Sax v. Colvin, No. 2:2012cv00371 - Document 24 (E.D. Wash. 2014)

Court Description: DECISION AND ORDER: Denying (ECF No 16 ) Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Granting (ECF No 18 ) Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Signed by Magistrate Judge Victor E. Bianchini. (LS, Courtroom Deputy)

Download PDF

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 10 11 Case No. 12-CV-00371(VEB) JOSHUA WILLIAM SAX, 12 Plaintiff, DECISION AND ORDER 13 vs. 14 CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 15 16 17 Defendant. I. INTRODUCTION 18 In December of 2009, Plaintiff Joshua William Sax applied for Supplemental 19 Security Income ( SSI ) benefits and Disability Insurance Benefits ( DIB ) under 20 1 DECISION AND ORDER SAX v COLVIN 12-CV-00371-VEB 1 the Social Security Act. The Commissioner of Social Security denied the 2 applications. 3 Plaintiff, represented by Calbom & Schwab, P.C., Jeffrey Schwab, Esq., of 4 counsel, commenced this action seeking judicial review of the Commissioner s 5 denial of benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405 (g) and 1383 (c)(3). The parties 6 consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. (Docket No. 9). 7 On February 3, 2014, the Honorable Rosanna Malouf Peterson, Chief United 8 States District Judge, referred this case to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 9 636(b)(1)(A) and (B). (Docket No. 23). 10 11 II. BACKGROUND 12 The procedural history may be summarized as follows: 13 On December 18, 2009, Plaintiff applied for SSI benefits and DIB, alleging 14 disability beginning July 1, 2007. (T at 144-45, 146-49). 1 The applications were 15 denied initially and Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law 16 Judge ( ALJ ). On March 9, 2011, a hearing was held before ALJ R.J. Payne. (T at 17 40). Plaintiff appeared with an attorney and testified. (T at 57-75). The ALJ also 18 received testimony from Dr. Marian Martin, a psychological expert. (T at 44-57). 19 1 20 Citations to ( T ) refer to the administrative record at Docket Nos. 11-13. 2 DECISION AND ORDER SAX v COLVIN 12-CV-00371-VEB 1 On April 7, 2011, ALJ Payne issued a written decision denying the 2 applications for benefits. 3 Commissioner s final decision on April 5, 2012, when the Social Security Appeals 4 Council denied Plaintiff s request for review. (T at 1-6). (T at 11-29). The ALJ s decision became the 5 On May 31, 2012, Plaintiff, acting by and through his counsel, timely 6 commenced this action by filing a Complaint in the United States District Court for 7 the Eastern District of Washington. (Docket No. 5). The Commissioner interposed 8 an Answer on August 6, 2012. (Docket No. 10). 9 Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, with supporting memorandum 10 of law, on December 3, 2012. (Docket No. 16, 17). The Commissioner moved for 11 summary judgment, supported by a memorandum of law, on January 15, 2013. 12 (Docket No. 18, 19). As noted above, the parties consented to the jurisdiction of a 13 Magistrate Judge. (Docket No. 9). 14 15 For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner s motion is granted, Plaintiff s motion is denied, and this case is dismissed. 16 17 18 19 20 3 DECISION AND ORDER SAX v COLVIN 12-CV-00371-VEB III. DISCUSSION 1 2 A. Sequential Evaluation Process 3 The Social Security Act ( the Act ) defines disability as the inability to 4 engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable 5 physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has 6 lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve 7 months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act also provides that a 8 plaintiff shall be determined to be under a disability only if any impairments are of 9 such severity that a plaintiff is not only unable to do previous work but cannot, 10 considering plaintiff s age, education and work experiences, engage in any other 11 substantial work which exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 12 1382c(a)(3)(B). Thus, the definition of disability consists of both medical and 13 vocational components. Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001). 14 The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process 15 for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. Step 16 one determines if the person is engaged in substantial gainful activities. If so, 17 benefits are denied. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404. 1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If not, the 18 decision maker proceeds to step two, which determines whether plaintiff has a 19 medially severe impairment or combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 20 4 DECISION AND ORDER SAX v COLVIN 12-CV-00371-VEB 1 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). 2 If plaintiff does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, 3 the disability claim is denied. If the impairment is severe, the evaluation proceeds to 4 the third step, which compares plaintiff s impairment with a number of listed 5 impairments acknowledged by the Commissioner to be so severe as to preclude 6 substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii); 20 7 C.F.R. § 404 Subpt. P App. 1. If the impairment meets or equals one of the listed 8 impairments, plaintiff is conclusively presumed to be disabled. If the impairment is 9 not one conclusively presumed to be disabling, the evaluation proceeds to the fourth 10 step, which determines whether the impairment prevents plaintiff from performing 11 work which was performed in the past. If a plaintiff is able to perform previous work 12 that plaintiff is deemed not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 13 416.920(a)(4)(iv). At this step, plaintiff s residual functional capacity (RFC) is 14 considered. If plaintiff cannot perform past relevant work, the fifth and final step in 15 the process determines whether plaintiff is able to perform other work in the national 16 economy in view of plaintiff s residual functional capacity, age, education and past 17 work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v); Bowen v. 18 Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 (1987). 19 20 The initial burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to establish a prima facie case 5 DECISION AND ORDER SAX v COLVIN 12-CV-00371-VEB 1 of entitlement to disability benefits. Rhinehart v. Finch, 438 F.2d 920, 921 (9th Cir. 2 1971); Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 1999). The initial burden is 3 met once plaintiff establishes that a mental or physical impairment prevents the 4 performance of previous work. The burden then shifts, at step five, to the 5 Commissioner to show that (1) plaintiff can perform other substantial gainful 6 activity and (2) a significant number of jobs exist in the national economy that 7 plaintiff can perform. Kail v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1496, 1498 (9th Cir. 1984). 8 B. Standard of Review 9 Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of a Commissioner s 10 decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A Court must uphold a Commissioner s decision, 11 made through an ALJ, when the determination is not based on legal error and is 12 supported by substantial evidence. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 13 1985); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). The [Commissioner s] 14 determination that a plaintiff is not disabled will be upheld if the findings of fact are 15 supported by substantial evidence. Delgado v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 570, 572 (9th Cir. 16 1983)(citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, 17 Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n 10 (9th Cir. 1975), but less than a 18 preponderance. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 601-02 (9th Cir. 1989). 19 Substantial evidence means such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 20 6 DECISION AND ORDER SAX v COLVIN 12-CV-00371-VEB 1 adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 2 (1971)(citations omitted). [S]uch inferences and conclusions as the [Commissioner] 3 may reasonably draw from the evidence will also be upheld. Mark v. Celebreeze, 4 348 F.2d 289, 293 (9th Cir. 1965). On review, the Court considers the record as a 5 whole, not just the evidence supporting the decision of the Commissioner. Weetman 6 v. Sullivan, 877 F.2d 20, 22 (9th Cir. 1989)(quoting Kornock v. Harris, 648 F.2d 525, 7 526 (9th Cir. 1980)). 8 It is the role of the Commissioner, not this Court, to resolve conflicts in 9 evidence. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 400. If evidence supports more than one rational 10 interpretation, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the 11 Commissioner. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097; Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th 12 Cir. 1984). Nevertheless, a decision supported by substantial evidence will still be 13 set aside if the proper legal standards were not applied in weighing the evidence and 14 making the decision. Brawner v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 839 F.2d 15 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1987). Thus, if there is substantial evidence to support the 16 administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence that will support a finding 17 of either disability or nondisability, the finding of the Commissioner is conclusive. 18 Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987). 19 20 7 DECISION AND ORDER SAX v COLVIN 12-CV-00371-VEB 1 C. Commissioner s Decision 2 The ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity 3 since July 1, 2007, the alleged onset date and met the insured status requirements of 4 the Social Security Act through March 31, 2013. (T at 16-17). The ALJ determined 5 that Plaintiff s attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, major depressive disorder, 6 possible anxiety/posttraumatic stress disorder, personality disorder, and alcohol 7 abuse were impairments considered severe under the Act. (Tr. 17-20). 8 The ALJ found that Plaintiff s impairments, including his substance abuse, 9 met several of the impairments set forth in the Listings (in particular, Listings §§ 10 12.04, 12.06, 12.08, and 12.09). (T at 21). However, because substance abuse was at 11 issue, rather than immediately awarding benefits (as would ordinarily be the case for 12 a claimant whose impairments met several of the Listings impairments); the ALJ 13 was required to conduct the sequential evaluation a second time to consider whether 14 Plaintiff would still be disabled absent substance abuse. See Bustamente v. 15 Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 955 (9th Cir. 2001); 20 CFR § 404.1535. 16 At step two of this re-evaluation, the ALJ found that even if Plaintiff stopped 17 the substance abuse, his remaining limitations would cause more than a minimal 18 impact on his ability to perform basic work activities, and (thus) Plaintiff had severe 19 impairments irrespective of his substance abuse. (T at 21). 20 8 DECISION AND ORDER SAX v COLVIN 12-CV-00371-VEB 1 However, the ALJ concluded that if Plaintiff stopped the substance abuse, he 2 would not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically 3 equaled any of the impairments in the Listings. (T at 22). The ALJ found that if 4 Plaintiff stopped the substance abuse, he would have the residual functional capacity 5 to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels, with some non-exertional 6 limitations. (T at 22-24). The ALJ determined that Plaintiff could perform his past 7 relevant work as a warehouse deliverer if he stopped abusing alcohol. (T at 24-25). 8 Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff would not be disabled if he 9 stopped his substance abuse and, as such, his substance abuse was a contributing 10 factor material to the determination of disability pursuant to 20 CFR §§ 404.1520 (f) 11 and 416.920 (f). Thus, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not entitled to benefits at 12 any time from the alleged onset date through April 7, 2011 (the date of the ALJ s 13 decision). (T at 25). 14 Commissioner s final decision on April 5, 2012, when the Appeals Council denied 15 Plaintiff s request for review. (Tr. 1-6). 16 D. As noted above, the ALJ s decision became the Plaintiff s Argument 17 Plaintiff contends that the Commissioner s decision should be reversed. This 18 case presents a single issue whether the ALJ s conclusion that Plaintiff s substance 19 20 9 DECISION AND ORDER SAX v COLVIN 12-CV-00371-VEB 1 abuse was a contributing factor material to the disability determination was 2 supported by substantial evidence. 3 IV. ANALYSIS 4 5 When a Social Security disability claim involves substance abuse, the ALJ 6 must first conduct the general five-step sequential evaluation without determining 7 the impact of substance abuse on the claimant. If the ALJ finds that the claimant is 8 not disabled, then the ALJ proceeds no further. If, however, the ALJ finds that the 9 claimant is disabled, then the ALJ conducts the sequential evaluation a second time 10 and considers whether the claimant would still be disabled absent the substance 11 abuse. See Bustamente v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 955 (9th Cir. 2001), 20 CFR § 12 404.1535. 13 The claimant bears the burden at steps 1-4 of the second sequential analysis of 14 showing substance abuse is not a contributing factor material to his disability. 15 Hardwick v. Astrue, 782 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1177 (E.D.Wa. 2011)(citing Parra v. 16 Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 748 (9th Cir. 2007)). To meet this burden, the claimant must 17 provide competent evidence of a period of abstinence and medical source opinions 18 relating to that period sufficient to establish his alcoholism is not a contributing 19 20 10 DECISION AND ORDER SAX v COLVIN 12-CV-00371-VEB 1 factor material to his alleged mental impairments and disability. Hardwick, 782 F. 2 Supp. 2d at 1177 (citing Parra, 481 F.3d at 748-49). 3 Here, as noted above, the ALJ found that Plaintiff s impairments, including 4 his substance abuse, met several of the impairments set forth in the Listings (in 5 particular, Listings §§ 12.04, 12.06, 12.08, and 12.09). (T at 21). However, the ALJ 6 concluded that if Plaintiff stopped the substance abuse, he would not have an 7 impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled any of the 8 impairments in the Listings. (T at 22). Moreover, the ALJ found that if Plaintiff 9 stopped the substance abuse, he would have the residual functional capacity to 10 perform a full range of work at all exertional levels, with some non-exertional 11 limitations. (T at 22-24). In particular, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff would have: 12 no more than mild difficulty understanding, remembering, and carrying out short 13 and simple or detailed instructions; moderate difficulty maintaining attention and 14 concentration for extended periods and working in coordination with or proximity to 15 others without being distracted by them; moderate difficulty interacting 16 appropriately with the public and responding appropriately to supervisors, but no 17 more than mild difficulty getting along with co-workers or maintaining socially 18 appropriate behavior; moderate difficulty responding to changes in the work setting; 19 20 11 DECISION AND ORDER SAX v COLVIN 12-CV-00371-VEB 1 and no more than mild limitations completing a normal workday and workweek and 2 maintaining regular attendance. (T at 22-24). 3 The record shows that Plaintiff successfully completed inpatient chemical 4 dependency treatment in May of 2010 and apparently refrained from substance 5 abuse thereafter. (T at 364-67). Thus, evidence from the period after Plaintiff 6 completed treatment is highly relevant to assessing his residual functional capacity 7 when not engaged in substance abuse. That evidence may be summarized as follows: 8 In August of 2010, Plaintiff was evaluated by Jan Davis-Morgan, a nurse 9 practitioner. Ms. Davis-Morgan reported that Plaintiff felt hopeful and proud that he 10 was sober. His energy level and concentration were good, but he had problems 11 sleeping. Ms. Davis-Morgan indicated that Plaintiff had some problems related to 12 PTSD, but she did not believe he met the full criteria for a diagnosis. She opined that 13 Plaintiff s panic disorder with some agoraphobia was problematic. (T at 392). Ms. 14 Davis-Morgan assigned a Global Assessment of Functioning ( GAF ) 2 score of 45 15 (T at 392), which is indicative of serious impairment in social, occupational or 16 school functioning. See Onorato v. Astrue, No. CV-11-0197, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17 174777, at *11 n.3 (E.D.Wa. Dec. 7, 2012). Ms. Davis-Morgan recommended 18 19 A GAF score is a rough estimate of an individual's psychological, social, and occupational functioning used to reflect the individual's need for treatment." Vargas v. Lambert, 159 F.3d 1161, 1164 n.2 (9th Cir. 1998). 20 12 2 DECISION AND ORDER SAX v COLVIN 12-CV-00371-VEB 1 increasing Plaintiff s dose of seroquel (a prescription medication used to treat 2 bipolar disorder) to help his sleep and stabilize his mood. (T at 393). 3 Plaintiff was examined by Manya Dobaj, a psychiatric nurse practitioner, in 4 December of 2010. She reported that Plaintiff was doing much better now that he 5 is sober and indicated that she would re-evaluate him for bipolar disorder. (T at 6 433). In January of 2011, Ms. Dobaj described Plaintiff s mood as stable on his 7 current medication regimen. (T at 432). In February of 2011, Ms. Dobaj reported 8 that Plaintiff had some mood lability. (T at 431). Later that month, Ms. Dobaj noted 9 that Plaintiff was doing well with no angry outbursts or fighting. (T at 430). In 10 March of 2011, Ms. Dobaj described Plaintiff as stable on his current medication 11 regimen. (T at 429). 12 Following Plaintiff s second February 2011 visit, Ms. Dobaj completed a form 13 entitled Mental Medical Source Statement. She assessed mild limitation as to 14 Plaintiff s ability to remember and carry out detailed instructions, but no limitation 15 as to his ability to remember locations and work-like procedures or his ability to 16 understand, remember, and carry out very short and simple instructions. (T at 395). 17 She found moderate limitation as to Plaintiff s ability to maintain attention and 18 concentration for extended periods and his ability to work in coordination with or 19 proximity to others without being distracted by them. (T at 396). Ms. Dobaj opined 20 13 DECISION AND ORDER SAX v COLVIN 12-CV-00371-VEB 1 that Plaintiff had mild limitation as to performing activities within a schedule, 2 maintaining regular attendance, and being punctual within customary tolerances. (T 3 at 396). 4 decisions and mild limitation as to completing a normal workday and work week 5 without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms. (T at 396). She found no limitation with regard to making simple work-related 6 In terms of social interaction, Ms. Dobaj assessed no limitation as to 7 interacting appropriately with the general public, mild limitation with respect to 8 getting along with co-workers and peers, and a moderate limitation as to accepting 9 instructions and responding appropriately to criticism from supervisors. (T at 396). 10 She found a mild limitation with regard to maintaining socially appropriate behavior 11 and adhering to basic standards of neatness and cleanliness. (T at 397). Concerning 12 adaptation skills, Ms. Dobaj opined that Plaintiff had moderate limitation as to his 13 ability to respond appropriately to changes in the work settings and mild limitation 14 with regard to his ability to set realistic goals or make plans independent of others. 15 (T at 397). 16 Dr. Marian Martin, a psychologist, reviewed Plaintiff s medical records and 17 completed a psychiatric review assessment in March of 2011. Dr. Martin opined 18 that, without substance abuse, Plaintiff had mild restriction of activities of daily 19 20 14 DECISION AND ORDER SAX v COLVIN 12-CV-00371-VEB 1 living, moderate difficulties in social functioning, and moderate difficulties in 2 maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace. (T at 421). 3 Dr. Martin also testified at the administrative hearing and reiterated the 4 assessment contained in her March 2011 report. (T at 48-51). However, at the outset 5 of the hearing, Dr. Martin asked the ALJ whether there were any treatment records 6 from the period after August of 2010. (T at 45). Plaintiff s attorney advised that 7 there were such records, but said that he did not have them with him. (T at 45). It 8 thus appears that Dr. Martin did not review the treatment notes and assessment from 9 Ms. Dobaj summarized above. 10 Nevertheless, Dr. Martin said that she would proceed based on the 11 information that I have, explaining that the records she had were sufficient for me 12 to form an opinion. (T at 45). On cross-examination by Plaintiff s counsel, Dr. 13 Martin was asked about Plaintiff s social skills. Dr. Martin again referenced the lack 14 of records since August of 2010, saying that there isn t a lot of the information, 15 basically, there after his treatment . . . . (T at 55). She noted that there had not been 16 a consultative exam-type of evaluation of his social functioning or [activities of 17 daily living. (T at 56). 18 The ALJ afforded significant weight to Dr. Martin s testimony. (T at 24). 19 Plaintiff challenges this aspect of the ALJ s decision and contends that the ALJ 20 15 DECISION AND ORDER SAX v COLVIN 12-CV-00371-VEB 1 should have ordered a consultative examination to assess his mental health 2 limitations. Plaintiff also questions the ALJ s reliance on Dr. Martin s testimony 3 given the psychologist s own concerns about the lack of evidence of Plaintiff s 4 condition after August of 2010. 5 As a threshold matter, this Court finds that it was error for the ALJ to rely so 6 heavily on Dr. Martin s opinion without providing her with access to the post- 7 August 2010 treatment records. 3 However, in the context of this particular case, the 8 error was harmless. 9 (including, most importantly, the February 2011 assessment from Ms. Dobaj, the 10 treating nurse practitioner) are consistent with Dr. Martin s opinion and, ultimately, 11 support the ALJ s RFC determination. In other words, the evidentiary gap noted by 12 Plaintiff (and Dr. Martin) has been filled with the post-August 2010 treatment notes 13 and Ms. Dobaj s assessment. The complete record contains substantial evidence 14 sufficient to support the ALJ s conclusion that Plaintiff s substance abuse was a 15 contributing factor material to his disability. The post-August 2010 evidence of 16 record was sufficient and the ALJ was not obliged to order a consultative 17 examination under the circumstances. See Anderson v. Colvin, No. CV-12-0054, 18 3 The treatment records from the post-August 2010 period 19 The fact that Dr. Martin did not have access to the post-August 2010 records does not mean it was error to rely on her opinion at all. She is still a qualified expert who examined voluminous records of Plaintiff s treatment history. However, the fact that she had (apparently) not been given an opportunity to review the most recent and relevant evidence should have been considered when deciding how much weight to give her opinion. 20 16 DECISION AND ORDER SAX v COLVIN 12-CV-00371-VEB 1 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150381, at *15-16 (E.D.Wa. Oct. 18, 2013). The treating 2 nurse practitioner s findings are essentially consistent with the ALJ s assessment. 3 This evidence, combined with the treatment notes during the period after August 4 2010 (which generally described positive progress) and Dr. Martin s review, is 5 sufficient to sustain the Commissioner s conclusion under the applicable standard of 6 review. See Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987). 7 8 V. CONCLUSION 9 After reviewing the administrative record, this Court finds substantial 10 evidence supports the Commissioner s decision, including the objective medical 11 evidence and supported medical opinions. It is clear that the ALJ thoroughly 12 examined the record, afforded appropriate weight to the medical evidence, including 13 the assessments of the examining medical providers and the non-examining 14 consultants, and afforded the subjective claims of symptoms and limitations an 15 appropriate weight when rendering his decision that Plaintiff was not entitled to 16 benefits. This Court finds no reversible error and because substantial evidence 17 supports the Commissioner s decision, the Commissioner is GRANTED summary 18 judgment and that Plaintiff s motion for judgment summary judgment is DENIED. 19 20 17 DECISION AND ORDER SAX v COLVIN 12-CV-00371-VEB 1 V. ORDERS 2 3 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that: 4 Plaintiff s motion for summary judgment, Docket No. 16, is DENIED. 5 The Commissioner s motion for summary judgment, Docket No. 18, is 6 7 8 GRANTED. The District Court Executive is directed to file this Order, provide copies to counsel, enter judgment in favor of the Commissioner and CLOSE the file. 9 10 DATED this 24th day of March, 2014. 11 12 13 /s/Victor E. Bianchini VICTOR E. BIANCHINI UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 18 DECISION AND ORDER SAX v COLVIN 12-CV-00371-VEB

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.