Mendez v. Anadarko Petroleum Corporation et al, No. 4:2010cv01755 - Document 43 (S.D. Tex. 2010)

Court Description: MEMORANDUM AND OPINION entered GRANTING 41 MOTION for Summary Judgment. Final judgment is entered by separate order. (Signed by Judge Lee H Rosenthal) Parties notified.(leddins, )

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ct.” Triple Tee Golf, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 485 F.3d 253, 261 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–25 (1986)). If the burden of proof at trial lies with the nonmoving party, the movant may satisfy its initial burden by “‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. While the party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, it does not need to negate the elements of the nonmovant’s case. Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). “A fact is ‘material’ if its resolution in favor of one party might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under governing law.” Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Tex., 560 F.3d 316, 326 (5th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). “If the moving party fails to meet [its] initial burden, the motion [for summary judgment] must be denied, regardless of the nonmovant’s response.” United States v. $92,203.00 in U.S. Currency, 537 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc)). When the moving party has met its Rule 56(a) burden, the nonmoving party cannot survive a summary judgment motion by resting on the mere allegations of its pleadings. The nonmovant must identify specific evidence in the record and articulate how that evidence supports that party’s claim. Baranowski v. Hart, 486 F.3d 112, 119 (5th Cir. 2007). “This burden will not be satisfied 9 by ‘some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, by conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence.’” Boudreaux, 402 F.3d at 540 (quoting Little, 37 F.3d at 1075). In deciding a summary judgment motion, the court draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Connors v. Graves, 538 F.3d 373, 376 (5th Cir. 2008). Anadarko argues that summary judgment is appropriate because it has paid all amounts due under the LHWCA, which bars suits by injured workers when employers comply with the Act. The LHCWA “provides nonseaman maritime workers . . . with no-fault workers’ compensation claims . . . against their employer . . . for injury and death.” Norfolk Shibuilding & Drydock Corp. v. Garris, 532 U.S. 811, 818 (2001). “Under the LHWCA, an injured worker is ordinarily barred from bringing a civil action against his or her employer.” Brown v. Forest Oil Corp., 29 F.3d 966, 970 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 905(a)). If an employer fails to pay the compensation required by the LHWCA, the employee’s right to sue is restored. Id. Anadarko submitted an affidavit by Gary Sylvester, one of its senior risk analysts. (Docket Entry No. 41-3). Sylvester stated that as of September 28, 2010, Mendez had “received approximately $133,246 in indemnity wages and $61,268 worth of paid medical care. To date, he continues to receive these benefits.” (Id. ¶ 3). Mendez does not dispute that he has received all benefits to which he is entitled under the LHWCA. The § 905(a) exclusivity provision applies. Anadarko is entitled to summary judgment. IV. Conclusion Anadarko’s motion for summary judgment is granted. Final judgment is entered by separate 10 order. SIGNED on December 20, 2010, at Houston, Texas. ______________________________________ Lee H. Rosenthal United States District Judge 11

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