Dickey v. Colvin (previously Astrue), No. 2:2012cv03028 - Document 26 (E.D. Wash. 2013)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S SUMMARY-JUDGMENT MOTION AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S SUMMARY-JUDGMENT MOTION denying 17 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 21 Motion for Summary Judgment Signed by Senior Judge Edward F. Shea. (VR, Courtroom Deputy)
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Dickey v. Colvin (previously Astrue) Doc. 26 1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 5 6 7 8 CV-12-3028-EFS Plaintiff, 9 10 No. JOHNNY DICKEY, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner of Social Security, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S SUMMARY-JUDGMENT MOTION AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S SUMMARYJUDGMENT MOTION 11 Defendant. 12 13 Before 14 judgment motions. 15 the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) denial of benefits. 16 Mr. Dickey contends the ALJ’s conclusions and findings of fact are not 17 supported by substantial evidence and are contrary to the law. 18 Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) asks the Court to 19 affirm the ALJ’s decision. 20 the Court, without oral ECF Nos. 17 & 21. argument, are cross-summary- Plaintiff Johnny Dickey appeals ECF No. 5. The After reviewing the record and relevant authority, the Court is 21 fully informed. 22 the ALJ’s decision and therefore denies Mr. Dickey’s motion and grants 23 the Commissioner’s motion. 24 /// 25 // 26 / For the reasons set forth below, the Court affirms ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S SUMMARY-JUDGMENT MOTION AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S SUMMARY-JUDGMENT MOTION- 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 A. Statement of Facts1 At the time of the administrative hearing, Mr. Dickey was 40 2 3 years old. ECF No. 10 at 26. He did not complete high school but did 4 earn a GED and has worked previously as an auto repair worker and 5 general laborer. 6 marijuana, heroin, methamphetamine, and cocaine when he was twelve. 7 Id. at 21. 8 March 2005. 9 March 2005 because he was incarcerated, and was again incarcerated for Id. at 26, 186. Mr. Dickey began using alcohol, Mr. Dickey worked in December 2003, September 2004, and Id. at 174. He stopped working in December 2003 and 10 about six months in 2009, and returned to jail in February 2010. 11 at 75, 77, 174. 12 B. Id. Procedural History In August 2008, Mr. Dickey applied for Supplemental Security 13 14 Income benefits 15 “claims for benefits”), alleging disability beginning October 1, 2001, 16 due to bipolar disorder, anxiety, and a left shoulder injury. 17 10 at 18, 154. 18 amended his alleged onset date to May 13, 2008. 19 denied 20 reconsideration on April 14, 2009. 21 written request for hearing on May 20, 2009. 22 video administrative hearing was held before ALJ Gene Duncan wherein 23 Mr. Dickey appeared telephonically from jail and was represented by initially and Disability Insurance Benefits (hereinafter, ECF No. Later, at the administrative hearing, Mr. Dickey on December 1, 2008, and Id. at 18. The claims were were denied upon Thereafter, he filed a Id. On July 7, 2010, a 24 1 25 The facts contained 26 in are the only briefly summarized. administrative hearing Detailed transcript, facts the decision, and the parties’ briefs. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S SUMMARY-JUDGMENT MOTION AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S SUMMARY-JUDGMENT MOTION- 2 are ALJ’s 1 counsel. Id. 2 claims 3 impairments (left 4 personality disorder, 5 residual functional capacity permitted a range of light work such as 6 small products assembler and small products inspector. 7 The Appeals Council thereafter denied Mr. Dickey’s request for review. 8 Id. at 1-3. for On September 16, 2010, the ALJ denied Mr. Dickey’s benefits, determining shoulder that notwithstanding depression, poly-substance and problem, dependence), his severe anti-social Mr. Dickey’s Id. at 20-27. On March 9, 2012, Mr. Dickey filed this lawsuit, claiming the 9 10 ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence. ECF Nos. 1 & 11 5. 12 Judgment, ECF No. 17, and on January 11, 2013, the Commissioner filed 13 her Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 21. 14 C. On November 16, 2012, Mr. Dickey filed his Motion for Summary Disability Determination 15 A "disability" is defined as the “inability to engage in any 16 substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 17 physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in 18 death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous 19 period of not less than twelve months.” 20 1382c(a)(3)(A). 21 evaluation process to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 22 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. 23 The decision-maker 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), uses a five-step sequential 20 Step one assesses whether the claimant is engaged in substantial 24 gainful activities. If he is, benefits are denied. 25 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). 26 20 C.F.R. §§ to step two. If he is not, the decision-maker proceeds ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S SUMMARY-JUDGMENT MOTION AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S SUMMARY-JUDGMENT MOTION- 3 Step two assesses whether the claimant has a medically severe 1 2 impairment or combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 3 416.920(c). the 4 denied. 5 step. If the claimant does not, disability claim is If the claimant does, the evaluation proceeds to the third 6 Step three compares the claimant's impairment with a number of 7 listed impairments acknowledged by the Commissioner to be so severe 8 as 9 404.1520(d), 404 Subpt. P App. 1, 416.920(d). to preclude or equals substantial one of the gainful listed activity. 10 meets impairments, 11 conclusively presumed to be disabled. 12 20 C.F.R. §§ If the impairment the claimant is the evaluation proceeds to the fourth step. If the impairment does not, 13 Step four assesses whether the impairment prevents the claimant 14 from performing work he has performed in the past by examining the 15 claimant’s residual functional capacity. 16 416.920(e). 17 is not disabled. 18 evaluation proceeds to the fifth step. 19 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), If the claimant is able to perform his previous work, he If the claimant cannot perform this work, the Step five, the final step, assesses whether the claimant can 20 perform 21 education, and work 22 416.920(f); see Bowen 23 claimant 24 cannot, the disability claim is granted. 25 26 other can, work the in the national economy experience. v. Yuckert, disability claim 20 482 is in C.F.R. U.S. 137 denied. view §§ of his 404.1520(f), (1987). If age, the If the claimant The burden of proof shifts during this sequential disability analysis. The claimant has the initial burden of establishing a prima ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S SUMMARY-JUDGMENT MOTION AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S SUMMARY-JUDGMENT MOTION- 4 1 facie case of entitlement to disability benefits. 2 438 F.2d 920, 921 (9th Cir. 1971). 3 Commissioner to show 1) the claimant can perform other substantial 4 gainful activity, and 2) that a "significant number of jobs exist in 5 the 6 Heckler, 722 F.2d 1496, 1498 (9th Cir. 1984). 7 only if his impairments are of such severity that he is not only 8 unable 9 education, national to economy," do and his which previous work the work experiences, Rhinehart v. Finch, The burden then shifts to the claimant but can Kail v. A claimant is disabled cannot, engage perform. in considering any other 10 gainful work which exists in the national economy. 11 D. age, substantial 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B). 12 his 13 42 U.S.C. §§ Standard of Review On review, the Court considers the record as a whole, not just 14 the evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision. 15 877 F.2d 20, 22 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Kornock v. Harris, 648 F.2d 16 525, 526 (9th Cir. 1980)). 17 that the claimant is not disabled if the ALJ applied the proper legal 18 standards and there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole 19 to support the decision. 20 Cir. 1983) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)); Brawner v. Sec’y of Health & 21 Human Servs., 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1987) (recognizing that a 22 decision supported by substantial evidence will be set aside if the 23 proper legal standards were not applied in weighing the evidence and 24 making 25 scintilla, Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n.10 (9th Cir. 26 1975), but less than a preponderance, McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d the decision). See Weetman v. Sullivan, The Court upholds the ALJ’s determination Delgado v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 570, 572 (9th Substantial evidence is more than ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S SUMMARY-JUDGMENT MOTION AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S SUMMARY-JUDGMENT MOTION- 5 a mere 1 599, 601-02 (9th Cir. 1989); Desrosiers v. Sec’y of Health & Human 2 Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988). 3 evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 4 conclusion." 5 (citations omitted). 6 may reasonably draw from the evidence" will also be upheld. 7 Celebrezze, 348 8 supports more than one rational interpretation, the Court must uphold 9 the ALJ’s decision. 10 E. v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) "[S]uch inferences and conclusions as the [ALJ] F.2d 289, 293 (9th Cir. 1965). Mark v. If the evidence Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984). 11 Richardson "It means such relevant 12 Analysis Mr. Dickey raises four main arguments in support of his 13 contention that the ALJ’s findings were not supported by substantial 14 evidence. 15 disorder and anxiety at step two of the sequential evaluation; second, 16 Mr. Dickey states the ALJ improperly rejected the opinions of his 17 treating and examining medical providers; third, Mr. Dickey claims the 18 ALJ improperly rejected his subjective complaints; and fourth, he 19 argues 20 specific jobs consistent with his functional limitations. 21 of the entire record, the Court rejects these claims and finds the 22 ALJ’s determination that Mr. Dickey is not disabled is supported by 23 substantial evidence. the First, he argues the ALJ improperly rejected his bipolar ALJ failed to meet the step five burden to identify Upon review 24 First, while Mr. Dickey maintains that the ALJ’s rejection of 25 his bipolar disorder and anxiety at step two requires reversal, the 26 Court disagrees. The ALJ acknowledged that the record reflects a ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S SUMMARY-JUDGMENT MOTION AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S SUMMARY-JUDGMENT MOTION- 6 1 diagnosis of anxiety, ECF No. 10 at 298, but correctly observed that 2 no 3 Additionally, because the ALJ proceeded beyond step two to consider 4 Mr. Dickey’s residual functional capacity in steps 3 and 4, the ALJ 5 did not commit reversible error. 6 911 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding no reversible error where ALJ continued 7 beyond 8 ability to work). 9 when reasonably finding that Mr. Dickey could work with a limitation 10 of superficial public contact and interaction with co-workers, and a 11 restriction of working independently rather than in collaboration with 12 others 13 Accordingly, the Court finds the ALJ did not commit reversible error. 14 medical source step two or in Second, ever and included bipolar disorder, id. at 22. See Lewis v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 909, relevant restrictions in assessing Here, the ALJ included these relevant restrictions intense the diagnosed ALJ interaction reasonably with others. evaluated the ECF opinions No. of 23. Mr. 15 Dickey’s treating and examining medical providers, Dr. Ho and Mr. 16 Clark. 17 he suffered from chronic pain which was made severe by movement, the 18 term “severe” came from Mr. Dickey not Dr. Ho, id. at 247, and it was 19 Dr. Ho’s opinion that Mr. Dickey could do medium work, id. at 251. 20 The ALJ’s physical residual functional capacity finding was consistent 21 with Dr. Ho’s opinion, and was, in fact, more favorable to Mr. Dickey 22 then Dr. Ho’s opinion. Additionally, Mr. Dickey claims the ALJ’s 23 improperly Clark’s 24 limitations. 25 that not only was Mr. Clark not an acceptable medical source, id. at 26 21-22, 25, but his observations were the most extreme of any other While Mr. Dickey argues the ALJ rejected Dr. Ho’s opinion that rejected Mr. opinion of marked and moderate However, the Court finds the ALJ reasonably observed ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S SUMMARY-JUDGMENT MOTION AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S SUMMARY-JUDGMENT MOTION- 7 1 source, id. at 25, and Mr. Clark’s opinions were inconsistent with the 2 opinions 3 relevant field of psychology, id. 4 is an alternative interpretation of the evidence, which because the 5 ALJ’s findings are reasonable and supported by substantial evidence, 6 does not justify reversal. 7 (9th Cir. 1984). of an acceptable medical source who specialized in the Ultimately, Mr. Dickey’s argument See Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 8 Third, while Mr. Dickey claims the ALJ improperly rejected his 9 own subjective complaints, the Court finds the ALJ reasonably, and not 10 arbitrarily, discounted Mr. Dickey’s subjective statements. 11 Specifically, the ALJ found Mr. Dickey’s assertions about disabling 12 limitations were belied by his activities, ECF No. 10 at 22, 24, his 13 assertions 14 at 4, and his statements about drug use were inconsistent, id. at 21, 15 49, 265, 298, 471. 16 supported 17 assertions, the Court affirms the ALJ’s credibility finding. were inconsistent with the objective medical evidence, id. by Because the ALJ articulated several valid reasons, substantial evidence, for discrediting Mr. Dickey’s 18 Finally, Mr. Dickey’s claim that the ALJ’s hypothetical to the 19 vocational expert did not account for limitations opinioned by Mr. 20 Clark 21 previously, the ALJ reasonably discounted Mr. Clark’s opinion, and 22 therefore his opinion need not be contained in the hypothetical. 23 Bayliss 24 Additionally, Dr. Moore opinioned that Mr. Dickey had no more than 25 moderate 26 limitations in interacting with others. and v. Dr. Moore, is Barnhart, limitations in 427 unsupported F.3d mental by 1211, the 1217 functioning record. (9th As Cir. necessitating noted See 2005). moderate ECF No. 10 at 67, 282-85. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S SUMMARY-JUDGMENT MOTION AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S SUMMARY-JUDGMENT MOTION- 8 1 The 2 consistent with, this opinion, by including limitations to superficial 3 public 4 Accordingly, the ALJ reasonably relied upon the vocational expert’s 5 testimony that Mr. Dickey could do the unskilled assembler job. 6 F. 7 ALJ’s hypothetical contact and to the vocational interaction with expert included, co-workers. Id. and at is 67. Conclusion In summary, the Court finds the record contains substantial 8 evidence from which the ALJ properly concluded, when applying the 9 correct 10 legal standards, that Mr. Dickey does not qualify for benefits. 11 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 12 1. DENIED. 13 14 Mr. Dickey’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 17, is 2. The Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 21, is GRANTED. 15 16 3. JUDGMENT is to be entered in the Commissioner’s favor. 17 4. The case shall be CLOSED. 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 20 The Clerk’s Office is directed to enter this Order and provide copies to all counsel. DATED this 27th day of November 2013. 21 22 s/ Edward F. Shea EDWARD F. SHEA Senior United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 Q:\EFS\Civil\2012\3028.socsec.sj.grant.close.lc2.docx ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S SUMMARY-JUDGMENT MOTION AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S SUMMARY-JUDGMENT MOTION- 9
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