Richie v. Thaler
Filing
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER.(Signed by Judge Nancy F. Atlas) Parties notified.(sashabranner, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
JEFFERY ALAN RICHIE,
TDCJ #1481626,
Petitioner,
v.
RICK THALER, Director,
Texas Department of Criminal Justice Correctional Institutions Division,
Respondent.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. H-11-3674
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
The petitioner, Jeffery Alan Richie (TDCJ #1481626, former TDCJ #902684,
#282577), has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to
challenge a state court conviction. The respondent has answered with a motion for summary
judgment, arguing that the petition must be denied [Doc. # 20]. Richie has filed a reply [Doc.
# 21]. Richie also requests discovery and an evidentiary hearing [Docs. # 22, # 23]. After
considering all of the pleadings, the state court records, and the applicable law, the Court
grants the respondent’s motion, denies the petition, and dismisses this case for reasons that
follow.
I.
BACKGROUND
A Wharton County grand jury returned an indictment against Richie in cause number
16161, charging him with possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, namely,
cocaine. The State enhanced that indictment for purposes of punishment with allegations that
Richie had at least three prior felony convictions. As a habitual offender, Richie faced a
potential sentence of between 25 years to life in prison if convicted of the charged offense,
which is summarized in more detail below.
The drug charges lodged against Richie in cause number 16161 were filed after the
Wharton County Sheriff’s Department executed a search warrant at Richie’s residence in El
Campo, Texas. A local magistrate approved the search warrant based on an affidavit from
Wharton County Sheriff’s Deputy Sergeant Tommy Johnson. In that affidavit, Sergeant
Johnson included information that he received from a “reliable” confidential informant. The
confidential informant, who reportedly had observed Richie sell crack cocaine from his
residence in the past, indicated that Richie presently was in possession of cocaine and that
he was manufacturing crack cocaine for sale on the premises. The ensuing search of Richie’s
residence yielded powder cocaine and crack cocaine that was packed for sale in small plastic
bags. Cocaine residue was apparent on various surfaces in the small home occupied by
Richie, which had electricity, but no running water. The officers also recovered drug
paraphernalia, including plastic straws or cylindrical objects of the sort used to snort cocaine
and a mirror with crack cocaine on it next to Richie’s bed. In addition, the officers recovered
tools of the drug trade that are commonly used in the manufacture and sale of crack cocaine,
including a digital scale, a large quantity of baking soda, Pyrex containers, and three
microwaves, all covered with cocaine residue, as well as a quantity of United States currency.
Richie’s defense counsel filed several discovery motions, including a motion to
compel the State to disclose the identity of the confidential source who provided the
2
information that Sergeant Johnson used to obtain a search warrant. Defense counsel also
filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from Richie’s residence on the grounds that
the warrant was based on stale information from an unreliable source and was not adequate
to establish probable cause for the search. The 329th District Court for Wharton County,
Texas, conducted an in camera proceeding to consider the information provided by Sergeant
Johnson’s confidential source. After a separate pretrial hearing held on January 22, 2008,
the trial court denied Richie’s motion to disclose the confidential informant’s identity and
Richie’s motion to suppress evidence. See Court Reporter’s Record, vol. 2, at 65. Richie
declined the State’s offer of a plea agreement, which contemplated a 25-year prison sentence,
and the case proceeded to trial.
At trial, the State presented all of the evidence seized during the search of Richie’s
residence. Richie’s defense counsel repeated her objections to the search and disputed the
validity of the warrant. The jury rejected Richie’s objections to the search and found Richie
3
guilty as charged in the indictment.1 The same jury determined further that the enhancement
allegations were “true” and sentenced Richie to life imprisonment.
Richie filed a direct appeal, arguing that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion
to suppress evidence; (2) refusing to require the State to identify the confidential source who
supplied information to Sergeant Johnson; and (3) admitting evidence of a parole violation
that was referenced in the search warrant. Richie argued further that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel because his defense attorney failed to file adequate pretrial motions or
conduct a sufficient investigation. An intermediate court of appeals rejected all of Richie’s
arguments and affirmed the conviction after detailing the facts that were presented in support
of the warrant to search Richie’s home, where crack cocaine was being manufactured and
sold:
On June 18, 2007, Tommy Johnson, a sergeant with the Wharton
County Sheriff’s Department Narcotics Task Force, submitted a probable
cause affidavit to a magistrate and obtained a search warrant for Richie’s
residence. Richie had been under investigation for selling cocaine and crack
cocaine. Johnson testified that he had been contacted by a confidential
informant in reference to Richie selling cocaine and crack cocaine within
1
Texas evidentiary rules authorize a jury to consider whether evidence was seized in violation
of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or the constitution or laws of the United
States. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23(a). If the jury decides that the evidence
was seized unlawfully, the jury is authorized to “disregard any such evidence so obtained.”
Id. A defendant has a statutory right to a jury instruction under this provision if the
following criteria are met: (1) the evidence heard by the jury raises an issue of fact; (2) the
evidence of that fact has been affirmatively contested by the defense; and (3) the contested
factual issue is “material to the lawfulness of the challenged conduct in obtaining the
evidence.” Madden v. State, 242 S.W.3d 504, 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The jury in
Richie’s case was instructed accordingly under this statute and given the option to disregard
any evidence that was seized unlawfully from Richie’s residence. See Clerk’s Record, at 6364.
4
twenty-four [hours] of seeking the warrant. The informant notified Johnson
that he had received a telephone call from Richie on June 16, 2007. The
informant told Johnson that Richie had called him and asked him to come to
his house. According to Johnson’s affidavit, Richie asked the informant to
come over only when he had cocaine. Johnson stated that the informant had
provided reliable information in the past and knew what cocaine and crack
cocaine looked like. According to the affidavit, the informant had previously
been to and had observed cocaine and had seen measuring cups and
microwaves that Richie used to “cook” the crack cocaine at his residence. The
informant advised that cocaine dealers came to Richie’s house to cook the
crack cocaine, that Richie used cocaine, and that Richie was on parole. The
informant reported to Johnson on the day before the search warrant was
executed that the informant had driven by Richie’s residence and observed
narcotic activity there. This coincided with Johnson’s personal knowledge that
he had observed people at the residence that he knew, from experience, were
involved with drugs.
Richie v. State, No. 13-08-084-CR, 2010 WL 878729, * 1 (Tex. App. — Corpus Christi
March 11, 2010). After the intermediate appellate court entered its decision, Richie did not
appeal further by filing a petition for discretionary review with the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals.
Subsequently, Richie challenged his conviction by filing a state habeas corpus
application under Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. In that application,
Richie complained at length that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial and on
direct appeal. A majority of those claims concerned his trial attorney’s unsuccessful effort
to discover the confidential informant’s identity and to suppress the evidence seized during
the search of his home. After considering all of the pleadings and the state court record, the
trial court rejected Richie’s claims without entering any written findings and forwarded his
5
application to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, which denied relief without a written
order. See Ex parte Richie No. 50,789-03 (Tex. Crim. App. March 2, 2011).
Richie now challenges his conviction with a petition for federal habeas corpus relief
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Richie, who has filed a lengthy supporting memorandum in support
of his petition, raises numerous claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. As in state court,
a majority of those claims concern his trial attorney’s failure to discover the confidential
informant’s identity or to suppress the evidence against him. Richie also faults his appellate
attorney for failing to raise several arguments in a motion for new trial or during his direct
appeal. The respondent has filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that Richie’s
petition must be denied because his claims do not merit relief. The parties’ contentions are
discussed further below under the governing federal habeas corpus standard of review.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Motions for summary judgment are typically governed by Rule 56 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. In this instance, the respondent’s summary-judgment motion must
be determined in compliance with the federal habeas corpus statutes. See Smith v. Cockrell,
311 F.3d 661, 668 (5th Cir. 2002); see also Clark v. Johnson, 202 F.3d 760, 764 (5th Cir.
2000). Federal habeas corpus proceedings filed after April 24, 1996 are governed by
provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (the “AEDPA”), Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). To the
6
extent that the petitioner’s claims were “adjudicated on the merits” in state court, the AEDPA
standard found at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) applies.2
Claims presenting pure questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact are
governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), which precludes habeas relief unless a petitioner
demonstrates that the state court’s decision to deny a claim “was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Martin v. Cain, 246 F.3d 471, 475
(5th Cir. 2001). A state court’s decision is deemed contrary to clearly established federal law
if it reaches a legal conclusion in direct conflict with a prior decision of the Supreme Court
or if it reaches a different conclusion than the Supreme Court based on materially
indistinguishable facts. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-08 (2000). A state court
unreasonably applies clearly established precedent if it identifies the correct governing legal
principle but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the case. See Brown v.
Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005). Under this standard, an unreasonable application is more
than merely incorrect or erroneous; rather, the state court’s application of clearly established
law must be “objectively unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 409.
2
There are additional limitations on federal habeas review. Pre-AEDPA precedent forecloses
habeas corpus relief if any of the following circumstances are present: (1) the claim is barred
as a consequence of the petitioner’s failure to comply with state procedural rules, Coleman
v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991); (2) the claim seeks retroactive application of a new rule
of law to a conviction that was final before the rule was announced, Teague v. Lane, 489
U.S. 288 (1989); or (3) the claim asserts trial error that, although of constitutional
magnitude, did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the
jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
7
The Supreme Court has clarified that “review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the
record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v.
Pinholster, — U.S. —, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). Where applicable, a state court’s
findings of fact “are ‘presumed to be correct’ unless the habeas petitioner rebuts the
presumption through ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” Nelson v. Quarterman, 472 F.3d
287, 292 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). This presumption extends not
only to express findings of fact, but to the implicit findings of the state court as well. See
Garcia v. Quarterman, 454 F.3d 441, 444 (5th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). Where pure
questions of fact are concerned, a petitioner is not entitled to relief unless he demonstrates
that the state court’s decision was “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in
light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); see
also Buntion v. Quarterman, 524 F.3d 664, 670 (5th Cir. 2008).
As this deferential standard reflects, the AEDPA has “modified a federal habeas
court’s role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas
‘retrials’ and to ensure that state court convictions are given effect to the extent possible
under law.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002) (quotation omitted). In that respect, the
AEDPA standard “stops short of imposing a complete bar on federal court relitigation of
claims already rejected in state court proceedings.” Harrington v. Richter, — U.S. —, 131
S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011). The Supreme Court has underscored the extent of this deferential
standard:
8
[28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)] preserves authority to issue the writ in cases where there
is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court’s decision
conflicts with this Court’s precedents. It goes no farther. Section 2254(d)
reflects the view that habeas corpus is a “guard against extreme malfunctions
in the state criminal justice systems,” not a substitute for ordinary error
correction through appeal. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332, n.5, 99 S.
Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). As a
condition for obtaining [a writ of] habeas corpus from a federal court, a state
prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented
in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well
understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for
fairminded disagreement.
Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786-87. This deferential AEDPA standard of review applies even
where the state court fails to cite applicable Supreme Court precedent or fails to explain its
decision. See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7 (2002); see also Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 785
(confirming that Ҥ 2254(d) does not require a state court to give reasons before its decision
can be deemed to have been ‘adjudicated on the merits’”). With this deferential standard in
mind, the petitioner’s claims are examined below under the applicable legal standard.
III.
DISCUSSION
A
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Trial
The state court records show that Richie was represented at trial by local criminal
defense attorney Lorna Henson. Richie contends that he was denied effective assistance of
counsel at trial for numerous reasons, many of which overlap. Richie’s specific allegations
are addressed in more detail below following a brief overview of the legal standard that
governs claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
9
Claims for ineffective assistance of counsel are analyzed under the well-established
standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail under the
Strickland standard, a defendant must demonstrate both constitutionally deficient
performance by counsel and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged deficiency. See
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 390, 390-91 (2000). “Unless a defendant makes both showings,
it cannot be said that the conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process
that rendered the result unreliable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
The first prong of the governing standard is only satisfied where the defendant shows
that “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be “highly deferential,”
and a reviewing court must make every effort “to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight,
to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct
from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. at 689. To prove prejudice, a defendant must
demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different.” Id at 694. “A reasonable probability” requires
“a ‘substantial’ not just a ‘conceivable,’ likelihood of a different result.” Pinholster, 131 S.
Ct. at 1403 (quoting Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 791).
In this instance, Richie lists approximately twenty allegations of deficient performance
by his trial attorney. The record reflects that Richie raises many of the same allegations that
were rejected during his direct appeal and state habeas corpus proceedings. To the extent
that Richie’s ineffective-assistance claims were rejected in state court, the central question
10
is not whether this Court “‘believes the state court’s determination’ under the Strickland
standard ‘was incorrect but whether the determination was unreasonable — a substantially
higher standard.’” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (quoting Schriro v.
Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 478 (2007)). In addition, “because the Strickland standard is a
general standard, a state court has even more latitude to reasonably determine that a
defendant has not satisfied that standard.” Knowles, 556 U.S. at 123 (citation omitted).
Thus, this standard is “doubly deferential” on habeas corpus review. Id.; see also Richter,
131 S. Ct. at 788 (emphasizing that the standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are
“highly deferential,” and “‘doubly’ so” when applied in tandem) (citations and quotations
omitted).
Because many of Richie’s allegations are related, the Court has grouped his
ineffective-assistance claims for ease of analysis. Liberally construed, Richie alleges that his
defense counsel was deficient because she failed to do the following: (1) to consult with him
before filing a motion to disclose the confidential informant’s identity; (2) to present
additional facts in support of the motion to suppress evidence or to challenge the affidavit
in support of the search warrant by requesting a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S.
154 (1978); (3) to advise him of his right to testify at the hearing on his pretrial motions; (4)
to research the law on parole warrants; (5) to interview his parole officer or call her as a
witness; (6) to conduct an independent investigation by taking her own photographs of the
scene; (7) to impeach evidence during Sergeant Johnson’s testimony; (8) to raise an objection
to hearsay testimony given by Sergeant Johnson about statements attributed to the
11
confidential informant in the probable cause affidavit; (9) to raise an objection during the
prosecutor’s closing argument; and (10) to prepare for the sentencing phase of the trial by
researching his social history for purposes of presenting mitigation evidence. The respondent
contends that the Richie does not demonstrate a valid ineffective-assistance claim under the
Strickland standard because he fails to show that his counsel’s performance was deficient.3
Richie’s allegations of deficient performance are discussed separately below.
1.
The Motion to Disclose the Confidential Informant’s Identity
Many of Richie’s ineffective-assistance claims take issue with his counsel’s failure
to consult with him before filing a pretrial motion to disclose the identity of the confidential
informant. As noted above, Sergeant Johnson obtained a warrant to search Richie’s
residence based on an affidavit that included information from a confidential source.
Richie’s defense attorney filed a written motion to disclose the identity of the confidential
informant in order to establish the reliability of the information used to justify the search
warrant, to assess whether the confidential informant was a witness to the offense, and to
3
The respondent argues at the outset that Richie failed to raise several portions of his
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims in state court. The respondent contends, therefore,
that Richie failed to exhaust available state court remedies in violation of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b), and that those claims are barred from federal review by the doctrine of procedural
default. The disjointed nature of Richie’s pleadings makes this determination difficult. A
review of Richie’s state habeas application confirms that he did not clearly present all of his
claims for adjudication in state court. The Fifth Circuit has recognized that where, as here,
a petitioner lodges multiple claims for ineffective assistance of counsel each distinct
allegation of ineffective assistance must be exhausted. See Jones v. Jones, 163 F.3d 285,
296-98 (5th Cir. 1998). Although several Richie’s allegations do appear unexhausted, the
Court does not address the doctrine of procedural default at this time because all of his
underlying claims are without merit for reasons set forth in the text hereafter.
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secure the confidential informant’s presence at trial for purposes of cross-examination. See
Clerk’s Record, at 27-28. The trial court considered the request for disclosure of the
confidential informant’s identity during an in camera proceeding and denied the motion at
a pretrial hearing.
Richie complains that his defense attorney was deficient because she filed the motion
to disclose the confidential informant’s identity without speaking with him first. Richie
argues that there were “other” arguments that he wanted to raise in this motion. In that
respect, Richie states that would have argued that there were “no informants in [his]
residence within the 48 hours preceding the affidavit issuance of the search warrant, nor any
other times was their [sic] informants at his residence.” Richie insists further that the
affidavit filed in support of the search warrant contained “false” information and that he was
entitled to confront and cross-examine the confidential informant at his trial.
Richie does not demonstrate that counsel was deficient or ineffective because, as the
intermediate court of appeals explained, the State was not required to disclose the
confidential informant’s identity as a matter of law under the circumstances of his case:
The State has the “privilege to refuse to disclose the identity of a person
who has furnished information relating to or assisting in a criminal
investigation.” TEX. R. EVID. 508(a). As such, the State may withhold the
identity of an informant unless the informant: (1) participated in the offense;
(2) was present at the time of the offense or arrest; or (3) was otherwise shown
to be a material witness to the transaction or to whether appellant knowingly
committed the act charged. Williams v. State, 787 S.W.2d 198, 199-200 (Tex.
App. — Corpus Christi 1990, pet ref’d).
The record does not reflect that the informant was present when
[Richie] was arrested, nor does it show that the informant participated in the
13
offense for which [Richie] was arrested. When information from an informant
is used only to establish probable cause for a search warrant and the informant
was not a participant in the offense or present when the search warrant was
executed, the identity need not be disclosed because the informant’s testimony
is not essential to a fair determination of guilt, rather, it is only relevant to a
determination of probable cause. Washington v. State, 902 S.W.2d 649,
655-57 (Tex. App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, pet. ref’d). For these
reasons, we hold that there was no abuse of discretion. [Richie]’s second issue
is overruled.
Richie v. State, No. 13-08-084-CR, 2010 WL 878729, *2-3 (Tex. App. — Corpus Christi
2010 March 10, 2010, no pet.).
Richie does not demonstrate that the state court’s determination was unreasonable.
There is no apparent legal basis to establish that the State was required to disclose the
confidential informant’s identity in his case or that his counsel was deficient for failing to
raise a particular argument which, if presented, would have been successful. Counsel is not
ineffective for failing to make a frivolous argument. See Green v. Johnson, 160 F.3d 1029,
1037 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[F]ailure to make a frivolous objection does not cause counsel’s
performance to fall below an objective level of reasonableness . . . .”). Absent a showing that
counsel failed to raise a meritorious objection and that the outcome would have been
different, the petitioner fails to demonstrate deficient performance or actual prejudice. See
Parr v. Quarterman, 472 F.3d 245, 256 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that counsel was not
deficient in failing to present a meritless argument) (citation omitted); Smith v. Puckett, 907
F.2d 581, 585 n.6 (5th Cir. 1990) (“Counsel is not deficient for, and prejudice does not issue
from, failure to raise a legally meritless claim.”); Lavernia v. Lynaugh, 845 F.2d 493, 499
(5th Cir. 1988) (“Counsel cannot be faulted for failing to pursue meritless motions.”)
14
(citations omitted); Murray v. Maggio, 736 F.2d 279, 283 (5th Cir. 1984) (“Counsel is not
required to engage in the filing of futile motions.”).
Regarding Richie’s claim that counsel failed to consult with him, Richie concedes that
his defense attorney visited with him briefly (approximately 27 minutes) sometime before
the pretrial hearing on the motion to disclose the confidential informant’s identity. During
that visit, defense counsel conveyed a plea bargain offer made by the prosecutor and
mentioned the motion that counsel had filed on Richie’s behalf. To the extent that Richie
complains that his counsel did not confer with him at length before this hearing, “brevity of
consultation time between a defendant and his counsel, alone, cannot support a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.” Murray, 736 F.2d at 282 (5th Cir. 1984) (citing Jones v.
Wainwright, 604 F.2d 414, 416 (5th Cir. 1979)).
Richie has not established that his counsel was deficient for failing to consult with him
in connection with the motion to disclose the confidential informant’s identity or that she
failed to raise a meritorious argument. It follows that he does not establish a valid
ineffective-assistance claim. To the extent that this claim was rejected by the state habeas
corpus court, Richie also fails to show that the state court’s decision was objectively
unreasonable. He is not entitled to relief for these reasons.
2.
The Motion to Suppress Evidence
In several related grounds, Richie complains that his defense counsel was deficient
because she failed to present additional facts in support of the motion to suppress evidence
seized from his home. Richie notes, in particular, that evidence may be suppressed where
15
a defendant can show that the affidavit that supports the warrant contains material false
statements or omissions. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978).
False
information in an affidavit can invalidate a search warrant where the misrepresentations are
the product of “deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth.” Franks, 438 U.S.
at 171. Richie accuses Sergeant Johnson of manufacturing false statements in the affidavit
that he supplied in support of the search warrant. Richie maintains, therefore, that defense
counsel was deficient for failing to request a hearing under Franks.
An attorney’s failure to file a motion to suppress or to adequately litigate a Fourth
Amendment claim may constitute deficient performance if the evidence would have been
suppressed as a result of the motion. See Ward v. Dretke, 420 F.3d 479, 488 (5th Cir. 2005).
The petitioner bears the burden of proving that the evidence admitted at his trial would have
been suppressed as a result of an adequate motion or objection by his counsel. See
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986). Richie does not meet that burden here
because he does not demonstrate that his counsel had a valid objection to raise under Franks
or the Fourth Amendment.
Importantly, Richie’s claim that his counsel should have requested a hearing under
Franks was rejected on direct appeal. The appellate court noted that defense counsel “filed
a motion to suppress and advocated strongly at the hearing on the motion.” Richie v. State,
No. 13-08-084-CR, 2010 WL 878729, * 4 (Tex. App. — Corpus Christi March 11, 2010, no
pet.). The appellate court concluded that defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to
16
request “a Franks hearing” because there was no evidence of “deliberate falsehood or
reckless disregard for the truth” by the officer who prepared the affidavit. Id.
Richie does not cite any evidence of a material misstatement in the affidavit or show
that a hearing under Franks was warranted.4 Richie’s unsupported allegation is not sufficient
to state a claim on federal habeas review. In that respect, the Fifth Circuit has “made clear
that conclusory allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel do not raise a constitutional
issue in a federal habeas proceeding.” Collier v. Cockrell, 300 F.3d 577, 587 (5th Cir. 2002)
(citing Miller v. Johnson, 200 F.3d 274, 282 (5th Cir. 2000); Ross v. Estelle, 694 F.2d 1008,
1012 (5th Cir.1983)). Based on this record, Richie does not show that the state court’s
decision to deny relief was incorrect or objectively unreasonable. Accordingly, he is not
entitled to relief on this issue.
3.
Failure to Advise of the Right to Testify at a Pretrial Hearing
Richie complains that his defense attorney was deficient because she did not advise
him of his right to testify at the hearing on his pretrial motions. See Memorandum, Doc. # 2,
13-36. Richie maintains that, if he had been allowed to testify at the hearing, he would have
contradicted the affidavit submitted by Sergeant Johnson in support of the search warrant.
This claim is without merit.
4
Richie has made a request for leave to conduct discovery regarding his allegation that
Sergeant Johnson and others involved in the investigation of his case engaged in misconduct
by fabricating a reason to search his residence. Richie’s motion for discovery is denied for
reasons discussed further below.
17
It is true that a criminal defendant has a fundamental constitutional right to testify in
his own defense. See Jordan v. Hargett, 34 F.3d 310, 312 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Rock v.
Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49-52 (1987)). Richie does not allege that he was prevented from
testifying or that he wished to testify in his own defense at his trial. Assuming that a
defendant’s right to testify extends to pretrial hearings, the record shows that Richie testified
at the pretrial hearing at issue. See Court reporter’s Record, vol. 2, at 68-71. During that
time, the trial court afforded Richie an opportunity to raise many of the arguments referenced
in his pleadings. See id. The trial court considered Richie’s arguments at the close of the
proceeding, but declined to change any of his rulings.
See id. at 71. Under these
circumstances, Richie does not show that he was denied an opportunity to testify in his own
defense and he does not articulate a valid claim for habeas corpus relief.
4.
Failure to Conduct Legal Research on Parole Warrants
Richie complains that his defense attorney was deficient because she failed to conduct
legal research regarding the effect of an arrest warrant that was issued by the parole board.
Richie takes issue with comments made Sergeant Johnson’s affidavit in support of the search
warrant application, in which Sergeant Johnson disclosed that Richie was “wanted” for
violations of his parole. Richie does not deny that, when the search of his home occurred,
the parole board had issued a warrant for his arrest or that he was in violation of the terms
and conditions of his parole. Richie maintains, however, that the existence of a parole
warrant was not sufficient to authorize the search of a residence. Thus, Richie argues that
18
his counsel was deficient for failing to research this issue and raise an appropriate objection
to the search.
Richie’s argument overlooks the fact that officers conducted the search of his
residence after obtaining a warrant based on probable cause supplied by Sergeant Johnson.
In that respect, the search of Richie’s residence was not conducted during the execution of
the parole warrant. The record clarifies that the parole warrant was referenced by the State
during the pretrial hearing on Richie’s motion to suppress as a potential alternative ground
for searching the residence. During examination by the prosecutor, Sergeant Johnson
confirmed that there was an “outstanding felony parole warrant” for Richie’s arrest at the
time of the search. Court Reporter’s Record, vol. 2, at 51. Sergeant Johnson stated that this
warrant authorized officers to “intrude into [Richie’s] home” to effect his arrest. Id.
Sergeant Johnson also agreed that, while executing that warrant, “[a]ny evidence . . . found
inside that home in plain view would have been admissible in court.” Id. The State argued
that the evidence seized was either in plain view of the officers who entered Richie’s home
or within Richie’s reach at the time of his arrest.
Richie does not demonstrate that the prosecutor’s argument (regarding the
admissibility of evidence seized while in plain view) was incorrect as a matter of law. See,
e.g., Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 374-75 (1993) (discussing the “plain view”
doctrine that allows police to seize contraband if its incriminating character is immediately
apparent and it is observed from a lawful vantage point); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 465-66 (1971) (discussing applications of the “plain view” exception to the warrant
19
requirement and searches conducted incident to an arrest). More importantly, he does not
show that his counsel was deficient for failing to conduct research or to raise an objection to
the prosecutor’s argument. Absent a showing that his counsel was deficient, and that he was
prejudiced as a result, Richie does not demonstrate that he was denied effective assistance
of counsel. Accordingly, Richie is not entitled to relief on this claim.
5.
Failure to Interview or Call a Witness
Richie complains that his defense attorney was deficient because she failed to
interview his parole officer or call her as a witness. Richie references a parole warrant that
issued prior to the search of his residence. Richie asserts that his parole officer would have
testified that the warrant was for “drug abuse violations” and not for a violent offense. This
claim is without merit.
The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly held that complaints of uncalled witnesses are not
favored in federal habeas corpus review “because allegations of what a witness would have
testified are largely speculative.” Coble v. Quarterman, 496 F.3d 430, 436 (5th Cir. 2007)
(citing Boyd v. Estelle, 661 F.2d 388, 390 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting Buckelew v. United States,
575 F.2d 515, 521 (5th Cir. 1978)). “Where the only evidence of a missing witnesses’
testimony is from the defendant, [a federal habeas corpus court] views claims of ineffective
assistance with great caution.” Sayre v. Anderson, 238 F.3d 631, 635-36 (5th Cir. 2001)
(citations and quotations omitted). To demonstrate the required Strickland prejudice on a
claim of ineffective assistance in this context, a petitioner “must show not only that [the]
20
testimony would have been favorable, but also that the witness would have testified at trial.”
Evans v. Cockrell, 285 F.3d 370, 377 (5th Cir. 2002).
Richie has not alleged that his parole officer would have testified in his defense if
called as a witness. Even if his parole officer had been called as a witness, Richie does not
show that the testimony would have been favorable. Based on this record, Richie does not
demonstrate that his counsel was deficient for failing to interview Richie’s parole officer or
to call her as a witness. Likewise, Richie does not show that the state court’s decision to
deny relief was objectively unreasonable. He is not entitled to relief on this ground.
6.
Failure to Investigate
Richie complains that his defense attorney was deficient because she failed to conduct
an adequate investigation. A habeas corpus petitioner who alleges a failure to investigate on
the part of his counsel must state with specificity what the investigation would have revealed
and how it would have changed the outcome of his trial. See Miller v. Dretke, 420 F.3d 356,
361 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Green, 882 F.2d 999, 1003 (5th Cir. 1989)). In
this instance, Richie claims that his counsel should have conducted an independent
investigation by taking her own photographs of his residence. Richie contends that
additional photographs would have been useful to cross-examine Sergeant Johnson about the
surveillance conducted at his residence, where cocaine and other items associated with the
drug trade were seized. Richie’s allegation is insufficient to demonstrate a valid claim for
reasons outlined briefly below.
21
The record shows that the State presented numerous photographs of Richie’s residence
and the evidence recovered from that location. See Court Reporter’s Record, vol. 6, State’s
Ex. Nos. 4-41. The record also reflects that defense counsel cross-examined Sergeant
Johnson at length during the pretrial suppression hearing and at trial. See Court Reporter’s
Record, vol. 2, at 35-42; vol. 3, at 110-44; vol. 4, at 1- 17. Richie does not clearly articulate
what, if anything, additional photographs of the scene would have illustrated. More
importantly, he does not demonstrate that additional photographs of the scene would have
changed the result. Absent a showing of deficient performance and actual prejudice, Richie
does not articulate a valid claim for ineffective assistance of counsel or show that the state
court’s decision to reject this claim was objectively unreasonable. It follows that Richie is
not entitled to relief on this issue.
7.
Failure to Introduce Impeachment Evidence
Richie complains that his defense attorney was deficient because she failed to present
evidence in the form of a letter, allegedly written by an “anonymous source” who was in jail
at the same time as Richie. Richie contends that the letter would have impeached Sergeant
Johnson’s credibility. The handwritten letter, which consists of one paragraph, is not dated
and it is barely legible. Ex parte Richie, No. 50,789-03 at 320. Although the contents of the
letter are unclear, it is signed “from the hood.” Id.
The respondent, who notes that the letter is unauthenticated and not in admissible
form, argues that defense counsel cannot be faulted for declining to offer the letter into
evidence or to use the letter during cross-examination to impeach Sergeant Johnson’s
22
testimony. The Court agrees. Decisions about cross-examination are strategic choices that
are entitled to substantial deference in the hindsight of federal habeas review. See Strickland,
466 U.S. at 689 (emphasizing that “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be
highly deferential” and that “every effort [must] be made to eliminate the distorting effects
of hindsight”). As the Supreme Court has repeated, “[s]trategic choices made after thorough
investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable[.]”
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91)).
To the extent that Richie gave the letter to his attorney, but she declined to present this
evidence at trial, her strategic decision cannot be the basis of an ineffective-assistance claim.
Strategic decisions made by counsel during the course of trial are entitled to substantial
deference in the hindsight of federal habeas review. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689
(emphasizing that “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential”
and that “every effort [must] be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight”). A
federal habeas corpus court may not find ineffective assistance of counsel merely because
it disagrees with counsel's chosen trial strategy. Crane v. Johnson, 178 F.3d 309, 312 (5th
Cir. 1999). It is well established that “[a] conscious and informed decision on trial tactics
and strategy cannot be the basis for constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel unless
it is so ill chosen that it permeates the entire trial with obvious unfairness.” Green v. Johnson,
116 F.3d 1115, 1122 (5th Cir. 1997); Garland v. Maggio, 717 F.2d 199, 206 (5th Cir.1983)
(citing Fitzgerald v. Estelle, 505 F.2d 1334 (5th Cir. 1975); Daniels v. Maggio, 669 F.2d
1075 (5th Cir. 1982)).
23
Richie does not demonstrate that his trial was tainted by unfairness as the result of his
counsel’s cross-examination strategy. In that respect, the letter does not clearly implicate
Sergeant Johnson or undercut his testimony. Likewise, Richie does not show that the letter
would have been admitted if counsel had offered it. Based on this record, Richie does not
show that counsel’s trial strategy was deficient or that he was actually prejudiced by his
counsel’s performance during cross-examination. It follows that Richie is not entitled to
relief on this claim.
8.
Failure to Raise a Hearsay Objection
Richie complains that his defense attorney was deficient because she did not raise an
objection to testimony given at trial by Sergeant Johnson about statements attributed to the
confidential informant. Those statements concerned information that was outlined in the
affidavit in support of Sergeant Johnson’s application for a search warrant. Richie objects,
in particular, to the following exchange between defense counsel and Sergeant Johnson about
whether information provided by the confidential source was stale and therefore insufficient
to demonstrate proximate cause:
DEFENSE: . . . [The confidential informant] advised that Jeffery Richie cooks
crack cocaine at the residence?
JOHNSON: Correct.
DEFENSE: Okay. Did he tell you how he knew that?
JOHNSON: No, not in here [in the affidavit].
DEFENSE: Did you ask him?
24
JOHNSON: Yes.
DEFENSE: Okay. But he didn’t tell you how he knew that?
JOHNSON: Said C.I. advised me [that he or she] saw Jeffery Richie cook crack
cocaine at the residence.
DEFENSE: Okay. I’m confused. Did you ask him how he knew that – him or her?
JOHNSON: The C.I. advised me that the C.I. was at the residence when Jeffery
Richie was cooking it.
DEFENSE: But as you already stated, he did not tell you when, correct?
JOHNSON: No.
DEFENSE: And you did not ask, correct?
JOHNSON: Correct.
Court Reporter’s Record, vol. 3, at 123-24. Richie contends that counsel should have
objected to Sergeant Johnson’s testimony about the information provided by his confidential
source because that information was inadmissible “hearsay.”
The respondent notes that the confidential informant’s statements to Sergeant Johnson
were not hearsay, which is defined as out-of-court statement offered into evidence to prove
the truth of the matter asserted.5 In Texas, testimony by a police officer may include out-ofcourt statements made by a confidential informant to show how the defendant became the
focus of a police investigation. Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402, 406-07 (Tex. Crim.
5
Under the Texas Rules of Evidence, “hearsay” is defined as “a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove
the truth of the matter asserted.” TEX. R. EVID. 801(d). In this context, the “matter asserted”
includes “any matter explicitly asserted, and any matter implied by a statement if the
probative value of the statement as offered flows from the declarant’s belief as to the
matter.” Id. at 801(c).
25
App. 2005). In that regard, “testimony by an officer that he went to a certain place or
performed a certain act in response to generalized ‘information received’ is normally not
considered hearsay because the witness should be allowed to give some explanation of his
behavior.” Id. at 408 n.21. By contrast, “details of the information received are considered
hearsay and are inadmissible — unless the officer’s conduct has been challenged, for
instance, as lacking probable cause.” Id. at 408 n.21.
The record confirms that Sergeant Johnson’s testimony was solicited by defense
counsel to determine whether the information that he received from the confidential
informant was adequate to support a finding of probable cause. See Court Reporter’s
Record, vol. 3, at 110-44; vol. 4, at 1-19. Defense counsel’s effort to challenge the validity
of the search warrant was required in order to place the issue before the jury. See Madden
v. State, 242 S.W.3d 504, 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (outlining the criteria for a jury
instruction on whether evidence was lawfully seized under art. 38.23(a) of the Texas Code
of Criminal Procedure). Richie does not allege or show otherwise. Because Sergeant
Johnson was permitted to convey information that he received from the confidential
informant in support of the search warrant, Richie does not show that his counsel had a valid
objection to make. Absent a showing that counsel failed to raise a meritorious objection and
that the outcome would have been different, Richie fails to demonstrate deficient
performance or actual prejudice. See Parr, 472 F.3d at 256. It follows that Richie does not
demonstrate a valid claim for ineffective assistance of counsel and he is not entitled to relief
on this claim.
26
9.
Failure to Raise Objections During Closing Argument
Richie complains that his defense attorney was deficient because she failed to raise
objections during the prosecutor’s closing argument at the guilt/innocence phase of the trial.
In particular, Richie takes exception to the prosecutor’s characterization of his residence as
“a crack house.” Court Reporter’s Record, vol. 4, at 58. Richie’s argument is without merit
because he does not show that the prosecutor’s comment exceeded the boundaries of
permissible argument or that counsel had a valid objection to raise under Texas law.
In Texas, jury argument is considered proper if it falls within four general categories:
(1) summation of the evidence; (2) reasonable deduction from the evidence; (3) answer to
argument by opposing counsel; and (4) a plea for law enforcement. See Freeman v. State,
340 S.W.3d 717, 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing Brown v. State, 270 S.W.3d 564, 570
(Tex. Crim. App. 2008)). In making a plea for law enforcement, a prosecutor may argue the
relationship between a jury’s verdict and (1) the deterrence of crime in general; (2) the
deterrence of specific crimes; (3) the impact it will have on the community at large; or (4)
the impact it will have on narrower segments of the community (e.g., law enforcement
officers, highway drivers, women, or children). See Borjan v. State, 787 S.W.2d 53, 55-56
(Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
The record reflects that the prosecutor’s comment was made during his summation
of the items recovered from Richie’s residence. The prosecutor’s characterization was also
reasonable deduction from this evidence, which showed that Richie was manufacturing and
selling crack cocaine from a residence that was dilapidated in appearance and, according to
27
testimony from officers who conducted the search, had electricity, but no running water. In
addition, by asking jurors to close down Richie’s sale of crack in the neighborhood, the
prosecutor’s comment was arguably made in connection with a plea to law enforcement
within the community. Based on this record, Richie does not show that the prosecutor
engaged in improper argument or that his counsel had a valid objection to make.
Alternatively, even if the prosecutor’s comment was inappropriate, counsel’s failure
to object cannot be faulted here. The Fifth Circuit has recognized that whether to object
during closing argument is a matter of trial strategy, which is ill-suited to second-guessing.
Drew v. Collins, 964 F.2d 411, 423 (5th Cir. 1992). Where the objection proposed by a
defendant has only dubious merit, at best, an attorney may make a strategic choice to forego
such an objection to avoid antagonizing the jury. See Wiley v. Puckett, 969 F.2d 86, 102 (5th
Cir. 1992); Spicer v. Cain, 2007 WL 4532221 (E.D. La. 2007) (noting that this is “especially
. . . true with respect to possible objections to a closing argument, which jurors are instructed
not to view as evidence”). Richie does not demonstrate a valid ineffective-assistance claim
based on his attorney’s failure to raise an objection during the prosecutor’s closing argument.
Accordingly, Richie is not entitled to relief on this claim.
10.
Failure to Investigate or Present Mitigating Evidence
Richie complains that his defense attorney was deficient because she failed to prepare
for the sentencing phase of the trial by researching his social history. Richie asserts,
therefore, that his attorney failed to present mitigating evidence on his behalf. As noted
above, a habeas corpus petitioner who alleges a failure to investigate on the part of his
28
counsel must state with specificity what the investigation would have revealed and how it
would have changed the outcome of his trial. See Miller, 420 F.3d at 361 (citing Green, 882
F.2d at 1003). Richie does not offer any facts showing what additional investigation of his
social history would have shown. His conclusory allegations are insufficient to demonstrate
deficient performance or actual prejudice. See Day v. Quarterman, 566 F.3d 527, 540-41
(5th Cir. 2009); see also Lincecum v. Collins, 958 F.2d 1271, 1279 (5th Cir. 1992) (denying
habeas relief where petitioner “offered nothing more than the conclusory allegations in his
pleadings” to support claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present
evidence). Because Richie does not articulate facts in support of his claim, he does not
demonstrate that his counsel was deficient for failing to investigate or present mitigating
evidence. Therefore, Richie is not entitled to relief on this issue.
B.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel on Appeal
Richie contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel on appeal because
the attorney who was appointed initially (Philip Hundl) failed to assist him with filing a
proper motion for new trial. Richie argues further that his second appointed appellate
attorney (Ken Lipscombe) was deficient because he failed to (1) file a motion to abate the
appeal to pursue an out-of-time motion for new trial; (2) alert the trial court of the deadline
for filing a motion for new trial; or (3) raise claims concerning a violation of the
Confrontation Clause, a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and a challenge
to the sufficiency of the evidence. In addition, Richie argues that Lipscombe failed to
adequately brief a challenge to the trial court’s ruling on his motion to suppress.
29
A claim of ineffective assistance on appeal is governed by the above-referenced test
set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which requires the defendant to
establish both constitutionally deficient performance and actual prejudice. See Smith v.
Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 535-36 (1986). To establish that appellate counsel’s performance was
deficient in the context of an appeal, the defendant must show that his attorney was
objectively unreasonable in failing to find arguable issues to appeal — that is, that counsel
unreasonably failed to discover non-frivolous issues and raise them. Smith v. Robbins, 528
U.S. 259, 285 (2000). If the defendant succeeds in such a showing, then he must establish
actual prejudice by demonstrating a “reasonable probability” that, but for his counsel's
deficient performance, “he would have prevailed on his appeal.” Id.
The respondent notes that Richie’s appeal was abated to allow him an opportunity to
litigate an out-of-time motion for new trial. The trial court considered that motion following
a hearing. See Court Reporter’s Record, Hearing, March 11, 2009. Therefore, Richie cannot
claim that he was denied the opportunity to file a motion for new trial as a result of his
attorney’s deficient performance or that counsel failed to abate the appeal so that Richie
could submit his motion for new trial.
With respect to his remaining claims, Richie does not demonstrate that any of the
proposed grounds had merit or that counsel failed to raise a non-frivolous argument on
appeal. The right to counsel on appeal “does not include the right to bring a frivolous appeal
and, concomitantly, does not include the right to counsel for bringing a frivolous appeal.”
Robbins, 528 U.S. at 278. In that respect, “[t]he Constitution does not require appellate
30
counsel to raise every nonfrivolous ground that might be pressed on appeal.” Ellis v.
Lynaugh, 873 F.2d 830, 840 (5th Cir. 1989); see also Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751
(1983) (observing that there is no “constitutional right to compel appointed counsel to press
nonfrivolous points requested by the client, if counsel, as a matter of professional judgment,
decides not to present those points”). To the contrary, counsel’s failure to raise an issue on
appeal will be considered deficient performance only when that decision “fall[s] below an
objective standard of reasonableness.” United States v. Reinhart, 357 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir.
2004) (citing United States v. Williamson, 183 F.3d 458, 462 (5th Cir.2000)). This standard
only requires counsel “to research relevant facts and law, or make an informed decision that
certain avenues will not prove fruitful.” Id.
The appellate brief filed by Richie’s appellate attorney reflects that he raised several
carefully chosen issues concerning the trial court’s evidentiary ruling on the motion to
suppress as well as the trial court’s decision to deny Richie’s request for the identity of the
confidential informant. In light of the drugs and drug paraphernalia recovered during the
search of his residence, Richie does not show that his appellate attorney was deficient for
failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. Richie does not demonstrate that a Brady
violation occurred in his case or that he was denied the right to confront and cross-examine
a witness. Richie does not demonstrate that his appellate attorney failed to discover and raise
a non-frivolous issue during his appeal. Based on this record, Richie does not show that his
appellate attorney was deficient.
31
Absent a showing that his appellate attorney was deficient or that he was actually
prejudiced as a result, Richie fails to demonstrate that he was denied effective assistance of
counsel on appeal. Likewise, Richie fails to show that the state court’s decision to reject his
ineffective-assistance claim was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Supreme Court precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Therefore, Richie
is not entitled to relief on this issue. Because Richie has failed to establish that any of his
claims merit relief, the respondent is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law and
the petition must be dismissed.
IV.
PETITIONER’S MOTIONS
A.
Discovery
Richie has filed a motion for discovery [Doc. # 22]. In that motion he proposes a
series of interrogatories and he requests leave to take depositions of Wharton County District
Attorney Josh McCown and Assistant District Attorney Gordon Dudley, who prosecuted his
case. The questions proposed by Richie pertain to allegations of misconduct by the
prosecution or by law enforcement personnel in connection with the confidential informant
who provided information in Richie’s case. Richie presents other questions about his
counsel’s failure to impeach testimony given by Sergeant Johnson.
Because Richie filed his request for discovery after the respondent submitted a motion
for summary judgment, this motion is governed by Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which authorizes a continuance to conduct discovery under certain circumstances.
Under Rule 56(d)(2), a district court may grant a continuance to “allow time to obtain
32
affidavits or declarations or to take discovery,” if the party opposing a motion for summary
judgment shows by affidavit or declaration that it cannot present facts essential to justify its
opposition. Richie does not provide an affidavit or sworn statement in support of his request
for discovery. He does not otherwise show that a continuance to conduct discovery is
warranted.
Motions for a continuance to conduct discovery to oppose summary judgment are
“generally favored, and should be liberally granted.” Stearns Airport Equip. Co. v. FMC
Corp., 170 F.3d 518, 534 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing International Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc.,
939 F.2d 1257, 1267 (5th Cir. 1991)). To justify a continuance, however, the movant must
demonstrate (1) why he needs additional discovery, and (2) how the additional discovery will
likely create a genuine issue of material fact. See Stearns Airport Equip., 170 F.3d at 534-35
(citing Krim v. BancTexas Group, Inc., 989 F.2d 1435, 1442 (5th Cir. 1993)). Specific facts
are required to support an extension of time to seek discovery in this context. In that regard,
the movant “must be able to demonstrate how postponement and additional discovery will
allow him to defeat summary judgment; it is not enough to ‘rely on vague assertions that
discovery will produce needed, but unspecified, facts.’” Stearns Airport Equip., 170 F.3d at
535 (quoting Washington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 901 F.2d 1281, 1285 (5th Cir. 1990) (citation
omitted)).
Importantly, Rule 56(d) and the other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply only to
the extent that they are not inconsistent with any statutory provisions or the rules governing
federal habeas corpus review. See 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, Rule 12 of the Rules Governing
33
§ 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. Under these rules, discovery is limited in
habeas corpus proceedings. In particular, “Rule 6 of the Rules Governing § 2254 cases
permits discovery only if and only to the extent that the district court finds good cause.”
Murphy v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 809, 814 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Hill v. Johnson, 210 F.3d
481, 487 (5th Cir. 2000). “Good cause” may be found when a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus “establishes a prima facie claim for relief.” Murphy, 205 F.3d at 814. Before
authorizing discovery, the Court must first conclude that the specific allegations in the
petition “show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully developed, be
able to demonstrate that he is confined illegally and is therefore entitled to relief.” Id. In that
regard, petitioner’s factual allegations “must be specific, as opposed to merely speculative
or conclusory, to justify discovery.” Id. “Simply put, Rule 6 does not authorize fishing
expeditions.” Id.; see also Ward v. Whitley, 21 F.3d 1355, 1367 (5th Cir. 1994).
The record shows that Richie had an opportunity to litigate issues concerning the
validity of the search warrant prior to and during his trial. Richie also raised numerous
objections on direct appeal and state habeas corpus review regarding the search of his
residence. As noted above, the Supreme Court has recently emphasized that federal habeas
corpus review “is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the
claim on the merits.” Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1398; see also Pape v. Thaler, 645 F.3d 281,
288 (5th Cir. 2011) (concluding that the district court was barred from conducting an
evidentiary hearing under Pinholster). To the extent that Richie’s claims were adjudicated
34
on the merits in state court, “he must overcome the limitation of § 2254(d)(1) on the record
that was before the state court.” Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1400.
Richie does not allege specific facts showing that discovery is justified by good cause
as required by Rule 6 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. See Murphy, 205 F.3d at
814 (5th Cir. 2000). More importantly, Richie does not demonstrate a sufficient connection
between the requested materials and the substantive claims for relief that he raises in his
petition. Thus, the proposed discovery does not warrant a continuance under Rule 56(d) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, the motion for discovery will be denied.
B.
Evidentiary Hearing
Richie also has filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing [Doc. # 23]. To the extent
that Richie failed to develop any facts related to his claims in state court, the decision
whether to hold an evidentiary hearing is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Under this
statute, if an applicant “failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court
proceedings,” then the federal habeas corpus court “shall not hold an evidentiary hearing”
on the claim unless the applicant shows that:
(A)
the claim relies on —
(I)
(ii)
(B)
a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on
collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously
unavailable; or
a factual predicate that could not have been previously
discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and
the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear
and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable
35
fact-finder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying
offense.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Richie fails to show that he is entitled to a hearing under this statute.
Likewise, he has not shown that the state court’s decision to deny relief on any of his claims
resulted in an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
The decision whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing is committed to this Court’s
discretion. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000) (stating that it was “Congress’
intent to avoid unneeded evidentiary hearings in federal habeas corpus” proceedings);
Robinson v. Johnson, 151 F.3d 256, 268 (5th Cir. 1998). An evidentiary hearing is not
required if there are “no relevant factual disputes that would require development in order
to assess the claims.” Robinson, 151 F.3d at 268. This court has been able to resolve all
issues raised in this case by referring to the pleadings, the state court records, including the
trial transcripts and exhibits. Richie’s request for an evidentiary hearing is therefore denied.
V.
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Because the habeas corpus petition filed in this case is governed by the AEDPA,
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2253, a certificate of appealability is required before an appeal may
proceed. See Hallmark v. Johnson, 118 F.3d 1073, 1076 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that actions
filed under either 28 U.S.C. § 2254 or § 2255 require a certificate of appealability). “This
is a jurisdictional prerequisite because the COA statute mandates that ‘[u]nless a circuit
justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court
of appeals . . . .’” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (citing 28 U.S.C.
36
§ 2253(c)(1)). Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases now requires a district
court to issue or deny a certificate of appealability when entering a final order that is adverse
to the petitioner.
A certificate of appealability will not issue unless the petitioner makes “a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), which requires a
petitioner to demonstrate “that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment
of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282
(2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). Under the controlling
standard, this requires a petitioner to show “that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or,
for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or
that the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.’”
Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336. Where denial of relief is based on procedural grounds, the
petitioner must show not only that “jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the
petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right,” but also that they “would
find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack, 529
U.S. at 484.
A district court may deny a certificate of appealability, sua sponte, without requiring
further briefing or argument. See Alexander v. Johnson, 211 F.3d 895, 898 (5th Cir. 2000).
The Court concludes that reasonable jurists would not debate whether the petition should
have been resolved in a different manner. Likewise, the Court concludes that jurists of
reason would not debate whether any procedural ruling in this case was correct or whether
37
the petitioner has stated a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Therefore, a
certificate of appealability will not issue.
VI.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1.
The respondent’s motion for summary judgment [Doc. # 20] is GRANTED.
2.
The petitioner’s motions for discovery and for an evidentiary hearing [Docs.
# 22, # 23] are DENIED.
3.
The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED, and this case is
DISMISSED with prejudice.
4.
A certificate of appealability is DENIED.
The Clerk shall provide a copy of this order to the parties.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on March 28, 2012.
NANCY F. ATLAS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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