Gallion v. Medco Health Solutions Inc et al, No. 2:2013cv00135 - Document 25 (E.D. Wash. 2014)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT MEDCO HEALTH SOLUTIONS INC.s MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS. Defendant Medco Health Solutions, Inc.s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings ECF No. 13 is GRANTED. Plaintiffs claims for violations of the Washington Co nsumer Protection Act, as well as any claims arising from a denial of long-term disability benefits, are DISMISSED with leave to amend within fourteen (14) days of the date of this order. All other claims are DISMISSED with prejudice. Defendants Disability Management Alternatives, LLC, and Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company, are dismissed without prejudice. Signed by Judge Thomas O. Rice. (LLH, Courtroom Deputy)
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Gallion v. Medco Health Solutions Inc et al Doc. 25 1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 7 KAREN GALLION, NO: 13-CV-0135-TOR Plaintiff, 8 v. 9 10 MEDCO HEALTH SOLUTIONS, INC., et al., ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT MEDCO HEALTH SOLUTIONS, INC.’s MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 11 Defendants. 12 13 BEFORE THE COURT is Defendant Medco Health Solutions, Inc.’s 14 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 13). This matter was heard with 15 oral argument on April 2, 2014. Bradley E. Smith appeared on behalf of the 16 Plaintiff. Deidra Nguyen appeared on behalf of Defendant Medco Health 17 Solutions. The Court has reviewed the briefing and the record and files herein, and 18 is fully informed. 19 // 20 // ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS ~ 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff asserts a variety of state law claims arising from an allegedly 3 wrongful denial of short-term and long-term disability benefits by her former 4 employer, Defendant Medco Health Solutions. Medco now moves to dismiss 5 Plaintiff’s claims as barred by a one-year limitations period in the subject disability 6 insurance policy. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will grant the motion. 7 FACTS 8 Plaintiff Karen Gallion (“Plaintiff”) was employed by Defendant Medco 9 Health Solutions, Inc. (“Medco”) from September 1995 to December 2010 as a 10 data entry operator. On or about November 11, 2010, Plaintiff was forced to stop 11 working due to symptoms attendant to post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). 12 Plaintiff asserts that her PTSD resulted from working under an abusive supervisor. 13 Unable to work, Plaintiff submitted a claim for short-term disability (“STD”) 14 benefits under a disability insurance policy sponsored by Medco and provided to 15 all Medco employees. The administrator of the STD policy, Defendant Disability 16 Management Alternatives, LLC, denied the claim on or about December 2, 2010. 17 Plaintiff returned to work on December 13, 2010, despite the fact that her PTSD 18 symptoms had not improved. 19 20 Plaintiff’s return to work was not successful. On December 17, 2010, as a “direct result of the work environment,” Plaintiff attempted to commit suicide. At ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS ~ 2 1 some point thereafter, Plaintiff submitted a second claim for STD benefits under 2 the same policy. This claim was also denied by Defendant Disability Management 3 Alternatives. Plaintiff did not thereafter return to work at Medco. 4 Plaintiff subsequently appealed the denials of her claims pursuant to the 5 appeal procedures set forth in the Summary Plan Description (“SPD” or “Plan”). 6 These appeals were ultimately denied on April 22, 2011, and August 2, 2011. 7 Plaintiff filed the instant action in the Spokane County Superior Court on 8 December 24, 2012. She subsequently filed an amended complaint on March 5, 9 2013, which was served on Medco on March 6, 2013. Medco removed the action 10 to this Court on April 4, 2013, on diversity jurisdiction and federal question 11 grounds. Medco now moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims as time-barred under the 12 one-year limitations period in the Plan. 13 DISCUSSION 14 Motions for judgment on the pleadings are governed by Federal Rule of 15 Civil Procedure 12(c). Rule 12(c) provides that a party may move for judgment on 16 the pleadings “[a]fter the pleadings are closed[,] but early enough not to delay 17 trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). To prevail on such a motion, the moving party must 18 “clearly establish[] on the face of the pleadings that no material issue of fact 19 remains to be resolved and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Hal 20 Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS ~ 3 1 1989). This standard is “functionally identical” to the standard applicable to a 2 Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 3 F.3d 1047, 1055 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011). 4 To withstand dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain 5 “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. 6 v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “Naked assertion[s],” “labels and 7 conclusions,” or “formulaic recitation[s] of the elements of a cause of action will 8 not do.” Id. at 555, 557. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 9 factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 10 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 11 678 (2009). While a plaintiff need not establish a probability of success on the 12 merits, he or she must demonstrate “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant 13 has acted unlawfully.” Id. 14 A complaint must also contain a “short and plain statement of the claim 15 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This 16 standard “does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an 17 unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 18 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In assessing whether Rule 8(a)(2) has 19 been satisfied, a court must first identify the elements of the plaintiff’s claim(s) and 20 then determine whether those elements could be proven on the facts pled. The ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS ~ 4 1 court should generally draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor, see 2 Sheppard v. David Evans and Assocs., 694 F.3d 1045, 1051 (9th Cir. 2012), but it 3 need not accept “naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Iqbal, 4 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotations and citation omitted). 5 In ruling upon a motion to dismiss, a court must accept all factual allegations 6 in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to 7 the party opposing the motion. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 8 988 (9th Cir. 2001). The court may disregard allegations that are contradicted by 9 matters properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit. Id. The court may also 10 disregard conclusory allegations and arguments which are not supported by 11 reasonable deductions and inferences. Id. 12 The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly instructed district courts to “grant leave to 13 amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless ... the pleading 14 could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 15 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). The standard for granting leave to amend is 16 generous—the court “should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. 17 Civ. P. 15(a)(2). In determining whether leave to amend is appropriate, a court 18 must consider the following five factors: bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the 19 opposing party, futility of amendment, and whether the plaintiff has previously 20 ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS ~ 5 1 amended the complaint. United States v. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 995 2 (9th Cir. 2011). 3 4 5 A. One-Year Limitations Period Medco has moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims as time-barred under the oneyear limitations period set forth in the Plan. The applicable provision states: 6 One-Year Limit to File Legal Action 7 If the Plan Administrator or Claims Administrator denies a claim on appeal, you have the right to file suit in federal court under ERISA Section 502(a). However, no legal action for recovery of benefits allegedly due under the Plan may be commenced by you or on your behalf against the Plan, the Claims Administrator or any other Plan fiduciary, claims administrator or other third party claims administrator unless it is filed within one year after the date of the final determination under the Claims Appeal Procedure described here. 8 9 10 11 12 13 ECF No. 14-1 at 16-17. The parties dispute whether this limitations period applies to any claim 14 arising from a denial of STD benefits, or whether it applies only to claims filed 15 under ERISA Section 502(a). This distinction is material because (1) Medco’s 16 Short-Term Disability Program, by its own terms, “is not subject to, nor governed 17 by, the requirements of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 18 (ERISA),” ECF No. 14-1 at 9; and (2) Plaintiff’s claims were not filed under 19 ERISA Section 502(a). Thus, Plaintiff’s claims are only time-barred if the one- 20 ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS ~ 6 1 year limitations period applies to any claim arising from a denial of STD benefits 2 as opposed to only ERISA claims. 3 Neither party briefed the issue of which state’s law governs interpretation of 4 the Plan. At the hearing on the motion, the parties agreed that Washington law 5 applies. Washington follows the “objective manifestation” theory of contracts. 6 Hearst Commc’ns, Inc. v. Seattle Times Co., 154 Wash.2d 493, 503 (2005). 7 Under this approach, [courts] attempt to determine the parties’ intent by focusing on the objective manifestations of the agreement, rather than on the unexpressed subjective intent of the parties. We impute intention corresponding to the reasonable meaning of the words used. Thus, when interpreting contracts, the subjective intent of the parties is generally irrelevant if the intent can be determined from the actual words used. We generally give words in a contract their ordinary, usual, and popular meaning unless the entirety of the agreement clearly demonstrates a contrary intent. We do not interpret what was intended to be written, but what was [actually] written. 8 9 10 11 12 Id. at 503-04 (citations omitted). In short, if a contract’s language is clear and 13 unambiguous, the contract must be enforced as written. Allstate Ins. Co. v. 14 Peasley, 131 Wash.2d 420, 424 (1997). 15 Whether contract language is ambiguous is a question of law. GMAC v. 16 Everett Chevrolet, Inc., --- Wash. App. ---, 317 P.3d 1074, 1078 (2014). An 17 ambiguity is not present simply because two parties to a contract have offered 18 differing interpretations. Id. “If only one reasonable meaning can be ascribed to 19 the agreement when viewed in context, that meaning necessarily reflects the 20 parties’ intent; if two or more meanings are reasonable, a question of fact is ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS ~ 7 1 presented.” Id. (emphasis added) (quotation and citation omitted). A court must 2 not “read an ambiguity into an agreement where it can reasonably be avoided.” Id. 3 at 1080. Hence, judgment as a matter of law is only appropriate if the language in 4 question, “viewed in light of the parties’ other objective manifestations, has only 5 one reasonable meaning.” Id. The principle that ambiguities must be construed 6 against the drafter only applies when it is not otherwise possible to ascertain the 7 parties’ intent. See Wash. Prof’l Real Estate LLC v. Young, 163 Wash. App. 800, 8 818 (2011) (“[A] reviewing court should not resort to the rule of interpretation that 9 construes the agreement against its drafter unless the intent of the parties cannot 10 otherwise be determined; the primary goal in interpreting a contract is to ascertain 11 the parties’ intent.”) (quotation and citation omitted). 12 The first sentence of the one-year limitations provision references a “right to 13 file suit in federal court under ERISA Section 502(a).” This sentence is clearly 14 ERISA-specific. The second sentence does not specifically mention ERISA; it 15 states that “no legal action for recovery of benefits” may be commenced more than 16 one year after a claim is denied. Medco asserts that the first and second sentences 17 exist independently, and urges the Court to interpret the plain language of the 18 second sentence—“no legal action”—to mean precisely what it says. Plaintiff, for 19 her part, contends that the first sentence limits the scope of the second, such that 20 ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS ~ 8 1 the phrase, “no legal action for recovery of benefits” means, “no legal action for 2 recovery of benefits under ERISA.” 3 Plaintiff’s reading, while plausible in isolation, is contradicted by the context 4 of the Plan as a whole. As noted above, the Plan unequivocally states that the 5 Short-Term Disability Program “is not subject to, nor governed by” ERISA. Why, 6 then, would it incorporate a provision requiring any action to recover benefits to be 7 filed under ERISA within one year? This interpretation simply does not make 8 sense in view of the Plan’s unequivocal statement that ERISA does not apply to 9 claims for STD benefits. In the context of the entire Plan, the only “reasonable 10 meaning” of this provision is that any legal action to recover STD benefits must be 11 filed within one year. Everett Chevrolet, Inc., --- Wash. App. ---, 317 P.3d at 12 1078. 13 The reference to ERISA in this provision is admittedly puzzling. It bears 14 noting, however, that a separate section of the SPD addressing the Long-Term 15 Disability Program, which is subject to ERISA, contains a virtually identical one- 16 year limitations provision. See ECF No. 14-1 at 24-25. Thus, it is possible that the 17 drafter of the Plan simply “copied and pasted” the limitations language from the 18 LTD benefits section into the STD section without realizing that the reference to 19 ERISA should have been deleted. Regardless of how it occurred, however, the fact 20 that the drafter of the Plan put one-year limitations provisions in both sections of ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS ~ 9 1 the document is an “objective manifestation” of intent to require that claims to 2 recover either type of benefits be filed within one year, regardless of the type of 3 claim being asserted. Based upon this objective manifestation of intent, and the 4 context of the Plan as a whole, the Court concludes that the one-year limitations 5 period applies to any claim arising from a denial of STD benefits, regardless of 6 whether the claim is filed under ERISA Section 502(a). 7 8 9 B. Enforceability of Limitations Period Plaintiff argues that even if the one-year limitations period applies to her claims, the Court should refuse to enforce it on unconscionability and public policy 10 grounds. In support of this argument, Plaintiff notes that she did not individually 11 negotiate the contract, that the Washington Legislature has declared limitations 12 periods shorter than three years for disability insurance claims violative of public 13 policy, and that controlling precedent forecloses a limitations period less than four 14 years on Consumer Protection Act claims. ECF No. 17 at 9-13. 15 “Generally, parties can shorten the applicable statute of limitations by 16 contract unless a shorter time frame is unreasonable or prohibited by statute or 17 public policy.” McKee v. AT&T Corp., 164 Wash.2d 372, 399 (2008); see also 18 Wothers v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 101 Wash. App. 75, 79-80 (2000) (“A 19 statute of limitation cannot enlarge the time for the commencement of an action 20 when the time limitation therefor is fixed by contract.”). As a threshold matter, the ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS ~ 10 1 Court finds that the one-year limitations provision is not unreasonable. In reaching 2 this conclusion, the Court notes that the Washington Legislature has endorsed one- 3 year limitations periods on actions to recover benefits under an insurance contract. 4 See RCW 48.18.200(1)(c) (“No insurance contract . . . shall contain any condition . 5 . . limiting right of action against the insurer to a period of less than one year from 6 the time when the cause of action accrues[.]”); Ashburn v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 7 42 Wash. App. 692, 697 (1986) (noting that RCW 48.18.200(1)(c) “impliedly 8 authorizes” one-year limitations periods in insurance contracts). Although this 9 provision of the Insurance Code does not apply to Plaintiff’s claims (see below), 10 the fact that the Legislature has provided for one-year limitations periods in the 11 insurance context weighs sharply against a finding that the limitation period at 12 issue is unreasonable. 13 The relevant question, then, is whether the one-year limitations period is 14 “prohibited by statute or public policy.” McKee, 164 Wash.2d at 399. With regard 15 to her claims to recover STD benefits, Plaintiff argues that RCW 48.21.010 and 16 .050, together with RCW 48.20.032 and .142, preclude a limitations period shorter 17 than three years. ECF No. 17 at 11. This argument is unpersuasive. The relevant 18 portion of the Plan is not a “group disability insurance” policy within the meaning 19 of RCW Chapter 48.21 because it is not “provided by a master policy issued to an 20 employer.” RCW 48.21.010(1). Instead, the Short-Term Disability Plan “is ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS ~ 11 1 financed entirely by [Medco] . . . and is paid for from its general assets.” ECF No. 2 14-1 at 9. Consequently, the statutes cited above do not apply. See May v. 3 Honeywell Int’l Inc., 2007 WL 1461243 at *6 (W.D. Wash. 2007), rev’d in part on 4 other grounds, 331 F. App’x 526 (2009) (holding that a short-term disability plan 5 that is “simply an in-house benefit program funded by [a] company itself” is not a 6 group disability plan within the meaning of RCW 48.21.010). Nor do these 7 statutes state a sufficiently compelling public policy to override the general rule 8 that parties to a contract are free to bind themselves to shorter limitations periods 9 than might otherwise apply. See McKee, 164 Wash.2d at 399; Wothers v. Farmers 10 Ins. Co. of Wash., 101 Wash. App. at 79-80. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s breach of 11 contract claims (first and second causes of action) must be dismissed with 12 prejudice. As Plaintiff has not cited a statute or public policy that would prohibit 13 enforcement of the one-year limitations period as to her causes of action for bad 14 faith, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and for violations of the 15 Washington Insurance Fair Conduct Act (third, fourth, fifth and seventh causes of 16 action), these claims must be dismissed as well. 17 With respect to her CPA claim, Plaintiff argues that a contractual limitations 18 period shorter than the four-year statute of limitations set forth in RCW 19.86.120 19 is unenforceable as a matter of law pursuant to the Washington Supreme Court’s 20 decision in McKee. The Court is not persuaded. The McKee case involved a two- ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS ~ 12 1 year limitations period on claims for violations of a consumer telephone service 2 contract. 164 Wash.2d at 399. The court held that this limitations period was 3 unenforceable as to the plaintiff’s CPA claims, explaining that it was too “harsh 4 and one-sided when imposed on a consumer in a contract of adhesion for a basic 5 consumer service.” Id. This Court does not read McKee to categorically preclude 6 contractual limitations periods shorter than three years from being applied to CPA 7 claims. Had the Washington Supreme Court intended to announce such a bright- 8 line rule, it easily could have done so. The better reading of McKee is that a court 9 must consider whether a shorter limitations period would unduly frustrate the 10 11 purpose of the CPA on the facts of a particular case. There are, however, other cases which support Plaintiff’s contention that 12 CPA claims should not subject to a limitations period in an insurance policy. See, 13 e.g., Simms v. Allstate Ins. Co., 27 Wash. App. 872, 877-78 (1980) (plaintiff’s 14 failure to bring CPA claim within fire insurance policy’s one-year limitation period 15 did not bar claim); O’Neill v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 124 Wash. App. 516, 16 530-31 (2004) (one-year limitation period in homeowners policy did not apply to 17 CPA claim arising from insurer’s alleged breach of the policy); but see Wothers, 18 101 Wash. App. at 79-80 (dismissing breach of contract and CPA claims filed after 19 one-year limitations period in insurance policy). These would appear to support a 20 ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS ~ 13 1 finding that enforcing a shorter limitations period on CPA claims in the insurance 2 context is against public policy. 3 In any event, Plaintiff’s CPA claim, as currently pled, fails to state a claim. 4 The Court understands Plaintiff to be asserting a per se CPA claim predicated upon 5 Medco’s alleged breach of the Washington insurance statutes and first-party claims 6 handling regulations. These statutes and regulations, however, do not apply to 7 Medco because Medco is not “engaged in the business of making contracts of 8 insurance.” RCW 48.01.050 (emphasis added); see also Helper v. CBS, Inc., 39 9 Wash. App. 838, 846 n.2 (1985) (explaining that an employer which provides an 10 “in-house” long-term disability plan for the sole benefit of its employees is not in 11 the “business” of selling insurance within the meaning of RCW 48.01.050 and 12 therefore cannot be sued for per se CPA violations predicated on alleged violations 13 of the insurance code). 14 At oral argument, Plaintiff argued that the insurance code and administrative 15 regulations apply to Medco because it provides “insurance” as that term is defined 16 in RCW 48.01.040. Assuming arguendo that Medco provides “insurance,” it is not 17 subject to the statutes and regulations that could potentially give rise to a per se 18 CPA claim. Both IFCA and its implementing regulations apply exclusively to 19 persons engaged in the “business of insurance.” RCW 48.30.010(1); WAC 284- 20 ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS ~ 14 1 30-330. Again, there is no dispute that Medco is not in the business of selling 2 insurance. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s per se CPA claim is dismissed with prejudice. 3 Because Plaintiff could potentially amend her complaint to assert a non-per 4 se CPA claim, however, the Court will dismiss this claim with leave to amend 5 within fourteen (14) days of the date of this order. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130. If 6 Plaintiff elects to amend, she should allege with particularity the conduct that 7 satisfies each of the five elements of a non-per se CPA claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 8(a)(2). 9 10 C. Claims Based Upon Denial of LTD Benefits Medco asserts that the amended complaint fails to state a claim for wrongful 11 denial of LTD benefits. The Court agrees. Although Plaintiff claims that she is 12 “entitled” to LTD benefits, see ECF No. 1 (Am. Compl.) at ¶ 3.1, her amended 13 complaint does not specifically allege that she ever applied for such benefits as the 14 Plan requires. See ECF No. 14-1 at 23 (“You must file a claim form with the 15 Claims Administrator, within 30 days of satisfying the Elimination Period, in order 16 to receive LTD benefits.”). This omission is conspicuous in view of Plaintiff’s 17 detailed allegations about having applied for STD benefits. See ECF No. 1 (Am. 18 Compl.) at ¶¶ 2.3, 2.4. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss any claims arising 19 from Medco’s alleged failure to pay LTD benefits with leave to amend within 20 fourteen (14) days of the date of this order. ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS ~ 15 1 D. Other Named Parties Plaintiff’s Complaint names two additional party defendants; Disability 2 3 Management Alternatives, LLC, third party administrator and wholly-owned 4 subsidiary of Hewitt Associates, LLC and Hartford Life and Accident Insurance 5 Company, third party claims administrator for Medchoice Long-Term Disability 6 Program. ECF No. 1, Exhibit 1. On September 6, 2013, the Court ordered 7 Plaintiff to immediately file, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A), her voluntary 8 dismissal of the Defendants who have not been served. ECF No. 9 at 2. Plaintiff 9 did not move to dismiss anyone. However, no proof of service has been filed with 10 respect to these named defendants and they have not otherwise appeared in this 11 case. 12 Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m), the Court will dismiss Disability 13 Management Alternatives, LLC, and Hartford Life and Accident Insurance 14 Company. 15 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 16 1. Defendant Medco Health Solutions, Inc.’s Motion for Judgment on the 17 Pleadings (ECF No. 13) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s claims for violations 18 of the Washington Consumer Protection Act, as well as any claims 19 arising from a denial of long-term disability benefits, are DISMISSED 20 ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS ~ 16 1 with leave to amend within fourteen (14) days of the date of this order. 2 All other claims are DISMISSED with prejudice. 3 2. Defendants Disability Management Alternatives, LLC, and Hartford Life 4 and Accident Insurance Company, are dismissed without prejudice and 5 the Clerk of Court shall terminate them from the caption of this case. 6 7 8 The District Court Executive is hereby directed to enter this Order and provide copies to counsel. DATED April 2, 2014. 9 10 THOMAS O. RICE United States District Judge 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS ~ 17
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