Hilton v. Milstead Management, LLC et al, No. 4:2023cv01865 - Document 22 (S.D. Tex. 2024)
Court Description: MEMORANDUM AND OPINION entered DENYING 14 MOTION for PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Judgment. (Signed by Judge Lee H Rosenthal) Parties notified.(LisaEddins, 4)
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Hilton v. Milstead Management, LLC et al Doc. 22 United States District Court Southern District of Texas ENTERED IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION DENIS HILTON, JR., individually and on behalf of all similarly situated employees, Plaintiff, v. MILSTEAD AUTOMOTIVE, LTD., et al., Defendant. § § § § § § § § § § § January 25, 2024 Nathan Ochsner, Clerk CIVIL ACTION NO. H-23-1865 MEMORANDUM AND OPINION The plaintiff, Denis Hilton, Jr., alleges that his former employer, Milstead,1 failed to pay him overtime wages and retaliated against him for participating in activity protected by the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203, et seq. He also alleges that Milstead interfered with his exercise of rights guaranteed by the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq., and retaliated against him for taking FMLA leave. Milstead moves for partial judgment on the pleadings. (Docket Entry No. 14). Milstead argues that Hilton’s complaint establishes as a matter of law the first element of the retail services exemption to the FLSA’s overtime provision—that Milstead is a “retail or service establishment.” See 29 U.S.C. § 207(i). Milstead argues that the court should not follow the Department of Labor’s non-binding definition of “retail or service establishment,” 29 C.F.R. § 779.24, which Milstead admits it does not meet on the pleadings. Milstead does not articulate an alternative definition, but states merely that “[t]here is no dispute that [it] is a service establishment.” (Docket Entry No. 14 The complaint refers to the three defendants—Milstead Management, LLC, Milstead Automotive, Ltd., and Amy Milstead—collectively as “Milstead.” (Docket Entry No. 1 at ¶ 1). Hilton does not specify which defendant employed him. 1 Dockets.Justia.com at 4). Milstead appears to rely solely on the following paragraph of Hilton’s complaint to establish that it is a “service establishment”: “During all relevant times, Defendants Milstead Automotive, and Milstead Management, LLC were and, upon belief remain, a joint, single, or continuous enterprise under Defendant Amy Milstead’s operation or common control for the common business service of running a garage and wrecker services for profit.” (Id. at 8) (quoting Docket Entry No. 1 at ¶ 10). Whether the retail services exemption applies to Milstead is a question better resolved at summary judgment, after discovery. The complaint—which says very little about Milstead’s business—does not establish as a matter of law that Milstead is a “retail or service establishment,” much less the other necessary elements of the exemption. On the present record, the motion is denied. SIGNED on January 25, 2024, at Houston, Texas. ________________________________ Lee H. Rosenthal United States District Judge 2
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