Khoraki v. Longoria, et al, No. 3:2022cv00070 - Document 52 (E.D. Va. 2022)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by District Judge Robert E. Payne on 5/12/2022. (jpow, )
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Khoraki v. Longoria, et al Doc. 52 Case 3:22-cv-00070-REP Document 52 Filed 05/13/22 Page 1 of 16 PageID# 415 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Richmond Division JAD KHORAKI, Plaintiff, V. Civil Action No. 3:22cv70 DERRICK LONGORIA, et al., Defendants. MEMORANDUM OPINION This matter is before the WALLACE'S MOTION TO DISMISS Court (EOF No. on DEFENDANT 33) and the DISMISS (EOF No. 35) filed by Josephine Wallace. to dismiss are addressed to COUNT II of See Am. Compl. at 11-12 {EOF No. 29). the AMENDED contends (a Emotional Distress II claim ("IIED")) for is Virginia law governing IIED claims. No. 35), barred by Wallace the seeks statute dismissal, of TO COMPLAINT. In one motion {EOF No. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). COUNT MOTION Both motions 33), Wallace relies on that JOSEPHINE Intentional defectively Therein she Infliction pleaded of under In the other motion (EOF asserting limitations. that For COUNT reasons II is neither explained nor readily apparent, this motion (EOF No. 35) relies on Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b). This rather strange procedural anomaly will be addressed later. Dockets.Justia.com Case 3:22-cv-00070-REP Document 52 Filed 05/13/22 Page 2 of 16 PageID# 416 Having considered the AMENDED COMPLAINT (EOF No. 29), the motions, MOTIONS and TO the supporting DISMISS {EOF and Nos. opposing 33, 35) will briefs, be Wallace's denied for the arrest and reasons set forth below. BACKGROUND The matter criminal arises prosecution physician, by from of Defendants an Dr. alleged Jad Derrick unlawful Khoraki, Longoria, a a 30-year-old police officer employed by the City of Richmond Police Department, and Jaime Blackmon, Richmond. a Deputy Am. Commonwealth's Compl. SISI 6, 7 Attorney (ECF No. for the 29). City Khoraki of was arrested on January 26, 2020 and February 6, 2020 for charges based on allegedly false reports made by Wallace. I. Factual Background The Amended Complaint dating application brief relationship December 2019. ("app"), recites Khoraki beginning Id. SI 12. that, in and March after meeting on a Wallace engaged in a 2019 and ending Shortly thereafter, Wallace made a series of reports to the Richmond Police Department, alleging various instances of stalking and assault by Khoraki. On January 21, 2020, Wallace told Longoria that she assaulted by Khoraki on January 20, 2020. 42-1). in Id. SI 13. had been See Ex. 1 (ECF No. Then, Wallace informed Longoria that Khoraki had stalked her between January 23 and 25, 2020. Based solely on Wallace's Case 3:22-cv-00070-REP Document 52 Filed 05/13/22 Page 3 of 16 PageID# 417 statements, arrest warrants were issued Khoraki was arrested on January 26, 2020. 29-1). by a magistrate. See Ex. A (ECF No. Khoraki was released on bond following the January 26th arrest. Thereafter, on January 29, 2020, Wallace met with Longoria claiming additional, more serious allegations. Wallace accused threatening of assaulting, strangling, her with a firearm on September 15, 2019.^ Relying solely on Longoria Khoraki In particular, Wallace's allegations, on obtained warrants. Wallace and Id. January 31, 2020, also petitioned the Richmond General District Court for a protective order against Khoraki. Am. Compl. SI 21 (ECF No. 29). Based on these new allegations, Khoraki was arrested again on February 6, 2020 and held without bond in the Richmond City Justice Center. Thereafter, Khoraki's counsel learned from Chesterfield County Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney Erin Barr and Chesterfield Police Detective Christopher King that Wallace had a history of making false allegations against men, including accusations against another man resulting in a false rape charge 1 It is alleged that she mentioned another stalking claim. See Ex. B (ECF No. 29-2); Am. Compl. 17, 19 (ECF No. 29); Ex. E (ECF No. 32-5). However, stalking is not apparent in the reporting REPORT. officer's narrative in See Ex. B (ECF No. 32-5). the INCIDENT/INVESTIGATION Case 3:22-cv-00070-REP Document 52 Filed 05/13/22 Page 4 of 16 PageID# 418 that was dismissed and expunged. 12, 2020, Khoraki's defense Id. 28, 29.2 counsel advised on February Blackmon and Longoria of Wallace's history of making false reports against men whom she evidence had met on a dating app. that fictitious. the current Counsel also offered allegations against Khoraki were Khoraki's counsel also provided contact information for Barr and King so that Blackmon and Longoria could confirm what counsel had been told. On by King February 13, 2020, Khoraki's counsel provided a report that allegations Notably, See Ex. D (EOF No. 29-4). detailed dating back King's report Wallace's to history 2018. Ex. E of making (EOF No. false 29-5). highlighted that Wallace previously had made identical allegations against a man she met on a dating app who assaulted her, threatened her.^ those stalked her, held a gun to her Am. Compl. fSI 30, 31 (EOF No. 29). allegations closely tracked what Wallace had head, and Of course, said about Khoraki. On February 14, 2020, Khoraki's counsel presented report about Wallace at the bond appeal hearing. Id. SI 33. some Blackmon point before that hearing, Longoria and the At both 2 In general, Wallace states that she lacks sufficient information to admit or deny any of these allegations. ANSWER SISI 28, 29 {EOF No. 22). However, Wallace denies that she made any fabricated reports related to Khoraki. See id. SI 2. 3 The report also indicated that Chesterfield Detectives had proof that Wallace had inflicted visible injury upon herself. Case 3:22-cv-00070-REP Document 52 Filed 05/13/22 Page 5 of 16 PageID# 419 reviewed the Chesterfield report containing the previous false allegations made by Wallace. Longoria agreed that the charges against Khoraki should be ^^nolle pros" and that he should be released. See Ex. G {EOF No. 32-7). Remarkably, Blackmon opposed bond because the ^^allegations [were] very violent" even though she was familiar with King's report. No. 29-3). Ex. C at 11 {EOF After the bond appeal hearing, Khoraki was granted a $10,000 secured bond and ordered to be released on an electronic monitor. Am. Compl. 1 22 {EOF No. 29). On February 27, 2020, the court dismissed by nolle prosequi the charges against Khoraki. Id. SI 36. The remaining charges and the preliminary protective order were dismissed on March 10, 2020. SI 37. In this action, Khoraki seeks damages for the injuries that he incurred as a result of the alleged malicious prosecution by Longoria, Blackmon, and Wallace as well as for the IIED caused by Wallace. Id. accusations, caus[ed] life," 39. arrest, irreparable id. contacted SI SI 38; and harm he was Khoraki claims incarceration to his when him at a the traumatized personal humiliated his employer, arrested that: and "false [him], professional "police officers friend's residence, and charged him with serious violent felonies" id.; his employer and colleagues have treated him differently since his arrest, id.; he "suffered extreme emotional distress during his wrongful Case 3:22-cv-00070-REP Document 52 Filed 05/13/22 Page 6 of 16 PageID# 420 arrest and incarceration" and ''incurred legal fees and professional and personal damage to his reputation," id.; and "requires therapy and suffers extreme stress and fear." from nightmares, flashbacks, Id. The Amended Complaint asserts the following claims: COUNT I (against Longoria and Blackmon) Malicious Prosecution by way of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; COUNT II (against Wallace), a State Law Claim for IIED; and COUNT III (against Longoria, Blackmon, Wallace), a State Law Claim for Malicious Prosecution. seeks $5,000,000.00 punitive damages compensatory from Longoria damages, and and Khoraki $1,000,000.00 Blackmon as well in as $3,000,000.00 from Wallace. II. Procedural History Khoraki 2022. filed the COMPLAINT Compl. (ECF No. 1). in this case on February 2, On March 8, 2022, Khoraki filed the AMENDED COMPLAINT (ECF No. 29), which is the operative document as to which Wallace's motions seek dismissal. As explained at the outset, Wallace filed two motions seeking dismissal of COUNT II. One motion (ECF No. 33) relied on Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) asserting 4 On that March COUNT 22, II 2022, was defectively Wallace filed pleaded. two MOTIONS The TO other DISMISS (ECF Nos. 33, 35) and accompanying memoranda (ECF Nos. 34, 36), which are the subject of this opinion. Khoraki responded on April 5, 2022. See PI.'s Resp. to Def. Mot. Dismiss (ECF No. 48); Mem. Supp. Pi.'s Resp. Def. Wallace's Mot. Dismiss (ECF No. 49). Wallace did not reply. Case 3:22-cv-00070-REP Document 52 Filed 05/13/22 Page 7 of 16 PageID# 421 motion (ECF No. 35) cites Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b), which simply provides that motions are allowed in pleadings. that motion relies on the statute of Stranger still, limitations which is an affirmative defense that Wallace did not plead. Ordinarily, the defense of the statute of limitations cannot be presented in a motion seeking dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).5 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1) (''In responding to a pleading, a party must affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense, including . . . statute of limitations"). However, where the bar of the statute of limitations is apparent on the face of the complaint, the bar may be presented in motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See Dean v. a Pilgrim^ s Pride Corp., 395 F.3d 471, 474 (4th Cir. 2005) ("The raising of the statute of limitations as a bar to plaintiffs' cause of action constitutes an affirmative defense and may be raised by motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), if the time bar is apparent on the face of the complaint."). Wallace's brief in support of her MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF No. 35) seems to take that course. See Def. Wallace's Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss (ECF No. 36). Therefore, both motions Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). ^ are appropriately analyzed under To that task, we now turn. It is most often presented in a motion for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Case 3:22-cv-00070-REP Document 52 Filed 05/13/22 Page 8 of 16 PageID# 422 DISCUSSION I. Standard of Review Governing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6): Failure to State a Claim A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) "tests the sufficiency of a complaint." F.3d 107, 116 (4th Cir. 2013). the factual allegations set Columbia v. Haley^ 738 To survive a motion to dismiss, forth in the complaint must be sufficient "^to raise a right to relief above the speculative level' and face.'" 555 ^state a claim to relief that is plausible on its Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, (2007)). "A claim is ^plausible on its face,' if a plaintiff can demonstrate more than ^a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.'" of Rockville, Ashcroft V. 891 Iqbal, F.3d 556 141, U.S. Rockville Cars, LLC v. City 145 662, (4th 678 Cir. (2009)). 2018) (quoting Nevertheless, "[a] complaint should not be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) . . . unless it appears to a certainty that the nonmoving party cannot prove any set of facts in support of its claim that would entitle it to relief." Chapman v. Clarendon Nat'l Ins. Co., 299 F. Supp. 2d 559, 562 (E.D. Va. 2004). When considering a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a court "must accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Rockville Cars, 891 F.3d at 145. Case 3:22-cv-00070-REP Document 52 Filed 05/13/22 Page 9 of 16 PageID# 423 However, courts need not "accept as couched as a factual allegation." true a legal conclusion SD3, LLC v. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc., 801 F.3d 412, 422 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Anand v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 754 F.3d 195, 198 (4th Cir. 2014)). And, "[t]hreadbare action, supported suffice." recitals by of mere the elements conclusory of a cause of do not statements, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Although allegations instrument a court's in is incorporated the is complaint, attached by review as reference, generally where an exhibit the a copy to of the instrument complaint and a court may consider it. limited is to a written complaint part the of or the Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 166 (4th Cir. 2016); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) reference ("A statement in elsewhere pleading or motion. exhibit to a in the a pleading may be same pleading or in adopted any by other A copy of a written instrument that is an pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes."). A. Inbexi'tional Standing Wallace contends Infliction that state a claim for TIED. of Khoraki Emotional has Distress: failed to Legal adequately The elements of IIED in Virginia are: "[1] the wrongdoer's conduct is intentional or reckless; [2] the conduct is outrageous and intolerable; [3] the alleged wrongful Case 3:22-cv-00070-REP Document 52 Filed 05/13/22 Page 10 of 16 PageID# 424 conduct and emotional distress are causally connected; and, [4] the distress is severe." 570 (E.D. Perk v. Worden, 475 F. Supp. 2d 565, Va. 2007) (quoting (1991)) (internal original); see also Russo v. quotations Womack v. White, 241 omitted) Eldridge, Va. 23, 26 (modifications 215 Va. 338 in (1974). Wallace's brief does not indicate which element(s) of the claim that she thinks to be inadequate. Instead, the brief rather pithily posits that Khoraki "has failed to allege any facts that his emotional distress was so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it" and that he has failed to plead with "specificity". Def.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss Failure State Claim 2 (EOF No. 34). Khoraki has alleged all of these elements in his Amended Complaint. It is true, as Wallace argues, that "IIED claims are disfavored in Virginia," but the Amended Complaint sufficient factual allegations to support COUNT II. pleads Marcantonio V. Dudzinski, 155 F. Supp. 3d 619, 632 (W.D. Va. 2015). First, Khoraki specifically pleads that "Ms. Wallace, with the specific purpose of inflicting emotional distress upon Dr. Khoraki, fabricated detention, and false allegations prosecution." Am. to Compl. cause ^ 61 his (ECF arrest, No. 29). These allegations resulted in his first arrest on January 26, 2020 and serious again claims on February against 6, 2020, after Khoraki after he 10 had Wallace been made more released on Case 3:22-cv-00070-REP Document 52 Filed 05/13/22 Page 11 of 16 PageID# 425 bond. Khoraki also pleads that he was humiliated as a result of these arrests and that Wallace ^'knew, or should have known, that the false accusations would likely result in harm plaintiff . . . include[ing] emotional distress." to the Id. SIH 62, 63. Second, Khoraki pleads that ''Ms. Wallace's conduct was so outrageous accepted of "tortious or conduct insufficient." been intolerable standards Virginia, malice and found character, only and that decency or and criminal worthy it of offended morality." intent is punitive the Id. so the extreme conduct in has degree, damages been as ^ 64. insufficient, Perk, 475 F. Supp. 2d at 570. where generally and likewise "Liability has so to is In outrageous go beyond in all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable Restatement (Second) in of a civilized Torts § 46 community." cmt. d Id. (1965)) (quoting (internal quotations omitted). In the present case, Wallace filed allegedly false reports accusing Khoraki of domestic abuse. Filing false police reports has been deemed outrageous and intolerable under Virginia law; in fact, Virginia has criminalized the conduct: 11 Case 3:22-cv-00070-REP Document 52 Filed 05/13/22 Page 12 of 16 PageID# 426 It shall be unlawful for any person (i) to knowingly give a false report as to the commission of any crime to any lawenforcement official with intent to mislead; (ii) to mislead knowingly, a with the law-enforcement intent agency, to cause another to give a false report to any lawenforcement official by publicly simulating a violation of Chapter 4 (§ 18.2-30 ^ seq.) or Chapter 5 {§ 18.2-77 et seq.); or (iii) without just cause and with intent to interfere with the operations of any lawenforcement official, to call or summon any law-enforcement official by telephone or other means, including engagement or activation of an automatic emergency alarm. Va. Code § 18.2-461. What had made another is more, the Amended Complaint alleges substantially similar, man. Also, it is and alleged making baseless allegations. baseless, that she that Wallace charges against has a history of Therefore, Wallace's conduct falls evenly within Virginia's definition of outrageous conduct. Third, Khoraki has pled that the alleged extreme emotional distress inflicted upon directly connected to him her by false Wallace is both allegations. causally Khoraki and states that Wallace's false allegations first led to humiliation upon his initial arrest, which grew into severe distress when he was Khoraki was arrested a second time and detained for eleven days in jail. Traumatic Khoraki continues to seek therapy Stress Disorder experienced he has wrongfully accused, arrested, and imprisoned. 12 due to the from Post being Khoraki further Case 3:22-cv-00070-REP Document 52 Filed 05/13/22 Page 13 of 16 PageID# 427 avers that the allegations and arrests have ''impacted his work and his interpersonal relationships." Def. Wallace's Mot. Dismiss 6 (ECF Mem. Supp. PI.'s Resp. No. 49). Specifically, Khoraki pleads that: The false accusations, incarceration arrest, traumatized Dr. and Khoraki, causing irreparable harm to his personal and professional life. Dr. Khoraki suffered humiliation when police officers contacted his employer, arrested him at a friend's residence, and charged him with serious violent felonies. Since his arrest. Dr. Khoraki has been treated differently by his employer suffered and extreme colleagues. Dr. emotional distress Khoraki during his wrongful arrest and incarceration. He incurred legal fees and professional and personal damage to his reputation. To date, he requires therapy and suffers from nightmares, flashbacks, extreme stress and fear. Am. Compl. SI 38 (ECF No. 29). Causation is quite clearly and sufficiently alleged. Fourth, Khoraki specifically alleges that he "did in fact suffer severe malicious, and emotional distress" due vindicative conduct", to Khoraki repairing pleads that of he personal "requires "false, which led to his arrest, deprivation of freedom, and prosecution and therapy and Wallace's now, his ongoing relationships. therapy and nightmares, flashbacks, extreme stress and fear." Id. SI suffers 65. from Id. SI 38. Beyond serious question, COUNT II satisfies the threshold for pleading a legally sufficient claim of IIED in Virginia. 13 Case 3:22-cv-00070-REP Document 52 Filed 05/13/22 Page 14 of 16 PageID# 428 Moreover, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that in federal court, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, plaintiffs need not plead emotional distress particularity required in Virginia courts. Times Co., fairly 416 simple sufficient court). to F.3d 320, allegations state a 337 (4th of severe claim for Cir. with the Hatfill v. New York 2005) (holding that emotional distress were IIED in a federal district Therefore, Khoraki has adequately stated a claim for IIED in COUNT II, and Wallace's MOTION TO DISMISS (EOF No. 33) COUNT II will be denied. B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: The Statute of Limitations In the MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF No. 35), Wallace moves to dismiss COUNT II as barred by the statute of limitations under Va. Code § 8.01-248. As explained above, dismissal for that reason is conceptually possible under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) if the bar appears on the face of the Amended Complaint, and, albeit inartfully stated, that is what Wallace seems to be doing in the brief in support of the MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF No. 35). See Def. Wallace's Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss (ECF No. 36). As a common law tort, IIED does not have a designated cause of action timeframe assigned to it, but rather is limited by the general statute without a of limitations defined limitation applicable to timeframe. 14 See personal actions Cobbs v. First Case 3:22-cv-00070-REP Document 52 Filed 05/13/22 Page 15 of 16 PageID# 429 Transit Comp., No. 6:16-cv-15, 2016 WL 7336562, at *8 (W.D. Va. Dec. 16, 2016). Virginia law states: Every personal action accruing on or after July 1, 1995, for which no limitation otherwise prescribed, shall be brought within two years after the right to bring such action has accrued. Va. Code § 8.01-248 (emphasis added). Wallace Khoraki's TIED claim is time-barred she the criminal accusations against made 2020,^ and Khoraki filed his argues under this statute complaint on him on that because January 31, February 2, 2020. Def. Wallace's Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 2 (EOF No. 36). It is true that Khoraki filed the Complaint on February 2, 2022, which means that the statute of limitations bars his claim for IIED unless it accrued on or after February 2, 2020. The latest date the cause of action could have accrued was March 10, 2020, once Khoraki was released from all claims stemming from Wallace's allegations. As Khoraki notes in his response brief, under Virginia law, his IIED cause of action was suspended until then. Specifically, Section 8.01-229(K) of the Virginia Code recites, in relevant part: 6 Note, the INCIDENT/INTAKE FORMS indicate that Wallace technically made the allegations on January 29, 2020. See Ex. E (ECF No. 32-5). The arrest warrant was not issued until January 31, 2022. See Ex. B (ECF No. 39-2). 15 Case 3:22-cv-00070-REP Document 52 Filed 05/13/22 Page 16 of 16 PageID# 430 In any personal action for damages, if criminal prosecution arising out of the same facts is commenced, the time such prosecution is pending shall not be computed as part of the period within which such a civil action may be brought. For purposes of this subsection, the time during which a prosecution from the is pending date of shall issuance be calculated of a warrant, summons, or capias, the return of filing of an indictment or information . . . until the date of the final judgment . . . [or] the date of final disposition. Thereafter, the civil action may be brought within the remaining period of the statute or within one year, whichever is longer. Va. Code § 8.01-229(K) (emphasis added). Consequently, Khoraki's claims were tolled beginning on January 25, 2020, when the first set of accusations was promulgated resulting in his criminal prosecution, and continued to be tolled until the charges were dismissed via nolle prosequi on March 10, 2020. Thus, Wallace's MOTION TO DISMISS (EOF No. 35) must be dismissed as Khoraki is well within the filing timeframe established by Virginia law for IIED claims. CONCLUSION For the reasons cited above, Khoraki has adequately pled a claim for IIED and that claim has been statute of limitations under Virginia Law. brought within the Thus, the MOTIONS TO DISMISS (EOF Nos. 33 and 35) will be DENIED. It is so ORDERED. /s/ &u Robert E. Payne Richmond, Virginia Date: May I ' Senior United States District Judge 2022 16
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