Lacour v. Harris County et al, No. 4:2023cv04280 - Document 8 (S.D. Tex. 2024)

Court Description: MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER - Based on the foregoing, the court ORDERS as follows: 1. The Prisoner's 1 Civil Rights Complaint filed by Lorenzo Lacour under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is DISMISSED with prejudice. 2. The dismissal will count as a "strike" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). ** Email sent to Manager of Three Strikes List. (Signed by Judge Sim Lake) Parties notified.(SheilaRAnderson, 4)

Download PDF
Lacour v. Harris County et al Doc. 8 United States District Court Southern District of Texas ENTERED IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION LORENZO LACOUR, SPN #02212521, Plaintiff, v. HARRIS COUNTY, et al., Defendants. § § § § § § § § § § March 07, 2024 Nathan Ochsner, Clerk CIVIL ACTION NO. H-23-4280 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER The plaintiff, Lorenzo Lacour (SPN #02212521), has filed a Prisoner's Civil Rights Complaint ("Complaint")(Docket Entry No. 1), under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 concerning an incident that occurred while he was confined in the Harris County Jail. Because Lacour is a prisoner who proceeds in forma pauperis, the court is required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (the "PLRA") to scrutinize the Complaint and dismiss the case if it determines that the action "(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). After considering all of the pleadings, the court concludes that this case must be dismissed for the reasons explained below. Dockets.Justia.com I. While in custody at Background Harris County Jail, Lacour filed this action against Harris County, Detention Officer C. Chukwu, and fellow inmate Reid Nathan Billingsley (SPN #027 94995) . 1 Lacour claims that Billingsley and several other inmates attacked him on September 11, 2023. 2 It appears that the altercation occurred on the second floor of the Jail in the "MHMR[] unit," where Officer Chukwu was assigned. 3 Lacour claims that Officer Chukwu was sleeping in the "PCC Office" when Lacour was assaulted, which resulted in bodily harm. 4 Lacour accuses be reprimanded. 5 Chukwu of negl and asks that he Lacour asks that all of his assailants be held accountable for attacking him. 6 Lacour also seeks punitive damages from Harris County for Officer Chukwu' s negligent failure to protect him from harm. 7 II. Standard of Review Federal courts are required by the PLRA to screen prisoner 1 2 Complaint, Docket Entry No. 1, p. 3. at 4. at 3. at 4. 5 -2- complaints to identify cognizable claims or dismiss the action if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 1584, See Crawford-El v. Britton, 118 S. Ct. 1596 (1998) (summarizing provisions found in the PLRA, including the requirement that district courts screen prisoners' complaints and summarily dismiss frivolous, malicious, or meritless actions); also Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 1761-62 (2015) (discussing the screening provision found in the federal forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e}(2), and reforms enacted by the PLRA that were "'designed to filter out the bad [filed by prisoners] and facilitate cons ion of the good' 11) (quoting Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910, 914 ( 2007}) (alteration in original). A complaint is frivolous if it "'lacks an arguable basis either law or in fact.' 11 Denton v. Hernandez, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 1733 (1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 1831 (1989)}. "A complaint lacks an arguable basis in law if it is based on an indisputably merit complaint alleges the violat does not exist." 1999) (citations ss legal theory, such as if the which clearly of a legal Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 718 (5th Cir. and internal quotation marks omitted}. "A complaint lacks an arguable basis in fact if, after providing the plaintiff the opportunity to present additional necessary, the facts alleged are clearly baseless." facts Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted}. -3- when To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, the factual all rel ions in the complaint "must be enough to raise a right to f above the speculative level [.]" Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007) (citation omitted). compla If the has not set forth "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," it must be dismissed. Id. at 1974. A reviewing court must "'accept all well-pleaded facts as true and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.'" 2020) Heinze v. Tesco Corp., 971 F.3d 475, 479 (5th Cir. tation omitted). But it need not accept as true any "conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or conclusions." Id. (internal quotation marks and l citations omitted); see also White v. U.S. Corrections, L.L.C., 996 F.3d 302, 306-07 (5th Cir. 2021) In other words, " [ t] hreadbare (same). recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) Ashcroft v. Igbal, 129 ting Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965). Because the plaintiff represents himself, his 2£Q. se pleadings are held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." curiam). suff Haines v. Kerner, 92 S. Ct. 594, 596 (1972) (per Even under this standard a plaintiff must allege facts which, when taken as true, state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Legate v. Livingston, 822 F.3d 207, 210 (5th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). A district court may ly dismiss a 2£Q. se litigant's lawsuit "before service -4- of process or before the filing of the answer" if it is that the plaintiff has pleaded his "best case." fied Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767-68 (5th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). III. A. Discussion Claims Against Billingsley and Other Assailants "To state a claim under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983, a plaintiff must (1) a a violation of ghts secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person act law." Sanchez v. Oliver, 995 F.3d 461, 466 (citation omitted). exe under color of state (5th Cir. 2021) The alleged violation "must be caused by the se of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the State is responsible." 2744, 2753 (1982). Lugar v. Edmundson Oil Co., 102 S. Ct. This means that "the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be d to be a state actor," that is, one who is in fact a state official, one who "has acted with or has obtained significant aid from state officials," or one whose "conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State." Id. Lacour cannot sue Billingsley or any of the other inmates who attacked him under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because he cannot show that they qualify as state actors. See Bryant v. Military Dep't of Miss., 597 F.3d 678, 686 (5th Cir. 2010) ("A person acts 'under color of state law' if he engages in the -5- '[m] isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.'u) (citations omitted). Accordingly, Lacour's claim against Billingsley is dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983. B. Claims Against Officer Chukwu Lacour accuses Officer Chukwu of negligence for falling as at his post and asks that he be reprimanded. 8 Claims of negligence are not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. , Davidson v. Cannon, 106 S. Ct. 668, 670 (1986) (stating that "lack of due care simply does not approach the sort of abusive government conduct" which rises to the level of a constitutional violation); Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 533 {5th Cir. 1995) (finding that allegations amounting to a claim of negligence were insufficient to raise a constitutional violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Ballard v. Travis County Sheriff's Dep't, 51 F.3d 1042, 1995 WL 152971, at *1 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam, unpublished) ( "The negligent failure to protect an inmate from other inmates will not support a cause of action under § 1983"). Likewise, there is no ional right to have an officer disciplined or corrected. const See Brown v. Gusman, Civil No. 15-1491, 2015 WL 6827260, *7 {E.D. La. 2015) (citing Ordaz v. Martin, No. 93-4170, 1993 WL 373830, at *9 {5th Cir. Sept. 15, 1993) (per curiam)). Accordingly, the claim 8 Complaint, Docket Entry No. 1, pp. 3, 4. -6- against Officer Chukwu is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983. C. Claims Against Harris County Lacour does not articulate a viable claim against Harris County, which cannot be held vicariously liable under a theory of respondeat superior for wrongdoing committed by its employees. See Monell v. Dep't of Social Services of City of New York, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2036 (1978) ("[W]e conclude that a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor - or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.") (emphasis in original). To state a claim for municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts identifying "(1) an official policy (or custom), of which (2) a policy maker can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation whose 'moving force' is that policy (or custom)." Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002); see also Monell, 98 S. Ct. at 2037-38. Lacour does not allege facts that are sufficient to establish a policy or to state a claim for relief against Harris Fort County Worth, as a municipality. 9 Texas, 588 F.3d 838, See 847 Peterson (5th Cir. v. City of 2009) ("A In addition, Lacour' s claim for punitive damages against Harris County fails for other reasons because punitive damages are not recoverable against a municipality in a suit filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2748, 2762 (1981) (holding that "a municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983"). 9 -7- municipality is almost never liable for an isolated unconstitutional act on the part of an employee; it is liable only for acts directly attributable to it 'through some official action or imprimatur.'") (quoting Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001)). Absent a viable federal claim, this action will be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(Bl . 10 IV. Conc1usion and Order Based on the foregoing, the court ORDERS as follows: 1. The Prisoner's Civil Rights Complaint filed by Lorenzo Lacour under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Docket Entry No. 1) is DISMISSED with prejudice. 2. The dismissal will count as a "strike" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The Clerk is directed to provide a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order to the plaintiff and to the Manager of the Three Strikes List for the Southern District of Texas at Three Strikes@txs.uscourts.gov. SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this,.,g th day of /11A,ec}I 2024. SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE The court declines to address or exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claim that Lacour may have. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see also Wong v. Stripling, 881 F.2d 200, 203-04 (5th Cir. 1989). 10 -8-

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.