Wagner v. University of Washington et al, No. 2:2020cv00091 - Document 36 (W.D. Wash. 2020)

Court Description: ORDER GRANTING Summary Judgment as to the Union, the University and the individual defendants (Dkt. Nos. 27 , 28 ) and DENYNIG Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 25 ). Signed by Judge Barbara J. Rothstein. (TH)

Download PDF

Wagner v. University of Washington et al Doc. 36 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE ) ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, a ) public university; ANA MARI CAUCE, ) President; MINDY KORNBERG, Vice ) President for Human Resources; BANKS ) EVANS, Assistant Vice President; and ) SERVICE EMPLOYEES ) INTERNATIONAL UNION LOCAL 925, ) a labor organization, ) ) Defendants. ) ____________________________________) CHARLENE WAGNER I. CASE NO. 2:20-cv-00091-BJR ORDER MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Charlene Wagner brings this putative class action against her former employer, 19 20 21 Amendment and Due Process rights by deducting union dues from her paycheck in a manner 22 Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 23 24 (2018). Before the Court are the parties Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. Dkt. Nos. 25 25 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 1 2 Having reviewed the Motions, the oppositions thereto, the record of the case, and the relevant legal 3 authorities, the Court will grant the Defendants Motions for Summary Judgment and deny 4 Plain 5 II. 6 A. Factual Background 7 8 9 10 BACKGROUND The parties have stipulated to a set of facts relevant to the pending motions. See Stipulation Regarding Facts for Cross-Mot. for Plaintiff was employed by the University as a Fiscal Specialist from 1999 until she separated from her 11 employment in February 2020. Id. ¶ 3. The Union is the sole representative of employees at the 12 University, but University employees are not required to become Union members. Id. ¶¶ 1, 8. The 13 parties agree that Plaintiff voluntarily became a member of the Union in 1999 when she signed a 14 membership agreement and union dues deduction authorization, which is commonly referred to as 15 Id. ¶¶ 3, 8, 9; see also Stipulated Facts 16 hereby authorize[s] 17 18 the University of Washington to deduct the current amount of dues/fees, based on the status 19 specified below 1999 Membership Card. In exchange for paying 20 Union dues, the parties stipulate that Plaintiff received certain benefits, including the right to vote 21 22 23 24 25 at 1. The Court concludes that oral argument Plaintiff has requested oral argument. See would not aid the disposition of the motions and will, therefore, rule on the motions based on the briefing presented. See Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR ns will be decided by the court without oral argument 1 2 1 2 3 on Union leadership, participate in internal Union affairs, access discounts for Union members, and other membership rights. Stipulated Facts ¶¶ 19 21. On June 13, 2018, just before the Supreme Court Janus, Plaintiff signed a 4 second membership card renewing her commitment to join the Union as a member. Id. ¶¶ 10, 13; 5 Stipulated Facts, Ex. 6, Dkt. No. 20- 6 7 8 9 include an membership dues. 2018 Membership Card. Like the 1999 Membership Card, the 2018 Membership Card includes an independent 10 hereby request and authorize my employer 11 to deduct from my wages all Union dues of fees as shall be certified by SEIU Local 925 in an 12 amount equal to the regular monthly dues or fees uniformly applicable to members of SEIU Local 13 Id. This latter agr 14 15 16 17 irrevocable unless revoked by sending written notice to both the University and the Union during a 15 day revocation period open once a year from when the agreement was entered. Id. Further, 18 the authorization states that it shall be automatically renewed from year-to-year unless revoked in 19 writing during the revocation window. Id. 20 Dues deductions for individual members such as those agreed to by Plaintiff are 21 22 23 24 the University, as employer, and the Union, representing employees. The relevant article of the CBA has been amended several times. All versions are the same, however, in that they authorize See 25 3 1 2 Stipulated Facts, Exs. 1 3, Dkt. Nos. 20-1 to 20-3. On June 24, 2018, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Janus, holding that 3 unions were not entitled to mandate deductions from the paychecks of non-consenting, non-union 4 members. 138 S. Ct. at 2486. Janus 5 previous decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), which recognized 6 7 8 9 that employees did not have to join a union, but the union that represented their bargaining unit could st In response to Janus, the State of Washington amended its code on collective bargaining 10 to include a new section affirming that union membership is voluntary. W ASH. REV. CODE § 11 41.80.050; see also S.H.B. 1575, 66th Leg., 2019 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019). The State also enacted 12 a new section to govern authorization and revocation of union membership dues deduction. W ASH. 13 REV. CODE § 41.80.100. 14 15 16 17 Plaintiff also reacted to the decision in Janus. On October 24, 2018, she sent a letter to the Union resigning her membership and requesting that the Union immediately cease deducting membership dues from her paycheck. Stipulated Facts ¶ 22; see also Stipulated Facts, Ex. 7, Dkt. 18 No. 20-7. The Union responded with a letter dated November 8, 2018, informing Plaintiff that she 19 may resign her membership at any time but, according to the 2018 Membership Card she signed, 20 she could only request that dues deductions cease during the designated revocation period. 21 22 23 24 25 Stipulated Facts ¶ 23; see also Stipulated Facts, Ex. 8, Dkt. No. 20-8. The letter identified this period as April 29, 2019 through May 14, 2019. Plaintiff did not contact the Union again either to affirm her resignation from membership or to request revocation of the membership dues deductions authorization during the designated 4 1 2 revocation period. Stipulated Facts ¶¶ 24 25. Instead, she filed suit in this Court on January 20, 2020. Stipulated Facts ¶ 25; Compl., Dkt. No. 1. Only after filing suit, did she attempt to contact 3 the University by sending an email on January 21, 2020. Stipulated Facts ¶ 25. Thus, when 4 Id. 5 ¶ 26. On January 31, 2020, the Union instructed the University to stop such deductions, which it 6 7 8 9 10 did. Id. ¶ 27. The last pay period for which dues were deducted was the pay period associated with earnings between January 1 and January 15, 2020. Id. Plaintiff formally separated from the University shortly thereafter on February 28, 2020. Id. ¶ 3. B. Procedural History 11 After both parties submitted their Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff 12 amended her complaint to add several officials from the University. See Second Am. Compl., Dkt. 13 No. 31-1 14 15 16 17 18 In her SAC, Plaintiff purports to represent a class consisting of current and former employees of the University who had, or continue to have, dues deducted according to their membership in the Union. SAC ¶¶ 37 48. Plaintiff brings seven claims for relief. Four claims she advances under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that (1) deducting union payments from her wages pursuant to RCW § 41.80.100 violated 19 the First Amendment; (2) deducting union payments from her wages pursuant to the 20 violated the First Amendment; (3) the procedures of dues deductions established by RCW § 21 41.80.100 violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (4) deducting union 22 23 24 25 CBA payments from her wages violated her freedom of association. SAC ¶¶ 49 71. Plaintiff also advances three state common law causes of action including (1) breach of contract based on the 1999 Membership Card agreement; (2) breach of contract based on the 2018 Membership Card 5 1 2 agreement; and (3) unjust enrichment. Id. ¶¶ 72 87. Based on the forgoing, Plaintiff seeks prospective declaratory and injunctive relief, and retrospective compensatory damages in the 3 4 5 Id. ¶¶ 88 98. C. Related Cases 6 7 8 The claims Plaintiff raises regarding collection of union dues from union members postJanus are not new 9 10 11 unanimously rejected those claims. SEIU Mot. for Summ. J. at 1 2; see also id. at 2 n.1 (listing -Mot. for Summ. J. and Def. cases); 12 , Dkt. No. 33 (adding three cases decided in the interim). Three 13 cases are noteworthy as they originated in this District and the plaintiffs in those cases were 14 represented by the same advocacy organization that represents Plaintiff in this matter. See Yates 15 16 17 s., No. 20-cv-05082, 2020 WL 3118496 (W.D. Wash. June 12, 2020); Belgau v. Inslee, No. 18-cv-5620, 2018 WL 4931602 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 11, 2018) (denying Belgau v. Inslee, 359 F. Supp. 3d 1000 (W.D. Wash. 18 19 2019) (granting defendants Cross-Motions for Summary J 20 Motion for Summary Judgment); Fisk v. Inslee, No. 16-cv-5889, 2017 WL 4619223 (W.D. Wash. 21 Oct. 16, 2017), 22 23 24 25 , 759 F. App x 632 (9th Cir. 2019) Fisk II Cross- the Court considers these claims thoroughly litigated and their invocation here frivolous. III. LEGAL STANDARD Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 dictates that the Court shall grant summary judgment 6 1 2 3 there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). In the present case, the parties have stipulated to a set of facts and, as such, the questions presented are purely legal in nature. 4 The standard for summary judgment does not change when parties cross-move for 5 summary judgment. See United States v. Fred A. Arnold, Inc., 573 F.2d 605, 606 (9th Cir. 1978). 6 7 8 9 Thus, when faced with Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment on the same claim, the Court must consider the appropriate evidentiary material identified and submitted in support of both motions, and in opposition to both motions, before ruling on each of them. Tulalip Tribes of Washington 10 v. Washington, 783 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Fair Hous. Council of Riverside 11 Cnty., Inc. v. Riverside Two, 249 F.3d 1132, 1134 (9th Cir. 2001)); see also AGCS Marine Ins. Co. 12 v. Expeditors Int l Ocean, Inc., No. 18-cv-0614, 2020 WL 3639584, at *4 (W.D. Wash. July 6, 13 2020). 14 15 16 17 IV. DISCUSSION A. Section 1983 Claims Section 1983 provides a private right of action for the 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To 18 19 state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show (1) that they were deprived of a right 20 secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) that the deprivation occurred 21 Heineke v. Santa Clara Univ., 965 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2020) 22 23 24 (quoting Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49 50 (1999)). The Court examines whether Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a violation of a right secured either by the First . 25 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1. First Amendment Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on her First Amendment claims, arguing that the University and the Union withdrew wages from her paycheck without sufficient waiver of her right pay nothing to [the] union. at 18 28. She argues that under Janus, all union dues deductions knowing, voluntary, and intelligent consent and that such consent did not occur in her case because, at the time she agreed to become a Union member, she did not know the Supreme Court would give her the option to not become a Union member without paying a fee. Defendants respond and 10 11 Amendment rights because Plaintiff consented to Union membership and dues deductions. See 12 SEIU Mot. for Summ. J. at 7 17. 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 As every Court that has been confronted with the same arguments Plaintiff presents here has concluded, her claims fail because she unequivocally opted to become a Union member and pay membership dues. Janus spoke only to state compelled dues deductions from non-union members, not union members like Plaintiff. In contrast to the plaintiff in Janus, Plaintiff in this case agreed to become a Union member, pay Union dues, and receive the associated benefits. The Janus did not contractual commitment to become a Union member and pay the dues associated beca 21 22 23 24 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 672 (1991). chosen otherwise had she foreseen Janus does not alter this 25 8 1 conclusion.2 s for Summary Judgment on 2 claims as to all Defendants 3 4 Judgment on these claims. 5 2. Due Process 6 Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on her Due Process claims arguing that 7 in conjunction with the 8 , establishes a system that allows for the withdrawing of wages without sufficient 9 10 11 Summary procedural safeguards like proper notice, hearing, or post-deprivation recovery procedures. Mot. for Summ. J. at 13 17. Defendants respond and move for summary judgment in their own 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 See Fisk 34 (9th Cir. 2019); Savas v. California State Law Enf t Agency, No. 20-cv-00032, 2020 WL 5408940, at *3 *6 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2020); Littler v. Ohio Ass n of Pub. Sch. Emps., No. 18-cv-1745, 2020 WL 4038999, at *5 *6 (S.D. Ohio July 17, 2020); Creed v. Alaska State Emps. , No. 20-cv-0065, 2020 WL 4004794, at *5 *10 (D. Alaska July 15, 2020); Molina v. Pennsylvania Soc. Serv. Union, Serv. Emps. l, No. 19-cv-00019, 2020 WL 2306650, at *7 *8 (M.D. Pa. May 8, 2020); Durst v. Oregon Educ. , No. 19-cv-00905, 2020 WL 1545484, at *3 *4 (D. Or. Mar. 31, 2020); Bennett v. Am. Fed n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, AFL-CIO, No. 19-cv-04087, 2020 WL 1549603, at *3 *5 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2020); Allen v. Ohio Civil Serv. Emps. Ass n AFSCME, Local 11, No. 19-cv-3709, 2020 WL 1322051, at *7 *12 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 20, 2020); Loescher v. Minnesota Teamsters Pub. & Law Enf t Emps. Union, Local No. 320, 441 F. Supp. 3d 762, 773 74 (D. Minn. 2020); Quirarte v. United Domestic Workers AFSCME Local 3930, 438 F. Supp. 3d 1108, 1118 19 (S.D. Cal. 2020); Few v. United Teachers Los Angeles, No. 18-cv-9531, 2020 WL 633598, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2020); Hendrickson v. AFSCME Council 18, 434 F. Supp. 3d 1014, 1023 24 (D.N.M. 2020); Mendez v. , 419 F. Supp. 3d 1182, 1186 (N.D. Cal. 2020); Aliser v. SEIU California, 419 F. Supp. 3d 1161, 1164 (N.D. Cal. 2019); Smith v. Teamsters Local 2010, No. 19-cv-00771, 2019 WL 6647935, at *8 *9 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2019); Smith v. New Jersey Educ. Ass n, 425 F. Supp. 3d 366, 373 75 (D.N.J. 2019); Oliver v. SEIU Local 668, 415 F. Supp. 3d 602, 606 08 (E.D. Pa. 2019); Anderson v. SEIU Local 503, 400 F. Supp. 3d 1113, 1115 1118 (D. Or. 2019); Seager v. United Teachers Los Angeles, No. 19-cv-00469, 2019 WL 3822001, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2019); Cooley v. California Statewide Law Enf t Ass n, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1077, 1079 81 (E.D. Cal. 2019); Smith v. Bieker, No. 18-cv-05472, 2019 WL 2476679, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2019); the Univ. of California, No. 19-cv-02289, 2019 WL 2635585, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2019); Babb v. California Teachers Ass n, 378 F. Supp. 3d 857, 876 77 (C.D. Cal. 2019); Crockett v. NEA-Alaska, 367 F. Supp. 3d 996, 1007 08 (D. Alaska 2019); Belgau, 359 F. Supp. 3d at 1015 17; Smith v. Superior Court, Cty. of Contra Costa, No. 18-cv-05472, 2018 WL 6072806, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2018). 2 9 1 2 3 right arguing that the deprivation of a liberty or property interest or that the procedure established is inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment. See SEIU Mot. for Summ. J. at 17 24. 4 In order to establish a Due Process violation, a plaintiff must show (1) a deprivation of a 5 constitutionally protected liberty or property interest, and (2) a denial of adequate procedural 6 7 8 9 10 protections. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC, 893 F.3d 1136, 1147 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Brewster v. Bd. Of Educ. Of Lynwood Unified Sch. Dist., 149 F.3d 971, 982 (9th Cir. 1998)). Here, the question is not whether Plaintiff has a liberty or property interest in her wages, as she argues, but whether she suffered a deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest 11 12 The answer, as this Court outlined above and every Court examining the question has concluded, 13 is that she did not suffer the deprivation of a liberty or property interest as she voluntarily assented 14 15 16 17 to Union membership and deduction of Union dues. See Marsh v. AFSCME Local 3299, No. 19cv-02382, 2020 WL 4339880, at *10 (E.D. Cal. July 28, 2020); Molina, 2020 WL 2306650, at *10 11. Further, 18 contentions fail because they rely on hypothetical misconduct not 19 present in her case. 20 deductions. See WASH. REV. CODE § 41.80.100(1) 21 22 23 24 25 Thus, pon authorization of an employee . . . that there is a high likelihood of future non-consenting deductions without proper notice or process rests on premise that either (1) the Union will provide false or dues deduction or (2) that the inadvertent University would, without affirmation of assent from the Union, begin deducting dues from an 10 as she 1 2 3 undeniably assented to Union membership and dues deductions. Second, she would otherwise lack standing to assert such hypothetical 4 5 Marsh, 2020 WL 4339880, at *4, *6 (quoting Mayfield v. U.S., 599 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2010)) 6 7 8 9 10 11 The Court will, therefore, grant Defendants Motions for Summary Judgments on s claims as to all Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment as to these claims. B. State Law Claims 12 1. Supplemental Jurisdiction 13 A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims 14 once it has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); 15 16 17 18 see also Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 826 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court, however, finds that resolution of the remaining claims is straightforward enough to do so here. See Action Embroidery the district court may have Corp. v. Atl. Embroidery, Inc. 19 discretion to dismiss the pendent claims where considerations of judicial economy, convenience 20 and fairness to litigants so dictate ) (internal quotations and citations removed)). 21 2. Breach of Contract 22 Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on her breach of contract claims arguing that the 23 24 25 1999 and 2018 membership agreements were not valid contracts because Plaintiff received no consideration for them or, alternatively, that the Union breached the contracts by withdrawing dues 11 1 2 after she purported to resign. at 29 30. Defendants counter and move for summary judgment on the same claims arguing that Plaintiff received consideration for her 3 commitment to join the Union and that the terms of her agreement committed to paying dues on 4 an annual basis regardless of membership status, unless withdrawn during the revocation period. 5 See SEIU Mot. for Summ. J. at 28 29. 6 7 8 9 The Court finds that the 1999 and 2018 agreements constitute valid contracts. Plaintiff received adequate consideration in the form of the benefits she stipulated she received, such as the right to vote on Union leadership, participate in internal Union affairs, and access discounts for 10 Union members. Stipulated Facts ¶¶ 19 21. Every district court that has examined this question 11 has found adequate consideration for union membership agreements and dues deductions to 12 constitute valid contracts. See Littler, 2020 WL 4038999, at *4; Creed, 2020 WL 4004794, at *5; 13 Hernandez v. AFSCME California, 424 F. Supp. 3d 912, 922 25 (E.D. Ca. 2019); Crockett, 367 14 15 16 17 F. Supp. 3d at 1008. Plaintiff ontract by continuing to withdraw dues after her alleged resignation from the Union, also fails. When she resigned, the 18 2018 Membership was in effect. That contract unmistakably provides that Union dues must be 19 paid unless authorization is revoked during the proper period of time. See 2018 Membership Card. 20 The stipulated facts are clear Plaintiff did not seek revocation during this period, thus she has no 21 22 23 24 Summary Judgment on as to all Defendants and deny n for Summary Judgment on those claims. 25 12 1 2 3. Unjust enrichment Plaintiff advances a claim of unjust enrichment against the Union and moves for summary 3 judgment on that claim arguing that SEIU received the benefits of the allegedly unlawful dues 4 deduction scheme 5 moves for summary judgment on this claim by pointing out, correctly, that unjust enrichment is 6 7 8 at 30. The Union responds and only appropriate where the parties are not in a contractual relationship. See SEIU Mot. for Summ. J. at 30; see Belgau, 359 F. Supp. 3d at 1017. Here, the Court has already determined that are valid contracts. See supra 9 10 11 enrichment 14 15 16 17 for summary judgment on that claim. V. 12 13 Motion for Summary Judgment on at 12. Thus, the Court will grant CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS Summary Judgment as to the Union, the University and the individual defendants Judgment. DATED this 11th day of September, 2020. 18 _______________________________ BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 13

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.