrimination" in its order somehow precludes application of 7 Rooker-Feldman in the instant action. 8 the May 7, 2012 hearing, Marshall argued that Rooker-Feldman should 9 United States District Court United States Supreme Court in his first petition for a writ of 2 For the Western District of Washington 1 not apply since he did not become aware of the full extent of Indeed, the Washington Supreme Court addressed and In re Marshall suggests that the fact that Opp'n at 18-19. Also, at 10 Defendants' alleged misconduct until recently. 11 law. 12 opportunity to raise objections in the state court proceedings. 13 did have such an opportunity and did in fact raise objections. 14 such, his claim is barred under Rooker-Feldman. 15 But that is not the The pertinent inquiry is whether Marshall had a reasonable He As Next, Marshall contends that there is a general exception to 16 Rooker-Feldman, whereby lower federal courts may review state court 17 judgments that are procured by fraud, deception, or mistake. 18 at 18. 19 deception, and malicious ethical violations" in order to procure 20 his disbarment by assigning biased hearing officers, i.e., Killian 21 and Danielson, to his disciplinary proceedings. 22 further contends that high-ranking bar officials and Washington 23 Supreme Court justices turned a blind eye to this alleged 24 misconduct. 25 Opp'n Marshall contends that the WSBA engaged in "fraud, Id. at 19. He Id. This argument fails for a number of reasons. First, the Ninth 26 Circuit has never recognized such an exception to Rooker-Feldman. 27 Second, the authority on which Marshall relies, In re Sun Valley 28 Foods Co., 801 F.2d 186 (6th Cir. 1986), is inapposite. 18 In Sun 'may entertain a collateral attack on a state court judgment which 3 is alleged to have been procured through fraud, deception, 4 accident, or mistake . . . .'" 5 Ins. Co. v. State of N. Carolina, 397 F.2d 586, 589 (4th Cir. 6 1968)). 7 Insurance concerns an exception to res judicata, not Rooker- 8 Feldman. 9 United States District Court Valley, the Sixth Circuit said of Rooker-Feldman: "A federal court 2 For the Western District of Washington 1 See West v. Evergreen Highlands Ass'n, 213 Fed. Appx. 670, 674 801 F.2d at 189 (quoting Resolute The language the Sixth Circuit quotes from Resolute Accordingly, the Court declines to follow Sun Valley. 10 (10th Cir. 2007) (stating "there is good reason to balk" at the 11 Rooker-Feldman exception enunciated in Sun Valley). 12 Sun Valley was controlling law, it would not save Marshall's 13 claims. 14 procurement of a judgment, for example, where a party "deceived the 15 Court into a wrong decree." 16 quotations omitted). 17 Supreme Court was "deceived" into disbarring him. 18 claims that the Washington Supreme Court "justices were aware of 19 the wrongdoing but refused to stop it." 20 Marshall's argument is circular. 21 Rooker-Feldman doctrine barring federal review of state decisions 22 does not apply if, by engaging in the very review the doctrine 23 prohibits, a federal court concludes that a state court erred. 24 Such a self-justifying exception would swallow the Rooker-Feldman 25 doctrine whole." 26 "procurement by fraud" exception, to the extent that it exists, 27 does not apply here. 28 Third, even if The Sun Valley exception depends on the improper Sun Valley, 801 F.2d at 189 (internal Marshall does not allege that the Washington Rather, Marshall Opp'n at 19. Further, "He claims in effect that the West, 213 Fed. Appx. at 674. Accordingly, the At the Court's May 7, 2012 hearing, Marshall also argued that 19 deference since it was not reached through a judicial process. 3 Marshall complained that there is no "separation of powers" in the 4 Washington disciplinary system: The WSBA hires the hearing officers 5 and the prosecutors; the Washington Supreme Court justices who 6 review the WSBA hearing officers' findings have served as 7 presidents of the WSBA; and the hearing officers, prosecutors, and 8 Washington Supreme Court justices hold administrative meetings 9 United States District Court the Washington Supreme Court's decision is not entitled to 2 For the Western District of Washington 1 that, according to Marshall, amount to ex parte contacts. Marshall 10 also faults the Washington Supreme Court for failing to make its 11 own factual findings during his disbarment proceedings. 12 The Court has a number of concerns with the merits of 13 Marshall's position. 14 These arguments were raised and rejected in Marshall's prior 15 collateral attacks. 16 complained about the structure of the WSBA disciplinary system, 17 including the independence of its various branches. 18 Ex. D ¶¶ 3.14-3.15. 19 Marshall should "avail[] himself of the Washington state courts to 20 challenge the finding of the disciplinary board." 21 In his second collateral attack, Marshall made almost identical 22 allegations. 23 dismissed, this time expressly on Rooker-Feldman grounds. 24 P at 2. 25 issues here. 26 However, the Court need not reach the merits. In his first collateral attack, Marshall also See, e.g., RJN Judge Robart dismissed the action stating that RJN Ex. M ¶¶ 4.11-4.24. RJN Ex. E at 5. Again his claims were RJN Ex. Accordingly, the Court cannot and will not revisit these Like Judge Robart, Judge Brandt, Judge Coughenour, and the 27 Ninth Circuit, the Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction over this 28 action under Rooker-Feldman. 20 1 C. Marshall's Claims Are Also Barred By Res Judicata 2 Even if Marshall's claims were not barred by Rooker-Feldman, substantially similar claims before the Washington Supreme Court, 5 Judge Robart, Judge Brandt, Judge Coughenour, the Ninth Circuit, 6 and the United States Supreme Court. In each and every case, 7 Marshall's claims have been rejected. Marshall's employment 8 discrimination claims are simply another attempt to relitigate his 9 United States District Court they would fail under res judicata. 4 For the Western District of Washington 3 previous claims. 10 Marshall has already raised Marshall is not entitled to yet another bite at the apple. Res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, bars 11 12 relitigation of a claim that has been determined by a final 13 judgment. 14 (Wash. 2011). 15 their claims under a different theory so that they may sue again. 16 Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Codispoti, 63 F.3d 863, 867 (9th 17 Cir. 1995). 18 determined [in prior litigation] are precluded." 19 citations and quotations omitted). 20 subsequent action involves (1) the same subject matter, (2) the 21 same cause of action, (3) the same persons or parties, and (4) the 22 same quality of persons for or against whom the decision is made as 23 did a prior adjudication." 24 Court finds that all elements of res judicata have been satisfied 25 here. Williams v. Leone & Keeble, Inc., 171 Wash. 2d 726, 730 Res judicata also bars plaintiffs from recasting "All issues which might have been raised and Id. (internal "Res judicata applies where the Williams, 171 Wash. 2d at 730. The 26 First, a final judgment was rendered in Marshall's disbarment 27 proceedings, In re Marshall, 167 Wash. 2d at 89, as well as in his 28 two prior collateral attacks, which were dismissed with prejudice, 21 1 RJN Exs. E at 6, P at 2. Marshall contends that his first 2 collateral attack was "dismissed without prejudice" and "[no] 3 judgment on the merits was ever entered." 4 misstates the facts. Opp'n at 22. Marshall Second, the subject matter of this case is identical to the 5 proceedings and his two collateral attacks: the propriety of 8 Marshall's prior state disciplinary proceedings and disbarment. 9 United States District Court subject matter involved in Marshall's state disciplinary 7 For the Western District of Washington 6 Marshall argues, without further explanation, that his claims are 10 not barred because they arose after October 1, 2009 -- the date of 11 the Washington Supreme Court's disbarment order. 12 This argument lacks merit. 13 the TAC occurred before Marshall's disbarment.11 14 EEOC Intake Questionnaire, Marshall concedes that the last 15 allegedly discriminatory act occurred on October 1, 2009. 16 Ex. W. Opp'n at 22. All of the relevant conduct alleged in Further, in his See RJN Third, the causes of action in this case are identical to 17 18 those that were asserted or could have been asserted in Marshall's 19 prior actions. 20 employment discrimination claims are not barred because they were 21 never alleged, considered, or rejected in his previous actions. 22 Opp'n at 23. 23 recasting its previous claims as a new legal theory, by raising new 24 11 25 26 27 28 Marshall argues that his state and federal However, a party cannot avoid res judicata merely by Marshall does allege: "From 2002 to the present, [Marshall] requested, but Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff by denying . . . services and otherwise affected the terms, conditions, or privileges of [Marshall]'s employment because of his race." TAC at 2. However, it is unclear why WSBA would have a duty to provide services, such as "bar materials, continuing legal education courses, [or] law office management counseling" to a disbarred attorney. See id. 22 1 claims that could have been brought in a prior action, or by 2 alleging conduct not alleged previously. 3 World Airlines, 681 F.2d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 1982). 4 precisely what Marshall is attempting to do here. whether successive lawsuits involve a single cause of action: 7 (1) whether rights or interests established in the prior judgment would be destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the second action; (2) whether substantially the same evidence is presented in the two actions; (3) whether the two suits involve infringement of the same right; and (4) whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts. 8 United States District Court 9 For the Western District of Washington That is The Ninth Circuit applies several criteria to determine 5 6 See Costantini v. Trans 10 11 12 Id. at 1201-1202 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 13 fourth, "most important," criterion is satisfied here. 14 120. 15 nucleus of facts: the proceedings that culminated in his 16 disbarment. 17 cannot award the injunctive and declaratory relief requested by 18 Marshall without impairing the Washington Supreme Court's 19 disbarment order or Judge Robart, Judge Brandt, Judge Coughenour, 20 and the Ninth Circuit's findings that Marshall's collateral attacks 21 are barred under Rooker-Feldman. 22 same evidence in the instant action that he has cited in prior 23 complaints and petitions, including Killian's job application, 24 Danielson's WSBA salary, the Clark Report, the McKay Report, and 25 the 1993 and 2006 ABA reports. 26 proceedings and his first collateral attack, Marshall now alleges 27 that he was singled out for selective enforcement because he is 28 African American. The See id. at All of Marshall's actions arose out of the same transactional The other criteria are also satisfied. The Court Marshall intends to rely on the Additionally, as in his disbarment Compare TAC ¶¶ 31, 37-41, with RJN Exs. A ¶ 167, 23 1 D at 39. Finally, Marshall asserts the same rights here that he 2 previously asserted in his state and federal court actions, 3 including his rights to due process and equal protection in his 4 disbarment proceedings. 5 Exs. A ¶ 167, D at 43-44, M at 45-50. Compare TAC ¶¶ 17, 19, 38, 49 with RJN Fourth, the parties in this action are identical to, or in 6 proceedings or the parties to Marshall's prior collateral attacks. 9 United States District Court privity with, the parties to Marshall's prior state disbarment 8 For the Western District of Washington 7 Although the Washington Supreme Court justices were named as 10 Defendants for the first time in the instant action, Marshall has 11 previously attempted to sue them in connection with his disbarment. 12 In his second collateral attack, Judge Brandt denied Marshall leave 13 to amend his complaint so as to add the justices as defendants. 14 See RJN Ex. P. 15 would have been "futile" under Rooker-Feldman. 16 Circuit also affirmed, concluding that adding more defendants would 17 only "prolong[] this vexatious and wasteful litigation."12 18 Marshall, 448 Fed. Appx. at 663. Judge Coughenour affirmed finding that amendment Id. The Ninth The final element of res judicata "simply requires a 19 20 determination of which parties in the second suit are bound by the 21 judgment in the first suit." 22 891, 905 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009). 23 attacks named the WSBA and the State of Washington, as does this 24 one. 25 with the WSBA. Ensley v. Pitcher, 152 Wash. App. Here, Marshall's prior collateral All of the WSBA Defendants named in this case are in privity The Washington Supreme Court is also bound by its 26 27 28 12 Even if the Washington Supreme Court was not involved in the prior actions, its justices are entitled to judicial immunity. See Section IV.D infra. 24 1 order disbarring Marshall. 2 state disbarment proceeding and filed the prior collateral attacks 3 challenging the disbarment proceedings. 4 of res judicata are met.13 D. 5 Further, Marshall defended the prior Accordingly, all elements Marshall's Claims Could Be Dismissed on a Number of Other Grounds 6 As Marshall's claims are barred by Rooker-Feldman and res 7 United States District Court judicata, the Court need not review all of the other grounds for 9 For the Western District of Washington 8 dismissal claimed by Defendants. However, having considered the 10 parties' other arguments, the Court notes that, even if it did have 11 jurisdiction, Marshall's claims would likely fail for a number of 12 other reasons. 13 jurisdiction, it does not review these issues in significant length 14 or detail. As the Court has already determined that it lacks Judicial Immunity: 15 Marshall's claims against the WSBA and 16 State Defendants are also barred under the doctrine of judicial 17 immunity. 18 available to judges but also to others who have a sufficiently 19 close nexus to the adjudicative process, including prosecutors, 20 administrative law judges, and agency officials performing 21 functions analogous to those of a prosecutor. 22 Justices of the Supreme Court, 67 F.3d 708, 715 (9th Cir. 1995). 23 Several cases have applied the doctrine in circumstances such as 24 this, where a plaintiff attorney sues in connection with 25 disciplinary proceedings. Judicial and quasi-judicial immunity are not only See Hirsch v. See id.; Clark v. Washingtion, 366 F.2d 26 27 28 13 Defendants also argue that Marshall's claims are barred by collateral estoppel. The merits of this argument are less clear. As Marshall's claims are clearly barred by Rooker-Feldman and res judicata, the Court does not address the issue. 25 1 678, 681 (9th Cir. 1966). 2 distinguish any of these cases. 3 Title VII: Marshall does not adequately address or Marshall's Title VII claims fail for a variety of under 42 U.S.C. § 20000e-5(e)(1) since the last alleged unlawful 6 employment practice alleged by Marshall occurred on October 1, 7 2009, the date of his disbarment, over a year before Marshall filed 8 his complaint in the instant action. 9 United States District Court reasons. 5 For the Western District of Washington 4 As an initial matter, Marshall's claim is time barred bring a Title VII claim for employment discrimination against Further, Marshall cannot 10 Defendants because he was never employed by them. See Camacho v. 11 Puerto Rico Ports Auth., 369 F.3d 570, 577-78 (1st Cir. 2004). 12 Relying on the D.C. Circuit's decision in Sibley Memorial Hospital 13 v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973), Marshall contends that 14 Title VII is applicable because his disbarment interfered with his 15 employment prospects. 16 applies where the defendant has a "highly visible nexus" with the 17 creation and continuance of direct employment relationships, 18 Sibley, 488 F.2d at 1342, or where the defendant exercises a degree 19 of control over the third-party employer. 20 Mexican-Am. Educators v. State of California, 231 F.3d 572, 581 21 (9th Cir. 2000) (applying interference theory where "state's 22 involvement is not limited to general legislative oversight but, 23 rather, affects the day-to-day operations of [the third-party 24 employer]"). 25 of courts have rejected the notion that agencies which regulate 26 professional licenses may be held liable under such a theory. 27 e.g., Fields v. Hallsville Indep. Sch. Dist., 906 F.2d 1017, 1021 28 (5th Cir. 1991). However, this interference theory only See, e.g., Ass'n of No such relationship exists here. 26 Further, a number See, 1 E. Marshall Is a Vexatious Litigant 2 The WSBA Defendants have asked the Court to declare Marshall a future claims filed in connection with Marshall's disbarment. 5 Defs.' Mot. at 43. 6 restrictions, the court must apply the following four guidelines: 7 (1) the litigant must be "provided with adequate notice and a 8 chance to be heard before the order [is] filed"; (2) the court must 9 United States District Court vexatious litigant and to enter a pre-filing order concerning any 4 For the Western District of Washington 3 create a record of review which includes a "listing of all the WSBA Before a court may file such pre-filing 10 cases and motions that led the district court to conclude that a 11 vexatious litigant order was needed"; (3) the court must make 12 "substantive findings as to the frivolous or harassing nature of 13 the litigant's actions"; and (4) "the[] order[] must be narrowly 14 tailored to closely fit the specific vice encountered." 15 Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1147-48 (9th Cir. 1990). 16 De Long v. The Court finds that there is adequate justification for 17 finding that Marshall is a vexatious litigant and for entering a 18 pre-filing order against him. 19 adequate notice. 20 in their moving papers and Marshall had an opportunity to address 21 that request in his opposition papers, in his surreply, and at the 22 Court's May 7, 2012 hearing. 23 the Court has listed all of Marshall's previous cases and filings 24 in Section II supra. 25 a finding that Marshall is a vexatious litigant and that a pre- 26 filing order is necessary to prevent further abuse of the judicial 27 process. 28 or identical to those he asserted or could have asserted before the First, Marshall was provided with The WSBA Defendants requested a pre-filing order Marshall declined to do so. Second, Third, the record in this case amply supports Marshall's allegations in the instant action are similar 27 separate cert petitions), Judge Robart, Judge Brandt, Judge 3 Coughenour, and the Ninth Circuit. 4 rejected Marshall's allegations. 5 instant action, the Ninth Circuit went so far as to deem his second 6 collateral attack "vexatious and wasteful." 7 Appx. at 663. 8 instant action were barred by Rooker-Feldman and res judicata. 9 United States District Court Washington Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court (in two 2 For the Western District of Washington 1 Nevertheless, he proceeded to bring yet another suit against fifty- 10 four defendants, alleging the same claims that have been raised and 11 rejected before.14 12 set forth in the conclusion below are narrowly tailored to address 13 and prevent Marshall's vexatious and wasteful re-litigation and 14 collateral attack of his disbarment while not infringing upon 15 Marshall's right of access to the courts. Each of these six courts Even before Marshall filed the Marshall, 448 Fed. Thus, Marshall was on notice that his claims in the Fourth, the Court finds that the restrictions 16 17 V. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Defendants' 18 19 motions for judgment on the pleadings. 20 in this matter are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE in their 21 entirety. 22 Should Marshall wish to file any future claims in this District 23 against any Defendant in this action, whether individually or in 24 14 25 26 27 28 Bradley Marshall's claims The Court also enters the following pre-filing order: At the December 5, 2011 hearing, when there were only fifty-one defendants in the case, Marshall represented to the Court that he would endeavor to voluntarily dismiss "people that shouldn't be in the case." Dec. 5, 2011 Hearing Transcript at 25. Marshall has yet to dismiss a single defendant. Instead, he amended his complaint again to name additional parties. At the May 7, 2012 hearing, Marshall conceded that a number of these fifty-four defendants should be dismissed as they had a tenuous connection to the case. 28 for Leave. 3 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 providing the factual and 4 legal basis for the claim and the specific reason(s) why it falls 5 outside the scope of this Order, and shall be accompanied by a copy 6 of the pleading or document Marshall seeks leave to file. 7 future claims shall not be deemed "filed," for purposes of tolling 8 the statute of limitations or otherwise, and shall not be served 9 United States District Court any combination thereof, each filing shall be preceded by a Motion 2 For the Western District of Washington 1 until and unless the Court grants the Motion for Leave. The Motion for Leave shall contain a certification Such This pre- 10 filing order shall apply only to future claims that are directly or 11 indirectly related to Marshall's disbarment or the disciplinary 12 proceedings described above. 13 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 16 17 Dated: May 23, 2012 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
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