Watson v. Dyersburg City Police Department et al, No. 2:2008cv02718 - Document 52 (W.D. Tenn. 2010)
Court Description: ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO SEVER 29 . Signed by Judge Samuel H. Mays, Jr., on April 12, 2010. (Mays, Samuel)
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Watson v. Dyersburg City Police Department et al Doc. 52 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE WESTERN DIVISION ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) THE CITY OF DYERSBURG, MASON ) “JOE” McDOWELL, CHRISTOPHER ) CLEMMONS, RUSSELL BURROWS, and ) ) STERLING WRIGHT, ) Defendants. ) ) TIMOTHY C. WATSON, No. 08-2718 ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO SEVER Before the Court is the November 9, 2009, Motion to Sever filed by Defendants the City of Dyersburg and Dyersburg Police Department Officers Mason “Joe” McDowell, Christopher Clemmons, Russell Burrows, and Sterling Wright. Plaintiff Timothy C. Watson’s Defendants argue that lawsuit raises allegations concerning three distinct incidents that are inappropriate for joinder into one action. of Their Motion to (See Defendants’ Memorandum in Support Sever at 4.) (“Defs’ Memo”) Watson, proceeding pro se, filed a response in opposition on November 20, 2009. (See Plaintiff’s Objections to Defendants’ Motion to Sever, Dkt. No. 31.) (“Pl.’s Resp.”) For the following reasons, the Court DENIES the Defendants’ Motion without prejudice to a Dockets.Justia.com future motion to sever any trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42. I. BACKGROUND Watson filed suit on October 15, 2008, alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights by arresting him without probable cause and using excessive force in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 See According to the Complaint, Watson attended a family birthday party held for a child on October 13, 2007. (Compl. at 3.) Watson was delivering clothes, presumably as a gift for the child. (Id.) As Watson walked into the home’s kitchen area, he alleges that Defendants McDowell and Wright approached him from behind and “jumped him,” causing Watson to fall to the ground. (Id.) McDowell and Wright allegedly choked Watson as he fell into the bathroom and struck him repeatedly with their fists and knees. (Id.) Officer Clemmons then arrived at the home and came to assist McDowell and Wright. (Id.) upward. Wright placed his knee in Watson’s back, forcing his body McDowell and Clemmons then began to strike Watson about the face while Wright added body blows. (Id. at 4.) point managed Watson, 1 during who this was commotion, then officers subjected to a “burst” This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343. 2 of At some to handcuff a chemical substance in his face.2 (Id.) Officers later transported Watson to the Dyersburg jail. On October 19, 2007, officers drove Watson to and from state court for a hearing. to the transport outside. wagon, (Id.) While officers walked Watson McDowell allegedly followed Watson Once Watson was secured inside the wagon, McDowell smiled at Watson, pointed his finger at Watson as though it were a handgun, and pulled the “trigger.” inference was clear: earlier altercation. To Watson the (Id.) Watson had been shot five times in an McDowell’s gesture appeared to signal that Watson was in danger of similar harm. (Id.) The final incident allegedly occurred several months later on February 20, 2008, when members of Department once again arrested Watson. the Dyersburg (Id.) Police After stopping the vehicle in which he was riding, officers threw Watson face down onto the ground in front of his three-year-old daughter. (Id.) Defendant Burrows then placed his knee on the back of Plaintiff’s neck. Watson asserts that he quickly spread his arms and told the officer, “I’m not resisting.” (Id. at 4-5.) Nonetheless, Clemmons, who apparently was with Burrows, sprayed Watson in his mouth with a chemical agent. 2 The Complaint refers to the chemical as “several burst[s] of freeze.” (Compl. at 4.) 3 II. ANALYSIS Defendants’ Motion argues that Watson has inappropriately joined what should be three separate legal actions into one. (Defs’ Memo at 1.) Because the three incidents involve three distinct factual scenarios, they argue, it is inappropriate and prejudicial to join them together for adjudication. 6.) (Id. at 4- Plaintiff responds that he appropriately grouped all of his claims into one lawsuit because each of the Defendant officers is a member of the Dyersburg Drug Task Force, which he alleges wrongfully profiled and targeted him for harassment and arrest. (Pl.’s Resp. at 1-2.) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 governs the parties a plaintiff may join in an action. Persons . . . defendants if: may be It provides that: joined in one action as (A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact defendants will arise in the action Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). common to all Rule 20 promotes the dual values of trial convenience and efficiency by allowing the maximum number of related Mosley v. claims Gen. to Motors be adjudicated Corp., 497 contemporaneously. F.2d 1330, 1332 (8th See Cir. 1974); Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. 11C Music, 202 F.R.D. 229, 231 4 (M.D. Tenn. 2001). 20 allows possible for scope parties.” Thus, the Supreme Court has held that Rule district of courts action to “entertain[] consistent with the broadest fairness to the United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 140 F.3d 442, 446 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that the factors for exercising supplemental 1367). jurisdiction are now controlled by 28 U.S.C. § Joinder of all related claims is “strongly encouraged.” Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 724. Rule 20, however, does not allow any and all claims against the same defendants to be joined. have fashioned joinder is a two-part appropriate. test See Interpreting the Rule, courts to determine Mosley, Bridgeport Music, 202 F.R.D. at 231. when 497 F.2d permissive at 1333; First, the right to relief against each Defendant must arise out of the same transaction or occurrence. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(A); Demboski v. CSX Transp., 157 F.R.D. 28, 29 (S.D. Miss. 1994). There is no bright-line rule for determining whether the events in question involve the same transaction; courts apply the test on a caseby-case basis. Mosley, 497 F.2d at 1333; Bridgeport Music, 202 F.R.D. at 231; Demboski, 157 F.R.D. at 29. The first prong prevents the joinder of “wholly unrelated” claims. See Michaels Bldg. Co. v. Ameritrust Co., 848 F.2d 674, 682 (6th Cir. 1988). 5 “[A]ll reasonably related claims different parties” may be joined. for relief by or against Mosley, 497 F.2d at 1333. Here, Watson alleges three incidents where members of the Dyersburg Drug Task and/or assault. Force allegedly targeted him for arrest Two of Watson’s claims involve incidents that occurred only six days apart in October 2007, during and shortly after Watson’s October 13, 2007 arrest. (See Compl. at 3-4.) The close temporal proximity and involvement of Officer McDowell in both incidents will implicate similar factual issues such that the two claims clearly involve one transaction or occurrence for purposes of Rule 20. The more difficult issue is whether Watson’s third claim, alleging that Officers Burrows and Clemmons used excessive force during the transaction February or 20, 2008 arrest, occurrence. (See is Compl. part at of the 4-5.) same The substantial time gap – four months – militates toward a finding that the third claim is not part of the same transaction or occurrence as the first two. However, Watson’s Complaint alleges that the Dyersburg Drug Task Force, of which all four officer Defendants were arrest and harassment. members, wrongfully targeted him (Id. at 3-5; Pl.’s Resp. at 1.) for This allegation links the alleged incidents, making them “reasonably related” and arguably part of the same transaction. 497 F.2d at 1333. 6 See Mosley, Courts have interpreted the transaction requirement more leniently when there is an allegation of a common pattern of discrimination. See Demboski, 157 F.R.D. at 29-30 & n.1 (discussing this trend); see also United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 142-43 (1965) (viewing claims against six county voter registrars as part of the same transaction or occurrence rather than as “individual torts” when the federal government alleged a common pattern of discrimination in enforcing state voter registration laws); Mosley, 497 F.2d at 1333 (allowing ten plaintiffs together to proceed because they with claims alleged their against General employer had Motors “the same general policy of discrimination” on the basis of race and sex). At this early stage of the litigation and with an allegation that members of the Dyersburg Drug Task Force acted in concert with one another to deny Plaintiff his civil rights, the Court is reluctant to conclude that Plaintiff’s allegations do not arise from the same transaction or occurrence. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 724 (noting that joinder is “strongly encouraged”). The Court, therefore, finds that Watson has met the first prong of Rule 20’s test for permissive joinder. The second requirement for joinder is that there must be some common 20(a)(2)(B). question of law or fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. The Rule does not require that all of the legal or factual issues be the same; a showing that some significant 7 legal or factual questions overlap is sufficient. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(B) (joinder allowed if “any question of law or fact [is] common” (emphasis added)); Mosley, 497 F.2d at 1334. Defendants admit that Plaintiff “can establish . . . commonality as to the legal theories arising from” the arrests. at 5.) (Defs’ Memo Indeed, allegations of false arrest and the use of excessive force form the basis for Plaintiff’s entire Complaint. (See Compl. requirements at of 3-5.) Rule Watson, 20 and thus, has demonstrated satisfied that joinder the is appropriate. III. For CONCLUSION the foregoing Motion to Sever. reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants’ The Court, however, is aware of Defendants’ suggestion that Officer Burrows may suffer prejudice if the case proceeds to trial and Plaintiff’s claims against him are tried simultaneously with (Defs’ Memo at 6.) those against the other three officers.3 Further development of the record must occur before the Court can determine whether that suggestion is well founded. Thus, the Court’s denial of Defendants’ Motion is without prejudice to the filing of a subsequent motion to sever for trial, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b), should Plaintiff’s claims survive any future motions to dismiss or for summary judgment. 3 Defendants argue that, because Plaintiff only accuses Burrows of involvement in the February 20, 2008, incident, he would be prejudiced if the jury considered Plaintiff’s claims against him while also considering the incidents surrounding the October arrest. 8 So ordered this 12th day of April, 2010. s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr. SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 9
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