Griffin v. Beneficial In Home Care, No. 2:2013cv00047 - Document 59 (E.D. Wash. 2013)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment ECF No. 43 is GRANTED. Plaintiffs request for a directed verdict or judgment as a matter of law, ECF No. 53 , construed by the Court as a cross-mo tion for summary judgment, is DENIED. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal of this Order would not be taken in good faith and would lack any arguable basis in law or fact. Plaintiffs in forma pauperis status is hereby REVOKED. The file is CLOSED. Signed by Judge Thomas O. Rice. (LLH, Courtroom Deputy)
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Griffin v. Beneficial In Home Care Doc. 59 1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 7 TIA GRIFFIN, NO: 13-CV-0047-TOR Plaintiff, 8 9 10 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT v. BENEFICIAL IN HOME CARE, INC., 11 Defendant. 12 13 BEFORE THE COURT is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment 14 (ECF No. 43). This matter was heard with oral argument on November 13, 2013. 15 Tia Griffin appeared pro se on her own behalf. Markus W. Louvier appeared on 16 behalf of Defendant. The Court has reviewed the briefing and the record and files 17 herein, and is fully informed. 18 19 20 BACKGROUND Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, alleges that her former employer violated Title VII by discriminating against her on the basis of race in the ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 wake of an accident involving a minor child under Plaintiff’s care. Plaintiff further 2 alleges that her former employer “obstructed justice” by withholding information 3 from Department of Health investigators during the ensuing investigation. 4 Defendant has moved for summary judgment on all claims, arguing that 5 there are no genuine issues of material fact for trial. Defendant also asserts that it 6 is immune from liability on all claims arising from its statements to investigators 7 pursuant to Washington’s child abuse reporting statute, RCW 26.44.060, and 8 Washington’s Anti-SLAPP statute, RCW 4.24.510. For the reasons discussed 9 below, the Court concludes that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment. 10 FACTS 11 At all times relevant to this lawsuit, Plaintiff Tia Griffin (“Plaintiff”) was a 12 nursing assistant registered with the Washington Department of Health (“DOH”). 13 Plaintiff, who is African American, was hired by Defendant Beneficial In Home 14 Care, Inc. (“Defendant”) in June 2011 as a Nursing Assistant. This was an at-will 15 employment relationship. One of Plaintiff’s main responsibilities in her role as a 16 Nursing Assistant was to provide part-time “respite care” for a minor child with 17 autism named S.D. Generally, this entailed caring for S.D. for approximately three 18 to four hours per day while S.D.’s parents attended to errands or other matters. 19 20 S.D. was injured while under Plaintiff’s care on October 22, 2011. Plaintiff asserts that she left S.D. alone in the bathroom for approximately ten seconds while ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 2 1 preparing to give the child a bath. Griffin Dep., ECF No. 46-1, at Tr. 61. Plaintiff 2 left the bath water running on a lukewarm temperature. Griffin Dep., ECF No. 46- 3 1, at Tr. 61. When Plaintiff returned, she discovered that S.D. had entered the 4 bathtub. Griffin Dep., ECF No. 46-1, at Tr. 61. A few minutes later, S.D. began to 5 wince and make noises. Griffin Dep., ECF No. 46-1, at Tr. 61. Plaintiff put her 6 hand in the bathwater and discovered that it was extremely hot. Griffin Dep., ECF 7 No. 46-1, at Tr. 61. She also observed that the bathtub’s temperature control dial 8 had been turned to the hottest setting. Griffin Dep., ECF No. 46-1, at Tr. 62. 9 Plaintiff immediately turned off the water and removed S.D. from the bathtub. 10 Griffin Dep., ECF No. 46-1, at Tr. 62. The nature and extent of S.D.’s injuries is 11 not clear from the existing record. It appears, however, that S.D. was severely 12 burned and required extensive medical care at Sacred Heart Medical Center in 13 Spokane and Harborview Medical Center in Seattle. See ECF No. 53 at 103-105. 14 At some point after the accident, S.D.’s parents contacted Defendant and 15 alleged that Plaintiff had been negligent in caring for S.D. and that S.D. had been 16 injured as a result. Pursuant to its mandatory reporting obligation, Defendant 17 reported the incident to the DOH. Defendant also placed Plaintiff on suspension 18 pending an official investigation in accordance with company policy. The matter 19 was subsequently investigated by the DOH, the Spokane Police Department and 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 3 1 the Seattle Police Department. While the precise outcome of these investigations 2 is unclear, it appears that Plaintiff was cleared of any deliberate wrongdoing. 3 4 5 6 While the above investigations were pending, Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s employment pursuant to the following company policy: If you have not officially given your notice to the agency, but have not worked any shifts in a 30 day period, for reasons of; L&I, doctors’ orders, personal, or any other reasons your personnel file will be closed and you will be terminated as an employee. 7 8 If you wish to reinstate your employment with Beneficial In-Home Care, you may reapply. You will not be promised a rehire. You will be considered as any other applicant. 9 ECF No. 45-2 (emphasis in original). Plaintiff did not apply to be reinstated after 10 she was cleared of wrongdoing. This lawsuit followed. 11 DISCUSSION 12 Summary judgment may be granted to a moving party who demonstrates 13 “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is 14 entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party 15 bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issues of 16 material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The burden then 17 shifts to the non-moving party to identify specific genuine issues of material fact 18 which must be decided by a jury. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 19 242, 256 (1986). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 4 1 plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury 2 could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id. at 252. 3 For purposes of summary judgment, a fact is “material” if it might affect the 4 outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id. at 248. A dispute concerning any 5 such fact is “genuine” only where the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could 6 find in favor of the non-moving party. Id. In ruling upon a summary judgment 7 motion, a court must construe the facts, as well as all rational inferences therefrom, 8 in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 9 378 (2007). Only evidence which would be admissible at trial may be considered. 10 11 12 Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2002). A. Title VII Race Discrimination Claims Title VII prohibits both intentional discrimination on the basis of race 13 (“disparate treatment”), and practices that, while not intentionally discriminatory, 14 have a disproportionately adverse effect (“disparate impact”) on racial minorities. 15 Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009). In support of her Title VII claims, 16 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant treated her less favorably than a white employee, 17 Courtney Williams, who had also been suspended and terminated under similar 18 circumstances. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant (1) assisted Ms. 19 Williams in applying for unemployment benefits while she served her suspension; 20 and (2) eventually reinstated Ms. Williams’ employment without requiring her to ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 5 1 formally reapply. ECF No. 50 at 16; ECF No. 51 at 4; ECF No. 53 at 10-12. 2 These allegations implicate a disparate treatment (as opposed to disparate impact) 3 theory of liability. 4 To state a prima facie disparate treatment claim under Title VII, a plaintiff 5 must show that (1) she belonged to a protected class (a racial minority); (2) she 6 was qualified for her job; (3) she was subjected to an adverse employment action; 7 and (4) similarly situated employees not in her protected class received more 8 favorable treatment. Moran v. Selig, 447 F.3d 748, 753 (9th Cir. 2006). If the 9 plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the 10 employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its adverse 11 employment action. Hawn v. Exec. Jet Mgmt., Inc., 615 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 12 2010). This is a burden of production rather than a burden of persuasion. Id. If 13 the employer articulates such a reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to 14 demonstrate that the employer’s proffered reason was a mere pretext for unlawful 15 discrimination. Id. The ultimate burden of proving intentional discrimination 16 remains at all times with the plaintiff. Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 17 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). 18 The first three elements of Plaintiff’s prima facie case are not in dispute. For 19 purposes of the instant motion, the only contested issue is whether a similarly- 20 situated employee received more favorable treatment than Plaintiff. Moran, 447 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 6 1 F.3d at 573. Having thoroughly reviewed the record, the Court concludes that 2 Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this issue. As a threshold 3 matter, Plaintiff has failed to establish that that Ms. Williams was a “similarly 4 situated” employee. As the Ninth Circuit explained in Moran, a plaintiff alleging 5 disparate treatment must demonstrate that the employee who allegedly received 6 more favorable treatment was similarly situated “in all material respects.” Moran, 7 447 F.3d at 755. 8 That standard has not been satisfied for two reasons. First, Plaintiff was 9 suspended under much more serious circumstances. Whereas Ms. Williams was 10 accused of stealing a client’s medications, see ECF No. 53 at Exhibit 12, Plaintiff 11 was accused of abusing and/or causing serious injuries to a minor child. Although 12 both women were ultimately cleared of wrongdoing, they were not “similarly 13 situated” while they served their suspensions. See Vasquez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 14 349 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir. 2003) (employee not similarly situated to disparate 15 treatment plaintiff where employee “did not engage in problematic conduct of 16 comparable seriousness”). 17 Second, there is no evidence that Plaintiff ever applied for unemployment or 18 spoke to Defendant about being reinstated. As a result, Plaintiff was never in a 19 position to receive—or be denied—the same treatment that Ms. Williams allegedly 20 received. With regard to the unemployment issue, the record simply reflects that ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 7 1 Ms. Williams received unemployment benefits while Plaintiff did not. Plaintiff 2 would apparently have a jury infer that Defendant was somehow responsible for 3 this circumstance, but the evidence to support such an inference is lacking. 4 Moreover, assuming that Defendant was somehow responsible for Plaintiff not 5 receiving unemployment benefits, its actions likely do not qualify as an “adverse 6 employment action” for purposes of the third element of Plaintiff’s prima facie 7 case. See Riley v. Tulsa Cnty. Juvenile Bureau ex rel. Tulsa Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 8 421 F. App’x 781, 785 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding that supervisor’s interference with 9 employee’s claim for unemployment benefits was not an adverse employment 10 action for purposes of a Title VII disparate treatment claim); see also McDonald- 11 Cuba v. Santa Fe Protective Servs, Inc., 644 F.3d 1096, 1102 (10th Cir. 2011) 12 (holding that “an application for unemployment benefits, without more” does not 13 amount to protected activity under Title VII). 14 As for the reinstatement issue, Plaintiff concedes that Ms. Williams was 15 rehired after she had a “conversation” with a member of Defendant’s human 16 resources department. There is no evidence that Plaintiff ever had a similar 17 conversation or otherwise contacted Defendant about the possibility of being 18 reinstated. Plaintiff’s vague and self-serving assertion that Defendant “did not 19 return her calls” in July 2012 is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material 20 fact. See Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 8 1 (noting that courts routinely “refuse[] to find a genuine issue where the only 2 evidence presented is uncorroborated and self-serving testimony”). Thus, the 3 Court concludes that Plaintiff was not similarly situated to Ms. Williams “in all 4 material respects.” Moran, 447 F.3d at 755. 5 In a similar vein, there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that Ms. 6 Williams was treated “more favorably” than Plaintiff. The crux of Plaintiff’s 7 argument is that unemployment and informal reinstatement were “never introduced 8 as options” to her. ECF No. 50 at 16. This argument misses the mark, as there is 9 no evidence that Defendant affirmatively “introduced” these options to Ms. 10 Williams. Once again, it is undisputed that Ms. Williams was reinstated after she 11 had a “conversation” with a member of Defendant’s human resources department. 12 ECF No. 50 at 16; ECF No. 53 at 12. There is no evidence that Defendant, rather 13 than Ms. Williams, initiated this conversation. The same is true with respect to the 14 unemployment issue; there is no evidence that Defendant affirmatively introduced 15 unemployment benefits as “an option” to Ms. Williams and declined to do the 16 same for Plaintiff. For this additional reason, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has 17 failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment. 18 At oral argument, Plaintiff asserted a second theory of disparate treatment 19 that was not fully developed in her briefing: that Defendant discriminated against 20 her by withholding information about the full extent of S.D.’s disabilities and care ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 9 1 needs, which information Defendant had previously provided to a white employee 2 named Kim Holbert. Taken to its logical conclusion, Plaintiff’s theory would be 3 that the information was withheld from her so a terrible accident would ensue, 4 resulting in her suspension and eventual firing. In other words, this was all a grand 5 conspiracy to ensure she would fail at her job and be fired. This theory fails for 6 lack of any proof. This theory also fails to state a prima facie case of disparate 7 treatment because Defendant’s alleged failure to provide relevant information 8 about S.D. does not qualify as an “adverse employment action.” For purposes of a 9 Title VII disparate treatment claim, adverse employment action is “a material 10 change in the terms and conditions of a person’s employment.” Chuang v. Univ. of 11 Calif. Davis, Bd. of Tr., 225 F.3d 1115, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000). Failing to disclose 12 the full extent of S.D.’s disabilities and care needs simply does not rise to this 13 level. Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Title VII claims. 14 B. Claims for Defamation, Libel, Slander, Obstruction of Justice, 15 Negligence and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 16 Plaintiff has asserted a variety of state common law claims arising from the 17 DOH’s investigation into the incident involving S.D. The essence of these claims 18 is that Defendant deliberately concealed several key facts from investigators which 19 tended to mitigate Plaintiff’s culpability for the accident. See ECF No. 53 at 12 20 (“The Defendant’s [sic] would not admit that they had placed me in an unsafe, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 10 1 hazardous environment that they knew about since 2010.”); ECF No. 57 at 11 2 (“[E]ven today, the Defendant’s [sic] continue to mislead investigators by not 3 acknowledging their blatant fraud and discrimination against me, Plaintiff, by 4 allowing me to be the face and scapegoat of blame after the fact of the incident in 5 order to hide their misconduct with all third and fourth parties involved in looking 6 into this situation.”); Griffin Dep., ECF No. 46-1, at Tr. 93 (Q: “So, it sounds to 7 me like your beef with [Defendant] regarding the [DOH] investigation is that they 8 didn’t tell the investigators about your level of training and the level of needs that 9 S.D. had.” A: “Yes.”). 10 By way of example, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to inform DOH 11 investigators (1) that she was not qualified or properly trained to care for a low- 12 functioning autistic child like S.D.; (2) that S.D. required a much more advanced 13 level of care than Defendant was providing; (3) that the water heater in S.D.’s 14 home had been set to a scalding temperature of 140 degrees; and (4) that Plaintiff 15 suffered from a lower back impairment which may have made it difficult for her to 16 quickly lift S.D. out of the bathtub. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant’s 17 refusal to provide DOH investigators with this information resulted in several non- 18 parties to this lawsuit making defamatory statements against her. See ECF No. 53 19 at 12 (“By remaining silent throughout the investigation processes, [Defendant] 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 11 1 started a firestorm where third and fourth parties got involved in making 2 slanderous and libelous statements against myself, the Plaintiff.”). 3 Defendant has moved to dismiss these claims as barred by Washington’s 4 child abuse reporting statute. As relevant here, the child abuse reporting statute 5 “immunizes those who report suspected child abuse to the authorities from suits 6 based on adverse consequences of reporting.” Webb v. Neuroeducation Inc., P.C., 7 121 Wash. App. 336, 348 (2004). The statute provides, in pertinent part: 8 9 (1) [A]ny person participating in good faith in the making of a report [of child abuse or neglect] pursuant to this chapter . . . shall in so doing be immune from any liability arising out of such reporting. 10 11 12 * * * (5) A person who, in good faith and without gross negligence, cooperates in an investigation arising as a result of a report made pursuant to this chapter, shall not be subject to civil liability arising out of his or her cooperation. 13 14 15 RCW 26.44.060. There can be no dispute that Plaintiff’s claims arise from the “making of a 16 report” of child abuse or neglect and/or “cooperat[ion] in an investigation” into 17 such a report. RCW 26.44.060(1) and (5). Thus, Defendant is immune from 18 liability if it acted in good faith. For purposes of RCW 26.44.060, good faith 19 means “a state of mind indicating honesty and lawfulness of purpose.” Whaley v. 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 12 1 State Dep’t of Soc. and Health Servs., 90 Wash. App. 658, 669 (1998). Defendant 2 bears the burden of establishing that it acted in good faith. Id. at 668. 3 As a threshold matter, it is undisputed that Defendant was required by law to 4 report all allegations of child abuse. See Griffin Dep., ECF No. 46-1, at Tr. 48, 51. 5 This mandatory reporting obligation cuts sharply against a finding that Defendant 6 acted with anything other than honesty and lawfulness of purpose. See Whaley, 90 7 Wash. App. at 669 (holding that day care operator’s statutory obligation to report 8 suspected child abuse “is a compelling consideration on the side of concluding her 9 purpose was lawful”). The Court finds that, on the present record, Defendant has 10 11 made a prima facie showing that it acted in good faith. Moreover, the evidence of record does not support Plaintiff’s claims that 12 Defendant withheld relevant information from the DOH. During her deposition, 13 Plaintiff conceded that she had no direct knowledge of what was—and was not— 14 conveyed to investigators. Griffin Dep., ECF No. 46-1, at Tr. 49-50. Plaintiff later 15 acknowledged that, to the best of her knowledge, Defendant had simply relayed the 16 complaints that had been lodged by S.D.’s parents. Griffin Dep., ECF No. 46-1, at 17 Tr. 102. Plaintiff did not depose any of Defendant’s employees or any of the DOH 18 investigators in an attempt to establish what information may have actually been 19 omitted. At bottom, there is simply no evidence from which a rational jury could 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 13 1 find that Defendant acted in bad faith. Accordingly, Defendant is immune from 2 liability on Plaintiff’s state law claims pursuant to RCW 26.44.060. 3 Defendant also moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims pursuant to 4 RCW 4.24.510, Washington’s anti-SLAPP statute. At oral argument, Defendant 5 indicated a willingness to abandon its anti-SLAPP arguments in light of Plaintiff’s 6 representation that her claims were not directed toward “communication . . . 7 regarding [a] matter reasonably of concern” to a government agency. RCW 8 4.24.510. Accordingly, the Court declines to address whether Defendant is entitled 9 to relief under the anti-SLAPP statute. 10 11 C. Disability Discrimination Claims In her opposition briefing, Plaintiff references disability discrimination 12 claims arising from Defendant’s alleged failure to accommodate her asthma and 13 lifting limitations. ECF No. 51 at 4; ECF No. 53 at 8-10. As Defendant correctly 14 notes, no such claims were pled in Plaintiff’s complaint. Accordingly, these claims 15 will be dismissed. See Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 16 (9th Cir. 1982) (a court’s liberal interpretation of a pro se complaint may not 17 supply essential elements of a claim that was never pled). 18 Assuming that these claims had been properly pled, Defendants are still 19 entitled to summary judgment. To prevail on a failure to accommodate claim 20 under the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Plaintiff must demonstrate ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 14 1 that “(1) she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) she is a qualified 2 individual able to perform the essential functions of the job with reasonable 3 accommodation; and (3) she suffered an adverse employment action because of her 4 disability.” Samper v. Providence Sacred Heart Med. Ctr., 675 F.3d 1233, 1237 5 (9th Cir. 2012). 6 Here, there is no evidence that Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment 7 action as a result of Defendant’s alleged failure to accommodate her disabilities. 8 Plaintiff was suspended due to an allegation that she caused S.D.’s injuries. She 9 was subsequently terminated pursuant to Defendant’s inactivity policy because she 10 had not worked a shift in over 30 days. Neither of these adverse employment 11 actions can be construed as arising from a failure to accommodate. To whatever 12 extent Plaintiff’s inability to lift S.D. out of the bathtub contributed to the child’s 13 injuries, she has failed to introduce evidence from which a rational jury could find 14 that her suspension or termination was causally related to the alleged failure to 15 accommodate. Thus, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on these claims. 16 17 D. Plaintiff’s Request for Affirmative Relief In her response to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff asks 18 the Court to enter “a directed verdict or judgment as a matter of law instead of 19 waiting for a jury trial.” ECF No. 53 at 1. The Court construes this request as a 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 15 1 cross-motion for summary judgment. For the reasons discussed above in 2 conjunction with Defendant’s motion, this motion is denied. 3 4 E. Revocation of In Forma Pauperis Status Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), “[a]n appeal may not be taken in forma 5 pauperis if the trial court certifies in writing that it is not taken in good faith.” The 6 good faith standard is satisfied when an individual “seeks appellate review of any 7 issue not frivolous.” See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). 8 For purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, an appeal is frivolous if it lacks any arguable 9 basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). 10 The Court finds that any appeal of this Order would not be taken in good 11 faith and would lack any arguable basis in law or fact. Accordingly, the Court 12 hereby revokes Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status. To the extent that Plaintiff 13 wishes to pursue an appeal, she must pay the requisite filing fee. 14 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 15 16 17 1. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 43) is GRANTED. 2. Plaintiff’s request for “a directed verdict or judgment as a matter of law,” 18 ECF No. 53, construed by the Court as a cross-motion for summary 19 judgment, is DENIED. 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 16 1 3. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal of 2 this Order would not be taken in good faith and would lack any arguable 3 basis in law or fact. Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status is hereby 4 REVOKED. 5 The District Court Executive is hereby directed to enter this Order, provide 6 copies to Plaintiff and defense counsel, enter JUDGMENT for Defendant, and 7 CLOSE the file. 8 DATED November 15, 2013. 9 10 THOMAS O. RICE United States District Judge 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 17
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