Nhye v. Ceccanti et al, No. 3:2010cv05069 - Document 54 (W.D. Wash. 2011)
Court Description: ORDER granting 44 Defendants Heimanns' Motion for Summary Judgment. This matter is now dismissed; the clerk is instructed to prepare a Judgment. Signed by Judge Ronald B. Leighton.(DN)
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Nhye v. Ceccanti et al Doc. 54 1 HONORABLE RONALD B. LEIGHTON 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 9 10 11 MICHAEL B.B. NHYE, Individually, 12 13 14 Case No. CV10-5069 RBL Plaintiff, v. DARCI CECCANTI, et al., 15 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT HEIMANNS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Defendants. 16 17 18 19 THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant Heimanns’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. 20 21 #44]. The case involves a civil rights claim by pro se Plaintiff Michael Nhye, an African American, who 22 claims that his admittedly unregistered and illegally parked vehicles were towed, while similarly situated cars 23 owned by white neighbors were not. He claims he was the victim of racial profiling and other discrimination, 24 and seeks damages and punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. §§1981, 1983, 1985 and 1986, and Chapter 49.60 25 26 RCW. 27 The Court previously dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims against all Defendants except the officer who was 28 allegedly responsible for towing the vehicles, Deputy Brian Heimann. [Dkt. #43] Defendant Heimann now ORDER Page - 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 2 seeks summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff has not and cannot establish a prima facie case against him, and that he is entitled to qualified immunity in any event. 3 Factual summary. 4 Plaintiff’s complaint (and his included Declaration, Dkt. #33 ) alleges the following: On July 19, 5 6 2009, in response to a neighbor’s complaint about Mr. Nhye’s vehicles, Deputy Heimann advised the Plaintiff 7 that two of his cars were parked illegally (blocking sidewalks) and had expired tabs. He told Nhye that the 8 cars would be towed if they were not moved. Two other cars were also marked for towing that day, though 9 there were “dozens” of other cars in the vicinity that were either illegally parked or had expired tabs and were 10 11 not marked for towing. Because he was being discriminated against, Nhye did not feel he had to move the 12 cars, and he did not. According to Plaintiff’s Response [Dkt. # 33], he had (somewhat inexplicably) himself 13 called 911 on July 5 to report that a neighbor had parked in front of the neighbor’s house, and the Deputies 14 who responded did not tow the offending car. 15 On July 25, Heimann returned, and wrote a ticket for a car parked in front of a fire hydrant. He also 16 17 towed two of Plaintiff’s illegally parked cars with expired tabs and/or no license plates. Plaintiff claims in 18 his Response [Dkt. # 33] that he did not and to this day does not know where his vehicles are, though he 19 apparently does know that they were towed by “J&J Auto Repair.” Plaintiff contends that dozens of cars in 20 his neighborhood are parked illegally and are not subject to towing. He contends his own cars were towed 21 because he is an African American, and the others were not towed because they belong to his white neighbors. 22 Plaintiff does not dispute that his cars were parked illegally or that they had expired tabs and/or no license 23 24 25 26 plates. Deputy Heimann has now moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff cannot establish the facts supporting his claims, and also arguing that he is immune from the Plaintiff’s suit. 27 28 ORDER Page - 2 1 2 Summary Judgment Standard. Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the 3 nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact which would preclude summary judgment as a 4 5 matter of law. Once the moving party has satisfied its burden, it is entitled to summary judgment if the non- 6 moving party fails to present, by affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file, 7 “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 8 (1986). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party’s position is not 9 sufficient.” Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995). Factual disputes whose 10 11 resolution would not affect the outcome of the suit are irrelevant to the consideration of a motion for summary 12 judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In other words, “summary judgment 13 should be granted where the nonmoving party fails to offer evidence from which a reasonable [fact finder] 14 could return a [decision] in its favor.” Triton Energy, 68 F.3d at 1220. 15 Qualified Immunity. 16 17 Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity from damages for civil liability as long as 18 their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 19 person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The existence of qualified 20 immunity generally turns on the objective reasonableness of the actions, without regard to the knowledge or 21 subjective intent of the particular official. Id. at 819. The purpose of qualified immunity is “to recognize that 22 holding officials liable for reasonable mistakes might unnecessarily paralyze their ability to make difficult 23 24 decisions in challenging situations, thus disrupting the effective performance of their public duties.” Mueller 25 v. Auker, 576 F.3d 979, 993 (9th Cir. 2009). Thus, only gross incompetence is punished; reasonable mistakes 26 are immunized. 27 28 ORDER Page - 3 1 2 In analyzing a qualified immunity defense, the Court must determine: (1) what right has been violated; (2) whether that right was so “clearly established” at the time of the incident that a reasonable 3 officer would have been aware of its constitutionality; and (3) whether a reasonable public officer could have 4 5 believed that the alleged conduct was lawful. See Gabbert v. Conn, 131 F.3d 793, 799 (9th Cir.1997); Newell 6 v. Sauser, 79 F.3d 115, 117 (9th Cir.1996). To be clearly established, the law must be sufficiently clear that 7 a reasonable official would understand that his or her action violates that right. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 8 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). The court should look to whatever decisional law is available to determine whether 9 the law was clearly established at the time the alleged acts occurred. Capoeman v. Reed, 754 F.2d 1512, 1514 10 11 (9th Cir. 1985). 12 Plaintiff Cannot Establish the Violation of a Constitutional Right. 13 As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s citation to 42 U.S.C. §§1981, 1985, and 1986 is apparently misguided. 14 Those sections relate to discriminations in the making or enforcement of contracts, to civil conspiracies, and 15 to neglecting to prevent a civil conspiracy, respectively. None of these sections is implicated by the 16 17 Plaintiff’s numerous and detailed factual allegations, as a matter of law. 18 Plaintiff’s claims, if they are viable at all, are under 42 U.S.C. §1983. To make out a cause of action 19 under §1983 against an individual defendant, “plaintiffs must plead that (1) [defendants] acting under color 20 of state law (2) deprived plaintiffs of rights secured by the Constitution or federal statutes.” Gibson v. United 21 States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986). If Plaintiff makes out such a claim, it must then be determined 22 whether Heimann is nevertheless qualifiedly immune. On the record before the Court, Plaintiff cannot make 23 24 25 out his prima facie case of demonstrating a constitutional violation, and he cannot overcome qualified immunity in any event. 26 27 28 ORDER Page - 4 1 2 According to Plaintiff, Heimann responded to a complaint from his friend, Defendant Ceccanti, and marked the cars for towing. Heimann expressly denies that he knew , communicated with, or was “friends’ 3 with Ceccanti. Plaintiff offers literally no evidence to support this allegation. 4 5 Plaintiff admits that Heimann told Mr. Nhye why he marked the cars for towing, and what Nhye had 6 to do to avoid having them towed (i.e., move them). According to Mr. Nhye, he chose not move the cars 7 because he felt he was being discriminated against due to his race. He admits the vehicles were parked 8 illegally and were not propertly licensed. He does not strenuously deny that such cars are subject to being 9 towed. A week later, Heimann followed through and had the cars towed. 10 11 Nhye’s “evidence” in support of his §1983 claim consists entirely of his allegation that the cars were 12 towed due to his race, and that similarly illegally parked cars were not towed, due to the race of thier owners 13 (white). He does not allege, and has not demonstrated, that the Deputy was aware of the other vehicles 14 parking status, or the race of the other vehicles’ owners. 15 Under these facts, Plaintiff’s claims against Deputy Heimann fail as a matter of law. He has not 16 17 established a prima facie case under §1983. Even if he had, there is no evidence or legal support for the 18 necessary demonstration that the law in this area was well established, such that a reasonable officer would 19 have known that his conduct violated the Constitution. There is no support whatsoever for the theoretical 20 claim that Defendant Heimann should have known that his actions were not constitutional. Only gross 21 incompetence is punished; reasonable mistakes are immunized. 22 The Plaintiffs’s claims against Mrs. Heimann are purely derivative of her status as Deputy Heimann’s 23 24 wife. In the absence of any viable claim against the husband, Plaintiff can assert no claims against the wife. 25 26 27 28 ORDER Page - 5 1 2 Defendants’ Motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and Plaintiff Nhye’s claims against Deputy Heimann and Mrs. Heimann are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The clerk shall terminate this matter. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 5 Dated this 18th day of March, 2011. 7 A 8 RONALD B. LEIGHTON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 6 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ORDER Page - 6
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