Redlingshafer v. Colvin, No. 4:2015cv05048 - Document 13 (E.D. Wash. 2016)

Court Description: ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. Granting in part and denying in part 11 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; and denying 12 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Senior Judge Edward F. Shea. (SK, Case Administrator)

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Redlingshafer v. Colvin Doc. 13 1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 5 6 7 CHRISTINE REDLINGSHAFER, Plaintiff, 8 v. 9 10 11 No.: 4:15-CV-5048-EFS CAROLYN COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Defendant. 12 13 14 Before the Court are cross-summary-judgment motions. ECF Nos. 11 & 15 12. Plaintiff Christine Redlingshafer appeals the Administrative Law 16 Judge’s (ALJ) denial of benefits. ECF No. 11. Ms. Redlingshafer contends 17 the ALJ erred because she 1) improperly rejected the opinions of Ms. 18 Redlingshafer’s medical care Redlingshafer’s subjective providers, 2) improperly rejected Ms. 19 complaints, and 3) failed to properly 20 identify specific jobs, available in significant numbers in the national 21 22 economy, which Ms. Redlingshafer could perform given her impairments. 23 ECF No. 11 at 7. The Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) 24 asks the Court to affirm the ALJ’s decision that Ms. Redlingshafer is 25 capable of performing substantial gainful activity in a field for which 26 a significant number of jobs exist in the national economy. ECF No. 12 27 at 1. After reviewing the record and relevant authority, the Court is 28 ORDER - 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 fully informed. 2 further proceedings. 3 A. 4 For the reasons set forth below, the Court remands for Statement of Facts1 Ms. Redlingshafer was born in 1968. Transcript of admin. hrg. 5 (“Tr.”) at 47. She has a limited education having only completed up 6 through half of seventh grade and never having obtained her GED. Tr. at 7 32. Ms. Redlingshafer has been diagnosed with a number of physical 8 9 conditions including degenerative disc disease, state-post discectomy, 10 asthma, 11 psychological conditions including depression and anxiety. Tr. 11, 15- 12 18, 358-365, 369-370, 401, 403, 410, 416, 419-424, 453, 459, 476, & 496- 13 497. At one point, she received surgery on her lower back in an attempt 14 to alleviate the pain. Tr. at 34. It helped for about a year and then 15 and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, as well as some the pain came back. Id. 16 According to Ms. Redlingshafer’s own testimony, she experiences 17 significant back pain on a daily basis. Tr. at 37. She claims the pain 18 is so bad that she can’t get out of bed four or five days a month and 19 20 requires help from her boyfriend to do so. Tr. at 36. She can’t sit or 21 stand for more than a few minutes without her back tightening up and the 22 pain 23 crocheting (her primary hobby) and watching television. Tr. at 36-37. 24 Some days she will visit with her daughter who comes over to help her 25 clean. Tr. at 37. There is evidence in the record, however, of Ms. escalating. Tr. at 32-33. Ms. Redlingshafer spends her days 26 1 The facts are only briefly summarized. Detailed facts are 27 contained in the administrative hearing transcript, the ALJ’s decision, 28 the parties’ briefs, and the underlying records. ORDER - 2 1 Redlingshafer living a somewhat active lifestyle, such as taking walks 2 to and from the library, playing with her granddaughter, playing with 3 her dog, and taking a road trip to California to visit family. Tr. at 4 475-476. 5 Ms. Redlingshafer has a very limited employment history. Tr. at 38 6 & 350. She worked as a warehouse worker from 1986 to 1999. Tr. at 43. 7 Apparently, she worked one other job in 1999 for approximately one week. 8 9 10 Tr. at 38. Since 1999, Ms. Redlingshafer has not been employed. Id. B. Procedural History 11 On October 11, 2011, Ms. Redlingshafer protectively applied for 12 supplemental security income alleging a number of physical disabilities. 13 Tr. at 226-34. Her alleged onset date is December 30, 1999. Id. 14 15 On February 14, 2012, Ms. Redlingshafer’s claim was denied. Tr. at 9. On May 4, 2012, reconsideration was denied. Id. On February 26, 2014, 16 an administrative hearing was held before ALJ Cecilia LaCara at which 17 Ms. Redlingshafer and an independent vocational expert, Daniel Labrosse, 18 both testified. Tr. 28-46. The ALJ determined that Ms. Redlingshafer has 19 20 the severe impairments of degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine 21 status post discectomy, asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, 22 depression, and anxiety. Tr. at 11. The ALJ proceeded to find that Ms. 23 Redlingshafer’s impairments do not meet or medically equal the severity 24 of 25 ultimately 26 any capacity listed found to impairments. that perform Ms. Id. Despite Redlingshafer sedentary work as her has impairments, the defined, residual except the ALJ functional that she is 27 further limited to occasional climbing of ramps or stairs; occasional 28 balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling; no climbing of ORDER - 3 1 ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; avoiding concentrated exposure to extreme 2 cold, excessive vibration and airborne irritants, such as odors, fumes, 3 dusts, gases, and poorly-ventilated areas; and avoiding concentrated 4 exposure to hazardous machinery. Tr. at 14-15. Ms. Redlingshafer was 5 further found to be limited to repetitive tasks involving only 6 occasional interaction with the general public and coworkers. Tr. at 15. 7 Based on this assessment, which was presented to the vocational 8 9 expert, and based Ms. residual Redlingshafer’s Redlingshafer can perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the 12 national 13 vehicle driver, and is not disabled as defined by the Social Security 14 Act. Tr. at 19. as document the preparer, ALJ work 11 such capacity, education, experience, economy, functional age, 10 15 and on concluded addresser, and Ms. escort The Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ’s decision. Tr. at 1- 16 7. Thereafter, Ms. Redlingshafer filed this lawsuit, appealing the ALJ’s 17 decision. ECF No. 1. The parties then filed the instant summary-judgment 18 motions. ECF Nos. 11 & 12. 19 20 C. Disability Determination A 21 "disability" is defined as the "inability to engage in any 22 substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 23 physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death 24 or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period 25 of 26 not less 1382c(a)(3)(A). than The twelve months." decision-maker 42 uses U.S.C. a §§ 423(d)(1)(A), five-step sequential 27 evaluation process to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 28 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. ORDER - 4 20 1 Step one assesses whether the claimant is engaged in substantial 2 gainful activities during the relevant period. If she is, benefits are 3 denied. 4 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If she is not, the decision-maker proceeds to step two. 5 Step two assesses whether the claimant has a medically severe 6 impairment or combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 7 416.920(c). If the claimant combination of impairments, does not have a severe impairment or 8 9 10 the disability claim is denied. If the impairment is severe, the evaluation proceeds to the third step. 11 Step three compares the claimant's impairment with a number of 12 listed impairments acknowledged by the Commissioner to be so severe as 13 to preclude substantial gainful activity. 14 Subpt. P App. 1, 416.920(d). If the impairment meets or equals one of 15 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404 the listed impairments, the claimant is conclusively presumed to be 16 disabled. If the impairment does not meet or equal one of the listed 17 impairments, the evaluation proceeds to the fourth step. 18 Step four assesses whether the impairment prevents the claimant 19 20 from performing work she has performed in the past. This includes 21 determining the claimant’s residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 22 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). If the claimant is able to perform her previous 23 work, she is not disabled. If the claimant cannot perform this work, the 24 evaluation proceeds to the fifth step. 25 26 Step perform five, other the work final in the step, assesses national whether economy in the view claimant of her can age, 27 education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f); 28 see Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 (1987). ORDER - 5 The 1 burden of proof shifts during this sequential disability 2 analysis. The claimant has the initial burden of establishing a prima 3 facie case of entitlement to disability benefits. Rhinehart v. Finch, 4 438 F.2d 920, 921 (9th Cir. 1971). The claimant meets this burden if she 5 establishes that a physical or mental impairment prevents her from 6 engaging in his previous occupation. The burden then shifts to the 7 Commissioner to show 1) the claimant can perform other substantial 8 9 gainful activity, and 2) that a “significant number of jobs exist in the 10 national economy” which the claimant can perform. Kail v. Heckler, 722 11 F.2d 1496, 1498 (9th Cir. 1984). A claimant is disabled only if her 12 impairments are of such severity that she is not only unable to do her 13 previous 14 experiences, engage in any other substantial gainful work which exists 15 work but cannot, in the national economy. considering her age, education, and work 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B). 16 D. Standard of Review 17 On review, the court considers the record as a whole, not just the 18 evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision. Weetman v. Sullivan, 877 F.2d 19 20 20, 22 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Kornock v. Harris, 648 F.2d 525, 526 21 (9th Cir. 1980)). The court upholds the ALJ’s determination that the 22 claimant is not disabled if the ALJ applied the proper legal standards 23 and there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support 24 the decision. 25 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)); Brawner v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 26 Delgado v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 570, 572 (9th Cir. 1983) 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1987) (recognizing that a decision supported 27 by substantial evidence will be set aside if the proper legal standards 28 were not applied in weighing the evidence and making the decision). ORDER - 6 1 Substantial 2 Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n.10 (9th Cir. 1975), but less than a 3 preponderance, McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 601-02 (9th Cir. 4 evidence is more than a mere scintilla, Sorenson v. 1989); Desrosiers v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 5 (9th Cir. 1988). “It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 6 might accept as adequate to support 401 (1971) a conclusion.” Richardson v. 7 Perales, 402 U.S. 389, (citations omitted). “[S]uch 8 9 inferences and conclusions as the [ALJ] may reasonably draw from the 10 evidence” will also be upheld. 11 (9th 12 interpretation, 13 Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984). 14 E. 15 Cir. 1965). If the the court Mark v. Celebrezze, 348 F.2d 289, 293 evidence must supports uphold the more ALJ’s than one decision. rational Allen v. Analysis The Court addresses each of Ms. Redlingshafer’s challenges to the 16 ALJ’s decision. 17 1. Treating Physicians 18 Ms. Redlinshafer contends that the ALJ failed to properly consider 19 20 21 the opinions of two of her medical care providers: Dr. Marie Ho, MD, and Mr. Ovidio B. Demiar, PAC. ECF No. 11 at 9. a. Dr. Marie Ho, MD 22 23 As to Dr. Ho, who conducted an orthopedic consultative evaluation 24 of Ms. Redlingshafer, the ALJ assigned “little weight” to Dr. Ho’s 25 opinions 26 given that she was a one-time examining practitioner and, therefore, her insight into Ms. Redlingshafer’s physical functioning was 27 limited. Tr. at 17. The ALJ further noted that Dr. Ho’s functional 28 ORDER - 7 1 evaluation essentially said that Ms. Redlingshafer could not work a full 2 eight-hour workday. Tr. at 17. 3 4 There are three type of physicians: treating physicians, examining physicians, and nonexamining physicians. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 5 830 (9th Cir. 1995). “As a general rule, more weight should be given to 6 the opinion of a treating source than to the opinion of doctors who do 7 not treat the claimant.” Id. The ALJ must provide “clear and convincing” 8 9 reasons for rejecting a treating or examining physician’s opinions and 10 may not reject such opinions without providing “specific and legitimate 11 reasons” supported by substantial evidence in the record for so doing. 12 Id. 13 Ms. Redlingshafer argues that the ALJ improperly “rejected” the 14 opinion of Dr. Ho without meeting the standard required in Lester. ECF 15 No. 11 at 10. Ms. Redlingshafer, however, mischaracterizes the ALJ’s 16 decision. The ALJ did not reject Dr. Ho’s opinion. Tr. at 17. In fact, 17 the ALJ considered Dr. Ho’s opinion of Ms. Redlingshafer’s functional 18 limitations in her decision. The ALJ, however, simply gave less weight 19 20 to Dr. Ho’s opinion and found it “less persuasive” because she was only 21 a one-time examining physician and not a treating physician. Tr. at 17. 22 This approach is exactly what Lester instructs an ALJ to do. Lester, 81 23 F.3d at 830 (“[M]ore weight should be given to the opinion of a treating 24 source than to the opinion of doctors who do not treat the claimant.”). 25 The Court finds that the ALJ did not err in giving less weight to Dr. 26 Ho’s opinion than she would to a treating physician’s opinions. 27 b. Mr. Ovidio Demiar, PAC 28 ORDER - 8 1 As to Mr. Demiar, the ALJ assigned “little weight” to his opinion 2 because “Mr. Demiar is not an acceptable medical source capable of 3 establishing a severe medically determinable impairment or functional 4 limitations that may result therefrom.” Tr. at 18. “[O]nly licensed 5 physicians and certain other qualified specialists are considered 6 acceptable medical sources.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th 7 Cir. 2012) (internal quotes omitted). Physician's assistants are defined 8 9 10 as “other sources,” and are not entitled to the same deference as acceptable medical sources. Id. 11 Ms. Redlingshafer argues that the ALJ improperly “rejected” Mr. 12 Demiar’s opinion. ECF No. 11 at 11. Again, the ALJ did not reject the 13 opinion. Tr. at 18. The ALJ simply gave less weight to Mr. Demiar’s 14 opinion than he did to the other medical experts because he was not 15 considered an acceptable medical source. Instead, the ALJ gave greater 16 weight to the opinions of Dr. Alex Fischer, Dr. Dan Donahue, Dr. Alnoor 17 Virji, and Dr. Wayne Hurley. Tr. at 18. These doctors, although they 18 were nonexamining medical experts, are considered acceptable medical 19 20 21 sources and each gave medical reports consistent with each other as to Ms. Redlingshafer’s functional limitations. Tr. at 18. 22 The Court finds that the ALJ did not err in giving less weight to 23 Mr. Demiar’s opinion, as an “other source,” and more weight to the 24 “acceptable medical sources.” 25 2. 26 Ms. Redlingshafer’s Subjective Complaints Ms. Redlingshafer argues the ALJ failed to provide valid reasons 27 for considering her testimony regarding the 28 effects of her impairments as less than credible. ORDER - 9 severity and limiting A 1 two-step analysis is used by the ALJ to assess whether a 2 claimant's testimony regarding subjective pain or symptoms is credible. 3 Garrison 4 v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th Cir. 2014). Step one requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant presented objective 5 medical evidence of an impairment, which could reasonably be expected to 6 produce some degree of the pain or other symptoms alleged. Lingenfelter 7 v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 2007); Smolen v. Chater, 80 8 9 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996). Objective medical evidence of the pain 10 or 11 claimant. Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014. If the claimant satisfies the 12 first step of this analysis, and there is no evidence of malingering, 13 the ALJ must accept the claimant's testimony about the severity of his 14 symptoms unless the ALJ provides specific, clear, and convincing reasons 15 fatigue, or the severity thereof, need not be provided by the for rejecting the claimant’s symptom-severity testimony. Id. An ALJ is 16 not “required to believe every allegation of disabling pain” or other 17 non-exertional impairment. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 18 2007). However, to discredit a claimant's testimony when a medical 19 20 impairment has been established, the ALJ must provide specific, cogent 21 reasons for the disbelief. Id. Factors that an ALJ may consider in 22 weighing a claimant's credibility include reputation for truthfulness, 23 inconsistencies in testimony or between testimony and conduct, daily 24 activities, and unexplained, or inadequately explained, failure to seek 25 treatment or follow a prescribed course of treatment. Id. 26 Here, there were inconsistencies in Ms. Redlingshafer’s own 27 testimony as between her testimony and her daily conduct. While before 28 the ALJ, Ms. Redlingshafer testified that she could not stand for more ORDER - 10 1 than four minutes without having to sit or lie down. Tr. at 33. She also 2 testified that she could not sit for more than five minutes without 3 having to stand up. Id. Later during the hearing, Ms. Redlingshafer 4 testified that she could sit for thirty minutes without needing to stand 5 up. Tr. at 39. She then testified that she could not walk more than a 6 half block before stopping. Id. She testified that three days per week 7 her pain level is at a “ten” and that many days per month she could not 8 9 get out of bed. Tr. at 40. The ALJ recognized Ms. Redlingshafer’s pain 10 and found that the impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the 11 alleged 12 Redlingshafer’s 13 limiting effects” of these symptoms entirely credible for a number of 14 reasons. Tr. at 15. 15 symptoms. Tr. at statements 15. However, regarding the ALJ “intensity, did not find persistence, Ms. and First, the ALJ noted the number of physical activities that Ms. 16 Redlingshafer admitted to her medical providers as having done. Id. For 17 instance, Ms. Redlingshafer helped her significant other with yard work 18 by raking leaves for 20 minutes. Id. She physically played with both her 19 20 granddaughter and her dog. Ms. Redlingshafer also testified that she 21 took a road trip to California to visit family. Id. The ALJ found that 22 these activities contradicted Ms. Redlingshafer’s testimony that she 23 could 24 Redlinsghafer also reported that she would occasionally walk to the 25 library and back, which contradicts the testimony that she can’t walk 26 not sit or stand for more than about five minutes. Ms. for more than half a block. Tr. at 16. The contradictions in testimony 27 and conduct, coupled with the severe descriptions by Ms. Redlingshafer 28 ORDER - 11 1 of her symptoms, led the ALJ to find that her credibility was undercut 2 in the appeal. Tr. at 16. 3 4 There is inadequately also evidence explaining, a in the failure record follow a of Ms. Redlingshafer prescribed course of 5 treatment. Tr. at 16. Ms. Redlingshafer’s medical history shows that she 6 was discharged from her physical therapy treatment program for “lack of 7 compliance.” Id. The ALJ found this was another reason why Ms. 8 9 Redlingshafer’s testimony was less than credible. Id. Ms. Redlingshafer 10 offers a number of plausible explanations to this Court as to why she 11 may have missed physical therapy but all are speculation and none of 12 them are supported by evidence in the record. ECF No. 11 at 18. 13 To clarify, the ALJ never found that Ms. Redlingshafer was not 14 credible as to the existence of her impairments. Tr. at 15. In fact, the 15 ALJ thoroughly analyzed the medical record before finding that Ms. 16 Redlingshafer does in fact have degenerative disc disease of the lumbar 17 spine status post discectomy. Tr. at 11. The ALJ found only Ms. persistence, and 18 Redlingshafer’s testimony regarding the “intensity, symptoms was not credible by Ms. 19 20 limiting effects” by of the the 21 contradicted medical records, 22 because it was Redlingshafer’s own testimony, and by Ms. Redlingshafer’s own conduct. 23 3. 24 Finally, Ms. Redlingshafer contends that the ALJ failed to provide 25 26 an Specific Jobs in the National Economy accurate and complete hypothetical to the vocation expert and, therefore, the ALJ did not sufficiently determine whether there jobs are 27 available in the national economy in significant 28 Redlingshafer can perform. ECF No. 11 at 20. ORDER - 12 number that Ms. 1 In 2 posing stated: 3 the hypothetical to the vocational expert, the ALJ Let’s assume that we have an individual who is of the same age, education, and work experience as that of the claimant, who is able to perform sedentary work with the following limitations. This person is limited to the occasional climbing of ramps or stairs; no climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; occasional balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling. Further, this person is to avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold, excessive vibration, irritants such as fumes, odors, dust, gases and poorly ventilated areas; is to avoid concentrated exposure to hazardous machinery. Further, this person is limited to simple, routine and repetitive tasks and is to only have occasional interaction with the general public and coworkers. Could an individual with these limitations be able to perform any of the claimant’s past work as actually and customarily performed per the DOT? 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Tr. at 43-44. In response, the vocational expert responded, “No.” The 16 ALJ then asked the vocational expert, “Would there be any other jobs 17 that this hypothetical individual could perform with the limitations 18 that I stated that exist in the national economy?” The expert responded, 19 “Yeah,” 20 and then proceeded to list a number of jobs that the hypothetical person could perform. In the third and final hypothetical, 21 the ALJ asked the vocational expert to consider the same person as 22 before. This time, however, the ALJ asked the vocation expert to factor 23 in that due to the “person’s physical conditions and associated pain and 24 25 . . . depression, this person cannot sustain sufficient concentration, 26 persistence or pace on a regular and continuing basis for eight hours a 27 day, 28 schedule.” Tr. at 45. The ALJ then asked whether such a person could five ORDER - 13 days a week for a full 40 hour workweek or equivalent 1 perform any of the claimant’s previous jobs or if there are any jobs in 2 the 3 responded, “No.” This third hypothetical was the only one of the three 4 national economy for such a person. Id. The vocational expert that factored in psychological impairments. 5 Ms. Redlingshafer believes the first hypothetical was improper 6 because it did not factor in Dr. Cooper’s determination that Ms. 7 Redlingshafer would need “close supervision” to ensure that tasks would 8 9 be completed correctly. ECF No. 11 at 19. She also contends that the ALJ 10 failed to incorporate Dr. Ho’s and Mr. Dormiar’s descriptions of her 11 functional 12 already ruled on whether the ALJ properly considered Dr. Ho’s and Mr. 13 Dormair’s opinions. The ALJ acted properly in giving those opinions less 14 weight for the above stated reasons. As to the first point, the Court 15 limitations. Id. As to the latter point, the Court has does find that the ALJ failed to properly form a hypothetical that fully 16 reflects Ms. Redlingshafer’s limitations. 17 “If an ALJ finds a severe impairment at step two, that impairment 18 must be considered in the remaining steps of the sequential analysis.” 19 20 Bray v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 2009). 21 If the hypothetical posed to the vocation expert “does not reflect all 22 the claimant's limitations, we have held that the expert's testimony has 23 no evidentiary value to support a finding that the claimant can perform 24 jobs in the national economy. DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 850 25 (9th Cir. 1991). 26 At step two of the analysis, the ALJ found that Ms. Redlingshafer 27 suffered from both depression and anxiety in addition to her physical 28 impairments. Tr. at 11. When the ALJ posed three hypotheticals to the ORDER - 14 1 vocational expert, only to the second one did the vocational expert 2 suggest jobs that Ms. Redlingshafer could perform given her impairments. 3 Tr. at 44-45. However, Ms. Redlingshafer’s mental impairments—depression 4 and anxiety—were not included until the third hypothetical. After this 5 third hypothetical, the vocational expert said that there weren’t any 6 jobs in the national economy for a person with those impairments. Tr. at 7 44-45. This hypothetical, however, included significant functional 8 9 10 limitations resulting from mental-health impairments, which the ALJ ultimately did not include in her step-two analysis. 11 In short, the vocational expert’s testimony, evidencing that there 12 are jobs in the national economy that someone with Ms. Redlingshafer’s 13 impairments could perform, was in response to a hypothetical that did 14 not include the mental impairments the ALJ found Ms. Redlingshafer to 15 have. Tr. at 44-45. In contrast, the vocational expert’s testimony, 16 evidencing that there are not jobs in the national economy that someone 17 with Ms. Redlingshafer’s impairments could perform, was in response to a 18 hypothetical which included functional limitations beyond what Ms. 19 20 Redlingshafer was ultimately found to have. No hypothetical included the 21 mental impairments and corresponding functional limitations that Ms. 22 Redlingshafer was found to have. Because an incomplete hypothetical “has 23 no evidentiary value,” the Commissioner did not prove that a significant 24 number of jobs exist in the national economy which the claimant can 25 perform. Therefore, the Court remands the case back to the ALJ to 26 determine whether there are a significant number of jobs that exist in 27 the national economy that someone with Ms. Redlingshafer’s physical and 28 mental impairments could perform. ORDER - 15 1 C. Conclusion 2 3 4 For the above-given reasons, the Court remands the case for further proceedings. Although the Court finds the ALJ erred, it is not clear from the record, as it currently stands, whether there are a 5 significant number of jobs existing in the national economy that Ms. 6 Redlingshafer could perform. The ALJ shall pose a complete hypothetical 7 to a vocational expert, factoring both her physical and mental 8 9 impairments, and shall make such a determination. 10 The Court finds that the ALJ did not err in weighing the opinions 11 of the medical experts. Therefore, the ALJ does not need to reevaluate 12 or reweigh the medical opinions. The Court further finds that the ALJ 13 did not act improperly in determining that Ms. Redlingshafer’s testimony 14 less than credible. Therefore, the ALJ does not need to reconsider Ms. 15 Redlingshafer’s testimony. 16 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 17 1. Ms. Redlingshafer’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 11, 18 is GRANTED IN PART (remand) and DENIED IN PART (no immediate 19 award of benefits). 20 21 2. is DENIED. 22 23 3. 24 25 The Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 12, This matter is REMANDED to the Commissioner for additional proceedings consistent with this Order. 4. 26 The Clerk’s Office is to enter Judgment in favor of Ms. Redlingshafer. 27 5. An application for attorney fees may be filed by separate 28 motion by Ms. Redlingshafer. ORDER - 16 1 6. 2 IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 4 The case shall be CLOSED. The Clerk’s Office is directed to enter this Order and provide copies to counsel and ALJ Cecilia LaCara. DATED this 24th day of February 2016. 5 6 ______s/Edward F. Shea_____ EDWARD F. SHEA Senior United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Q:\EFS\Civil\2015\5048.social.sec.lc2.docx ORDER - 17

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