Wold v. Franklin et al, No. 2:2012cv00225 - Document 57 (E.D. Wash. 2013)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - granting in part and denying in part 24 Motion for Summary Judgment Signed by Senior Judge Edward F. Shea. (VR, Courtroom Deputy)
Download PDF
<![CDATA[
Wold v. Franklin et al Doc. 57 1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 5 6 7 No. DOUGLAS J. WOLD, Plaintiff, 8 11 12 13 14 15 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT v. 9 10 CV-12-0225-EFS NICK HENZEL, in his individual capacity as a Columbia County Sheriff’s Deputy; JOE HELM, in his individual capacity as a Columbia County Sheriff’s Deputy; WALTER J. HESSLER, in his official capacity as the Sheriff of Columbia County, and in his individual capacity as Columbia County Sheriff’s Deputy; and COLUMBIA COUNTY, a municipal corporation 16 Defendants. 17 I. 18 19 On November 20, 2013, INTRODUCTION the Court heard oral argument on 20 Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 24. 21 the Court directed the parties provide supplemental briefing on the 22 issue 23 parties, 24 applicable authority, the Court is fully informed. 25 set forth below, the Court finds that there is a material issue of 26 fact as to the excessive use of force claim. ORDER of ratification. the record in Having this reviewed matter, the and At the hearing, submissions having of the consulted the For the reasons - 1 Dockets.Justia.com II. 1 2 BACKGROUND Factual History1 A. On April 30, 2009, Plaintiff was housed in the Columbia County 3 4 Jail’s general 5 disturbance in the jail, Defendant Henzel, the only deputy present at 6 the jail, at approximately 3:00 a.m. ordered Plaintiff to leave the 7 cells 8 evidenced by the video tape, the Plaintiff, within several seconds 9 after and population enter entering the the area dayroom known and dayroom, as close exited the the the “catwalk.” door behind dayroom 10 Defendant Henzel. 11 After him. walking a As toward Defendant Henzel sprayed Plaintiff with pepper spray. At 12 around Several steps outside the door to the dayroom, 3:24 a.m., Defendants Henzel and Helm escorted 13 Plaintiff, while handcuffed and shackled, outside to hose off the 14 pepper spray. 15 planted his feet and appeared to lean toward Defendant Henzel. 16 Defendant Helm approached Plaintiff, Defendant Henzel pulled Plaintiff 17 to the ground, rotating from the grass to the concrete pathway, where 18 Plaintiff’s face and shoulder impacted the ground. 19 Plaintiff 20 personnel to see to Plaintiff’s injuries. 21 // to While escorting Plaintiff back into the jail, Plaintiff the jail, Defendants contacted After After returning emergency medical 22 23 24 1 In ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the Court has considered the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom as contained in the submitted affidavits, declarations, exhibits, and depositions, in the 25 light 26 Plaintiff. 1999). ORDER - 2 most favorable to the party opposing the motion – here, the See Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 1 B. Procedural History Plaintiff filed his initial Complaint on April 27, 2012. 2 ECF 3 No. 1. On January 15, 2013, Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint 4 asserting Defendants violated his civil rights through the use of 5 excessive force and being deliberately indifferent to his medical 6 needs. 7 Complaint 8 immunity. 9 instant motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 18. on April Defendants filed their Answer to the Amended 29, ECF No. 22. 2013, asserting the defense of qualified On September 12, 2013, Defendants filed the ECF No. 24. III. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 10 Defendants 11 seek summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims of 12 deliberate indifference and excessive force, and maintain they are 13 entitled to qualified immunity. 14 A. Legal Standards 15 Summary judgment is appropriate if the “movant shows that there 16 is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 17 entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 18 Once a party has moved for summary judgment, the opposing party must 19 point to specific facts establishing that there is a genuine dispute 20 for trial. 21 the nonmoving party fails to make such a showing for any of the 22 elements essential to its case for which it bears the burden of proof, 23 the trial court should grant the summary judgment motion. 24 “When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule [56(a)], its 25 opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical 26 doubt as to the material facts. ORDER - 3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). If Id. at 322. . . . [T]he nonmoving party must come 1 forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 2 trial.’” 3 574, 586-87 (1986) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis in original). 4 When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court does 5 not weigh the evidence or assess credibility; instead, “the evidence 6 of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences 7 are to be drawn in his favor.” 8 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). 9 B. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 Discussion 10 Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a 11 claimant: (1) that a person acting under color of state law committed 12 the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived the claimant 13 of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or 14 laws of the United States. 15 (1981). 16 the 17 participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act 18 which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of 19 which [the plaintiff complains].” 20 (9th Cir. 1978). 21 and 22 defendant 23 constitutional deprivation. 24 (1976). 25 superior liability. 26 690-92 (1978). A person deprives another “of a constitutional right, within meaning focus ORDER Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 on of section if he does an affirmative act, Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 The inquiry into causation must be individualized the whose 1983, duties acts or and responsibilities omissions are alleged of to each have individual caused a See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 Liability for a violation will not arise from respondeat - 4 Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, A causal link between a person holding a supervisorial 1 position and the claimed constitutional violation must be shown; vague 2 and conclusory allegations are insufficient. 3 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 4 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). See Fayle v. Stapley, Here, the parties agree each Defendant was acting under color of 5 6 state law. Accordingly, the Court takes up each of the alleged 7 violations in turn. 8 1. Deliberate Indifference 9 Plaintiff’s complaint asserts that Defendants were deliberately 10 indifferent of his medical needs. 11 due process clause imposes, at a minimum, the same duty the Eighth 12 Amendment imposes: “persons in custody ha[ve] the established right to 13 not have officials remain deliberately indifferent to their serious 14 medical needs.” 15 This duty to provide medical care encompasses detainees' psychiatric 16 needs. 17 Cir. 1988). Carnell v. Grimm, 74 F.3d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1996). Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 864 F.2d 1454, 1461 (9th Under 18 With regard to medical needs, the the Eighth Amendment's standard of deliberate 19 indifference, a person is liable for denying a prisoner needed medical 20 care only if the person “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to 21 inmate health and safety.” 22 (1994). 23 the person merely “be aware of facts from which the inference could be 24 drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, [] he must also 25 draw that inference.” 26 risk, but ORDER - 5 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 841 In order to know of the excessive risk, it is not enough that was not, Id. then If a person should have been aware of the the person has not violated the Eighth 1 Amendment, no matter how severe the risk. 2 895, 914 (9th Cir. 2001). But if a person is aware of a substantial 3 risk person 4 prisoner's serious medical needs on the basis of either his action or 5 his inaction. of serious First, 6 harm, a may Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d be liable for neglecting a Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. prior to the pepper-spray and take-down incidents, 7 Plaintiff, throughout his briefing and oral arguments, has not shown 8 facts indicating that Defendants subjectively knew of an excessive 9 health risk. Additionally, after Plaintiff suffered injuries from 10 contacting the concrete sidewalk, the evidence clearly shows Plaintiff 11 was 12 undisputed 13 knowledge required for a deliberate indifference claim. 14 Defendants’ motion is granted as to deliberate indifference. provided medical facts, assistance. Plaintiff has Accordingly, not based demonstrated upon the the requisite Therefore, 15 2. Excessive Use of Force 16 Second, Plaintiff contends Defendants used excessive force in 17 the use of pepper spray and the “take down.” 18 excessive force claim, Plaintiff must show “that excessive force was 19 used against [him]” and “that the law at the time . . . clearly 20 established that the force used was unconstitutionally excessive.” 21 Moss v. 22 Fourth Amendment claims of excessive force are evaluated according to 23 the framework established by Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 24 Under Graham, “all claims that law enforcement officers have used 25 excessive 26 investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ . . . should be analyzed under ORDER U.S. Secret Serv., 675 - 6 force—deadly or To succeed on his F.3d 1213, 1229 (9th not—in the course of Cir. 2012). an arrest, 1 the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness' standard.” 2 395. 3 intrusion’ on a person's liberty with the ‘countervailing governmental 4 interests 5 objectively reasonable under the circumstances.” 6 Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 701 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 7 396). This analysis “requires balancing the ‘nature and quality of the at stake’ a. 8 to determine whether the force used was Smith v. City of Defendant Helm Plaintiff 9 490 U.S. at contends used that individual liability under § 1983, the Court’s inquiry into causation must be 12 individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each 13 individual 14 (1976). 15 However, 16 Additionally, while Defendant Helm walked over to Plaintiff prior to 17 the take down, the video clearly shows that Defendant Helm did not 18 assist 19 Accordingly, 20 demonstrate how Defendant Helm by not being present for the pepper 21 spray incident, and merely passively observing the take down, is in 22 anyway liable under section 1983. 23 Defendants’ motion is granted. he was Defendant the b. Plaintiff not Henzel present in Goode, undisputed - 7 for taking evidence 423 U.S. 362, Helm’s 370-71 the pepper-spray Plaintiff before to the incident. the Court ground. does not Therefore, as to Defendant Helm, Defendant Henzel contends that capacity, used excessive force. ORDER v. assessing Here, Defendant Helm was Henzel’s immediate duty supervisor. 24 26 Rizzo in his 11 See However, in capacity, defendant. force. Helm, 10 25 excessive Defendant Defendant Henzel, in his individual The Court finds there is a material 1 issue of fact as to whether Defendant Henzel’s use of pepper spray and 2 taking Plaintiff to the ground was objectively reasonable. 3 reviewed the video footage of both incidents, a reasonable juror could 4 find either that the use of force depicted is reasonable or that the 5 use of force was excessive. 6 exists as to the force used, the issue is best reserved for the trier 7 of fact. c. 8 Accordingly, as a material issue of fact Defendants Columbia County & Hessler Finally, 9 Having Plaintiff maintains that Defendants Hessler, in his 10 official capacity as Columbia County Sheriff, and Columbia County, 11 violated his rights by maintaining a policy or custom permitting the 12 excessive 13 Defendant Hessler’s approval of Defendant Henzel’s conduct ratified 14 that conduct, and accordingly Defendants Hessler and Columbia County 15 are now liable for Henzel’s actions. use of force. Specifically, Plaintiff maintains that 16 A municipality is liable for the violation of constitutional 17 rights if a city officer's conduct is directly attributable to the 18 city's policy or custom. 19 436 U.S. 658, 691-94 (1978). 20 municipal defendants under § 1983: 1) by showing that decision-making 21 official was, as matter of state law, final policymaking authority 22 whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy 23 in 24 policymaking authority either delegated that authority to, or ratified 25 decision of, subordinate. 26 v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 124 (1988). area ORDER of - 8 decision, or Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of New York, 2) Plaintiff may establish liability of by showing that official with final Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; City of St. Louis 1 Here, Defendant Hessler, as Sheriff, was the final policymaking 2 authority and Plaintiff maintains the municipality is liable because 3 he ratified Defendant Henzel’s conduct. The 4 Supreme Court has stated that “if the authorized 5 policymakers approve a subordinate's decision and the basis for it, 6 their ratification would be chargeable to the municipality because 7 their decision is final.” 8 112, 9 municipal 127 (1988). The policymaker City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. Court may be held that “a single decision sufficient to trigger by section a 1983 10 liability under Monell, even though the decision is not intended to 11 govern future situations.” 12 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 13 480-81 14 affirmative choice. 15 attaches only where ‘a deliberate choice to follow a course of action 16 is made from among various alternatives by the official or officials 17 responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject 18 matter 19 (plurality opinion)); accord City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 20 808, 823 (1985) (plurality opinion) (“The word ‘policy’ generally 21 implies 22 alternatives.”). 23 knowledge of the alleged constitutional violation.” 24 176 F.3d 1231, 1239 (9th Cir. 1999). 25 unconstitutional act does not, by itself, constitute ratification. 26 Instead, a plaintiff must prove that the policymaker approved of the ORDER (1986). in a - 9 However, question.’” course of Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1347 there Id. must be evidence of a conscious, “Municipal liability under section 1983 Id. action (quoting Pembaur, consciously chosen 475 U.S. from at among 483-84 various However, “ratification requires, among other things, Christie v. Iopa, “A policymaker's knowledge of an 1 subordinate's act. For 2 policymaker's mere refusal to overrule a subordinate's completed act 3 does not constitute approval.” 4 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Weisbuch v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 119 F.3d 5 778, 781 (9th Cir. 1997) (“To hold cities liable under section 1983 6 whenever 7 discretionary acts of subordinates would simply smuggle respondeat 8 superior liability into section 1983.”)) policymakers example, fail it is well-settled that a Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1239 to overrule the unconstitutional 9 The Ninth Circuit, in its unpublished opinion in Au Hoon v. City 10 and County of Honolulu, 922 F.2d 844 (1991), found a single subsequent 11 act 12 overturning the district court, the Ninth Circuit stated that “[a] 13 review of the transcript of proceedings below makes apparent that the 14 district court believed that ‘ratification’ could not apply to actions 15 that had already been taken at a lower level. 16 at 4 (“Thus, it is not correct to say that only actions approved in 17 advance 18 municipality under section 1983. 19 authority with policymaking authority, and further ignores the fact 20 that ratification demonstrates that the act was consonant with the 21 policy of the entity”). of ratification are was ‘ratified’ for sufficient purposes to of create liability. In That was error.” imposing liability Id. on a To do so confuses decisionmaking Additionally, in Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630 (9th 22 23 Cir. 1991), a police chief sent 24 internal affairs complaint could not be sustained. 25 Court found that by signing the letter the police chief ratified the 26 investigation into the complaint and therefore “[t]he jury verdict was ORDER - 10 a signed letter stating that Id. at 635. an The 1 not in plain error.” Id. at 646. “The jury properly could find such 2 policy or custom from the failure of [the police chief] to take any 3 remedial steps after the violations.” Id. at 647. Here, Defendant Hessler admits to approving of Henzel’s conduct 4 5 in its entirety. 6 evidence in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, this act could be 7 ratification 8 right, could evidence a policy or custom of approving excessive use of 9 force, analogues to the letter in Larez. of ECF No. Henzel’s 44-1, Ex conduct, 7. and Accordingly, if that taking conduct the violated a Accordingly, the Court finds 10 that there is a triable issue as to whether Defendants Hessler, in his 11 official 12 Henzel’s conduct. 13 Hessler, in his official capacity, and Defendant Columbia County is 14 denied. 15 C. capacity, and Columbia County, are liable for Defendant Accordingly, Defendants’ motion as to Defendant Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the deliberate indifference claim is 16 17 dismissed 18 against Defendant Helm is dismissed. 19 are 1) Plaintiff’s claim Defendant Henzel, in his individual capacity, 20 used 21 ratified 22 Defendants Hessler, in his official capacity, and Columbia County. 23 // 24 // 25 // 26 / ORDER against excessive force Defendant - 11 all Defendants, and 2) Henzel’s and the force claim The remaining claims for trial Plaintiff’s conduct excessive claim Defendant establishing Hessler liability for IV. 1 Accordingly, 2 IT IS CONCLUSION HEREBY ORDERED: Defendants’ Motion for 3 Summary Judgment, ECF No. 24, is GRANTED IN PART (dismissing all 4 deliberate 5 Defendant Helm) AND DENIED IN PART (remainder). IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 7 indifference claims; dismissing all DATED this 23rd day of December 2013. 9 s/ Edward F. Shea EDWARD F. SHEA Senior United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 Q:\EFS\Civil\2012\0225.gipdip.msj.lc2.docx ORDER - 12 against The Clerk’s Office is directed to enter this Order and provide copies to counsel. 8 claims
]]>
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You
should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google
Privacy Policy and
Terms of Service apply.
