New v. Colvin (previously Astrue), No. 2:2012cv05138 - Document 24 (E.D. Wash. 2014)

Court Description: DECISION AND ORDER; granting 19 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 21 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Case is remanded for calculation of benefits. Case closed. Signed by Magistrate Judge Victor E. Bianchini. (CV, Case Administrator)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 10 11 12 13 14 Case No. 12-CV-05138 (VEB) LORA NEW, on behalf of JNJ, a Minor Child, Plaintiff, DECISION AND ORDER vs. 15 CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 16 Defendant. 17 18 19 20 I. INTRODUCTION In May of 2007, Plaintiff Lora New, the mother and natural guardian of JNJ ( Claimant ), filed an application on Claimant s behalf for Supplemental Security 1 DECISION AND ORDER RE: NEW V. COLVIN 12-CV-5138 (VEB) 1 Income ( SSI ) benefits under the Social Security Act, alleging disability due to 2 attention deficit hyperactivity disorder ( ADHD ) and oppositional defiant disorder. 3 The Commissioner of Social Security denied the application. 4 Plaintiff, represented by D. James Tree, Esq., commenced this action seeking 5 judicial review of the Commissioner s denial of benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 6 405 (g) and 1383 (c)(3). The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United 7 States Magistrate Judge. (Docket No. 8). 8 On January 3, 2014, the Honorable Rosanna Malouf Peterson, Chief United 9 States District Judge, referred this case to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 10 636(b)(1)(A) and (B). (Docket No. 18). 11 II. BACKGROUND 12 The procedural history may be summarized as follows: 13 Plaintiff is the mother of Claimant, a minor child. On May 23, 2007, Plaintiff 14 filed an application for SSI benefits on Claimant s behalf, alleging disability 15 beginning December 15, 1999. (T at 11, 188-194).1 The application was denied 16 initially and Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge 17 ( ALJ ). On February 8, 2011, a hearing was held before ALJ Caroline Siderius. (T 18 at 52). Claimant and Plaintiff appeared with an attorney. (T at 55). Plaintiff testified. 19 20 1 Citations to ( T ) refer to the administrative record at Docket No. 12. 2 DECISION AND ORDER RE: NEW V. COLVIN 12-CV-5138 (VEB) 1 (T at 57-58, 63-65, 74-79). The ALJ also heard testimony from Dr. Kent Layton, a 2 clinical psychologist. (T at 58-63, 65-73). Claimant s brother appeared and testified. 3 (T at 80-84). 4 On March 11, 2011, ALJ Siderius issued a written decision denying the 5 application for benefits and finding that Claimant was not disabled within the 6 meaning of the Social Security Act. (T at 8-30). The ALJ s decision became the 7 Commissioner s final decision on August 30, 2012, when the Social Security 8 Appeals Council denied Plaintiff s request for review. (T at 1-7). 9 On October 23, 2012, Plaintiff, acting by and through her attorney and on 10 Claimant s behalf, commenced this action by filing a Complaint in the United States 11 District Court for the Eastern District of Washington. (Docket No. 5). The 12 Commissioner interposed an Answer on January 14, 2013. (Docket No. 10). 13 Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on June 28, 2013. (Docket No. 14 19). The Commissioner moved for summary judgment on August 9, 2013. (Docket 15 No. 21). Plaintiff filed a reply memorandum of law in further support of her motion 16 on August 23, 2013. (Docket No. 22). As noted above, the parties consented to the 17 jurisdiction of a Magistrate Judge. (Docket No. 8). 18 19 For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner s motion is denied, Plaintiff s motion is granted, and this case is remanded for calculation of benefits. 20 3 DECISION AND ORDER RE: NEW V. COLVIN 12-CV-5138 (VEB) III. DISCUSSION 1 2 A. Sequential Evaluation Process 3 An individual under the age of eighteen (18) is disabled, and thus eligible for 4 SSI benefits, if he or she has a medically determinable physical or mental 5 impairment that results in marked and severe functional limitations, and which can 6 be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a 7 continuous period of not less than 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i). 8 However, that definitional provision excludes from coverage any individual under 9 the age of [eighteen] who engages in substantial gainful activity.... 42 U.S.C. § 10 1382c(a)(3)(C)(ii). 11 By regulation, the agency has prescribed a three-step evaluative process to be 12 employed in determining whether a child can meet the statutory definition of 13 disability. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924; see generally Meredith v. Astrue, No. CV-09-0384, 14 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37363, at *3 (E.D.Wa. April 5, 2011). 15 The first step of the test, which bears some similarity to the familiar five-step 16 analysis employed in adult disability cases, requires a determination of whether the 17 child has engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C .F.R. § 416.924(b). If so, then 18 both statutorily and by regulation the child is ineligible for SSI benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 19 1382c(a)(3)(C)(ii); 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(b). 20 4 DECISION AND ORDER RE: NEW V. COLVIN 12-CV-5138 (VEB) 1 If the claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the second step 2 of the test requires an examination as to whether the child suffers from one or more 3 medically determinable impairments that, either singly or in combination, are 4 properly regarded as severe, in that they cause more than a minimal functional 5 limitation. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(c). 6 If the existence of a severe impairment is discerned, the agency must then 7 determine, at the third step, whether the impairment meets or equals a presumptively 8 disabling condition identified in the listing of impairments set forth under 20 C.F.R. 9 Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App. 1 (the Listings ). Id. Equivalence to a listing can be either 10 medical or functional. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(d). If an impairment is found to meet or 11 qualify as medically or functionally equivalent to a listed disability, and the twelve- 12 month durational requirement is satisfied, the claimant will be deemed disabled. 20 13 C.F.R. § 416.924(d)(1). 14 Analysis of functionality is informed by consideration of how a claimant 15 functions in six main areas, commonly referred to as domains. 20 C.F.R. § 16 416.926a(b)(1); Meredith, 2011 LEXIS 37363, at *4. The domains are described as 17 broad areas of functioning intended to capture all of what a child can or cannot do. 18 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(1). Those domains include: (i) acquiring and using 19 information; (ii) attending and completing tasks; (iii) interacting and relating with 20 5 DECISION AND ORDER RE: NEW V. COLVIN 12-CV-5138 (VEB) 1 others; (iv) moving about and manipulating objects; (v) caring for oneself; and (vi) 2 health and physical well-being. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(1). 3 Functional equivalence is established in the event of a finding of an 4 extreme limitation, meaning more than marked, in a single domain. 20 C.F.R. § 5 416.926a(a); Meredith, 2011 LEXIS 37363, at *4. An extreme limitation is an 6 impairment which interferes very seriously with [the claimant's] ability to 7 independently 8 416.926a(e)(3)(I). initiate, sustain, or complete activities. 20 C.F.R. § 9 Alternatively, a finding of disability is warranted if a marked limitation is 10 found in any two of the listed domains. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(a); Meredith, 2011 11 LEXIS 37363, at *4. A marked limitation exists when the impairment interferes 12 seriously with [the claimant's] ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete 13 activities. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(2)(I). A marked limitation may arise when 14 several activities or functions are impaired, or even when only one is impaired, as 15 long as the degree of limitation is such as to interfere seriously with the ability to 16 function (based upon age-appropriate expectations) independently, appropriately, 17 effectively, and on a sustained basis. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 18 112.00(C). 19 20 6 DECISION AND ORDER RE: NEW V. COLVIN 12-CV-5138 (VEB) 1 B. Standard of Review 2 Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of a Commissioner s 3 decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A Court must uphold a Commissioner s decision, 4 made through an ALJ, when the determination is not based on legal error and is 5 supported by substantial evidence. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 6 1985); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). The [Commissioner s] 7 determination that a plaintiff is not disabled will be upheld if the findings of fact are 8 supported by substantial evidence. Delgado v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 570, 572 (9th Cir. 9 1983)(citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, 10 Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n 10 (9th Cir. 1975), but less than a 11 preponderance. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 601-02 (9th Cir. 1989). 12 Substantial evidence means such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 13 adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 14 (1971)(citations omitted). [S]uch inferences and conclusions as the [Commissioner] 15 may reasonably draw from the evidence will also be upheld. Mark v. Celebreeze, 16 348 F.2d 289, 293 (9th Cir. 1965). On review, the Court considers the record as a 17 whole, not just the evidence supporting the decision of the Commissioner. Weetman 18 v. Sullivan, 877 F.2d 20, 22 (9th Cir. 1989)(quoting Kornock v. Harris, 648 F.2d 525, 19 526 (9th Cir. 1980)). 20 It is the role of the Commissioner, not this Court, to resolve conflicts in 7 DECISION AND ORDER RE: NEW V. COLVIN 12-CV-5138 (VEB) 1 evidence. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 400. If evidence supports more than one rational 2 interpretation, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the 3 Commissioner. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097; Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th 4 Cir. 1984). Nevertheless, a decision supported by substantial evidence will still be 5 set aside if the proper legal standards were not applied in weighing the evidence and 6 making the decision. Brawner v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 839 F.2d 7 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1987). Thus, if there is substantial evidence to support the 8 administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence that will support a finding 9 of either disability or nondisability, the finding of the Commissioner is conclusive. 10 Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987). 11 C. Commissioner s Decision 12 The ALJ noted that Claimant was born on April 16, 1996, and, as such, was a 13 school-age child, as defined under 20 CFR § 416.962a (g)(2), on May 23, 2007 (the 14 application date) and was an adolescent on March 11, 2011 (the date of the ALJ s 15 decision). (T at 14). At step one of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ found that 16 Claimant had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 23, 2007, the 17 application date. (T at 14). 18 At step two, the ALJ determined that Claimant s ADHD, obsessive- 19 compulsive disorder, and oppositional defiant disorder were impairments considered 20 severe under the Act. (Tr. 14). 8 DECISION AND ORDER RE: NEW V. COLVIN 12-CV-5138 (VEB) 1 However, at step three, the ALJ concluded that Claimant did not have an 2 impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the 3 impairments set forth in the Listings. (T at 14-25). 4 Claimant did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that 5 functionally equaled the Listings. (T at 15-18). In particular, the ALJ determined 6 that Claimant had less than a marked limitation in acquiring and using information, 7 less than a marked limitation in attending and completing tasks, less than a marked 8 limitation with respect to interacting and relating with others, less than a marked 9 limitation as to moving about and manipulating objects, less than a marked 10 limitation with regard to the ability to care for herself, and less than a marked 11 limitation in health and physical well-being. (T at 18-25). The ALJ also found that 12 As such, the ALJ concluded that Claimant had not been disabled, as defined 13 under the Act, from May 23, 2007 (the application date), through March 11, 2011 14 (the date of her decision) and was therefore not entitled to benefits. (Tr. 25). As 15 noted above, the ALJ s decision became the Commissioner s final decision on 16 August 30, 2012, when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff s request for review. 17 (Tr. 1-7). 18 19 20 9 DECISION AND ORDER RE: NEW V. COLVIN 12-CV-5138 (VEB) 1 D. Plaintiff s Argument 2 Plaintiff argues that the Commissioner s decision should be reversed. In 3 particular, she contends that the ALJ committed reversible error by failing to 4 consider the opinion of Dr. Hazel Gavino, a treating physician. 5 IV. ANALYSIS 6 7 In disability proceedings, a treating physician s opinion carries more weight 8 than an examining physician s opinion and an examining physician s opinion is 9 given more weight than that of a non-examining physician. Benecke v. Barnhart, 10 379 F.3d 587, 592 (9th Cir. 2004); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 11 1995). If the treating or examining physician s opinions are not contradicted, they 12 can be rejected only for clear and convincing reasons. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. If 13 contradicted, the opinion can only be rejected for specific and legitimate reasons 14 supported by substantial evidence in the record. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 15 1043 (9th Cir. 1995). 16 On February 10, 2011, Dr. Hazel Gavino, Claimant s treating family practice 17 physician, completed a medical report in which she diagnosed hypothyroidism, 18 ADHD, behavioral disorder (possibly bipolar disorder), personality disorder, and 19 substance abuse. (T at 624). Dr. Gavino assessed marked limitation with respect to 20 acquiring and using information, marked limitation as to attending and completing 10 DECISION AND ORDER RE: NEW V. COLVIN 12-CV-5138 (VEB) 1 tasks, extreme limitation with regard to interacting and relating with others, no 2 limitation as to moving about and manipulating objects, extreme limitation in caring 3 for herself, and a marked limitation as to health and physical well-being. (T at 624- 4 26). 5 The ALJ did not discuss Dr. Gavino s assessment. The Commissioner 6 concedes that this was error. (Docket No. 21, at p. 5). However, the Commissioner 7 argues that this was harmless error, noting that the ALJ addressed treatment notes 8 that appeared to be from Dr. Gavino, in which the physician reported that Claimant 9 was taking medication for ADHD and opined that there was no guarantee that the 10 patient will be doing much better on these medications [because] she still needs a lot 11 of guidance in terms of care. (T at 618). The author of the reports (which appears 12 to be Dr. Gavino based on the format and the initials HG appearing on two of the 13 reports) also noted parent-child relationship problems. (T at 616). 14 referenced these reports in support of her conclusion that Claimant does well when 15 she is on her medication and had increased symptoms when she was non- 16 compliant with her medication regimen. (T at 617). The ALJ also found support in 17 these reports for her finding that Claimant s behavioral problems may improve with 18 a mending of the parent-child relationship. (T at 17). The ALJ 19 Although there is support in the record for the general proposition that 20 Claimant s limitations might diminish if she was more compliant with medication 11 DECISION AND ORDER RE: NEW V. COLVIN 12-CV-5138 (VEB) 1 and an improved relationship with her mother, this does not provide a basis for 2 disregarding (without explanation) the marked limitations assessed by Dr. Gavino in 3 her February 2011 report. 4 An ALJ s mistake may be considered harmless if it was nonprejudicial to the 5 claimant or irrelevant to the . . . ultimate disability conclusion. Stout v. Comm r of 6 Soc. Sec., 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006). Here, it would have been reasonable 7 for a different ALJ to have recognized Dr. Gavino s assessment, given it proper 8 weight in light of Dr. Gavino s treating physician status, considered the other 9 evidence of record, and reached a different disability determination. Thus, the 10 assessment cannot be considered irrelevant to the ultimate disability conclusion. 11 See, e.g. Gordon v. Astrue, No. 10-CV-1198, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94611, at *27- 12 28 (E.D. Ca. Aug. 24, 2011)(finding that ALJ s failure to consider evidence was not 13 harmless because had such evidence been fully credited, a different ALJ could 14 likely have reached a different disability determination ). 15 Dr. Gavino s opinion is supported by the assessments of Claimant s teachers, 16 who reported that Claimant had obvious and serious problems with acquiring and 17 using information (T at 222, 232) and attending to and completing tasks (T at 223, 18 233), even in highly structured and supportive educational settings. Consistent with 19 Dr. Gavino s opinion, Claimant s limitations would be expected to be more 20 significant without the support provided by structured school settings. See Douglas 12 DECISION AND ORDER RE: NEW V. COLVIN 12-CV-5138 (VEB) 1 v. Astrue, No. CV 07-3284, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9863, at *23 (C.D.Ca Feb. 10, 2 2009)( Plaintiff maintains, and the Court agrees, that because Plaintiff's educators 3 have adapted her scholastic environment to meet [Plaintiff's] documented 4 deficiencies [by] providing her the structure and support she needs to accommodate 5 her 6 environment. ). 2 impairments, Plaintiff would worsen outside of this structured 7 The ALJ afforded significant weight to the opinions of two non-examining 8 State Agency review consultants, finding their conclusions that Claimant had less 9 than marked limitations in all domains consistent with the medical evidence of 10 record. (T at 17). In fact, however, these findings were inconsistent with Dr. 11 Gavino s assessment. The ALJ did not address that assessment and, thus, did not 12 reconcile the inconsistency with her decision to justify giving significant weight to 13 the non-examining consultants opinions. 14 2 15 16 17 18 19 20 Section 416.924a (b)(5)(iv)(C) of the Social Security Regulations provides that: A structured or supportive setting may minimize signs and symptoms of your impairment(s) and help to improve your functioning while you are in it, but your signs, symptoms, and functional limitations may worsen outside this type of setting. Therefore, we will consider your need for a structured setting and the degree of limitation in functioning you have or would have outside the structured setting. Even if you are able to function adequately in the structured or supportive setting, we must consider how you function in other settings and whether you would continue to function at an adequate level without the structured or supportive setting. 13 DECISION AND ORDER RE: NEW V. COLVIN 12-CV-5138 (VEB) 1 Likewise, the ALJ gave great weight to the opinion of Jay Toews, a 2 consultative examiner, who found that Claimant had mild learning problems and 3 described her as a fairly typical teenager, [albeit] somewhat high spirited and 4 adventuresome. (T at 565). Dr. Toews assigned a GAF score3 range of 60-65, 5 which is indicative of moderate symptoms or difficulty in social, occupational or 6 education functioning. See Sandburg v. Astrue, No. CV-10-219, 2012 U.S. Dist. 7 LEXIS 2018, at *22 (E.D.Wa. Jan. 6, 2012). 8 consistent with the record as a whole. (T at 18). Again, however, Dr. Toews 9 rather benign findings are not consistent with Dr. Gavino s opinion (or, for that 10 The ALJ found this opinion matter, with the assessments of Claimant s teachers), all of which the ALJ ignored. 11 The Commissioner argues that the ALJ would have rejected Dr. Gavino s 12 opinion in any event based on the evidence that Claimant s condition would improve 13 if she followed the recommended medication regimen. (Docket No. 21, at p. 6). 14 However, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that it is a questionable practice to 15 chastise one with a mental impairment for the exercise of poor judgment in seeking 16 rehabilitation. Nguyen v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir.1996)(quoting 17 Blankenship v. Bowen, 874 F.2d 1116, 1124 (6th Cir.1989)). In addition, the ALJ 18 19 20 A GAF score is a rough estimate of an individual's psychological, social, and occupational functioning used to reflect the individual's need for treatment." Vargas v. Lambert, 159 F.3d 1161, 1164 n.2 (9th Cir. 1998). 3 14 DECISION AND ORDER RE: NEW V. COLVIN 12-CV-5138 (VEB) 1 does not appear to have considered SSR 96-7p. Under that ruling, an ALJ must not 2 draw an adverse inference from a claimant's failure to seek or pursue treatment 3 without first considering any explanations that the individual may provide, or other 4 information in the case record, that may explain infrequent or irregular medical visits 5 or failure to seek medical treatment, information and explanations which the ALJ 6 did not document as having been sought. 7 For the foregoing reasons, the ALJ s failure to address Dr. Gavino s opinion 8 cannot be considered harmless error. See Pearce v. Astrue, No. C09-04MJP, 2009 9 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102498, at *19 (W.D.Wa. Nov. 3, 2009). 10 Under the Ninth Circuit s credit as true doctrine, evidence will be credited 11 and the case will be remanded for calculation of benefits where (1) the ALJ failed 12 to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting the evidence; (2) there are no 13 outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination of disability can be 14 made; and (3) it is clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to find the 15 claimant disabled were such evidence credited. Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 16 1178 (9th Cir. 2000)(quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1292 (9th Cir. 1996). 17 The purpose of this doctrine is to discourage ALJs from reaching a 18 conclusion about a claimant's status first, and then attempting to justify it by 19 ignoring any evidence in the record that suggests an opposite result. Vasquez v. 20 Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 593-94 (9th Cir. 2009). Further, if the Commissioner has 15 DECISION AND ORDER RE: NEW V. COLVIN 12-CV-5138 (VEB) 1 appropriate reasons for rejecting evidence, it is both reasonable and desirable to 2 require the ALJ to articulate them in the original decision. Harman, 211 F.3d at 3 1179 (quoting Varney v. Sec y of Health & Human Serv., 859 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th 4 Cir. 1988)). 5 The credit as true doctrine is not a mandatory rule in the Ninth Circuit, but 6 leaves the court flexibility in determining whether to enter an award of benefits upon 7 reversing the Commissioner's decision. Mustonen v. Colvin, No. CV-12-3127, 2013 8 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168343, at *26 (E.D.Wa. Nov. 26, 2013). 9 In this case, Dr. Gavino assessed marked or extreme limitations in five (5) 10 domains and opined that Claimant s mental health impairments prevented her from 11 appropriately caring for herself, including being compliant with medication. (T at 12 624-26). This is consistent with Claimant s treating physician s treatment note that 13 there was no guarantee that the patient will be doing much better on these 14 medications [because] she still needs a lot of guidance in terms of care. (T at 618). 15 The ALJ failed to provide any reasons for rejecting Dr. Gavino s opinion; 16 there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination of 17 disability can be made; and it is clear from the record that the ALJ would be required 18 to find the claimant disabled if Dr. Gavino s opinion was credited. The standard for 19 the credit as true doctrine has thus been met. 20 16 DECISION AND ORDER RE: NEW V. COLVIN 12-CV-5138 (VEB) 1 In Vasquez, the Ninth Circuit exercised its discretion and applied the credit 2 as true doctrine because of Claimant s advanced age and severe delay of seven 3 years in her application. Vasquez, 572 F.3d at 593-94. Here, the Claimant s young 4 age and delay of more than six years from the date of the application make it 5 appropriate for this Court to use its discretion and apply the credit as true doctrine 6 pursuant to Ninth Circuit precedent. 7 8 V. ORDERS IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that: 9 Plaintiff s motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 19, is granted. 10 Defendant s motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 21, is denied. 11 Plaintiff s counsel may file an application for attorneys fees. 12 This case is remanded for calculation of benefits. 13 The District Court Executive is directed to file this Order, provide copies to 14 15 counsel, enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and CLOSE the file. DATED this 31st day of January, 2014. 16 17 18 /s/Victor E. Bianchini VICTOR E. BIANCHINI UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 19 20 17 DECISION AND ORDER RE: NEW V. COLVIN 12-CV-5138 (VEB)

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