John v. Colvin, No. 2:2013cv03049 - Document 18 (E.D. Wash. 2014)

Court Description: ORDER Granting 15 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 14 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Senior Judge Fred Van Sickle. (PL, Case Administrator)

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John v. Colvin Doc. 18 1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 7 CYNTHIA JOHN, NO: CV-13-3049-FVS Plaintiff, 8 v. 9 10 11 CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Defendant. 12 Before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment, ECF Nos. 14, 13 15. The Court has reviewed the motions, the memoranda in support, the Plaintiff’s 14 reply memorandum, and the administrative record. 15 JURISDICTION 16 Plaintiff Cynthia John filed an application for Supplemental Security Income 17 benefits on October 22, 2008. (Tr. 25.) Plaintiff alleged an onset date of May 2, 18 1985. (Tr. 198.) Benefits were denied initially and on reconsideration. On 19 February 17, 2010, Plaintiff timely requested a hearing before an administrative 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 law judge (“ALJ”). (Tr. 111.) A hearing was held before ALJ Gene Duncan on 2 June 9, 2011. (Tr. 40-100.) At that hearing, testimony was heard from Lloyd 3 Meadow, PhD, a psychological expert, and the claimant. (Tr. 41.) The Plaintiff 4 was represented by attorney Chad Hatfield at the hearing. (Tr. 40.) On September 5 14, 2011, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled. (Tr. 25-35.) 6 The Appeals Council denied review. (Tr. 1-4.) This matter is properly before this 7 Court under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 8 9 STATEMENT OF THE CASE The facts of this case are set forth in the administrative hearing transcripts 10 and record and will only be summarized here. The Plaintiff was twenty-three years 11 old when she applied for benefits and was twenty-six years old when the ALJ 12 issued the decision. The Plaintiff currently is unemployed, is supported through 13 the Washington State Department of Social and Health Services, and lives in an 14 apartment with her uncle and her son. (Tr. 43.) The Plaintiff has only ever had 15 one job, and it did not last. (Tr. 47.) The Plaintiff describes being unable to find 16 work due to vision complications from her glaucoma and due to her low IQ. 17 18 STANDARD OF REVIEW Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of a 19 Commissioner’s decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A court must uphold the 20 Commissioner’s decision, made through an ALJ, when the determination is not ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 2 1 based on legal error and is supported by substantial evidence. See Jones v. 2 Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). “The 3 [Commissioner’s] determination that a claimant is not disabled will be upheld if 4 the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence.” Delgado v. Heckler, 5 722 F.2d 570, 572 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Substantial 6 evidence is more than a mere scintilla, Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 7 1119 n.10 (9th Cir. 1975), but less than a preponderance. McCallister v. Sullivan, 8 888 F.2d 599, 601-02 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Desrosiers v. Secretary of Health and 9 Human Services, 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988)). Substantial evidence “means 10 such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 11 conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citations omitted). 12 “[S]uch inferences and conclusions as the [Commissioner] may reasonably draw 13 from the evidence” will also be upheld. Mark v. Celebrezze, 348 F.2d 289, 293 14 (9th Cir. 1965). On review, the court considers the record as a whole, not just the 15 evidence supporting the decisions of the Commissioner. Weetman v. Sullivan, 877 16 F.2d 20, 22 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Kornock v. Harris, 648 F.2d 525, 526 (9th Cir. 17 1980)). 18 It is the role of the trier of fact, not this court, to resolve conflicts in 19 evidence. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 400. If evidence supports more than one 20 rational interpretation, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 3 1 Commissioner. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097; Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 2 (9th Cir. 1984). Nevertheless, a decision supported by substantial evidence will 3 still be set aside if the proper legal standards were not applied in weighing the 4 evidence and making a decision. Brawner v. Sec’y of Health and Human Services, 5 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1988). Thus, if there is substantial evidence to support 6 the administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence that will support a 7 finding of either disability or nondisability, the finding of the Commissioner is 8 conclusive. Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987). 9 10 SEQUENTIAL PROCESS The Social Security Act (the “Act”) defines “disability” as the “inability to 11 engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 12 physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which 13 has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 14 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act also provides that a 15 Plaintiff shall be determined to be under a disability only if his impairments are of 16 such severity that Plaintiff is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, 17 considering Plaintiff’s age, education and work experiences, engage in any other 18 substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. 19 §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B). Thus, the definition of disability consists of both 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 4 1 medical and vocational components. Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 2 (9th Cir. 2001). 3 The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process 4 for determining whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. Step one 5 determines if he or she is engaged in substantial gainful activities. If the claimant 6 is engaged in substantial gainful activities, benefits are denied. 20 C.F.R. §§ 7 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). 8 If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activities, the decision 9 maker proceeds to step two and determines whether the claimant has a medically 10 severe impairment or combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R. 11 §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant does not have a severe 12 impairment or combination of impairments, the disability claim is denied. 13 If the impairment is severe, the evaluation proceeds to the third step, which 14 compares the claimant’s impairment with a number of listed impairments 15 acknowledged by the Commissioner to be so severe as to preclude substantial 16 gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii); see also 20 17 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. If the impairment meets or equals one of the listed 18 impairments, the claimant is conclusively presumed to be disabled. 19 20 If the impairment is not one conclusively presumed to be disabling, the evaluation proceeds to the fourth step, which determines whether the impairment ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 5 1 prevents the claimant from performing work he or she has performed in the past. 2 If the plaintiff is able to perform his or her previous work, the claimant is not 3 disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). At this step, the 4 claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) assessment is considered. 5 If the claimant cannot perform this work, the fifth and final step in the 6 process determines whether the claimant is able to perform other work in the 7 national economy in view of his or her residual functional capacity and age, 8 education and past work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 9 416.920(a)(4)(v); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 (1987). 10 The initial burden of proof rests upon the claimant to establish a prima facie 11 case of entitlement to disability benefits. Rhinehart v. Finch, 438 F.2d 920, 921 12 (9th Cir. 1971); Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 1999). The initial 13 burden is met once the claimant establishes that a physical or mental impairment 14 prevents him from engaging in his or her previous occupation. The burden then 15 shifts, at step five, to the Commissioner to show that (1) the claimant can perform 16 other substantial gainful activity, and (2) a “significant number of jobs exist in the 17 national economy” which the claimant can perform. Kail v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 18 1496, 1498 (9th Cir. 1984). 19 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 6 1 2 ALJ’S FINDINGS At step one of the five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that 3 Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 22, 2008, the 4 application date. (Tr. 27.) At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the 5 medically determinable impairments of iritis and headaches. (Tr. 27.) However, 6 the ALJ found that neither of the Plaintiff’s impairments, alone or in combination, 7 was severe. (Tr. 27-35.) Accordingly, the ALJ found that the Plaintiff was not 8 under a disability for purposes of the Act. (Tr. 35.) 9 10 ISSUES The Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial 11 evidence or free of legal error because the ALJ erred in finding at step two that the 12 Plaintiff was not under a disability. 13 14 DISCUSSION To satisfy step two’s requirement of a severe impairment, the claimant must 15 prove the existence of a physical or mental impairment by providing medical 16 evidence consisting of signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings; the claimant’s 17 own statement of symptoms alone will not suffice. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1508, 18 416.908; Taylor v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 1985). The ALJ then 19 determines whether the medically determinable impairment significantly limits her 20 physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c); ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 7 1 416.920(c). The fact that a medically determinable condition exists does not 2 automatically mean the symptoms are “severe,” or “disabling” as defined by the 3 Social Security regulations. See e.g. Edlund, 253 F.3d at 1159-60; Fair v. Bowen, 4 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989); Key v. Heckler, 754 F.2d 1545, 1549-50 (9th 5 Cir. 1985). 6 An impairment may be found to be non-severe when “medical evidence 7 establishes only a slight abnormality or a combination of slight abnormalities 8 which would have no more than a minimal effect on an individual’s ability to 9 work.” Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 85-28. Medical evidence alone is 10 evaluated in assessing severity. Id. “The severity requirement cannot be satisfied 11 when medical evidence shows that the person has the ability to perform basic work 12 activities, as required in most jobs.” Id. Basic work activities include: “walking, 13 standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling; seeing, 14 hearing, speaking; understanding, carrying out and remembering simple 15 instructions; responding appropriately to supervision, coworkers, and usual work 16 situation.” Id. 17 “[T]he step-two inquiry is a de minimis screening device to dispose of 18 groundless claims.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing 19 Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 153-54). An ALJ may find an impairment not severe “only if 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 8 1 the evidence establishes a slight abnormality that has ‘no more than a minimal 2 effect on an individual‘s ability to work.’” Id. (citing SSR 85-28). 3 The Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in not finding that Ms. John suffered 4 from the severe impairments of mental retardation and glaucoma. 5 Mental Impairments 6 Ms. John alleges that she suffers from mental retardation. Ms. John has 7 been examined by three psychological experts and a fourth psychological expert 8 reviewed her medical records and testified at the June 9, 2011, hearing. 9 The first examining psychologist was Arch Bradley, M.Ed., who examined 10 Ms. John on September 11, 2008. Dr. Bradley relied on the Wechsler Adult 11 Intelligence Scale III, the Woodcock Johnson III Tests of Achievement, and a 12 structured interview. (Tr. 262.) Dr. Bradley identified Ms. John as having a 13 deficient IQ, with a Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale III full scale IQ score of 48. 14 (Tr. 262.) He diagnosed her as suffering between moderate and mild mental 15 retardation. (Tr. 264-65.) He found Ms. John’s prospects for employment very 16 limited as a result of her low IQ. (Tr. 264-65.) 17 On June 17, 2009, Ms. John was evaluated by Jay M. Toews, Ed.D. (Tr. 18 278.) Dr. Toews reviewed Dr. Bradley’s earlier opinion. (Tr. 278.) Dr. Toews 19 also performed a psychodiagnostic interview and mental status assessment on Ms. 20 John. (Tr. 278, 279-80.) Included in his mental status assessment were the ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 9 1 Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptomology (“SIMS”), the mini-mental 2 state examination (“MMSE”) questionnaire, and the fifteen-figures test. (Tr. 279- 3 80.) Dr. Toews found Ms. John’s answers and performances during his 4 examination to be suspicious. (Tr. 280.) He found her performance on the Mini- 5 Mental Status Exam inconsistent with the IQ identified by Dr. Bradley. (Tr. 280.) 6 Dr. Toews found the results on the SIMS and fifteen-figures test suggestive of 7 malingering. (Tr. 280.) 8 At the June 9, 2011, hearing, testimony was taken from Lloyd Meadow, 9 Ph.D. Dr. Meadow reviewed the reports of Dr. Bradley and Dr. Toews. (Tr. 59.) 10 Dr. Meadow testified that nothing about Dr. Bradley’s report reason to question its 11 validity. (Tr. 59.) Dr. Meadow found no evidence in Dr. Toews’ report to support 12 Dr. Toews’ conclusion that Ms. John is not credible. (Tr. 66.) Dr. Meadow agreed 13 with Dr. Bradley’s report and disagreed with Dr. Toews’ report. (Tr. 67.) Dr. 14 Meadow took issue with Dr. Toews’ skepticism over Ms. John’s inability to count 15 to ten and with Dr. Toews’ opinion that Ms. John’s difficulty reciting the days of 16 the week was suspicious. (Tr. 69-70.) Dr. Meadow also relied on the fact that Dr. 17 Toews “accepts the IQ score” as established by Dr. Bradley. (Tr. 75.) 18 After the hearing on August 11, 2011, Ms. John was examined by Roland 19 Dougherty, Ph.D. Dr. Dougherty performed the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale 20 – IV, the Wechsler Memory Scale-III, and the Test of Memory Malingering ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 10 1 (“TOMM”) on Ms. John. (Tr. 463.) Dr. Dougherty noted poor effort on the tests 2 and questioned the tests’ validity. (Tr. 463.) Dr. Dougherty found a similar 3 intelligence score on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale as found by Dr. 4 Bradley. (Tr. 463.) However, Dr. Dougherty noted that Ms. John’s scores on the 5 TOMM and Wechsler Memory Scale tests suggested malingering. (Tr. 463-64.) 6 Dr. Dougherty also noted a contrast between Ms. John’s demeanor and behavior 7 during his mental status examination and the alleged deficiencies in her intellect. 8 (Tr. 464.) Ultimately, Dr. Dougherty diagnosed Ms. John as malingering. (Tr. 9 466.) 10 In determining that Ms. John did not suffer from a severe mental 11 impairment, ALJ Duncan preferred the opinions of Dr. Toews and Dr. Dougherty 12 over the opinion of Dr. Bradley and testimony of Dr. Meadow. In evaluating a 13 disability claim, the adjudicator must consider all medical evidence provided. A 14 treating or examining physician’s opinion is given more weight than that of a non- 15 examining physician. Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 592 (9th Cir. 2004). If 16 the treating physician's opinions are not contradicted, they can be rejected by the 17 decision-maker only with clear and convincing reasons. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 18 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1996). If contradicted, the ALJ may reject the opinion with 19 specific, legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence. See Flaten 20 v. Secretary of Health and Human Serv., 44 F.3d 1453, 1463 (9th Cir. 1995). ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 11 1 With regard to Dr. Bradley’s opinion, ALJ Duncan noted that Dr. Bradley 2 himself questioned the validity of Ms. John’s test scores, given that English was 3 Ms. John’s second language. (Tr. 34, 262.) Dr. Bradley also noted that beyond the 4 test scores, Dr. Bradley relied heavily on the self-reporting of Ms. John. (Tr. 34.) 5 An ALJ may discount a medical opinion where that opinion is based heavily on 6 self-reports that are less than credible. See Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 7 554 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 2009). Here, the ALJ found Ms. John not credible 8 as to her symptom testimony. (Tr. 31.) That finding has not been challenged. 9 Accordingly, Dr. Bradley’s reliance on Ms. John’s self-reporting can serve as a 10 basis for discounting Dr. Bradley’s opinion. ALJ Duncan also relied on the fact 11 that two other examiners questioned the validity of Dr. Bradley’s opinion. (Tr. 12 34.) Finally, ALJ Duncan noted that Ms. John’s admitted abilities stand in contrast 13 to the opinion of Dr. Bradley. (Tr. 34.) These bases are supported in the record 14 and comprise specific and legitimate reasons for discounting the contradicted 15 opinion of Dr. Bradley. 16 With regard to the testimony of Dr. Meadow, ALJ Duncan noted that Dr. 17 Meadow relied very heavily on Dr. Bradley’s assessment. (Tr. 33.) Dr. Meadow 18 also gave his testimony without the benefit of Dr. Dougherty’s report, which 19 confirmed much of Dr. Toews’ report. (Tr. 33.) ALJ Duncan noted that Dr. 20 Meadow appeared to rely almost exclusively on the IQ score assessment of Dr. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 12 1 Bradley without evaluating the actual level of Ms. John’s functioning. (Tr. 33.) 2 These reasons provide a substantial basis for rejecting Dr. Meadow’s testimony. 3 With the testimony of Dr. Meadows and the opinion of Dr. Bradley 4 discounted, the record provides no basis for a finding that Ms. John suffers a 5 severe mental impairment. Instead, the medical evidence points to a diagnosis of 6 malingering. As a result, the ALJ did not err in holding that Ms. John did not 7 suffer a severe mental impairment. 8 Glaucoma 9 ALJ Duncan found that Ms. John suffered from a medical condition 10 affecting her eyes but that none of the evidence in the record established that her 11 vision was impacted beyond a minimal level. Ms. John argues that the ALJ erred 12 by not finding that her visual limitations were severe. 13 Ms. John was seen by Richard P. Mills, M.D., on June 9, 2009. (Tr. 319.) 14 At that time, Ms. John was suffering increased intraocular pressure. (Tr. 319.) She 15 was prescribed eye drops to lower the pressure. (Tr. 319.) She was found to have 16 visual acuity of 20/30 in her right eye and 20/100 in her left eye. (Tr. 319.) Visual 17 field testing showed extremely constricted visual fields. (Tr. 319.) However, the 18 visual field constriction was not consistent with the degree of damage noted in her 19 eye. (Tr. 319-20.) Dr. Mills was “firmly optimistic” about Ms. John’s visual 20 acuity in her left eye. (Tr. 319-20.) Dr. Mills followed up with Ms. John on ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 13 1 March 11, 2010, where he noted that her condition appeared unchanged. (Tr. 350.) 2 Dr. Mills informed Ms. John that she must vary the drops to meet her symptoms 3 and recommended no changes. (Tr. 350.) 4 On August 27, 2010, Ms. John was examined by Barbara A. Smit, M.D., 5 Ph.D. (Tr. 436.) Dr. Smit measured Ms. John’s corrected visual acuity at 20/50 6 and 20/100. (Tr. 436.) Dr. Smit noted that Ms. John’s iritis appeared to be 7 “quiescent” and that her intraocular pressure appeared well controlled. (Tr. 436.) 8 Dr. Smit noted that Ms. John appeared at her examination without her contacts or 9 glasses. (Tr. 436.) Dr. Smit also noted that an attempt was made to measure Ms. 10 John’s visual field, but the test results were not consistent with Ms. John’s physical 11 condition. (Tr. 436.) 12 Ms. John was seen by Marvin G. Palmer, M.D., on July 15, 2011. Dr. 13 Palmer diagnosed Ms. John as suffering from compound myopic astigmatism and 14 primary open angel glaucoma in her right eye and compound myopic astigmatism 15 and narrow angle glaucoma secondary to iritis in her left eye. (Tr. 451.) Dr. 16 Palmer made a secondary diagnosis of bilateral amblyopia with constricted visual 17 fields. (Tr. 451.) Dr. Palmer measured Ms. John’s visual acuity as 20/50 in her 18 right eye and 20/200 in her left eye without correction. (Tr. 450.) Dr. Palmer 19 noted that Ms. John appeared at the examination without contacts or glasses. (Tr. 20 450.) Dr. Palmer also noted that “[w]ith Ms. John[‘s] constricted visual fields one ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 14 1 would consider her blind.” (Tr. 451.) However, Dr. Palmer was also “unable to 2 prove [Ms. John] has a functional problem.” (Tr. 451.) Dr. Palmer also noted that 3 Ms. John “is able to take care of her children and do household chores and live an 4 independent life with her boyfriend.” (Tr. 451.) 5 ALJ Duncan reviewed Ms. John’s visual medical history and concluded that 6 Ms. John’s medical conditions were controlled with her current medication. (Tr. 7 29.) ALJ Duncan found no evidence of any more than a minimal limitation on Ms. 8 John’s ability to work. (Tr. 29, 30.) As ALJ Duncan noted, there are no examples 9 in the record of Ms. John being functionally limited by her vision. Indeed, at two 10 of her eye examinations, Ms. John appeared without the aid of contacts or glasses. 11 (Tr. 436, 450.) Ms. John even explained that she did not use her prescribed 12 contacts because they caused her pain. (Tr. 447.) Despite this, Ms. John has a 13 record of being capable of caring for herself and her children independently, and 14 Ms. John’s medical providers have consistently noted that her prognosis is good. 15 (Tr. 350-52, 436-37, 451.) 16 The one statement that stands in contrast to Ms. John’s consistently positive 17 diagnoses is Dr. Palmer’s notes that “[w]ith Ms. John[‘s] constricted visual fields 18 one would consider her blind” and that Ms. John’s “lmited education and 19 constricted visual fields will make her unemployable.” (Tr. 451.) However, ALJ 20 Duncan explicitly disregarded those statements because of the claimant’s ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 15 1 questionable credibility and because a diagnosis of blindness contradicted Dr. 2 Palmer’s own opinion that Ms. John had no limitations. (Tr. 458.) Given the 3 contradictions and Ms. John’s lack of credibility, the Court finds that ALJ 4 Duncan’s decision to disregard Dr. Palmer’s statements is supported by clear and 5 convincing reasons. As the remaining evidence provides no basis to find more 6 than a minimal limitation imposed by Ms. John’s eye conditions, the Court finds 7 that ALJ Duncan’s decision is free of legal error and supported by substantial 8 evidence. 9 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 10 1. The Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 14, is DENIED. 11 2. The Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 15, is 12 GRANTED. 13 3. JUDGMENT shall be entered for the Defendant. 14 IT IS SO ORDERED. 15 The District Court Executive is hereby directed to enter this Order, to 16 17 provide copies to counsel, and to close this file. DATED this 29th day of January, 2014. 18 19 20 s/Fred Van Sickle Fred Van Sickle Senior United States District Judge ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 16

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