Corter v. Douglas County et al, No. 2:2012cv00173 - Document 38 (E.D. Wash. 2013)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING DOUGLAS COUNTY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; granting 17 Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendant Douglas County terminated. Signed by Senior Judge Edward F. Shea. (CV, Case Administrator)
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Corter v. Douglas County et al Doc. 38 1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 5 6 7 CASE NO. CV-12-173-EFS TAMARA MARIE CORTER, a married individual, 8 ORDER GRANTING DOUGLAS COUNTY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Plaintiff, 9 v. 10 11 12 DOUGLAS COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Washington, and STEVE GROSECLOSE, individually and as an agent of Douglas County, 13 Defendant. 14 15 Before the Court, without oral argument, is Defendant Douglas 16 County’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 17 (“County”) 18 Tamara Corter’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against it because there is 19 insufficient evidence that the County ratified any wrongful conduct by 20 Defendant Steve Groseclose or failed to train its employees. 21 Corter opposes the motion. 22 and relevant authority, the Court is fully informed. 23 below, the Court grants the County’s summary-judgment motion. 24 /// 25 // 26 / asks the Court to grant ECF No. 17. summary ECF No. 20. judgment Douglas County on Plaintiff Ms. After reviewing the record As set forth ORDER GRANTING DOUGLAS COUNTY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 Background1 A. Ms. Corter and Mr. Groseclose were previously married and they 2 3 have two sons from this marriage. Following their divorce, Ms. Corter 4 had primary custody of the two boys. 5 severe autism and requires significant care and attention. The oldest son suffers from 6 On March 30, 2009, Ms. Corter was prescribed sleep medicine to 7 help her rest; she had become sleep deprived caring for the oldest 8 son. 9 Deputy Sheriff’s Office because she was concerned about Ms. Corter’s 10 slurred speech and incoherency after speaking with her on the phone. 11 ECF No. 18-1, Ex. A, at 39-41. 12 “welfare check” on Ms. Corter and prepared an incident report about 13 their visit: On the same day, Ms. Corter’s friend called the Chelan County Later that day, officers conducted a Spoke with Tammy [Corter] along with her father, William Heitzman. Tammy said she was upset, but did not feel like harming herself or anyone else. Tammy just got a prescription for Triaz. . . .sleeping pills filled at the Chelan Safeway. On the way home said she took two and felt 14 15 16 17 18 1 The Facts. parties submitted ECF No. 24. a Joint Statement of Uncontroverted The Court treats these facts as established, 19 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d), and sets these forth without citation to 20 the record. 21 citation. Any disputed facts or quotations are supported by a When considering this motion, the Court 1) believed the undisputed facts and Plaintiff’s evidence, 2) drew all justifiable 22 inferences therefrom in Plaintiff’s favor, 3) did not weigh the 23 evidence or assess credibility, and 4) did not accept assertions 24 made by Plaintiff that were flatly contradicted by the record. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); 25 Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). 26 ORDER GRANTING DOUGLAS COUNTY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 2 fine. William said he was the one who took her earlier today to Wenatchee. He said they met with MHP, but they were unable to help as she was not making any threats and did not want voluntary help. William is staying the night with Tammy and the 17 and 8 year old boys. The 17 YO is autistic. One rifle belonging to the ex-boyfriend possibly in the house unk. where. William will alt and call if he finds it so it can be taken for safe keeping. 1 2 3 4 5 ECF No. 18-1, Ex. D (ellipses in original). The incident report was 6 placed on the law-enforcement database, Spillman. 7 Because Mr. Groseclose works for the County as a detective, he 8 has access to Spillman. His access to Spillman is subject to County 9 policies that restrict is access to work-related reasons and require 10 him to maintain the confidentiality of such information as necessary 11 to perform his investigative duties. Nonetheless, in contravention of 12 County policy, Mr. Groseclose accessed Spillman to obtain the incident 13 report pertaining to Ms. Corter. Mr. Groseclose then used this 14 obtained information, including Ms. Corter’s medical information, to 15 support a guardianship petition for his oldest son in 2009. 16 Mr. Groseclose has been disciplined by the County for disclosing 17 investigative information on two prior occasions; neither involved 18 improper access and use of Spillman information. In September 2005, 19 Mr. Groseclose unnecessarily disclosed information about a Child 20 Protective Services complaint to a woman’s employer during an attempt 21 to contact the woman. The County responded to the woman’s formal 22 complaint and investigated the matter. Mr. Groseclose was directed by 23 the County to complete counseling for violating the following portion 24 of his contract: 25 26 Employee(s) shall restrictions on be aware of and shall observe legal the release and dissemination of ORDER GRANTING DOUGLAS COUNTY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 3 1 2 3 4 information. He/She shall disclose such information as required in the proper performance of his/her duties. Employee(s) shall neither disclose nor use for his/her personal interest any confidential information acquired by him/her in the course of his/her official duties. Employee(s) shall treat as confidential matters related to him/her in official confidence regarding investigation, internal affairs and sensitive personnel information. 5 ECF No. 20-1, at 29-30. 6 The second incident occurred in May 2006 when Mr. Groseclose 7 disclosed to a friend that she was likely being investigated for 8 assault. This disclosure violated the County’s Standard Operating 9 Procedures Manual: 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 You must keep what you learn at work confidential. You may not attempt to gain personally from anything you learn. Do not allow unauthorized personnel access to criminal records. You may not make any false reports or entries or remove any existing entry to any official document without proper authority. You will frequently learn information which is sensitive or privileged. You are not free, even in the privacy of your home, to share any of the details of ongoing investigations, or confidential information about any aspect of the department. This is a basic condition of employment. Even more than other county agencies, we require you to act professionally, not to gossip or break confidences, and to handle any inter-personal, inter-agency disputes as professionals. 18 ECF No. 20-1, Ex. 8. Based on Mr. Groseclose’s self-report to the 19 County of his disclosure to the friend, the County investigated the 20 matter and gave him a written reprimand, which stated in part: “I 21 found that complaint [from the 2005 incident] sustained and counseled 22 you regarding the appropriate dissemination of information. I believe 23 these incidents are similar enough in nature to warrant your receipt 24 of this written reprimand . . . .” Id. 25 26 ORDER GRANTING DOUGLAS COUNTY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 4 The County has not yet disciplined Mr. Groseclose for accessing 1 2 Spillman to obtain the incident report pertaining to Ms. Corter. 3 ECF No. 20-1, at 33. On March 23, 2012, Ms. Corter filed this § 1983 lawsuit against 4 5 the County and Mr. Groseclose. In regard to the County, Ms. Corter 6 claims it ratified Mr. Groseclose’s actions and failed to train and 7 supervise Mr. Groseclose. 8 Douglas County filed the instant summary-judgment motion. 9 B. ECF No. 20-1, at 15-19. On June 6, 2013, ECF No. 17. Standard 10 Summary judgment is appropriate if the “pleadings, the discovery 11 and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there 12 is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 13 is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 14 Once a party has moved for summary judgment, the opposing party must 15 point to specific facts establishing that there is a genuine issue for 16 trial. 17 nonmoving party fails to make such a showing for any of the elements 18 essential to its case for which it bears the burden of proof, the 19 trial court should grant the summary judgment motion. 20 “When the moving party has carried its burden . . . [showing that it 21 is entitled to judgment as a matter of law], its opponent must do more 22 than show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to material facts.” 23 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586- 24 87 (1986). 25 must come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine 26 issue for trial.’” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). If the Id. at 322. “In the language of the Rule [56], the nonmoving party Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. ORDER GRANTING DOUGLAS COUNTY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 5 1 P. 56(e)). 2 does 3 evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable 4 inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” 5 Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). 6 C. not When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court weigh the evidence or assess credibility; instead, “the Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Analysis To support her § 1983 claim against the County, Ms. Corter must 7 8 show 1) her constitutional right was violated and 2) that the 9 violatory conduct was committed by the County, while acting under 10 color of state law. 11 (1988). 12 sufficient evidence as to each of these elements to survive summary 13 judgment. The 42 U.S.C. § 1983; West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 Court addresses below whether Ms. Corter presented 14 1. Constitutional Right: Informational Privacy 15 The first § 1983 prong is whether a constitutional right was 16 violated; 17 informational privacy. 18 absolute; rather, it is a conditional right which may be infringed 19 upon 20 Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 551 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Planned 21 Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Lawall, 307 F.3d 783, 790 (9th Cir. 2002)). 22 To 23 information outweighs the individual’s privacy interest, the Court 24 balances the following factors: 25 26 a the right showing determine of at here is Ms. Corter’s right to “[T]he right to informational privacy is not proper whether issue the governmental government’s interest.” interest in Tucson Woman’s disclosing (1) the type of information requested, (2) the potential for harm in any subsequent non-consensual disclosure, (3) the adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized ORDER GRANTING DOUGLAS COUNTY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 6 the disclosure, (4) the degree of need for access, and (5) whether there is an express statutory mandate, articulated public policy, or other recognizable public interest militating toward access. 1 2 3 Id. 4 After balancing the above factors in light of the submitted 5 evidence, the Court finds Ms. Corter establishes triable issues of 6 fact as to whether her conditional constitutional right to privacy was 7 violated. First, Mr. Groseclose discovered sensitive medical 8 information pertaining disclosure of to Ms. Corter. Second, because of the 9 this sensitive medical information during the 10 guardianship proceedings, Ms. Corter was at risk of losing custody of 11 her oldest son. Third, the County recognizes the need to restrict law 12 enforcement’s use of investigative information to only law-enforcement 13 purposes and has established policies to that effect; however, there 14 are few safeguards to prevent the disclosure of such information by a 15 law enforcement officer for personal use. Fourth, there was no 16 legitimate law enforcement purpose for Mr. Groseclose to access the 17 incident report pertaining to Ms. Corter. Finally, the County has not 18 articulated a public disclosure of, need for Mr. Groseclose’s access to, and 19 the incident report related to Ms. Corter. 20 Accordingly, after considering these factors, the Court determines Ms. 21 Corter submitted sufficient evidence to establish triable issues of 22 fact relating to whether her conditional constitutional right to 23 privacy was violated. Douglas County’s motion is denied in this 24 regard. 25 /// 26 ORDER GRANTING DOUGLAS COUNTY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 7 1 2. Under Color of State Law 2 The second § 1983 prong is whether the unconstitutional conduct 3 was committed by a person acting under color of state law. There is 4 no dispute that the County, as a municipality, is a person under § 5 1983 and may be liable for a constitutional violation. 6 Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). 7 However, it is disputed whether the County “acted” under color of 8 state law. See Monell v. 9 A municipality cannot be liable based on respondeat superior; 10 instead to prove a municipality “acted” under color of state law, a 11 plaintiff must show that a “policy or custom” of the municipality 12 caused the injury. 13 “policy or custom”: 1) a “promulgated, adopted, or ratified” policy of 14 a municipality, Thompson v. City of L.A., 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th 15 Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds by Bull v. City & Cnty. of San 16 Francisco, 595 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010); 2) a permanent and well- 17 settled practice amounting to a municipal custom, City of St. Louis v. 18 Praprotnik, 19 municipal employees adequately, City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 20 U.S. 378, 388-91 (1989). 21 Mr. 22 Groseclose as to the proper handling of law-enforcement information. 23 24 485 U.S. Groseclose’s a. Id. at 689-91. 112, 127 There are three ways to show a (1988); or 3) a failure to train At issue here is whether the County ratified conduct or failed to train or supervise Mr. Ratification Ms. Corter claims the County is liable because it ratified Mr. 25 Groseclose’s conduct. If a final policymaker approves the decision of 26 a subordinate and its basis, then the municipality is liable because ORDER GRANTING DOUGLAS COUNTY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 8 1 it ratified the conduct. 2 policy must be an affirmative, conscious, or deliberate choice. 3 e.g., Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1535 (9th Cir. 1995) 4 (finding 5 concluding that alleged sexual harassment incidents did not occur); 6 Hammond v. Cnty. of Madera, 859 F.2d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding 7 ratification because county board accepted and approved illegal deeds 8 leading to deprivation of property rights), overruled on other grounds 9 by Wood v. Ostrander, 851 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir. 1988). ratification Prapotnik, 485 U.S. at 127. because police chief A municipal approved a See, report 10 Ms. Corter argues that the County’s minimal punishment of Mr. 11 Groseclose’s two prior violations and failure thus far to reprimand 12 him 13 information for personal gain evidences the County’s ratification of 14 his Spillman wrongdoing. 15 Groseclose 16 ratification by the County. 17 1342, 1348 (9th Cir. 1992) (“It does not alter our conclusion that 18 City Manager Gleason's inaction in Gillette's case does not amount to 19 “ratification” under . . . Praprotnik.”). 20 affirmative, conscious, or deliberate choice by the County to ratify 21 Mr. 22 Accordingly, the County’s motion is granted in this regard. 23 for improperly for his Groseclose’s b. accessing Spillman and using the obtained That the County has not yet disciplined Mr. improper improper Spillman access does not equate to See, e.g., Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d access of There is no evidence of an Spillman for personal gain. Failure to Train and Supervise 24 Ms. Corter claims the County is liable because it has a custom 25 or policy of failing to train and supervise its employees in regard to 26 proper access and use of investigative information. A municipality is ORDER GRANTING DOUGLAS COUNTY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 9 1 liable for its employee’s constitutional violations under the failure- 2 to-train-and-supervise theory of liability if: 1) “the county has 3 customs or policies that amount to deliberate indifference,” and 2) 4 “these customs or policies were the moving force behind the employee's 5 violation of constitutional rights.” 6 1178, 1186 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Gibson v. Cnty. of Washoe, 290 F.3d 7 1175, 1193-93 (9th Cir. 2002)). Long v. City of L.A., 442 F.3d 8 Ms. Corter argues a jury should assess whether Douglas County 9 was deliberately indifferent by inadequately training/supervising its 10 employees as to the use of confidential information. 11 inadequate 12 policymakers continue to adhere to a training/supervision program they 13 know 14 employees; 2) there is a pattern of tortious conduct by employees; or 15 3) 16 failure to give employees “tools to handle recurring situations.” 17 Long, 442 F.3d at 1186. 18 a or training should know constitutional The Court amounts has to deliberate failed violation recognizes is that to indifference prevent highly A municipality’s tortious predictable whether a local when: conduct based on government 1) by the has 19 “displayed a policy of deliberate indifference to the constitutional 20 rights of its citizens is generally a jury question.” 21 F.3d at 1194-95 (citing Oviatt By and Through Waugh v. Pearce, 954 22 F.2d 1470, 1478 (9th Cir. 1992)). 23 evidence 24 determines it must grant the County summary judgment. 25 26 The in the evidence light most However, after considering the favorable establishes that Gibson, 290 to Mr. Ms. Corter, Groseclose the violated Court the County’s policies regarding the proper disclosure of investigative ORDER GRANTING DOUGLAS COUNTY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 10 1 information on two prior occasions. 2 that 3 Accordingly, there is no evidence to establish a triable issue of fact 4 as 5 disclosure training/supervision program that it knew or should have 6 known failed to prevent tortious disclosures by its employees. 7 undisputed that the County had policies regarding the proper access to 8 and disclosure of investigative information, and that Mr. Groseclose 9 received these policies when he was employed and reminded of such other to County whether the employees County have continued However, there is no evidence committed to adhere similar to an violations. information- It is 10 after his two previous improper disclosures. 11 and disciplined Mr. Groseclose for his two prior improper disclosures. 12 For his first improper disclosure of information, the County provided 13 Mr. Groseclose with counseling; for his second improper disclosure of 14 information, the County placed a written reprimand in his file. 15 both occasions, Mr. Groseclose was reminded of the particular County 16 policy that he violated. 17 involved 18 information, the circumstances of each were different from each other, 19 as well as different from his improper access to and disclosure of 20 information pertaining to Ms. Corter’s incident report. 21 took appropriate graduated steps to address Mr. Groseclose’s improper 22 disclosures: 23 Groseclose and do not extend to other County employees. 24 of Mr. Groseclose’s improper Spillman access and then subsequent use 25 of that information in the guardianship procedure, Mr. Groseclose’s 26 conduct Mr. was The County investigated On Although each of these two prior incidents Groseclose improperly disclosing investigative The County disclosures that, under this record, are isolated to Mr. not indicative of a At the time deliberately-indifferent ORDER GRANTING DOUGLAS COUNTY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 11 1 training/supervision program by the County, but rather “rogue conduct” 2 by 3 training/supervision program that the County knew failed to prevent 4 tortious conduct by its employees, or of a pattern of tortious conduct 5 by untrained County employees. 6 with 7 information. 8 predictable by the County. a County the detective. tools Mr. Because 9 to the There properly is evidence of adherence to a The County provided Mr. Groseclose access Groseclose’s Court no finds and instant Ms. disseminate conduct Corter investigative was presented not highly insufficient 10 evidence to support a triable issue of fact as to whether the County 11 failed to properly train or supervise Mr. Groseclose, the Court need 12 not address whether its training policy was the moving force that 13 caused 14 County’s favor. 15 D. Ms. Corter’s injury. Summary judgment granted in Douglas Conclusion 16 For the above-given reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 17 1. is GRANTED. 18 19 20 21 22 23 Douglas County’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 17, 2. Judgment is to be entered in Douglas County’s favor with prejudice. IT IS SO ORDERED. The Clerk’s Office is directed to enter this Order and provide copies to all counsel. DATED this 20th day of September 2013. 24 25 s/ Edward F. Shea EDWARD F. SHEA Senior United States District Judge 26 Q:\EFS\Civil\2012\0173.douglas.msj.docx ORDER GRANTING DOUGLAS COUNTY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 12
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