Lara v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Filing
2
Memorandum and Recommendation : recommending that the Government's Motion to Dismiss be Granted; and that the Movants Motion to Vacate be Denied.(Signed by Magistrate Judge Frances H Stacy) Parties notified.(bwhite, )
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
V.
J. JESUS ALVAREZ LARA,
Defendant-Movant
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CRIMINAL ACTION NO. H-10-96
CIVIL ACTION NO. H-11-2744
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Magistrate Judge in this federal habeas corpus proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§2255 is Movant J. Jesus Alvarez Lara’s §2255 Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence
(Document No. 50),1), the United States’ Response and Motion to Dismiss Movant’s §2255 Motion
(Document No. 52, 53), and Movant’s Response to the United States’ Motion to Dismiss § 2255
Motion (Document No. 54). After reviewing Movant’s §2255 Motion, the Government’s Response
and Motion to Dismiss, Movant’s Response to the Government’s Motion to Dismiss, the record of
the proceedings before the District Court in the underlying criminal case and on appeal, and the
applicable case law, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS, for the reasons set forth below, that the
Government’s Motion to Dismiss (Document No. 53) be GRANTED, and that Movant J. Jesus
Alvarez Lara’s §2255 Motion (Document No. 50) be DENIED.
I.
Procedural History
Movant J. Jesus Alvarez Lara (“Lara”), who is currently in the custody of the United States
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J. Jesus Alvarez Lara’s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence can be found at
Document No. 1 in Civil Action H-11-2744 and at Document No. 50 in Criminal Action No. H10-96.
Bureau of Prisons, is seeking federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. §2255. This is Lara’s first
attempt at §2255 relief.
On February 24, 2010, Lara was charged by Indictment with illegal reentry by a previously
deported alien after an aggravated felony conviction in violation of 8 U.S.C. §1326(a) and (b)(1).
(Document No. 1). On April 9, 2010, Lara pleaded guilty, without a written plea agreement, to the
Indictment.
Prior to sentencing, a pre-sentence investigation report (“PSR”) was prepared to which Lara
filed written objections. (Document Nos.19, 20, 22, 24, 27). Lara objected to his second conviction
for drug possession being characterized as an aggravated felony, which under U.S.S.G.
§2L1.2(b)(1)(C) resulted in an eight level enhancement of his base offense level. Lara argued that
the Fifth Circuit decision that had been relied on to support the eight level enhancement had been
reversed by the United States Supreme Court in Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S.Ct. 2577
(2010). According to Lara, because he had not been convicted of an aggravated felony but only
simple felonies, his base offense level should have been increased by four levels not eight levels.
The Probation Office agreed with Lara’s objection and filed an Addendum to the PSR. Pursuant to
the Addendum, Lara had a base offense level of 8 under U.S.S.G. §2L1.2(a). Lara’s base offense
level was increased by four levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. §2L1.2(b)(1)(D). Because Lara accepted
responsibility for his activities, his offense level was reduced by two levels. With an offense level
of 10, and a criminal history category of VI, Lara had an advisory guideline sentencing range of 24
to 30 months.
Lara was sentenced on July 16, 2010. The Government argued for a sentence at the high end
of the advisory guideline range, or in the alternative, for a departure under 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)
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because of his lengthy criminal history and concern for public safety. In contrast, Lara’s counsel
argued for a sentence at the low end of the advisory guideline sentencing range.
Mr. Gallagher: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you. I’d urge the Court to impose a
sentence at the low end of the guidelines in this matter. One, as I’m sure you noticed,
Mr. — I do ask the Court to take into account Mr. Alvarez has spent about six weeks
in Immigration custody prior to coming to custody of the Marshals, as reflected on
the first page of the PSR.
The PSR reflects a number of convictions, as well as arrests which did not lead in
conviction (sic). I do want to point out the timing on those. More than half of his
criminal history points in almost all of those arrests are from more than ten years ago.
And Mr. Alvarez’ conduct has changed dramatically from the 1990s to 2000. And,
for instance, the Court, the PSR applied (sic) found that he had about 13 criminal
history points, and only five of those were from the past ten years. The others are
from longer ago than that because he admits being in the country for some period of
time. His older convictions count. But, nonetheless, I’d urge the Court to impose a
sentence at the low end in light of his diminished criminal conduct in the past decade.
He’s only been deported once, and he is — he is a 50-year old man, and that maturity
has come about his – the dampening down of his arrest and arrest of the police (sic).
The Court: When he was found in the United States, he was in custody; correct?
Mr. Gallagher: Yes, Your Honor. Yes, Your honor.
The Court: What was he charged with?
Mr. Gallagher: It was endangering a child, Your Honor, to which he received 120
days in jail. The PSR describes that he had --The Court: A child on a bicycle, or he was holding a child while riding a bicycle
while intoxicated.
Mr. Gallagher: Exactly, Your Honor. Exactly. Right. And, like I said, he gets
points for those, and then another conviction in 2009 and 2004. But all of those
before that, all of the other things he gets points for are from 1994 and earlier, which
is what puts him up in Category 6.
So in light of the timing and age of some of these convictions, I’d urge the Court to
impose a sentence in the low end of the guidelines in this matter.
The Court: Mr. Smith?
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Mr. Smith: Your Honor, I’m going to ask for the exact opposite, something on the
high end. And if the Court were inclined to go outside of the guidelines, I think that
it would be appropriate in this case based upon 18 USC §3553A, and here is why.
I take a totally different look, as far as Mr. Lara’s criminal history in the 90's, and
even going into the 2000s, he had at least 11 unajudicated public intoxicated arrests
(sic). Some of them we don’t know what happened with those. This most recent
arrest for riding a bicycle holding a child, because you need to go get some more
beers and you’re intoxicated with a child on a bike with a ten-month old child is
totally in line with a public intoxication arrest, the 11 that he had and we don’t even
know what happened with those.
With a person that has this issue in their lives or life with drinking alcohol and not
being allowed to drink that, my concern is public safety. And in the event he comes
back and he decides to get on another bike or get behind the wheel of a car and drive
and drink, the consequences could be potentially disastrous. And I think, looking at
the totality of his criminal history, I think the Court can take into account if he were
to come back, deterrence, what is in the interest of public safety, his criminal history.
Although he doesn’t have a very extensive deportation history, I think that his
criminal history speaks for itself, and that’s, in essence, a clear window, as far as
what he would do if he were to come back to the United States.
Therefore, I would ask for a sentence at the top end of the guidelines of 30 months.
And I rest.
The Court: Do you want to respond to that?
Mr. Gallagher: Well, briefly, I do want— obviously, Mr. Alvarez has an issue with
alcohol which was most severe in the ‘90s. I do want to emphasize the prosecutor
raises the issue of drunk driving. That — the only indication I see of that is from
1988. And while he obviously has public intoxication issues since then, the use of
a car I don’t see suggested. He has driven, but he has not been charged with any
drunk driving offenses, even as a charge, much less as a conviction, for more than 20
years. So I think the drunk driving concern is overstated.
He is someone who obviously has had an alcohol problem throughout his life, and
it likely persists. With that said, as I said, his has a somewhat limited deportation
history. He’s been deported only once. He’s going to serve a substantial period of
time in jail now, regardless of whether the Court follows my recommendation or the
prosecution’s recommendation. And we’ve discussed, he understands he cannot
come back to the United States, and this will deter him from coming back to the
interest of the United States (sic). And further deterrence of misconduct upon
expecting his return is diminished, Your Honor.
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The Court: Mr. Lara, is there anything you’d like to say before I pronounce
sentence?
The Defendant: The only thing I can say about alcohol is I never had a father or
mother to guide me. I grew up on the streets, and when I arrived here I just drank and
I did drugs. And I worked all the time. I’ve always worked. I’ve never assaulted
anyone, I’ve never taken anything from anyone. I work. I work to survive. I work
to live. I’m an upholsterer, and that’s what I work as. I learned to do that kind of
work here, and that’s my job. That’s it. (Document No. 39, pp. 5-9).
On July 16, 2010, Lara was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 46 months, to be followed by
a 3 year term of supervised release. (Document No. 28, Transcript of Sentencing Hearing,
Document No. 39, p 12). Judgment was entered on July 27, 2010. (Document No. 30). With
respect to Lara’s sentence, Judge Harmon stated:
J. Jesus Alvarez is before the Court for sentencing after entering a plea of guilty to
one count involving illegal reentry by a previously deported alien after a felony
conviction. He has previously been deported at least one time without prosecution.
He accepts responsibility for the offense and he expressed remorse for having
engaged in continued illegal activity. He has a history of illegal entry and reentry
into the United States, as well as extensive criminal history which includes
possession of marijuana, driving while intoxicated, driving while his license is
suspended, disorderly conduct, theft by check, resisting arrest, possession of a
controlled substance, criminal mischief, theft and endangering a child.
I don’t hear that — I don’t hear from him any kind of indication that he won’t
continue this drinking, that obviously it is the problem. The problem is causing
virtually all his criminal activities. I don’t believe that he’s — I believe there’s a
very, very high chance of his reentering the United States again. His family is here
and it’s just very troubling. I really feel sorry for him, Mr. Lara. I think it’s a very
sad case. This particular conviction by my math is 17, criminal convictions.
I have considered Part E, factors that may warrant departure, Part E of the presentece
report, and I believe that Mr. Lara’s criminal history category substantially under
represents the seriousness of his criminal history and the likelihood that he will
commit other crimes. I reached this conclusion upon consideration of the nature and
to the extent of his past criminal conduct.
His conduct has demonstrated a disregard and indifference to others and law
enforcement. No sanction has had any impact on deterring him from this criminal
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lifestyle, and it’s therefore unlikely he would be deterred in the future without a more
serious punishment than that previously imposed for prior crimes.
Pursuant to the United States Sentencing Guidelines Section A — I’m sorry—
Section 4A1.3a(A)(4)(A), the Court will add, moving down the sentencing table, I’m
going to add a total of four offense levels, making his total offense level 14. And, of
course, his criminal history category remains a 6. I believe that this is a more
appropriate offense level in this case. And the guideline imprisonment range would
therefore be 37 to 46 months.
I believe that a sentence at the high end of that range is warranted due to the
likelihood of his committing future crimes. I’ve considered the guidelines and find
that a sentence within those, while I departed from the guidelines incrementally along
the table and find a sentence within the new guidelines is consistent with and takes
into account the purposes of 18 United States Code Section 3585A. And his sentence
will address specifically the goals of punishment, the protection of the public and
deterrence, and is sufficient and necessary but not greater than necessary to comply
with the purposes of the statutory sentencing framework of the provisions of 18
United States Code Section 3585A. (Document No. 39, p. 9-11).
Lara appealed his sentence to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. (Document No.36). The
Fifth Circuit affirmed the Court’s upward departure of Lara’s sentence. (Document No. 47, 48).
The Fifth Circuit wrote:
J. Jesus Alvarez Lara (Alvarez) pleaded guilty to illegal reentry by a previously
deported alien and was sentenced to 46 months of imprisonment and three years of
supervised release. He now appeals his sentence, which was based on a upward
departure under U.S.S.G. §4A1.3, arguing that the facts did not warrant an upward
departure and that the sentence was greater than necessary to achieve the goals of 18
U.S.C. §3553(a).
We review Alvarez’s sentence for reasonableness. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007); United States v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 517 F.3d 751, 764 (5th Cir.
2008). Reasonableness review, in the context of a guidelines departure, requires this
court to evaluate both the decision to depart upward and the extent of the departure
for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Zuniga-Peralta, 442 F.3d 345, 347 (5th
Cir. 2006). An upward departure is not an abuse of discretion if the reasons for the
departure advance the objectives of §3553(a) and are justified by the particular facts
of the case. Id.
Given Alvarez’s extensive criminal record and the lack of deterrent effect from prior
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lenient sentences, the district court did not abuse its discretion by upwardly departing
based upon its finding that Alvarez’s criminal history under-represented the
seriousness of his criminal history and the likelihood that he would recidivate. See
§3553(a); Zuniga-Peralta, 442 F.3d at 347; United States v. Brantley, 537 F.3d 347,
349-50 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Simkanin.420 F.3d 397, 418 n. 24 (5th Cir.
2005); United States v. Pennington, 9 F.3d 1116, 1118 (5th Cir. 1993). Additionally,
Alvarez has not shown that the district court erred in determining the extent of the
departure. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51; Zuniga-Peralta, 442 F.3d at 347-48. Following
the direction of §4A1.3(a)(4)(B), because Alvarez was already in the highest criminal
history category, the district court moved incrementally down the Sentencing Table
from a total offense level of ten to an offense level of 14; a total offense level of 14
with a criminal history category of VI yielded a new advisory sentencing guidelines
range of 37 to 46 months imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A, Sentencing
Table. The district court determined that 46 months was the most appropriate and
reasonable sentence for Alvarez. This 46-month sentence was 16 months greater
than the high-end of the guidelines sentence range applicable without the upward
departure. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A, Sentencing Table. This court has affirmed
similar and more substantial departures. See Zuniga-Peralta, 442 F.3d at 346-48;
United States v. Lee, 358 F.3d 315, 328-29 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v.
McKenzie, 991 F.2d 203, 205 n. 7, 206 n. 8 (5th Cir. 1993). (Document No. 48).
II. Discussion
Within one year of his conviction being final, Lara timely filed a §2255 Motion to Vacate,
Set Aside, or Correct Sentence (Document No. 50). Lara challenges the upward departure imposed
at sentencing. He also raises claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. According to Lara, his
counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to argue that Lara had not been convicted of any
aggravated offenses that would have denied him lawful entry into the United States. Lara suggests
that counsel could have and should have relied on Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S.Ct. 2577
(2010) and argued that “Mr. Lara in accordance with Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit precedence
was defined as part of “the people” who has come to the United States voluntarily and accepted some
societal obligations” (Document No. 54) and argue that his criminal history was the equivalent of
a misdemeanor offense and that his sentence should not have been enhanced. Lara also argues that
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counsel failed to object to his criminal history and failed to argue at sentencing that his criminal
history was related to his alcohol use.
The Government, in its Motion to Dismiss (Document No. 53) argues that Lara’s §2255
Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence should be dismissed because Lara is not entitled
to relief. According to the Government, Lara cannot challenge the Court’s application of the
sentencing guidelines in a §2255 proceeding, and further argues that even assuming that such a claim
was cognizable, the issue was raised in his direct appeal. As to Lara’s ineffective assistance of
claims, the Government argues that Lara has not shown that his counsel was deficient nor has he
shown he was prejudiced.
Lara was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 46 months. He had an advisory guideline
range of 24 to 30 months but the Court departed upward by 16 months under U.S.S.G. §4A1.3(a)(1).
Lara challenges his sentence, which he contends is too severe because the majority of his prior
convictions resulted from his problems with alcohol abuse.
The law is clear that alleged
misapplications of the Sentencing Guidelines are not cognizable in a §2255 motion. United States
v. Williamson, 183 F.3d 458, 462 (5th Cir. 1999). In addition, even assuming that Lara could pursue
such a claim in a §2255 proceeding, “issues raised and disposed of in a previous appeal from a
judgment of conviction are not considered.” United States v. Kalish, 780 F.2d 506, 508 (5th Cir. ),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1118 (1986); United States v. Rocha, 109 F.3d 225, 229 (5th Cir. 1997).
Lara appealed his sentence to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Fifth Circuit found that the
Court had not abused its discretion by upwardly departing. Given the Fifth Circuit’s determination,
Lara cannot re-litigate this claim through his §2255 motion.
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are generally measured by the standard of
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Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under Strickland, a petitioner must be able to show
that his counsel was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced him to the extent that a fair trial
could not be had. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Deficiency is judged by an objective reasonableness
standard, with great deference given to counsel and a presumption that the disputed conduct is
reasonable. Id. at 687-88. The prejudice element requires a petitioner to prove that absent the
disputed conduct of counsel, the outcome would have been both different and more favorable. Id.
at 694-95. Under Strickland, a petitioner must establish both deficiency and prejudice prongs to be
entitled to habeas relief. The failure to establish either deficient performance or prejudice makes it
unnecessary to examine the other prong. United States v. Seyfert, 67 F.3d 544, 547 (5th Cir. 1995).
Under the deficiency prong of Strickland, judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance is
“highly deferential” and “a strong presumption” is made that “trial counsel rendered adequate
assistance and that the challenged conduct was the product of reasoned trial strategy.” Wilkerson
v. Collins, 950 F.2d 1054, 1064-65 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 921 (1993) (citing
Strickland). To overcome the presumption of competence, the petitioner “must identify the acts or
omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional
judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Under the prejudice prong of Strickland, a petitioner must
be able to establish that absent his counsel’s deficient performance, the result of his trial could have
been different. “An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting
aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.” Id. at 691.
Constitutionally effective assistance of counsel under Strickland is not errorless counsel. The
determination of whether counsel has rendered reasonably effective assistance turns on the totality
of facts in the entire record. Each case is judged in light of the number, nature, and seriousness of
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the charges against a defendant, the strength of the case against him, and the strength and complexity
of his possible defense. Baldwin v. Maggio, 704 F.2d 1325, 1329 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1220 (1984). The reasonableness of the challenged conduct is determined by viewing the
circumstances at the time of that conduct. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. “We will not find inadequate
representation merely because, with the benefit of hindsight, we disagree with counsel’s strategic
choices.” Kitchens v. Johnson, 190 F.3d 698, 701 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Green v. Johnson, 116
F.3d 1115, 1122 (5th Cir. 1997)). Conclusory allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel do not
raise a constitutional question in a federal habeas petition. Miller v. Johnson, 200 F.3d 274, 281 (5th
Cir), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 849 (2000) (citing Barnard v. Collins, 958 F.2d 634, 642 (5th Cir. 1992);
Ross v. Estelle, 694 F.2d 1008, 1012 (5th Cir. 1983)).
The United States Supreme Court in Harrington v. Richter, ___U.S.___, 131 S.Ct. 770, 778
(2011) recently discussed Strickland in the context of a habeas proceeding involving a state
conviction. While Harrington did not involve a federal habeas proceeding involving a federal
conviction, the Court’s discussion of Strickland and ineffective assistance of counsel claims is
instructive and equally applies to claims brought in a federal habeas proceeding such as those raised
herein.
With respect to ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the Court observed that “[t]here are,
[ ] ‘countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense
attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.’ Rare are the situations in which the
‘wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions’ will be limited to any one technique
or approach.” Id. at 788-89 (quoting from Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).
As a result, counsel’s
performance does not fall below that guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment where it can be shown that
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counsel formulated a strategy that was reasonable at the time and balanced limited resources with
effective trial tactics and strategies. Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 789. “Just as there is no expectation
that competent counsel will be a flawless strategist or tactician, an attorney may not be faulted for
a reasonable miscalculation or lack of foresight or for failing to prepare for what appear to be remote
possibilities.” Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 791. Moreover, “it is difficult to establish ineffective
assistance when counsel’s overall performance indicates active and capable advocacy.” Harrington,
131 S.Ct. at 791 (emphasis added). Finally, in considering the prejudice prong of Strickland, the
likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable. Id. at 791-792 (Citations
omitted). As a result, “‘[s]urmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.’” (quoting from
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. ___, ___, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010)). In part, because:
Unlike a later reviewing court, the attorney observed the relevant proceedings, knew
of materials outside the record, and interacted with the client, with opposing counsel,
and with the judge. It is “all too tempting” to “second-guess counsel’s assistance
after conviction or adverse sentence.” The question is whether an attorney’s
representation amounted to incompetence under “prevailing professional norms,” not
whether it deviated from best practices or most common custom.
Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 778 (citations omitted).
As to the specific examples of ineffective assistance of counsel which Lara cites to in support
of his ineffectiveness claim, such as that counsel could have and should have argued the applicability
of Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S.Ct. 2577 (2010), the record shows that counsel relied on
this holding in the written objections that were filed. (Document No. 19). The record further shows
that based on Lara’s objections to the PSR, the PSR was amended to reflect that Lara had not been
convicted of an aggravated felony but only simple felonies and as a result, a four level enhancement
applied and not an eight level enhancement. This lowered Lara’s advisory sentencing guideline
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range from 33 to 44 months to 24 to 30 months. Given that counsel made the arguments suggested
by Lara, he has not shown that any alleged error prejudiced him within the meaning of Strickland.
Lara also argues that counsel failed to object to his PSR on the ground that his prior
convictions used to determine his criminal history were “counseled convictions.” The PSR suggests
that with respect to Lara’s prior criminal convictions, he either was represented by counsel or had
waived his right to counsel. See Clark v. Collins, 19 F.3d 959, 966 (5th Cir. 1984) (“Failure to raise
meritless objections is not ineffective lawyering; it is the very opposite.”); United States v. Kimler,
167 F.3d 889, 893 (5th Cir. 1999) (“An attorney’s failure to raise a meritless argument cannot form
the basis of a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim because the result of the proceeding
would not have been different had the attorney raised the issue.”). As to Lara’s contention that
counsel failed to argue that his criminal history was absent any serious offenses and for the most part
was a result of alcohol abuse, the record shows that counsel argued this at the Sentencing Hearing.
(Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, Document No. 39, p. 5-6, 8-9). Counsel argued that Lara should
be sentenced at the low end of the advisory guideline range. In conclusion, Lara has offered no proof
of how counsel’s performance was objectively deficient, and no proof that such deficient
performance prejudiced him in any way. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
Based on the foregoing, it is
RECOMMENDED that the Government’s Motion to Dismiss Movant’s §2255 Motion
(Document No. 53) be GRANTED, and that Movant J. Jesus Alvarez Lara’s §2255 Motion to
Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence (Document No. 50) be DENIED.
The Clerk shall file this instrument and provide a copy to all counsel and unrepresented
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parties of record. Within 14 days after being served with a copy, any party may file written
objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(C), Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), and General Order 80-5, S.D.
Texas. Failure to file objections within such period shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking
factual findings on appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Ware v. King, 694 F.2d 89 (5th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 930 (1983); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982) (en
banc). Moreover, absent plain error, failure to file objections within the fourteen day period bars an
aggrieved party from attacking conclusions of law on appeal. Douglass v. United Services
Automobile Association, 79 F.3d 1415, 1429 (5th Cir. 1996). The original of any written objections
shall be filed with the United States District Clerk, P.O. Box 61010, Houston, Texas 77208.
Signed at Houston, Texas, this 29th day of March, 2012.
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