Martushoff v. State of Washington et al, No. 2:2018cv01870 - Document 93 (W.D. Wash. 2019)
Court Description: ORDER denying Plaintiff's 52 Motion to Amend and Supplement Complaint. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint is due within 21 days of this order. Defendants shall respond to Plaintiff's complaint within twenty-one (21) days after Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint is entered on the docket. Signed by Judge Ricardo S. Martinez. (PM)
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Martushoff v. State of Washington et al Doc. 93 1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 ADAM MARTUSHOFF, an individual, CASE NO. C18-1870-RSM Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND AND SUPPLEMENT COMPLAINT AND ORDERING PLAINTIFF TO FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT v. THERESA LUVERA, et al., Defendants. This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend and Supplement Complaint. Dkt. #52. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED. I. BACKGROUND 17 On December 27, 2018, Plaintiff Adam Martushoff, appearing pro se, filed this action 18 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dkt. #1. Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint on January 2, 2019, 19 which serves as the current complaint in this case. Dkt. #7. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges civil 20 rights violations by the State of Washington and various state agencies resulting from a law 21 enforcement investigation into allegations that Plaintiff neglected and abused his children. Dkt. 22 23 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND AND SUPPLEMENT COMPLAINT AND ORDERING PLAINTIFF TO FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT PAGE - 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 #7 at 47–51. Plaintiff claims that the criminal investigation was conducted improperly and 2 included falsified evidence, id. at 51–53, and that the criminal proceedings and investigation 3 served as the basis for civil proceedings wherein Plaintiff was denied the right to see or interact 4 with his children. See generally, id. Plaintiff seeks a variety of injunctive relief and monetary 5 damages. 6 Since filing the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff has moved to amend and supplement 7 his complaint several times to revise his legal claims and change the listed defendants. See, e.g., 8 Dkts. #21, #45, #49. Prior to the Court ruling on these motions, Plaintiff terminated or withdrew 9 his motion to amend. See, e.g., Dkt. #24, #46, #50. On March 25, 2019, Plaintiff filed the current 10 Motion to Amend and Supplement Complaint. Dkt. #52. In support of this Motion, Plaintiff 11 attached a proposed Second Amended Complaint totaling 137 pages. See id., Ex. A. On April 12 8, 2019, Defendants filed their Response opposing Plaintiff’s Motion. Dkt. #57. 13 II. 14 DISCUSSION A. Legal Standard 15 Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), a “court should freely give leave [to amend] when 16 justice so requires,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Courts apply this policy with “extreme liberality.” 17 Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003). Five factors are 18 commonly used to assess the propriety of granting leave to amend: (1) bad faith, (2) undue delay, 19 (3) prejudice to the opposing party, (4) futility of amendment, and (5) whether plaintiff has 20 previously amended the complaint. Allen v. City of Beverly Hills, 911 F.2d 367, 373 (9th Cir. 21 1990); Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). In conducting this five-factor analysis, the 22 23 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND AND SUPPLEMENT COMPLAINT AND ORDERING PLAINTIFF TO FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT PAGE - 2 1 court must grant all inferences in favor of allowing amendment. Griggs v. Pace Am. Group, Inc., 2 170 F.3d 877, 880 (9th Cir. 1999). In addition, the court must be mindful of the fact that, for 3 each of these factors, the party opposing amendment has the burden of showing that amendment 4 is not warranted. DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 187 (9th Cir. 1987); see also 5 Richardson v. United States, 841 F.2d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 1988). 6 The Court acknowledges that, by nature of his pro se appearance, Plaintiff should be 7 afforded “the benefit of any doubt” with respect to compliance with local and federal civil 8 procedure. Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 9 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“A document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,’ and ‘a pro se 10 complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal 11 pleadings drafted by lawyers.’”) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Cf. Fed. R. 12 Civ. P. 8(f) (“All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice”). 13 B. Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend and Supplement 14 Even construing Plaintiff’s pleadings liberally, the Court finds that granting Plaintiff’s 15 Motion to Amend and Supplement, Dkt. #52, would impose undue prejudice on Defendants. 16 Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s Motion partly because Plaintiff failed to comply with Local Rule 17 15, which requires a party moving to amend a pleading to indicate how the proposed pleading 18 differs from the original, either by bracketing or striking through the text to be deleted and 19 underlining or highlighting the text to be added. See Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 15. Although 20 Plaintiff’s Motion fails to comply with these requirements, see Dkt. #52, Ex. A, his addition of 21 22 23 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND AND SUPPLEMENT COMPLAINT AND ORDERING PLAINTIFF TO FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT PAGE - 3 1 nearly seventy pages of text in the proposed amended complaint diminishes the usefulness of this 2 rule. See Dkt. #58 at 2. 3 The more fundamental flaw of Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint is its violation of 4 Rule 8. This rule requires a pleading stating a claim for relief to contain “a short and plain 5 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), and that 6 “each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d). The Court agrees 7 with Defendants that both Plaintiff’s original and proposed amended complaints fail to comply 8 with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. See Dkt. #57 at 3. 9 Although courts must construe a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings liberally, a plaintiff must 10 nevertheless allege a minimum factual and legal basis for each claim so that defendants are given 11 fair notice of the plaintiff’s claims and the grounds upon which they rest. See Brazil v. United 12 States Dep't of the Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Although a pro se litigant . . . may 13 be entitled to great leeway when the court construes his pleadings, those pleadings nonetheless 14 must meet some minimum threshold in providing a defendant with notice of what it is that it 15 allegedly did wrong.”). A complaint that does not clearly and concisely describe the factual 16 allegations nor provide defendants with notice of who is being sued on which theory, violates 17 Rule 8. See, e.g., McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177–79 (9th Cir. 1996); Nevijel v. North 18 Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 674 (9th Cir. 1981). For example, a properly plead federal 19 civil rights claim would specify each defendant, set forth a short and plain statement of each 20 claim showing that a specific defendant took a specific action, participated in another’s action, 21 or omitted to perform an action that caused each alleged constitutional deprivation. 22 23 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND AND SUPPLEMENT COMPLAINT AND ORDERING PLAINTIFF TO FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT PAGE - 4 1 After careful review of Plaintiff’s current amended complaint and proposed second 2 amended complaint, the Court finds that both fail to comply with Rule 8. With respect to 3 defendant Theresa Luvera, both complaints allege that Defendant “failed to follow law 4 enforcement protocols and training” including “failure to question witnesses, failure to weigh 5 evidence, failure to investigate evidentiary leads, etc.” and that Defendant failed to act upon 6 evidence that Plaintiff’s children were in imminent danger of neglect and psychosexual abuse. 7 Dkt. #7 at 7; Dkt. #52, Ex. A at 18. For the remaining defendants, Plaintiff alleges a general 8 claim throughout both complaints that various defendants were “informed of” and “given direct 9 evidence” of criminal activities conducted by Detective Luvera. See, e.g., Dkt. #7 at 11, 21; Dkt. 10 #52, Ex. A at 31, 38, 55. Each of Plaintiff’s general assertions is followed by a conclusory 11 statement that the named defendant is legally culpable or legally liable. 12 Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint adds more detail that defendant Luvera allowed 13 the criminal investigation of Plaintiff to continue despite “material evidence” showing his 14 innocence and that love, affection, companionship, comfort and society existed between Plaintiff 15 and his children. Dkt. #52, Ex. A at 17-18. Even with this additional information, the conclusory 16 language in both versions of Plaintiff’s complaint make it challenging to understand the 17 underlying facts of Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff’s Statement of Claim section, id. at 81-83, 18 provides a useful starting point for the factual basis of Plaintiff’s claims by describing various 19 witness statements and medical records collected in relation to a Child Protective Services 20 investigation. However, a complaint properly plead under Rule 8 must make clear connections 21 between specific allegations and individual defendants—here, how these alleged facts are 22 23 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND AND SUPPLEMENT COMPLAINT AND ORDERING PLAINTIFF TO FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT PAGE - 5 1 connected to the acts or omissions by defendant Luvera and the other listed defendants. See 2 McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 1996). 3 Moreover, the factual details of Plaintiff’s claims are buried among pages of information 4 irrelevant to the claims at issue in this case, such as historical instances of outrageous conduct by 5 the State of Washington and past misconduct by defendants that is unrelated to Plaintiff’s claims. 6 See Dkt. #52, Ex. A at 1-6. The sheer length of Plaintiff’s pleadings alone—63 pages and 137 7 pages, respectively—could arguably violate Rule 8. See Schmidt v. Herrmann, 614 F.2d 1221, 8 1224 (9th Cir.1980) (upholding a Rule 8(a) dismissal of 30-page complaint that was “confusing, 9 distracting, ambiguous, and unintelligible”); Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 674 10 (9th Cir.1981) (upholding Rule 8(a) dismissal of 48-page complaint that was excessively “verbose, 11 confusing and almost entirely conclusory”); Hatch v. Reliance Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 409, 415 (9th 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 Cir.1985) (Rule 8(a) dismissal of complaint exceeding 70 pages that was “confusing and conclusory”). For these reasons, even under a liberal construction of these claims for a pro se litigant, the Court finds that both of Plaintiff’s pleadings violate Rule 8. Granting Plaintiff’s Motion would therefore unduly burden Defendants due to the time and effort required to parse Plaintiff’s legal claims and arguments. For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend, Dkt. #52. C. Requested Relief Upon finding that Plaintiff’s current complaint violates Rule 8, the Court considers Defendant’s request that the Court order Plaintiff to replead his current complaint filed on January 2, 2019 and answered by Defendants on April 8, 2019. Dkt. #57 at 3. While the Court ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND AND SUPPLEMENT COMPLAINT AND ORDERING PLAINTIFF TO FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT PAGE - 6 1 agrees that a repleaded complaint will clarify the facts and arguments at issue, judicial efficiency 2 and the substantial interests of justice favor allowing Plaintiff to replead a Second Amended 3 Complaint to address the deficiencies he already identified in his current pleading—specifically, 4 substituting or terminating certain defendants, adding new authorities to the Basis of Jurisdiction, 5 and clarifying particular aspects of his Statement of Claim. See Dkt. #52 at 1-2. 6 For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds it appropriate to allow Plaintiff to file a Second 7 Amended Complaint that conforms to the short, concise pleading requirements under Fed. R. 8 Civ. P. 8(a) and (d) while making the changes he has previously attempted to make. This 9 addresses Defendant’s need to clearly understand the legal claims and arguments at issue while 10 affording a pro se plaintiff the opportunity to amend his original complaint. 11 In allowing Plaintiff the opportunity to replead a Second Amended Complaint, the Court 12 cautions Plaintiff that his pro se appearance only allows him to appear on his own behalf in this 13 case. See Dkt. #58 at 6 (Plaintiff states he is “acting as pro se counsel” for two additional 14 plaintiffs). To add the claims of additional parties to a complaint, those parties must either seek 15 representation from legal counsel or also appear pro se. 16 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend and Supplement, Dkt. #52 17 and ORDERS Plaintiff to file a Second Amended Complaint within twenty-one (21) days that 18 remedies the pleading deficiencies discussed in this Order. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended 19 complaint within twenty-one days, the Court shall dismiss this matter with prejudice. 20 21 22 23 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND AND SUPPLEMENT COMPLAINT AND ORDERING PLAINTIFF TO FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT PAGE - 7 III. 1 2 3 CONCLUSION Having reviewed the relevant briefing and the remainder of the record, the Court hereby finds and ORDERS that: 4 (1) Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend and Supplement Complaint, Dkt. #52, is DENIED; 5 (2) Plaintiff shall file a Second Amended Complaint within twenty-one (21) days of the 6 date of this Order that complies Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) and 8(d). The Second Amended 7 Complaint should bear the docket number assigned in this case and be labeled 8 “Second Amended Complaint”; 9 10 (3) Defendants shall respond to Plaintiff’s complaint within twenty-one (21) days after Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint is entered on the docket. 11 12 13 14 15 DATED this 10 day of June 2019. A RICARDO S. MARTINEZ CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO AMEND AND SUPPLEMENT COMPLAINT AND ORDERING PLAINTIFF TO FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT PAGE - 8
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