Ressy v. King County et al, No. 2:2011cv00760 - Document 43 (W.D. Wash. 2012)

Court Description: ORDER granting 30 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Case is DISMISSED in full, by Judge Marsha J. Pechman.(MD)

Download PDF
Ressy v. King County et al Doc. 43 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 8 9 10 HECTOR L. RESSY, 11 12 13 14 CASE NO. C11-760 MJP Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT v. KING COUNTY and D. BENEVENTE, Defendants. 15 16 This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. 17 No. 30.) Having reviewed the motion, the response (Dkt. No. 39), the reply (Dkt. No. 41), and 18 all related papers, the Court GRANTS the motion. 19 20 Background Plaintiff Hector Ressy brings several claims arising out of an incident at the King County 21 Correctional Facility on May 5, 2008. He alleges he was placed in overtightened handcuffs 22 while being transported from a dayroom to a visitor room. He brings claims of excessive force, 23 cruel and unusual punishment, as well as negligence and assault and battery claims. At the time 24 of the incident, he was a pre-hearing detainee brought in on a probation violation. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 Ressy claims officer Danny Benavente (apparently misspelled by Plaintiff as 2 “Benevente”) placed him in handcuffs that were too tight while being led from a dayroom to visit 3 his attorney on May 5, 2008. During the two minute walk, Benavente allegedly held Ressy’s 4 arms, bumped him against the wall, and did not loosen his handcuffs. Ressy claims Benavente 5 told him “so you like to file grievances?” as they walked to the visitor room. (Ressy Decl. ¶ 1.) 6 He did not apparently complain to Benavente about the handcuffs when he was led to the 7 meeting room. Ressy then met with his attorney for roughly twenty minutes, during which he 8 was not handcuffed. He claims his wrists were painful and hands numb. After the meeting he 9 was placed back in handcuffs again and led back to his cell. Benavente states that “[a]t some 10 point prior to being returned to his cell, Mr. Ressy complained about his wrists.” (Benavente 11 Decl. ¶ 8.) Benavente states that Ressy was non-responsive to his question of whether he wanted 12 to see a nurse. (Id.) Another officer on duty, Pablo Chan, also states Benavente asked Ressy if 13 he wanted to have his wrists examined as they were returning to Ressy’s cell. (Chan Decl. ¶ 6.) 14 Chan, too, asked Ressy the same question, but Ressy did not respond except to say “huh.” (Id.) 15 Roughly ten minutes after returning to his cell, Ressy called Chan for a medical exam. A 16 nurse saw him about three and a half hours later on his report of a painful wrist due to tightened 17 cuffs. (Dkt. No. 36 at 5.) The nurse found a good range of motion, no decreased movement, 18 abrasions, and no open wounds or evidence of trauma to right wrist. (Id.) He did, however, note 19 “[s]everal small red areas to right wrist.” (Id.) Fifteen days later on May 20, 2008, Ressy visited 20 a nurse complaining of wrist pain and numbness. (Dkt. No. 37.) The nurse noted no swelling, 21 redness, or pain to the touch and Ressy was not limited in his range of movement. (Id. at 4.) On 22 May 30, 2008, Ressy saw another nurse complaining of chest pain. He also stated that the 23 24 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 2 1 handcuffs placed on him prior to that specific visit hurt him. (Dkt. No. 38 at 5.) Oddly, he 2 “denie[d] any problems with his right hand prior to this visit.” (Id.) 3 At his deposition, Ressy explained that during the incident on May 5, 2008, he felt 4 numbness and tingling in his wrist during the incident, but that he has not sought medical care 5 for this condition. (Ressy Dep. at 14.) He also revealed that he was involved in a separate 6 incident in September, 2011, where he claims Pierce County Sheriffs injured his right hand. (Id. 7 at 23, 24, 32.) This exacerbated the numbness and tingling in his right hand. (Id. at 32.) 8 Ressy filed a pro se complaint alleging claims of: (1) excessive force in violation of the 9 Fourth Amendment; (2) cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth, Fifth and 10 Fourteenth Amendments; (3) Monell liability for these constitutional violations against the 11 County; (4) assault and battery; and (5) negligence as to Benavente and the County. Defendants 12 move for summary judgment on all claims. 13 Analysis 14 A. Standard 15 The Court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine 16 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 17 Civ. P. 56(a). The Court views the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the party 18 opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 19 (1986). The moving party has the burden to show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. 20 Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159 (1970). Once the moving party has met its 21 initial burden, the nonmoving party must “designate specific facts showing that there is a 22 genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). 23 B. Qualified immunity 24 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 3 1 Benavente asserts a defense of qualified immunity to Ressy’s Fourth Amendment claim. 2 The Court finds Benavente is entitled to qualified immunity. 3 The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials “from liability for civil 4 damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 5 rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 6 818 (1982). To analyze whether the immunity attaches, the Court engages in a two step inquiry 7 in no required order. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). The Court must consider 8 whether the alleged constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the incident. 9 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). The court must consider whether the facts “[t]aken in 10 the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury . . . show [that] the [defendant’s] conduct 11 violated a constitutional right[.]” Id. “Qualified immunity is applicable unless the official’s 12 conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. 13 An initial question is whether the Fourth Amendment’s protections apply to Plaintiff 14 while he was a pre-hearing detainee on a probation violation. They do. In Pierce v. Multnomah 15 County, Or., the Ninth Circuit recognized the Supreme Court in Graham “made clear that pre16 trial detainees are protected by the Constitution from excessive force that amounts to 17 punishment.” 76 F.3d 1032, 1042 (9th Cir. 1996). The court in Pierce decided that the Fourth 18 Amendment protected pre-trial detainees who were arrested without a warrant and held prior to 19 arraignment. Id. at 1043. Here, Plaintiff was held prior to a hearing on his alleged probation 20 violation, but it is not clear whether his arrest was with or without a warrant. Even if it was an 21 arrest with a warrant, the Court holds the Fourth Amendment’s protections apply to Plaintiff’s 22 claim. 23 1. Clearly Established? 24 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 4 1 It is clearly established that a pretrial detainee cannot be placed in handcuffs in a manner 2 that causes an appreciable injury. 3 When identifying the right that was allegedly violated, a court must define the right more 4 narrowly than the constitutional provision guaranteeing the right, but more broadly than all of the 5 factual circumstances surrounding the alleged violation. See Watkins v. City of Oakland, Cal., 6 145 F.3d 1087, 1092-93 (9th Cir. 1998). The determination of whether a right is clearly 7 established must be “undertaken in light of the specific context of the case.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 8 201. “The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would 9 understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 10 (1987). To conclude that the right is clearly established, the court need not identify an identical 11 prior action. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. 12 As of May 2008, the law was clearly established that an officer could violate the Fourth 13 Amendment by excessively tightening handcuffs in a manner that causes observable pain. The 14 Ninth Circuit has held at least twice that over-tightening restraints can be the basis of a violation 15 of the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee to be free from excessive force. Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 16 F.3d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1993); Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 645 (9th Cir. 1989). While 17 these cases both dealt with arrestees, Defendants seem to concede that these cases apply to 18 pretrial detainees. The facts of those cases show the tightening must be more than usual and that 19 it often includes an officer failing to heed a request to loosen the handcuffs. In Palmer, the court 20 held that the application of handcuffs in a manner that caused pain and bruising that lasted 21 several weeks violated the Fourth Amendment. 9 F.3d at 1436. Notably, the arrested individual 22 complained about the cuffs and the officer did nothing to alleviate the pain in his visibly 23 discolored wrists. Similarly, in Hansen, the court found that the application of handcuffs that left 24 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 5 1 bruises and caused pain in the fingers of an arrestee could be sufficient to prove an excessive 2 force claim. 885 F.2d at 645. The court also noted the officer was rough and abusive to the 3 point the plaintiff received bruises to her wrist that required medical treatment, and a bystander 4 observed what appeared to be extremely rough behavior. Id. 5 The Court finds it clearly established as of May 5, 2008, that a corrections officer can 6 violate a pre-hearing detainee’s Fourth Amendment rights by over-tightening handcuffs in a 7 manner that inflicts observable pain or injury, particularly where the officer disregards the 8 detainee’s complaints the cuffs are over-tightened. 9 10 2. Constitutional Violation? Ressy has failed to present facts supporting his claim Benavente’s application of 11 handcuffs constitutes excessive force. 12 The question to resolve here is “[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting 13 the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?” 14 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. Determining whether a defendant officer’s use of force was 15 “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment “requires a careful balancing of the nature and 16 quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the 17 countervailing government interests at stake.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) 18 (internal quotations omitted). “This analysis requires ‘careful attention to the facts and 19 circumstances in each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the 20 suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is 21 actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.’” Gibson v. County of Washoe, 22 Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1197 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). The Court is also 23 24 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 6 1 to weigh the circumstances from the viewpoint of a reasonable officer at the scene, not using 2 20/20 hindsight. Id. 3 The facts here do not show that an officer in Benavente’s position would have known that 4 he was using excessive force. Benavente was following normal procedures to place handcuffs 5 on Ressy to move him from the dayroom to the visitor room. (Hyatt Decl. ¶¶ 8-9; Benavente 6 Decl.¶ 10.) The cuffs were placed on twice, and the application was for roughly two minutes at a 7 time. Ressy did not complain to Benavente at the time they were first placed on. Instead, Ressy 8 states he only told Benavente to “get his hands off [him].” (Ressy Decl. ¶ 3.) On the return trip, 9 Benavente asked Ressy if he wanted to see a doctor about his wrist, which Ressy declined. 10 (Benavente Decl. ¶ 8.) Ressy has presented inadequate factual evidence that the application of 11 the handcuffs caused observable or significant pain. He testified he experienced tingling and 12 numbness in his right wrist at the time of the incident. (Ressy Dep. at 14.) He refused medical 13 care initially, and the nurse who saw him several hours later noted at most “several small red 14 areas to right wrist.” (Dkt. No. 36 at 5.) He had no sensation problems with his hand, no 15 abrasions or any evidence of trauma. (Id.) Fifteen days later there was still no evidence of pain 16 or numbness in his right wrist. (Dkt. No. 37 at 4.) Contradictorily, ten days after that, Ressy 17 “denie[d] any problems with his right hand prior to visit.” (Dkt. No. 38 at 5.) This contradictory 18 record is difficult to square with Ressy’s allegations that the he felt pain in his wrist for a year 19 following the incident. (Ressy. Decl. ¶ 4.) These facts are not enough to sustain Ressy’s claim. 20 See Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 922 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that 21 conclusory allegations unsupported by medical evaluations fail to create a dispute of fact as to 22 whether the plaintiff suffered an injury as a result of being handcuffed). 23 24 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 7 1 The Court GRANTS the motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. 2 No reasonable officer in Benavente’s position would have known he was violating Ressy’s 3 rights. 4 B. Eighth Amendment 5 Ressy brings a claim for cruel and unusual punishment, which for pre-trial detainees, is a 6 form of Fifth Amendment claim. Ressy also casts this as a claim under the Fourteenth 7 Amendment. Ressy has failed to present any facts supporting this claim and failed to oppose the 8 opening brief on this issue, which is an admission the motion has merit. Local Rule CR 7(b)(2). 9 “[P]retrial detainees . . . possess greater constitutional rights than prisoners.” Stone v. 10 City of San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850, 857 n.10 (9th Cir. 1992). A pretrial detainee’s right to be 11 free from punishment is grounded in the Due Process Clause, but courts borrow from Eighth 12 Amendment jurisprudence when analyzing the rights of pre-trial detainees. See Pierce v. County 13 of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1205 (9th Cir. 2008). Unless there is evidence of intent to punish, 14 then those conditions or restrictions that are reasonably related to legitimate penological 15 objectives do not violate pretrial detainees’ right to be free from punishment. See Block v. 16 Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 584 (1984) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538-39 (1979)). 17 Order and security are legitimate penological interests. See White v. Roper, 901 F.2d 1501, 1504 18 (9th Cir. 1990). 19 Ressy has not produced evidence that there was an intent to punish him by placing him in 20 handcuffs. Ressy points to one statement that Benavente purportedly told him “so you like to 21 file grievances?” (Ressy Decl. ¶ 40.) Even if this was true, there is inadequate evidence that he 22 was restrained in a manner that could amount to punishment. He was placed in handcuffs in the 23 manner proscribed by the jail facility in order to protect staff, other inmates, and visitors. (Hyatt 24 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 8 1 Decl. ¶¶ 5-6.) These are valid penological and security interests to support the use of handcuffs. 2 As explained above, the only evidence of any harm was the redness observed on Ressy’s wrist, 3 and Ressy’s subjective complaints of numbness and pain. The contemporaneous nurse 4 observation does not seem to confirm Ressy’s complaints. Even when coupled with the claim 5 that Benevente’s jibe about Ressy filing complaints, the facts cannot sustain a claim for cruel and 6 unusual punishment. 7 Ressy also appears to contend that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment as a 8 result of Benavente bumping him into the wall and holding his arms. However, he has not 9 alleged that the use of force caused him any harm and has provided no evidence to support the 10 claim. There does not appear to be objective evidence showing he was bumped to the extent that 11 it caused any harm. Benavente admits he put his hands on Ressy’s arm, but only to control him 12 as they went down the stairs. Officer Chan observed this technique, and it was consistent with 13 King County policies. (Chan Decl. ¶ 5; Hyatt Decl. ¶ 9.) No facts corroborate the declaration in 14 which Ressy states he was bumped or that he was roughed up. These facts do not show cruel and 15 unusual punishment. 16 The Court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of Benavente on the Eighth, Fifth, and 17 Fourteenth Amendment claims. 18 C. Monell Liability Against County 19 Ressy’s constitutional claims against the County require a showing that an official policy 20 or custom caused the constitutional deprivation. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 58, 21 690-91 (1978). Because Ressy has shown no constitutional violations, there can be no Monell 22 liability. The Court GRANTS the motion and DISMISSES these claims. 23 D. Assault and Battery 24 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 9 1 Ressy’s claim for assault and battery is time-barred. A claim for assault and battery is 2 governed by a two-year statute of limitations. RCW 4.16.100. Ressy alleges the incident took 3 place on May 5, 2008, but waited until May 6, 2011, to file his claim. It is time-barred and 4 therefore DISMISSED. 5 E. Negligence 6 Ressy inadequately alleges that Benavente negligently failed to protect him from physical 7 harm, and that the County is liable through the principle of respondeat superior. 8 “The essential elements of actionable negligence are: (1) the existence of a duty owed to 9 the complaining party; (2) a breach thereof; (3) a resulting injury; and (4) a proximate cause 10 between the claimed breach and resulting injury.” Pedroza v. Bryant, 101 Wn.2d 226, 228 11 (1984). “The causal relationship of an accident or injury to a resulting physical condition must 12 be established by medical testimony beyond speculation and conjecture.” Carlos v. Cain, 4 Wn. 13 App. 475, 477 (1971) (quotation omitted). “It must rise to the degree of proof that the resulting 14 condition was probably caused by the accident, or that the resulting condition more likely than 15 not resulted from the accident, to establish a causal relation.” Id. (quotation omitted). 16 Ressy’s complaint alleges Benevent breached a “duty to take reasonable steps to protect 17 inmates from physical harm.” (Compl. ¶ 45.) In his response brief, he cites to the Prisoner 18 Handbook, which states he would be “provide[d] protection from abuse, corporal punishment, 19 personal injury, disease, and harassment.” (Dkt. No. 39 at 4.) 20 Ressy’s negligence claim fails for lack of evidence of causation between the alleged acts 21 and his purported injury. Ressy claims he suffers ongoing pain and numbness that arose out of 22 the incident on May 5, 2008. The medical evidence shows that four hours after the incident there 23 was no evidence of pain, reduced motion, or lack of sensation. (Dkt. No. 36 at 5.) Ressy has 24 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 10 1 provided no medical evidence that would show the alleged handcuffing caused the harm about 2 which he complains. He admits, in fact, that he never sought treatment for the condition. There 3 is further evidence that he was later injured in an incident in 2011 that may in fact be the cause of 4 any pain he now claims. With inadequate evidence of causation, Ressy cannot proceed on this 5 claim. The Court GRANTS the motion on this issue and DISMISSES the claim against 6 Benavente. 7 Any claim for respondeat superior liability cannot be sustained, as it is premised on there 8 being a viable negligence claim. The claim is thus DISMISSED as to the County, as well. 9 F. 10 Request for Counsel In his motion, Ressy requests appointment of counsel to help with his Monell claim. 11 Because that claim is dismissed for lack of actionable constitutional claims, the Court DENIES 12 the request as MOOT. It would not aid in his cause or be a reason to deny summary judgment. 13 14 Conclusion The Court GRANTS the motion in full. Ressy fails to present sufficient evidence of a 15 violation of his Fourth, Fifth, Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment rights. Benavente’s actions were 16 not unreasonable or excessive. Ressy’s constitutional claims fail against both Benavente and the 17 County. His assault and battery claim is time barred, and his negligence claim lacks sufficient 18 evidence of causation to survive dismissal. The case is DISMISSED in full. 19 The clerk is ordered to provide copies of this order to Plaintiff and all counsel. 20 Dated this 13th day of June, 2012. 22 A 23 Marsha J. Pechman United States District Judge 21 24 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 11

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.