Washington v. City of Seattle, et al, No. 2:2013cv01556 - Document 77 (W.D. Wash. 2016)
Court Description: ORDER granting defendants' 74 Motion to Bifurcate; Pretrial Conference set for 4/11/2016 at 02:00 PM by Judge Richard A Jones.(RS)
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Washington v. City of Seattle, et al Doc. 77 1 HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 10 11 12 NATHANIEL WASHINGTON, 13 Plaintiff, 14 CASE NO. C13-01556 RAJ ORDER v. CITY OF SEATTLE; STEPHEN SMITH, JR; ALBERT ELLIOT; CLAYTON AGATE; and DOES 1-5, 15 16 17 Defendants. 18 19 20 I. INTRODUCTION 21 This is a civil rights action in which plaintiff, Nathanial Washington alleges that 22 Seattle police officers used excessive force in effecting his arrest. Defendants have asked 23 the court to bifurcate the trial into two phases – first, a determination of whether plaintiff 24 was subjected to excessive force and second, if excessive force is found, whether that 25 force was a result of an unconstitutional policy or practice of the city. In support of their 26 motion, defendants argue that bifurcation will conserve judicial resources, simplify the 27 ORDER- 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 issues for the jury, and minimize potential prejudice to the individual defendants. The 2 court agrees. For the reasons stated below, the motion is GRANTED. Dkt. # 74. 3 II. BACKGROUND 4 The facts of this case have been summarized in previous orders. See Dkt. # 70. 5 Plaintiff’s amended complaint alleges three claims: (1) municipal liability under Monell 6 v. New York City Department of Public Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), (2) excessive 7 force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and (3) assault and battery under Washington State law. Earlier in the proceedings, both parties filed motions for partial summary 8 9 judgment. Dkt. ## 35, 38. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment on his excessive force 10 claim, while defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff’s Monell claim. See Dkt. ## 35, 38. 11 On September 9, 2015, the court denied both motions. See Dkt. # 70. Plaintiff opposed summary judgment on the Monell claim by arguing that the 12 13 city’s police department had a longstanding practice or custom of using unnecessary or 14 excessive force. In support of that argument, plaintiff cited to the Department of Justice’s 15 (“DOJ”) investigation of the Seattle Police Department (“SPD”) and the DOJ’s 1 16 subsequent findings. Id., p. 9. That report acknowledged that the “SPD engages in a 17 pattern or practice of using unnecessary or excessive force, in violation of the Fourth 18 Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 14141.” DOJ Report, p. 3. 19 The report also explained that the DOJ based its conclusion on numerous factual findings, 20 including: 21 Findings 22 23 When SPD officers use force, they do so in an unconstitutional manner nearly 20% of the time. This finding (as well as the factual findings identified below) is not based 24 25 26 1 The report is publicly available at: 27 http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/12/16/spd_findletter_12-16-11.pdf. ORDER- 2 on citizen reports or complaints. Rather, it is based on a review of a randomized, stratified, and statistically valid sample of SPD’s own internal use of force reports completed by officers and supervisors. 1 2 3 SPD officers escalate situations and use unnecessary or excessive force when arresting individuals for minor offenses. 4 5 Multiple SPD officers at a time use unnecessary or excessive force together against a single subject. Of the excessive force incidents we identified, 61% of the cases involved more than one officer. 6 7 8 Id., p. 4. 2 9 10 11 12 13 14 The court ultimately held that, based on the facts of this case, plaintiff had proffered sufficient evidence demonstrating a causal connection between the policies/practices identified in the DOJ report and the purportedly excessive force used against him. Dkt. #70, at pp. 7-12. Accordingly, the court found that there was a genuine issue for trial and refused to dismiss the Monell claim on summary judgment. Id. III. 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 LEGAL STANDARD Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) grants courts the authority to “order a separate trial of one or more separate issues, claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or thirdparty claims.” Courts may order separate trials to achieve “convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize” the proceedings. Id. Decisions regarding bifurcation are left to the trial court’s sound discretion. Hirst v. Gertzen, 676 F.2d 1252 1261 (9th Cir. 1982). IV. ANALYSIS 22 23 24 a. Judicial Resources and Simplification of the Issues Defendants argue that bifurcation will serve judicial economy because determining whether the officers used excessive force in the first phase of the trial will 25 26 2 The DOJ investigators reviewed use of force reports covering the period between 27 January 1, 2009 and April 4, 2011. Id., p. 4. ORDER- 3 1 either prove or dispose of a necessary element of plaintiff’s Monell claim against the city. 2 The court agrees. 3 Under Monell, the existence of a constitutional violation is a predicate to the city’s 4 liability. See Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (“If a person has suffered 5 no constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police officer, the fact that 6 departmental regulations might have authorized the use of constitutionally excessive 7 force is quite beside the point.”). Here, plaintiff alleges that the officers violated his 8 constitutional rights by using excessive force in effecting his arrest. Thus, a finding of 9 excessive force is necessary to a finding of Monell liability. Accordingly, resolving the 10 excessive force question in the first phase of the trial will conserve judicial resources 11 because it may dispose of the need for a second phase of trial. See Atencio v. Arpaio, 12 2013 WL 5327382, at *3-*4 (D. Ariz. Sept. 24, 2013) (“Here, all of Plaintiffs’ claims are 13 contingent on the use of excessive force…[t]herefore, bifurcation of trial serves the 14 purpose of judicial economy, because if the individual defendants prevail, the time and 15 expense involved in litigating the Monell claims will be saved.”) (emphasis added). b. Prejudice 16 17 Defendants also argue that the individual officers will be prejudiced by the 18 introduction of evidence relating to the Monell claim against the city. The court agrees. 19 The DOJ report is the primary, if not sole, evidence plaintiff relies on to show that the 20 City had a policy or custom of violating constitutional rights. The data in that report 21 relates to several other use of force cases and relies upon interviews with individuals who 22 likely have no connection to this case. Here, the jury must determine whether the 23 individual officers in this case used excessive force based upon the facts and 24 circumstances of this case. Bifurcation will avoid the risk that the jury will review the 25 26 27 ORDER- 4 1 DOJ report and leap to the conclusion that the individual officers in this case acted in 3 2 accordance with the findings in that report. 3 Indeed, a number of other courts have chosen to bifurcate Monell claims based on 4 concerns about such prejudice. See, e.g., Quintanilla v. City of Downey, 84 F.3d 353, 356 5 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming the district court’s decision and noting that “bifurcation 6 allowed the court to separate the questions of the three officers’ actions from the 7 questions regarding the Chief and the city’s liability under Monell.”); Atencio, 2013 WL 8 5327382, at *5 (ruling that bifurcation is necessary in excessive force case to eliminate 9 prejudice to individual defendants); Green v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 2014 WL 174988, at *2 10 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2014) (finding bifurcation appropriate “in light of the potential for 11 undue prejudice”); Boyd v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 2006 WL 680556, at *2 (N.D. 12 Cal. Mar. 14, 2006) (bifurcating in excessive force case based, in part, on prejudice to 13 individual defendants); Hwang v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 2008 WL 4447708, at *2 14 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2008) (holding that bifurcation was warranted where the vast 15 majority of the evidence admissible against the City on the municipal liability claim was 16 not also admissible against the individual officers on the excessive force claim, and 17 admission of the evidence would, as such, likely be unduly prejudicial). c. Pretrial Hearing Regarding Admissibility of the DOJ Report 18 19 The pretrial conference in this matter will take place on April 11, 2016 at 2:00p.m. 20 The court has set aside the entire afternoon for this conference. The court will hear 21 argument regarding the admissibility of the DOJ report at that time. 22 23 24 25 26 27 3 To the extent plaintiff argues that the report should be admitted as evidence of habit under Rule 406, the court finds that argument to be entirely without merit. See, e.g., U.S. v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 123 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding that a habit is reflexive if “it involves a person’s regular practice of meeting a particular kind of situation with a specific type of conduct, such as the habit of going down a particular stairway two stairs at a time.”); Babcock v. Gen. Motors Corp., 299 F.3d 60, 66 (1st Cir. 2002) (finding evidence that an individual “always wore his seatbelt regardless of whether he was the driver or a passenger and regardless of the length of the trip” shows reflexive conduct). ORDER- 5 1 V. CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to bifurcate (Dkt. # 74) is 3 GRANTED. The trial will be bifurcated into two phases: a first phase will be devoted to 4 determining plaintiffs’ excessive force and state law claims, and a second phase will be 5 devoted to plaintiff’s Monell claim. Both phases will be tried before the same jury. 6 Additionally, the parties will appear for a pretrial conference on April 11, 2016 at 2:00 7 p.m. The parties should be prepared to discuss all pretrial matters, including the 8 admissibility of the DOJ report under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8) and proposed jury 9 instructions regarding bifurcation. 10 11 Dated this 10th day of March, 2016. 12 14 A 15 The Honorable Richard A. Jones United States District Court 13 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 ORDER- 6
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