Sanchez et al v. Grandview School District No 200, No. 2:2010cv03118 - Document 103 (E.D. Wash. 2013)
Court Description: ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT granting 97 Motion for Summary Judgment Signed by Senior Judge Edward F. Shea. (VR, Courtroom Deputy)
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Sanchez et al v. Grandview School District No 200 Doc. 103 1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 5 6 No. JOSE GARCIA, an incapacitated person, CV-10-3118-EFS 7 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT Plaintiff, 8 v. 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 GRANDVIEW SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 200, and their Board of Trustees; Russell K. (“Kevin”) Chase, individually and as a School District employee; John W. Mathis, individually and as a School District employee; Rick Ramos, individually and as a School District employee; Barbara Merz, individually and as a School District employee; Thora Michels, individually and as a School District employee; Irma GonzalezRamos, individually and as a School District employee; Diann Zavala, individually and as a School District employee, 18 Defendants. 19 I. 20 INTRODUCTION 21 This 22 Administrative 23 District (District) denied Plaintiff Jose Garcia a free appropriate 24 public education (FAPE) and denied Ms. Maria Sanchez, Plaintiff’s 25 mother, access to Mr. Garcia’s Individualized Education Plan (IEP) 26 meetings. suit arises Law Judge from an (ALJ) October finding 13, that 2010 the Order Grandview by the School ORDER - 1 Dockets.Justia.com 1 Plaintiff’s original Complaint asserts only two claims for 2 relief: one claim under the Individuals with Disabilities Education 3 Act (IDEA), and one claim under Article IX § 1 of the Washington 4 Constitution. 5 and asserts the following eleven claims: discrimination under the 6 Americans 7 under the ADA; discrimination under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation 8 Act; a § 1983 claim for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment right to 9 equal protection; claims under Article I § 12 and Article IX § 1 of 10 the Washington Constitution; a state law negligence claim; a § 1983 11 claim for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment rights to procedural 12 and substantive due process; a claim under Title VI of the Civil 13 Rights Act of 1964; a discrimination claim under the Washington Law 14 Against Discrimination (WLAD); and a state law claim for negligent 15 hiring, training, and supervision. 16 Plaintiff’s amended complaint abandons the IDEA claim with Disabilities Act (ADA); disability-based harassment See ECF No. 76. This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for 17 Partial Summary Judgment, ECF No. 97. 18 judgment 19 Decision and the August 30, 2013 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 20 Law and Order entered in Grandview School District No. 200 v. Maria 21 Sanchez and Jose Garcia, No. 11-2-00084-1, Yakima County Superior 22 Court, 23 asserting it provided Mr. Garcia with a FAPE under the IDEA. giving arguing preclusive the effect District to should Plaintiff seeks partial summary the be May 24, 2013 collaterally Memorandum estopped from 24 For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that no genuine 25 issues of material fact preclude partial summary judgment and for the 26 following reasons grants Plaintiff’s motion. ORDER - 2 II. 1 BACKGROUND1 2 On January 15, 2010, Ms. Sanchez filed a Due Process Hearing 3 Request with the Office of Superintendent of Public Instruction (OSPI) 4 on behalf of her son, Mr. Garcia. 5 Office of Administrative Hearings for assignment to an ALJ. 6 11, 2010, the ALJ found that Ms. Sanchez was not bound by the two-year 7 statute of limitations set forth in the IDEA because the District 8 withheld information required to be provided under the IDEA. 9 the summer of 2010, the ALJ heard an additional sixteen days The Complaint was forwarded to the On June During of 10 testimony and admitted several hundred pages of documents. The ALJ 11 issued a decision setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions 12 of law, on October 13, 2010, finding the District failed to provide 13 Mr. Garcia a FAPE in accordance with the IDEA and State law. 14 remedy for these violations, the ALJ ordered Ms. Sanchez to choose the 15 services of either Dr. Marlowe or Ms. White to evaluate Mr. Garcia; 16 Ms. Sanchez would be reimbursed for the costs. 17 ordered to contract with Dr. Marlowe and Ms. White to "design and 18 implement" an appropriate program for Mr. Garcia within sixty days of 19 the ALJ’s October 13, 2010 Order, with the District bearing all costs 20 associated with that plan. As a The District was also 21 22 23 24 1 In ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the Court has considered the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom as contained in the submitted affidavits, declarations, and exhibits, in the light most 25 favorable to the party opposing the motion – here, the Defendant. 26 Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 1999). ORDER - 3 See 1 After the sixty days passed on December 13, 2010, Plaintiffs 2 filed their Complaint before this Court for declaratory judgment, 3 injunctive relief, and damages on December 16, 2010, alleging that the 4 District failed to develop and implement an appropriate educational 5 program 6 Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 1210 et 7 seq., 8 Administrative Order. as and required sought by the immediate IDEA, 20 U.S.C. enforcement of § 1401 the et October seq., 13, the 2010 9 On January 11, 2011, the District filed a petition with the 10 Superior Court of Yakima County requesting judicial review of the 11 ALJ’s 12 asserted that the ALJ erred in three ways: 1) in applying an exception 13 to the 2-year statute of limitations, 2) in determining that it failed 14 to provide a FAPE under 20 U.S.C. § 1400 and the IDEA, and 3) in 15 granting 16 education. The Yakima County Superior Court, after considering the 17 7,000 administrative 18 during which the court allowed both parties to submit the testimony of 19 additional witnesses including the testimony of Dr. Carl Field and 20 Deborah Hill, Ph.D., issued a Memorandum Decision on May 24, 2013, and 21 a Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order on August 30, 22 2013. 23 applied an exception to the two-year statute of limitations and that 24 the District failed to provide a FAPE under 20 U.S.C. § 1400 and the 25 IDEA. October the page 13, 2010 remedy decision. of a In 6-year record the private and petition placement holding a the District compensatory three-day hearing The Yakima County Superior Court found that the ALJ correctly The court further found that the ALJ’s six-year award was 26 ORDER - 4 1 punitive and went beyond the IDEA-authorized remedy and reduced the 2 private placement compensatory education to four years. III. DISCUSSION 3 4 A. Legal Standards 5 Summary judgment is appropriate if the “pleadings, the discovery 6 and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there 7 is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 8 is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 9 Once a party has moved for summary judgment, the opposing party must 10 point to specific facts establishing that there is a genuine issue for 11 trial. 12 nonmoving party fails to make such a showing for any of the elements 13 essential to its case for which it bears the burden of proof, the 14 trial court should grant the summary judgment motion. 15 “When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its 16 opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical 17 doubt as to the material facts. 18 forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 19 trial.’” 20 574, 586-87 (1986) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis in original). 21 When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court does 22 not weigh the evidence or assess credibility; instead, “the evidence 23 of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences 24 are to be drawn in his favor.” 25 U.S.242, 255 (1986). 26 // Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). ORDER - 5 If the Id. at 322. . . . [T]he nonmoving party must come Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 1 B. Analysis Plaintiff 2 seeks estoppel. partial summary Plaintiff asserts judgment that on the the issue decision of of 3 collateral the 4 Yakima County Superior Court should be given preclusive effect under 5 the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 6 that the Superior Court’s finding that the District failed to provide 7 a FAPE under the IDEA should preclude the District from asserting 8 before this Court that it provided Mr. Garcia with a FAPE under the 9 IDEA. Specifically, Plaintiff argues 10 A federal court considering whether to apply issue preclusion 11 based on a prior state court judgment must look to state preclusion 12 law. 13 See also W. Coast Theater Corp. v. City of Portland, 897 F.2d 1519, 14 1525 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[A] federal court must give to a state court 15 judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment 16 under the law of the state in which the judgment was rendered.”) 17 Accordingly, the Court looks to Washington’s law of issue preclusion. 18 19 20 21 22 23 McInnes v. California, 943 F.2d 1088, 1092-93 (9th Cir. 1991). Under Washington law, issue preclusion or collateral estoppel requires the party seeking preclusion to establish that: (1) the issue decided in the earlier proceeding was identical to the issue presented in the later proceeding, (2) the earlier proceeding ended in a judgment on the merits, (3) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to, or in privity with a party to, the earlier proceeding, and (4) application of collateral estoppel does not work an injustice on the party against whom it is applied. 24 Christensen v. Grant Cnty. Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 152 Wn.2d 299, 307 25 (2004). 26 ORDER - 6 Collateral estoppel may be applied to preclude only issues 1 that were litigated and finally determined in the earlier proceeding, 2 and the party against whom it is asserted must have had a full and 3 fair opportunity to litigate the issue. Id. at 306. 4 First, Defendant asserts the issues before this Court (ADA and 5 negligence claims) are different than the IDEA claim presented to the 6 Superior Court, including different standards of proof. 7 the extent that Mr. Garcia brings before this Court on partial summary 8 judgment the sole issue of “estopping the District from asserting or 9 claiming in this case that it provide Jose Garcia with a FAPE under 10 the IDEA,” ECF No. 101 at 5, the identical issue of providing a FAPE 11 was presented and decided in the earlier proceeding. 12 at 1. 13 ADA or negligence issues, but those are not the issues for which 14 Plaintiff seeks collateral estoppel. 15 which 16 presented 17 provided Mr. Garcia with a FAPE under the IDEA. See ECF No. 97-3 Defendants are correct that the Superior Court did not address collateral with Second, 18 However, to as District estoppel the is has is identical clear denied Accordingly, as to the issue for sought issue, from the the the to earlier wit: Superior Student a proceeding whether the Court’s finding free was District appropriate that 19 “[t]he public 20 education,” ECF No. 97-4 at 37, the earlier proceeding reached the 21 merits of the IDEA claim. 22 As to the third requirement, there is no dispute that Plaintiff 23 seeks collateral estoppel against the same party, the District, that 24 the Superior Court ruled against in the earlier proceeding. 25 // 26 / ORDER - 7 Finally, as to injustice, the Court finds the District had a 1 2 full and fair hearing before both the ALJ and the Superior Court. 3 ALJ conducted an extensive sixteen-day hearing and received thousands 4 of pages of documents. 5 before the Superior Court, including the presentation of additional 6 evidence, including the expert testimony of Dr. Carl Field and Deborah 7 Hill, Ph.D. 8 issue of providing a FAPE under the IDEA, so no injustice will occur 9 if the District is prevented from again litigating the issue before 10 The The District then received a three-day hearing Thus, the District received two separate hearings on the this Court. Accordingly, 11 the Court finds Plaintiff has sufficiently 12 established that under Washington law, collateral estoppel applies to 13 the issue of whether the District provided Mr. Garcia with a FAPE 14 under the IDEA. 15 /// 16 /// 17 /// 18 /// 19 /// 20 /// 21 /// 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 // 26 / ORDER - 8 IV. 1 CONCLUSION 2 The issue of whether the District provided a FAPE under the IDEA 3 was fully litigated before the Yakima County Superior Court, and the 4 Superior Court’s finding that the District failed to provide a FAPE 5 under 6 Accordingly, 7 collateral estoppel from asserting before this Court that the District 8 provided a FAPE to Mr. Garcia under the IDEA. 9 10 11 12 13 the IDEA the Accordingly, would be District IT IS recognized is HEREBY by other precluded ORDERED: Washington under the Plaintiff’s courts. doctrine Motion of for Partial Summary Judgment, ECF No. 97, is GRANTED. IT IS SO ORDERED. The Clerk’s Office is directed to enter this Order and provide copies to all counsel. DATED this 3rd day of December 2013. 14 s/ Edward F. Shea EDWARD F. SHEA Senior United States District Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 Q:\EFS\Civil\2010\3118.partial-msj.lc2.docx ORDER - 9
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