Holmquist et al v. United States, No. 2:2017cv00046 - Document 19 (E.D. Wash. 2017)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS. Defendants Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Failure to State a Claim ECF No. 11 is GRANTED. The deadlines, hearings and trial date are VACATED. Each party to bear its own costs and expenses. The file is CLOSED. Signed by Chief Judge Thomas O. Rice. (LLH, Courtroom Deputy)
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Holmquist et al v. United States Doc. 19 1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 GUNNAR HOLMQUIST, et al. 7 NO. 2:17-CV-0046-TOR Plaintiffs, 8 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS v. 9 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 10 11 Defendant. 12 13 BEFORE THE COURT is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of 14 Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Failure to State a Claim (ECF No. 11). This matter 15 was submitted for consideration with oral argument. The Court held a hearing on 16 July 12, 2017. At the hearing, Lindsey Schromen-Wawrin represented Plaintiffs 17 and Serena M. Orloff represented the United States. The Court has reviewed the 18 record and files herein, and is fully informed. For the reasons discussed below, 19 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 11) is GRANTED. 20 // ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 2 BACKGROUND This case arises out of a failed initiative to ban the transportation of certain 3 fossil fuels by rail through the city of Spokane. Relevant to this case, Spokane 4 encourages residents to take part in the legislative process by allowing its citizens 5 to submit citizen’s initiatives. Spokane City Charter § 82. Citizens submit the 6 initiative by filing the proposed law with the City Clerk, who forwards the initiative 7 to the City Council for consideration. Spokane Municipal Code § 02.02.030. 8 9 The City Council “may pass the measure as proposed, reject [it] and propose another one dealing with the same subject to be considered as council 10 legislation, or submit the initiative measure to the voters . . . .” Id. § 02.02.040. 11 If the City Council “does not pass the measure as proposed or submit [it] to the 12 voters,” the initiative is forwarded to the City Hearing Examiner who must “issue a 13 formal written opinion as to the legal validity and effect of the proposed measure . 14 . . .” Id. With the benefit of that analysis, the proponent can choose to revise the 15 measure by withdrawing it and submitting a new one. Id. 16 Alternatively, the proponent may seek to bypass the City Council by 17 collecting signatures from Spokane voters. Id. If the proponent is able to collect 18 the signatures of at least five percent of the electorate, “the council shall either pass 19 such ordinance without alteration or submit it to popular vote at the next available 20 general municipal election.” Spokane City Charter § 82. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 2 1 2 FACTS Plaintiff Dr. Holmquist submitted two initiatives (Initiative Nos. 2016-2 and 3 2016-6) to amend the City Charter and City Code, respectively—the first on June 4 10, 2016, and the second on July 6, 2016. ECF Nos. 1 at ¶¶ 13, 17; 1-2; 1-3. The 5 initiatives sought to ban the transportation of coal and oil by rail within the City of 6 Spokane, citing concerns that such violated the “right of the people of Spokane to a 7 healthy climate.” ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 14, 18. The City Council took no action to 8 place the first initiative on the ballot and declined to place the second initiative on 9 the ballot, “citing concerns about federal preemption. ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 16, 19. 10 Spokane City Councilmember Breean Beggs introduced Resolution No. 11 2016-0064 on July 18, 2016 proposing a similar prohibition of the transit of certain 12 fossil fuels by rail within the City of Spokane. ECF No. 1 at ¶ 20. The Spokane 13 City Council voted unanimously to adopt the resolution, and requested that the 14 Spokane County Auditor hold a special election on November 8, 2017 for the 15 ballot proposition. ECF No. 1 at ¶ 21. 16 On August 2, 2016, the Hearing Examiner for the City of Spokane issued a 17 legal opinion regarding Initiative 2016-6 opining that federal law would preempt 18 any attempt to restrict or prohibit the operations of a rail carrier and that a “ban on 19 the transport of oil and coal by rail is therefore outside the scope of the initiative 20 power.” ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 22-23. On August 15, 2016 Council President Ben ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 3 1 Stuckart, citing preemption concerns, introduced Resolution No. 2016-0071 to 2 rescind Resolution No. 2016-0064 and thereby withdraw the Spokane City 3 Council’s request to the Spokane County Auditor for the placement of the 4 Resolution on the November 8, 2016, ballot. ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 24-25. The City 5 Council adopted the resolution to rescind by a 5-2 vote. ECF No. 1 at ¶ 26. Later, 6 Councilmember Beggs filed a new initiative seeking – once again – to ban the 7 transit of coal and oil by rail through the City of Spokane, but the City Council 8 decided to take no action on the initiative. ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 26-28. 9 INTRODUCTION 10 The parties do not dispute that the Interstate Commerce Commission 11 Termination Act of 1995 (ICCTA) preempts the proposed initiatives. The dispute 12 centers on whether – as Plaintiffs argue – the preemptive effect violates Plaintiff’s 13 purported constitutional right to a livable and healthy climate by prohibiting 14 Plaintiffs from passing legislation that would curb the purported deterioration of 15 the climate. Defendant has moved the Court to dismiss the action for failure to 16 state a claim and lack of standing. The Court finds Plaintiffs claim fails on 17 justiciability grounds because the issue is not ripe, fails for lack of standing, and 18 any relief requested would amount to an advisory opinion; the Court need not 19 address the remaining contentions. 20 // ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 4 1 LAW ON JUSTICIABILITY The jurisdiction of federal courts is defined and limited by Article III of the 2 3 Constitution, which extends judicial Power to cases and controversies. Flast v. 4 Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94 (1968). This forms the basis for the judicial doctrine of 5 justiciability—“the term of art employed to give expression to this dual limitation 6 placed upon federal courts by the case-and-controversy doctrine.” Flast, 392 U.S. 7 at 95. “Justiciability is itself a concept of uncertain meaning and scope.” Id. 8 Courts have mixed judicial prudence1 with this limitation 2 on judicial power and 9 crafted specific categories of justiciability, including: advisory opinions, feigned 10 and collusive cases, standing, ripeness, mootness, political questions, and 11 administrative questions. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 95; Justiciability, 13 Fed. Prac. & 12 Proc. Juris. § 3529 (3d ed.) (citing cases). Notably, these categories are not 13 14 1 15 (1951) (concurring opinion) (“Whether ‘justiciability’ exists . . . has most often 16 turned on evaluating both the appropriateness of the issues for decision by courts 17 and the hardship of denying judicial relief.”). 18 2 19 constitution of the United States, for the statute cannot extend the jurisdiction 20 beyond the limits of the constitution.”). Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 156 Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. 303, 304 (1809) (“Turn to the article of the ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 5 1 mutually exclusive, and “the same concerns often can be reflected in the language 2 of two or more of these categories.” 13 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3529. 3 4 1. Standing The party invoking a federal court’s jurisdiction must demonstrate it has 5 standing. Wittman v. Personhuballah, 136 S. Ct. 1732, 1736 (2016) (citing 6 Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997)). “A party has 7 standing only if he shows that he has suffered an ‘injury in fact,’ that the injury is 8 ‘fairly traceable’ to the conduct being challenged, and that the injury will likely be 9 ‘redressed’ by a favorable decision.” Wittman, 136 S. Ct. at 1736 (citing Lujan v. 10 Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–561 (1992)). “[T]he injury or threat of 11 injury must be ‘real and immediate,’ not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’” City of 12 Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 95 (1983). 13 14 2. Ripeness “Ripeness is peculiarly a question of timing.” Thomas v. Union Carbide 15 Agr. Prod. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580 (1985) (brackets omitted) (quoting Blanchette v. 16 Connecticut Gen. Ins. Corps., 419 U.S. 102, 140 (1974)). “A claim is not ripe for 17 adjudication if it rests upon ‘contingent future events that may not occur as 18 anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.’” Id. at 580-581 (quoting 13A C. 19 Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3532 (1984)). 20 “[I]f the contingent events do not occur, the plaintiff likely will not have suffered ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 6 1 an injury that is concrete and particularized enough to establish the first element of 2 standing . . . In this way, ripeness and standing are intertwined.” Bova v. City of 3 Medford, 564 F.3d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). 4 5 3. Advisory Opinions “[T]he oldest and most consistent thread in the federal law of justiciability is 6 that the federal courts will not give advisory opinions.” Flast, 392 U.S. at 96 7 (internal quotations and citation omitted). Under Article III, Federal courts are 8 confined to “real and substantial controversies admitting of specific relief through 9 a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what 10 the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.” Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 11 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990) (citations and brackets omitted). “In any case the Court 12 will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a suit which is not 13 adversary, or upon the complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its 14 operation, or until it is necessary to do so to preserve the rights of the parties.” 15 Coffman v. Breeze Corp., 323 U.S. 316, 324-25 (1945) (citations omitted). 16 Relevant to this case, “[t]he declaratory judgment procedure is available in the 17 federal courts only in cases involving an actual case or controversy, where the 18 issue is actual and adversary, and it may not be made the medium for securing an 19 advisory opinion in a controversy which has not arisen.” Coffman, 323 U.S. at 324 20 (citations omitted). ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 7 1 2 DISCUSSION At its base, Plaintiffs complaint alleges: ICCTA “prohibits local laws” – in 3 this case, laws prohibiting the transit of certain fossil fuels by rail – that would 4 secure Plaintiff’s right to live in a healthy and safe Spokane and this undermines – 5 and thus infringes on – Plaintiff’s purported constitutional right to a livable habitat. 6 See ECF Nos. 1; 15. In other words, (1) the federal law prohibits local laws (2) 7 that would secure (3) Plaintiff’s right to live in a healthy and safe Spokane. 8 First, of special import here, the federal law does not prohibit the passing of 9 local laws. Rather, it may only preempt certain law’s application. This distinction 10 highlights the impropriety of deciding the merits of this case—because there has 11 been no preemption, there has been no harm in fact traceable to ICCTA, the issue 12 is not ripe for review, and any relief would amount to an advisory opinion and fail 13 to redress Plaintiffs’ concern. 14 There has been no harm traceable to ICCTA and the issue is not ripe because 15 the challenged law has not been applied—i.e there has been no injury by its 16 operation. Coffman, 323 U.S. at 324-25. Accordingly, deciding the case now is 17 not necessary and would not cause any significant hardship on Plaintiffs. Id.; Joint 18 Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, 341 U.S. at 156. While the City Council cited 19 preemption concerns in their ultimate decision not to place the initiatives on the 20 ballot, this was based on a legal opinion by a third party, not an actual application ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 8 1 of the statute. 3 Notably, the opinion also cited concerns that the measure would 2 strip business entities of legal rights, an “outcome [that] cannot be squared with the 3 constitution or the associated case law.” ECF No. 1-2 at 10. 4 Further, Plaintiffs could have attempted to circumvent the City Council by 5 garnering support from five percent of the electorate, which would have placed the 6 measure on the ballot regardless of any legal opinion. This seriously undermines 7 any claim that that ICCTA is preventing the initiative from passing, as opposed to 8 the Plaintiffs’ lack of effort. Plaintiffs argue that pursuing the initiative through 9 support of the electorate would be futile because third parties can bring suit 10 challenging the legality of the initiative based on preemption. This potential does 11 not render this avenue of action futile—rather, it highlights why this action is 12 premature. If the initiative were placed on the ballot, any legal challenge would 13 14 15 3 16 court act only to redress injury that fairly can be traced to the challenged action of 17 the defendant, and not injury that results from the independent action of some third 18 party not before the court.” Simon v. E. Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 19 26, 41-42 (1976); see also Washington Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 20 1141 (9th Cir. 2013). “[T]he ‘case or controversy’ limitation of Art. III requires that a federal ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 9 1 bring the present issue front and center, as Plaintiffs would be able to defend the 2 initiative based on the arguments posed here. 4 3 4 4 5 federal law preempts state and local laws. For the reasons discussed above, this is 6 not the case. Moreover, Plaintiffs are not precluded from influencing state and 7 federal legislation, which are likely the best avenues where any concern for the 8 climate can be addressed on a state or national scale. Importantly, we have a 9 representative government at the federal level—even if Plaintiffs’ power to change 10 and create laws are diluted, this is the nature of our well-established system of laws 11 and self-governance by representation. It is noteworthy that Plaintiffs did not even 12 exercise the rights available to them. Plaintiffs could have tried to convince the 13 City Council that the law would not be preempted because such would be 14 unconstitutional; and Plaintiffs could have sought the requisite votes to get the 15 initiative on the ballot. Further, other avenues of redress exist. For example, “to 16 the extent that state and local agencies promulgate EPA-approved statewide plans 17 under federal environmental laws (such as ‘statewide implementation plans’ under 18 the Clean Air Act), ICCTA generally does not preempt those regulations because it 19 is possible to harmonize ICCTA with those federally recognized regulations.” 20 Ass’n of Am. Railroads v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 622 F.3d 1094, 1098 Plaintiffs argue that their right to self-governance is being infringed because ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 10 1 Similarly, the requested relief – i.e. declaring ICCTA’s preemptive effect 2 unconstitutional – would only amount to an advisory opinion and would not 3 redress Plaintiffs’ claimed injury. Without a concrete application of the statute at 4 issue, any opinion and corresponding order would have no immediate effect, but 5 would rather amount to an advisory opinion as to whether future legislation would 6 be preempted. Whether a similar initiative will be placed on the ballot in the future 7 and whether the proposed law would be passed is speculative, at best. As such, 8 Plaintiffs’ claim rests upon “contingent future events that may not occur as 9 anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” Thomas, 473 U.S. at 580-581 (1985) 10 (internal quotations and citation omitted). In the words of the Supreme Court, 11 “[w]e can only hypothesize that such an event will come to pass, and it is only on 12 this basis that the constitutional claim could be adjudicated at this time. An 13 opinion now would be patently advisory . . . .” Babbitt v. United Farm Workers 14 Nat. Union, 442 U.S. 289, 304 (1979). 15 16 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Quinault Indian Nation v. Imperium Terminal Servs., 17 LLC, 187 Wn.2d 460, 469 (2017) (the Washington Ocean Resources Management 18 Act is “a balancing tool intended to be used by local government to weigh the 19 commercial benefits of coastal development against the State’s interest in 20 protecting coastal habitats and conserving fossil fuels.”). ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 11 1 Second, Plaintiffs’ claim of harm is not fairly traceable to ICCTA and any 2 relief requested would not redress the purported harm. Plaintiffs’ argument is 3 premised on a causal link (1) from ICCTA to the failure of the initiative to pass 4 and (2) from the failed initiative to general global warming. The first link fails to 5 hold because ICCTA did not prevent the legislation from passing, as discussed 6 above. Bellon, 732 F.3d at 1142 (“where the causal chain involves numerous third 7 parties whose independent decisions collectively have a significant effect on 8 plaintiffs’ injuries, . . . the causal chain is too weak to support standing.”) (citation 9 omitted) . 10 The second link – the causal connection between the failed initiatives and 11 Spokane’s climate - is tenuous, at best. Plaintiffs do not argue that the mere transit 12 of fossil fuels through Spokane harms the environment. See ECF No. 1. Rather, 13 Plaintiffs rely on the purported fact that the use of fossil fuels is contributing to 14 global warming, which – as Plaintiffs argue – will eventually lead to mass 15 extinction. Plaintiffs’ position is premised on the idea that banning transportation 16 of certain fossil fuels through Spokane will create a choke point and effectively 17 throw a wrench in the cogs of the fossil fuel industry—thereby leading to less 18 extraction and combustion due to the inability to transport the fossil fuels. This 19 causal chain is too attenuated to establish standing—it is not the transit, but the 20 combustion, that purportedly causes climate change. Importantly, Plaintiffs cannot ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 12 1 rely on “vague, conclusory statements” that ICCTA preemptive effect “contributes 2 to greenhouse gas emissions, which in turn, contribute to climate-related changes 3 that result in their purported injuries.” Bellon, 732 F.3d at 1142. Although an 4 avalanche of similar legislation across the country may achieve Plaintiffs’ goal, 5 this possibility is highly questionable and purely speculative. Indeed, the proposed 6 legislation may even increase fossil fuel emissions if trains must travel around 7 Spokane or if the fossil fuel is delivered by truck. Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477 (“Article 8 III denies federal courts the power ‘to decide questions that cannot affect the rights 9 of litigants in the case before them . . . .’”) (quoting North Carolina v. Rice, 404 10 U.S. 244 (1971)). 11 AMENDMENT OF THE COMPLAINT 12 At oral argument, Plaintiffs’ counsel conceded that Plaintiffs have put their 13 best foot forward with respect to the complaint 5; and when the Court asked 14 whether amendment of the complaint would be futile, Plaintiff’s counsel did not 15 16 17 5 18 argument, I don’t see that you need leave to amend . . . I take it there isn’t any 19 other allegation you could make in response to the government's motion to dismiss. 20 THE COURT: Okay. I understand your argument and I, from your MR. SCHROMEN-WAWRIN: That’s right, Your Honor. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 13 1 bring any additional argument or facts suggesting an amendment would be 2 anything other than futile. 3 4 CONCLUSION Plaintiffs have brought this claim before the statute at issue has been enacted 5 and have failed to plausibly show that the relief they request will achieve their 6 concern for a healthy and safe Spokane. Amendment would be futile, so the Court 7 is GRANTING Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss without leave to amend. 8 ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Failure to State a Claim (ECF No. 11) is GRANTED. 2. The District Court Executive is directed to ENTER this Order and Judgment accordingly, furnish copies to counsel, and CLOSE the file. 3. The deadlines, hearings and trial date are VACATED. Each party to bear its own costs and expenses. DATED July 14, 2017. 16 17 THOMAS O. RICE Chief United States District Judge 18 19 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS ~ 14
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